The Freedom of the Seas

Hugo Grotius

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HVGONIS GROTII MARE LIBERVM SIVE DE IVRE QVOD BATAVISCOMPETIT AD INDICANA COMMERCIA, DISSERTATIO

1608

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace DIVISION OF INTERNATIONALLAW

THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TOTAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE

A DISSERTATION BY HUGO GROTIUS

TRANSLATED WITH A REVISION OF THE LATIN TEXT OF 1633BY RALPH VAN DEMAN MAGOFFIN, PH.D. Associate in Greekand Roman History and Roman Archaeology The Johns HopkinsUniversity

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY JAMES BROWNSCOTT DIRECTOR

NEW YORK OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMERICAN BRANCH: 35 WEST 32ND STREET LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE,AND BOMBAY HUMPHREY MILFORD

1916

COPYRIGHT 1916 BY THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FORINTERNATIONAL PEACE WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE QUINN BODEN CO. PRESS RAHWAY, N. J.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Since the month of August, 1914, the expression “Freedom of the Seas” hasbeen on the lips alike of belligerent and neutral, and it seems as advisable asit is timely to issue—for the first time in English—the famous Latin tractateof Grotius proclaiming, explaining, and in no small measure making the “freedomof the seas.” [1]

The title of the little book, first published, anonymously, in November,1608, explains the reason for its composition: “The Freedom of the Seas, or theRight which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian trade.” It wasan open secret that it was written by the young Dutch scholar and lawyer, HugoGrotius. It was a secret and remained a secret until 1868 that the Mare Liberum was none other than Chapter XII of thetreatise De Jure Praedae, written by Grotius in the winterof 1604–5, which first came to light in 1864 and was given to the world fouryears later. [2]

The publication of the treatise on the law of prize is important as showingthat the author of the Mare Liberum was already anaccomplished international lawyer, and itproves beyond peradventure that the masterpiece of1625 on the “Law of War and Peace” was not a hurried production, but theculmination of study and reflection extending over twenty years and more. Moreimportant still is the fact that neither the law of prize nor the Mare Liberum was a philosophic exercise, for it appearsthat Grotius had been retained by the Dutch East India Company to justify thecapture by one of its ships of a Portuguese galleon in the straits of Malaccain the year 1602; that the treatise on the law of prize, of which the Mare Liberum is a chapter, was in the nature of a brief;and that the first systematic treatise on the law of nations—The Law of War andPeace—was not merely a philosophical disquisition, but that it was the directoutgrowth of an actual case and of professional employment. [1]

The Spaniards, as is well known, then claimed the Pacific Ocean and the Gulfof Mexico, and Portugal claimed, in like manner, the Atlantic south of Moroccoand the Indian Ocean, and both nations, at this time under a common sovereign,claimed and sought to exercise the right of excluding all foreigners fromnavigating or entering these waters. The Dutch, then at war with Spain,although not technically at war with Portugal, established themselves in 1598in the island of Mauritius. Shortly thereafter they made settlements in Javaand in the Moluccas. In 1602 the Dutch East India Company was formed, and, asit attempted to trade with the East Indies, its vessels came into competitionwith those of the Portuguese engaged in the Eastern trade, which sought toexclude them from the Indian waters. One Heemskerck, a captain in the employ ofthe Company, took a large Portuguese galleon in the Straits of Malacca. Totrade with the East Indies was one thing, to capture Portuguese vessels wasquite another thing. Therefore, some members of the Company refused their partsof the prize; others sold their shares in the company, and still others thoughtof establishing a new company in France, under the protection of King Henry IV,which should trade in peace and abstain from all warlike action. The matter wastherefore one of no little importance, and it appears that Grotius wasconsulted and wrote his treatise on the law of prize, which is in the nature ofa brief and is, at any rate, a lawyer’s argument. [1]

In 1608 Spain and Holland began negotiations which, on April 9, 1609,resulted in the truce of Antwerp for the period of 12 years, and, in the courseof the negotiations, Spain tried to secure from the United Provinces arenunciation of their right to trade in the East and West Indies. The DutchEast India Company thereupon, it would appear, requested Grotius to publishthat part of his brief dealing with the freedom of the seas. This was doneunder the title of Mare Liberum, with such changes as werenecessary to enable it to stand alone.

It will be observed that the Mare Liberum was writtento refute the unjustified claims of Spain and Portugal to the high seas and toexclude foreigners therefrom. The claims of England, less extensive but notless unjustifiable, were not mentioned, and yet, if the arguments of Grotiuswere sound, the English claims to the high seas to the south and east ofEngland, as well as to undefined regions to the north and west, would likewisefall to the ground. Therefore the distinguished English lawyer, scholar, andpublicist, John Selden by name, bestirred himself in behalf of his country andwrote his Mare Clausum in 1617 or 1618, although it wasnot published until 1635, to refute the little tractate, MareLiberum. [1] In the dedication to King Charles I,Selden said: “There are among foreign writers, whorashly attribute your Majesty’s more southern and eastern sea to their princes.Nor are there a few, who following chiefly some of the ancient Caesarianlawyers, endeavor to affirm, or beyond reason too easily admit, that all seasare common to the universality of mankind.” The thesis of Selden was twofold:first, “that the sea, by the law of nature or nations, is not common to allmen, but capable of private dominion or property as well as the land”; second,“that the King of Great Britain is lord of the sea flowing about, as aninseparable and perpetual appendant of the British Empire.”

In this battle of books, to use the happy expression of Professor Nys, theDutch Scholar has had the better of his English antagonist. If it cannot besaid that Grotius wears his learning “lightly like a flower”, the treatise ofSelden is, in comparison, over-freighted with it; the MareLiberum is still an open book, the Mare Clausum isindeed a closed one, and as flotsam or jetsam on troubled waters, Chapter XIIof the Law of Prize rides the waves, whereas its rival, heavy and water-logged,has gone under.

In the leading case of The Louis (2 Dodson 210), decided in 1817, some twohundred years after Selden’s book was written, Sir William Scott, later LordStowell and one of Selden’s most distinguished countrymen, said, in rejectingthe claim of his country to the exercise of jurisdiction beyond a marine leaguefrom the British shore:

I have to observe, that two principles of public law are generallyrecognized as fundamental.

One is the perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states.Relative magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility,whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the more powerfulneighbor; and any advantage seized upon that ground is mere usurpation. This isthe great foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the peace ofmankind, both in their politic and private capacities, to preserveinviolate.

The second is, that all nations being equal, all have an equal right to theuninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for theirnavigation. In places where no local authority exists, where the subjects ofall states meet upon a footing of entire equality and independence, no onestate, or any of its subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority overthe subjects of another.

In closing the preface to the Mare Clausum, Selden usedlanguage, which the undersigned quotes, albeit in an inverse sense, as a fitending to this subject:

“Other passages there are everywhere of the same kind. But I enlarge myselftoo much in a thing so manifest. Therefore I forbear to light a candle to thesun. Farewell reader.”

JAMES BROWN SCOTT, Director of theDivision of International Law.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

February 28, 1916.

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

The Latin Text

The Latin Text is based upon the Elzevir edition of 1633, the modificationsbeing only such as to bring the Latin into conformity with the present dayTeubner and Oxford texts.

References in the notes to classic authors are given in unabbreviated form,following in other respects the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae Index. Citations tothe Civil Law are given in the modern notation, which is followed, inparentheses, by the older method of reference. The text used is that ofMommsen, Krueger, Schoell et Kroll. The Canon Law is cited from the Friedbergedition of 1879–81. The abbreviations used are explained below.

The Translation

The translator wishes to make due acknowledgment for the passages fromclassic writers quoted from standard translations, to which references are alsomade in the notes. He has also consulted the French translation of Grotius byA. Guichon de Grandpont (1845). But his chief acknowledgment is to hiscolleague and friend, Professor Kirby Flower Smith of The Johns HopkinsUniversity, to whom he read the translation, and who gave him the benefit ofhis knowledge of Latin and his taste in English, in a number of troublesomepassages. Many niceties of the translation belong to Professor Smith, butmistakes in interpretation belong to the translator alone.

Acknowledgment and thanks are also due to ProfessorWestel Woodbury Willoughby of Johns Hopkins, who hasbeen so good as to read the translation through in galley proof and give thetranslator the benefit of his technical knowledge of law; to Bishop Shahan,Rector of the Catholic University of America, who has given of his time to helpexpand several of Grotius’ abbreviated references to theological or canonicalauthors; and to John Curlett Martin, Johns Hopkins Fellow in Greek, who hasbeen of great assistance in the verification of references.

List of Abbreviations

Auth., Authenticum.

Clem., Constitutiones Clementis Papae Quinti.

Dist., Distinctio Decreti Gratiani.

Extravag., Constitutiones XX D. Ioannis Papae XXII.

Lib. VI, Liber sextus Decretalium D. Bonifacii Papae VIII.

Other abbreviations should offer no difficulties.

Notes of Explanation

The words and phrases in the Latin text in capitals follow the type of theElzevir text.

In order that both text and translation may be complete in themselves, thenotes below the translation follow the notes of the text in shortened orexpanded form, or in duplicate, as the occasion would seem to demand.

[] in the translation, text, or notes, inclose additions made by thetranslator.

CAPITA DISSERTATIONIS HVGONIS GROTII DE MARELIBERO

- Ad Principes populosque liberos orbis Christiani . . . . . . . . PAGINA 1

- CAPVT I. Iure gentiumquibusvis ad quosvis liberam esse navigationem . . . . . . . 7

- II. Lusitanos nullum habere ius dominii ineos Indos ad quos Batavi navigant titulo inventionis . . . . . . . . 11

- III. Lusitanos in Indos non habere iusdominii titulo donationis Pontificiae . . . . . 15

- IV. Lusitanos in Indos non habere iusdominii titulo belli . . . . . . . . . 18

- V. Mare ad Indos aut ius eo navigandi nonesse proprium Lusitanorum titulo occupationis . 22

- VI. Mare aut ius navigandi proprium nonesse Lusitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae . 45

- VII. Mare aut ius navigandi proprium nonesse Lusitanorum titulo praescriptionis aut consuetudinis . . . . . . . 47

- VIII. Iure gentium inter quosvis liberamesse mercaturam . . . . . . . . 61

- IX. Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esseLusitanorum titulo occupationis . . . 65

- X. Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esseLusitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae . 66

- XI. Mercaturam cum Indis non esseLusitanorum propriam iure praescriptionis aut consuetudinis . . . . . . . . 67

- XII. Nulla aequitate niti Lusitanos inprohibendo commercio . . . . . . . 69

- XIII. Batavis ius commercii Indicani, quapace, qua indutiis, qua bello retinendum . . . 72

- Regis Hispaniarum litterae . . . . 77

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Introductory Note . . . . . . PAGE v

- Translator’s Preface . . . . . . xi

- FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

- TO THE RULERS AND TO THE FREE AND INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF CHRISTENDOM . .. . . 1

- CHAPTER I. By the Lawof Nations navigation is free to all persons whatsoever . . . . . 7

- II. The Portuguese have no right by titleof discovery to sovereignty over the East Indies to which the Dutch makevoyages . . 11

- III. The Portuguese have no right ofsovereignty over the East Indies by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation. . . . . 15

- IV. The Portuguese have no right ofsovereignty over the East Indies by title of war . . 18

- V. Neither the Indian Ocean nor the rightof navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of occupation . . . .. . 22

- VI. Neither the Sea nor the right ofnavigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by virtue of title based on thePapal Donation . . 45

- VII. Neither the Sea nor the right ofnavigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of prescription or custom. . . . 47

- VIII. By the Law of Nations trade is freeto all persons whatsoever . . . . . . 61

- IX. Trade with the East Indies does notbelong to the Portuguese by title of occupation . . 65

- X. Trade with the East Indies does notbelong to the Portuguese by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation . . . .. 66

- XI. Trade with the East Indies does notbelong to the Portuguese by title of prescription or custom . . . . . . . . 67

- XII. The Portuguese prohibition of tradehas no foundation in equity . . . . . 69

- XIII. The Dutch must maintain their rightof trade with the East Indies by peace, by treaty, or by war . . . . . . . . 72

- Appendix: Two letters of Philip III, King of Spain . . . . . . . . 77

AD PRINCIPES POPVLOSQVE LIBEROS ORBISCHRISTIANI

Error est non minus vetus quam pestilens, quo multi mortales, ii autemmaxime qui plurimum vi atque opibus valent, persuadent sibi, aut, quod veriusputo, persuadere conantur, iustum atque iniustum non suapte natura, sed hominuminani quadam opinione atque consuetudine distingui. Itaque illi et leges etaequitatis speciem in hoc inventa existimant, ut eorum qui in parendicondicione nati sunt dissensiones atque tumultus coerceantur; ipsis vero qui insumma fortuna sunt collocati, ius omne aiunt ex voluntate, voluntatem exutilitate metiendam. Hanc autem sententiam absurdam plane atque naturaecontrariam auctoritatis sibi nonnihil conciliasse haud adeo mirum est, cum admorbum communem humani generis, quo sicut vitia ita vitiorum patrociniasectamur, accesserint adulantium artes quibus omnis potestas obnoxia est.

Sed contra exstiterunt nullo non saeculo viri liberi, sapientes, religiosi,qui falsam hanc persuasionem animis simplicium evellerent ceteros autem eiusdefensores impudentiae convincerent. Deum quippe esse monstrabant conditoremrectoremque universi, imprimis autem humanae naturae parentem, quam ideo, nonuti cetera animantia, in species diversas, variaque discrimina segregasset, sedunius esse generis, una etiam appellatione voluisset contineri,dedisset insuper originem eandem, similem membrorumcompagem, vultus inter se obversos, sermonem quoque et alia communicandiinstrumenta, ut intelligerent omnes naturalem inter se societatem esse atquecognationem. Huic autem a se fundatae aut domui aut civitati summum illumprincipem patremque familias suas quasdam scripsisse leges, non in aere auttabulis, sed in sensibus animisque singulorum, ubi invitis etiam etaversantibus legendae occurrent his legibus summos pariter atque infimosteneri, in has non plus regibus licere, quam plebi adversus decreta decurionum,decurionibus contra praesidium edicta, praesidibus in regum ipsorum sanctiones.Quin illa ipsa populorum atque urbium singularum iura ex illo fonte dimanare,inde sanctimoniam suam atque maiestatem accipere.

Sicut autem in ipso homine alia sunt quae habet cum omnibus communia, aliaquibus ab altero quisque distinguitur, ita earum rerum quas in usum hominisproduxisset natura alias eam manere communes, alias cuiusque industria aclabore proprias fieri voluisse, de utrisque autem datas leges, ut communibusquidem sine detrimento omnium omnes uterentur, de ceteris autem quod cuiquecontigisset eo contentus abstineret alieno.

Haec si homo nullus nescire potest nisi homo esse desierit, hac si gentesviderunt quibus ad verum omne caecutientibus sola naturae fax illuxit, quid vossentire ac facere aequum est, principes populique Christiani?

Si quis durum putat ea a se exigi quae tam sancti nominis professiorequirit, cuius minimum est ab iniuriis abstinere, certe quid sui sit officiscire quisque potest ex eo quod alteri praecipit. Nemo est vestrum qui nonpalam edicat rei quemque suae esse moderatorem et arbitrum: qui non fluminibuslocisque publicis cives omnes uti ex aequo et promiscue iubeat, qui noncommeandi commercandique libertatem omni ope defendat.

Sine his si parva illa societas, quam rempublicam vocamus, constare nonposse iudicatur (et certe constare non potest) quamobrem non eadem illa adsustinendam totius humani generis societatem atque concordiam erunt necessaria?Si quis adversus haec vim faciat, merito indignamini, exempla etiam pro flagitimagnitudine statuitis, non alia de causa nisi quia ubi ista passim licentstatus imperi tranquillus esse non potest. Quod si rex in regem, populus inpopulum inique et violente agat, id nonne ad perturbandam magnae illiuscivitatis quietem et ad summi custodis spectat iniuriam? Hoc interest, quodsicut magistratus minores de vulgo iudicant, vos de magistratibus, ita omniumaliorum delicta cognoscenda vobis et punienda mandavit rex universi, vestraexcepit sibi. Is autem quamquam supremam animadversionem sibi reservat, tardam,occultam, inevitabilem, nihilominus duos a se iudices delegat qui rebus humanisintersint, quos nocentium felicissimus non effugit, conscientiam cuique suam,et famam sive existimationemalienam. Haec tribunalia illis patent quibus aliapraeclusa sunt; ad haec infirmi provocant; in his vincuntur qui vincuntviribus, qui licentiae modum non statuunt, qui vili putant constare quod emiturhumano sanguine, qui iniurias iniuriis defendunt, quorum manifesta facinoranecesse est et consentiente bonorum iudicio damnari, et sui ipsorum animisententia non absolvi.

Ad utrumque hoc forum nos quoque novam causam afferimus; non hercule destillicidiis aut tigno iniuncto, quales esse privatorum solent, ac ne ex eoquidem genere quod frequens est inter populos, de agri iure in confiniohaerentis, de amnis aut insulae possessione; sed de omni prope oceano, de iurenavigandi, de libertate commerciorum. Inter nos et Hispanos haec controversasunt: Sitne immensum et vastum mare regni unius nec maximi accessio; populonecuiquam ius sit volentes populos prohibere ne vendant, ne permutent, ne deniquecommeent inter sese; potuerit ne quisquam quod suum numquam fuit elargiri, autinvenire quod iam erat alienum; an ius aliquod tribuat manifesta longi temporisiniuria.

In hac disceptatione ipsis qui inter Hispanos praecipui sunt divini atquehumani iuris magistri calculum porrigimus, ipsius denique Hispaniae propriasleges imploramus. Id si nihil iuvat, et eos quos ratio certa convincitcupiditas vetat desistere, vestram principes maiestatem, vestram fidem quotquotestis ubique gentes appellamus.

Non perplexam, non intricatam movemus quaestionem. Non de ambiguis inreligione capitibus, quae plurimumhabere videntur obscuritatis, quae tantis tam diuanimis decertata, apud sapientes hoc fere certum reliquerunt, nusquam minusinveniri veritatem quam ubi cogitur assensus. Non de statu nostrae reipublicae,et libertate armis haud parta sed vindicata; de qua recte statuere ii demumpossunt qui iura patria Belgarum, mores avitos, et institutum non in legesregnum, sed ex legibus principatum accurate cognoverint, in qua tamenquaestione aequis iudicibus extremae servitutis depulsa necessitas, subtiliusinquirentibus decreti tot nationum publica auctoritas, infensis etiam etmalevolis adversariorum confessio nihil dubitandum reliquit.

Sed quod hic proponimus nihil cum istis commune habet, nullius indigetanxiae disquisitionis, non ex divini codicis pendet explicatione, cuius multamulti non capiunt, non ex unius populi scitis quae ceteri merito ignorant.

Lex illa e cuius praescripto iudicandum est, inventu est non difficilis,utpote eadem apud omnes; et facilis intellectu, utpote nata cum singulis,singulorum mentibus insita. Ius autem quod petimus tale est quod nec rexsubditis negare debeat, neque Christianus non Christianis. A natura enimoritur, quae ex aequo omnium parens est, in omnes munifica, cuius imperium ineos extenditur qui gentibus imperant, et apud eos sanctissimum est qui inpietate plurimum profecerunt.

Cognoscite hanc causam principes! cognoscite populi! si quid iniquumpostulamus, scitis quae vestra et e vobis eorum qui viciniores nobis estis apudnos semper fuerit auctoritas!Monete, parebimus. Quin si quid a nobis hac in repeccatum est, iram vestram, odium denique humani generis non deprecamur. Sincontra se res habet, quid vobis censendum, quid agendum sit, vestrae religioniet aequitati relinquimus.

Olim inter populos humaniores summum nefas habebatur armis eos impetere quires suas arbitris permitterent, contra qui tam aequam condicionem recusarent,ii non ut unius sed ut omnium hostes ope communi comprimebantur. Itaque eam inrem videmus icta foedera, iudices constitutos. Reges ipsi validaeque gentesnihil aeque gloriosum ac magnificum deputabant, quam aliorum coercereinsolentiam, aliorum infirmitatem atque innocentiam sublevare. Qui si moshodieque obtineret, ut humani nihil a se alienum homines arbitrarentur,profecto orbe non paulo pacatiore uteremur; refrigesceret enim multorumaudacia, et qui iustitiam utilitatis causa nunc negligunt, iniustitiam damnosuo dediscerent.

Sed hoc ut in causa istac non frustra forte speramus, ita illud certoconfidimus, bene rebus expensis existimaturos vos omnes imputari nobis nonmagis posse pacis moras, quam belli causas; ac proinde uti hactenus amici nobisfaventes atque benevoli fuistis, ita vos aut etiam magis in posterum fore, quonihil optatius iis potest contingere qui primam partem felicitatis putant benefacere, alteram bene audire.

CAPVT I: Iure gentium quibusvis ad quosvisliberam esse navigationem

Propositum est nobis breviter ac dilucide demonstrare ius esse Batavis, hocest, Ordinum Foederatorum Belgico-Germaniae subditis ad Indos, ita uti navigantnavigare, cumque ipsis commercia colere. Fundamentum struemus hanc iurisgentium, quod primarium vocant regulam certissimam, cuius perspicua atqueimmutabilis est ratio; licere cuivis genti quamvis alteram adire, cumque eanegotiari.

Deus hoc ipse naturam loquitur, cum ea cuncta quibus vita indiget, omnibuslocis suppeditari a natura non vult: artibus etiam aliis alias gentes datexcellere. Quo ista, nisi quod voluit mutua egestate et copia humanas foveriamicitias, ne singuli se putantes sibi ipsis sufficere, hoc ipso redderenturinsociabiles? Nunc factum est ut gens altera alterius suppleret inopiam,divinae iustitiae instituto, ut eo modo (sicut Plinius dicit [1] ) quod genitum esset uspiam, apud omnes natum videretur. Poetas itaquecanentes audimus:

- Nec vero terrae ferre omnes omnia possunt. [2]

Item:

Excudent alii,

et quae sequuntur. [3] Hoc igitur qui tollunt, illam laudatissimam tollunthumani generis societatem, tollunt mutuas benefaciendi occasiones, naturamdenique ipsam violant. Nam et ille quem Deus terris circumfudit Oceanus,undique et undique versus navigabilis, et ventorum stati aut extraordinariiflatus, non ab eadem semper, et a nulla non aliquando regione spirantes, nonnesignificant satis concessum a natura cunctis gentibus ad cunctas aditum? HocSeneca [1] summum Naturae beneficium putat, quod et vento gentes locis dissipatasmiscuit, et sua omnia in regiones ita descripsit, ut necessarium mortalibusesset inter ipsos commercium. Hoc igitur ius ad cunctas gentes aequaliterpertinet: quod clarissimi Iurisconsulti [2] eo usque producunt, ut negent ullam rempublicam aut Principem prohiberein universum posse, quo minus alii ad subditos suos accedant, et cum illisnegotientur. Hinc ius descendit hospitale sanctissimum: hinc querelae:

- Quod genus hoc hominum? quaeve hunc tam

- barbara morem

- Permittit patria? hospitio prohibemur harenae. [3]

Et alibi

- . . . . . litusque rogamus

- Innocuum et cunctis undamque auramque patentem. [4]

Et scimus bella quaedam ex hac causa coepisse, ut Megarensibusin Athenienses, [1] Bononiensibus in Venetos, [2] Castellanis etiam in Americanos has iustas potuisse belli causas esse,et ceteris probabiliores Victoria putat, [3] si peregrinari et degere apud illos prohiberentur, si arcerentur aparticipatione earum rerum quae iure gentium aut moribus communia sunt, sidenique ad commercia non admitterentur.

Cui simile est quod in Mosis [4] historia et inde apud Augustinum legimus, [5] iusta bella Israelitas contra Amorrhaeos gessisse, quia innoxiustransitus denegabatur; qui IVRE HVMANAE SOCIETATIS aequissimo patere debebat.Et hoc nomine Hercules Orchomeniorum, Graeci sub Agamemnone Mysorum Regi armaintulerunt, [6] quasi libera essent naturaliter itinera, ut Baldus dixit. [7] Accusanturquea Germanis apud Tacitum [1] Romani, quod colloquia congressusque gentium arcerent, fluminaque etterras et coelum quodam modo ipsum clauderent. Nec ullus titulus Christianisquondam in Saracenos magis placuit, quam quod per illos terrae Iudaeae adituarcerentur. [2]

Sequitur ex sententia Lusitanos etiamsi domini essent earum regionum ad quasBatavi proficiscuntur, iniuriam tamen facturos si aditum Batavis et mercatumpraecluderent.

Quanto igitur iniquius est volentes aliquos a volentium populorum commerciosecludi, illorum opera quorum in potestate nec populi isti sunt, nec illudipsum, qua iter est, quando latrones etiam et piratas non alio magis nominedetestamur, quam quod illi hominum inter se commeatus obsident atqueinfestant?

CAPVT II: Lusitanos nullum habere ius dominii ineos Indos ad quos Batavi navigant titulo inventionis

Non esse autem Lusitanos earum partium dominos ad quas Batavi accedunt, putaIavae, Taprobanae, partis maximae Moluccarum, certissimo argumento colligimus,quia dominus nemo est eius rei quam nec ipse umquam nec alter ipsius nominepossedit. Habent insulae istae quas dicimus et semper habuerunt suos reges,suam rempublican, suas leges, sua iura; Lusitanis mercatus, ut aliis gentibusconceditur; itaque et tributa cum pendunt, et ius mercandi a principibusexorant, dominos se non esse, sed ut externos advenire satis testantur; nehabitant quidem nisi precario. Et quamquam ad dominium titulus non sufficiat,quia et possessio requiritur, cum aliud sit rem habere, aliud ius ad remconsequendam, tamen ne titulum quidem dominii in eas partes Lusitanis ullumesse affirmo, quem non ipsis eripuerit Doctorum, et quidem Hispanorumsententia.

Primum si dicent inventionis praemio eas terras sibi cessisse, nec ius, necverum dicent. Invenire enim non illud est oculis usurpare, sed apprehendere, utGordiani epistolaostenditur; [1] unde Grammatici [2] invenire et occupare pro verbis ponunt idem significantibus; et totaLatinitas quod adepti sumus, id demum invenisse [3] nos dicit, cui oppositum est perdere. Quin et ipsa naturalis ratio, etlegum diserta verba, et eruditiorum interpretatio [4] manifeste ostendit, ad titulum dominii parandum eam demum sufficereinventionem quae cum possessione coniuncta est, ubi scilicet res mobilesapprehenduntur, aut immobiles terminis atque custodia sepiuntur; [5] quod in hac specie dici nullo modo potest. Nam presidia illuc Lusitaninulla habent. Quid quod ne reperisse quidem Indiam ullo modo dici possuntLusitani, quae tot a saeculis fuerat celeberrima. Iam ab Horati tempore: [6]

- Impiger extremos currit mercator ad Indos

- Per mare pauperiem fugiens.

Taprobanes pleraque quam exacte nobis Romani descripsere? [7] Iam vero et ceteras insulas ante Lusitanos nonfinitimi tantum Persae et Arabes, sed Europaei etiam,praecipue Veneti noverant.

Praeterea inventio nihil iuris tribuit, nisi in ea quae ante inventionemnullius fuerant. [1] Atqui Indi cum ad eos Lusitani venerunt, etsi partim idololatrae,partim Mahumetani erant, gravibusque peccatis involuti nihilominus publiceatque privatim rerum possessionumque suarum dominium habuerunt, quod illis sineiusta causa eripi non potuit. [2] Ita certissimis rationibus post alios auctores maximi nominis concluditHispanus Victoria: [3] ‘Non possunt’, inquit, ‘Christiani saeculares aut Ecclesiasticipotestate civili et principatu privare infideles, eo dumtaxat titulo, quiainfideles sunt, nisi ab eis alia iniuria profecta sit’.

Fides enim, ut recte inquit Thomas [4] non tollit ius naturale aut humanum ex eo dominia profecta sunt. Immocredere infideles non esse rerum suarum dominos, haereticum est; et res abillis possessas illis ob hoc ipsum eripere furtum est et rapina, non minus quamsi idem fiat Christianis.

Recte igitur dicit Victoria [5] non magis ista ex causa Hispanis ius in Indos quaesitum, quam Indisfuisset in Hispanos, si qui illorum priores in Hispaniam venissent. Neque verosunt Indi Orientis amentes et insensati, sedingeniosi et solertes, ita ut ne hinc quidempraetextus subiciendi possit desumi, qui tamen per se satis est manifestaeiniquitatis. Iam olim Plutarchus πρόφασιν πλεονεξίας fuisse dicitἡμερω̄σαι τὰ βαρβαριϰὰ, improbam scilicet alieni cupiditatem hoc sibivelum obtendere, quod barbariem mansuefacit. Et nunc etiam color ille redigendiinvitas gentes ad mores humaniores, qui Graecis olim et Alexandro usurpatusest, a Theologis omnibus, praesertim Hispanis, [1] improbus, atque impius censetur.

CAPVT III: Lusitanos in Indos non habere iusdominii titulo donationis Pontificiae

Secundo si Pontificis Alexandri Sexti divisione utentur, ante omnia illudattendendum est, volueritne Pontifex contentiones tantum Lusitanorum etCastellanorum dirimere, quod potuit sane, ut lectus inter illos arbiter, sicutet ipsi Reges iam ante inter se ea de re foedera quaedam pepigerant; [1] et hoc si ita est, cum res inter alios acta sit, ad ceteras gentes nonpertinebit; an vero prope singulos mundi trientes duobus populis donare. Quodetsi voluisset, et potuisset Pontifex, non tamen continuo sequeretur dominoseorum locorum esse Lusitanos, cum donatio dominum non faciat, sed secutatraditio; [2] quare et huic causae possessio deberet accedere.

Tum vero si quis ius ipsum sive divinum sive humanum scrutari volet, nonautem ex commodo suo metiri, faciledeprehendet donationem eiusmodo ut rei alienaenullius esse momenti. Disputationem de potestate Pontificis, hoc est EpiscopiRomanae Ecclesiae, hic non aggrediar, nec quicquam ponam nisi ex hypothesi, hocest, quod confitentur homines inter eos eruditissimi, qui plurimum Pontificiaetribuunt auctoritati, maxime Hispani, qui cum pro sua perspicacia facile videntDominum Christum omne a se terrenum imperium abdicasse, [1] mundi certe totius dominium, qua homo fuit, non habuisse, et sihabuisset, nullis tamen argumentis astrui posse ius illud in Petrum, autRomanam Ecclesiam Vicarii iure translatum; cum alias etiam certum sit, multaChristum habuisse in quae Pontifex non successerit, [2] intrepide affirmarunt (utar ipsorum verbis) Pontificem non esse dominumcivilem aut temporalem totius orbis. [3] Immo etiam si quam talem potestatem in mundo haberet, eam tamen nonrecte exerciturum, cum spirituali sua iurisdictione contentus esse debeat,saecularibus autem Principibus eam concedere nullo modo posse. Tum vero si quamhabeat potestatem, eam habere, ut loquuntur in ordine ad spiritualia. [4] Quocirca nullam illi esse potestatem in populos infideles, ut qui adEcclesiam non pertineant. [5]

Vnde sequitur ex sententia Caietani et Victoriae etpotioris partis tam Theologorum quam Canonistarum, [1] non esse idoneum titulum adversus Indos, vel quia Papa dederitprovincias illas tamquam dominus absolute, vel quia non recognoscunt dominiumPapae; atque adeo ne Saracenos quidem isto titulo umquam spoliatos.

CAPVT IV: Lusitanos in Indos non habere iusdominii titulo belli

His igitur sublatis cum manifestum sit, quod et Victoria scribit, [1] Hispanos ad terras remotiores illas navigantes nullum ius secumattulisse occupandi eas provincias, unus dumtaxat titulus belli restat, qui etipse si iustus esset, tamen ad dominium proficere non posset, nisi iurepraedae, hoc est post occupationem. Atqui tantum abest ut Lusitani eas resoccupaverint, ut cum plerisque gentibus quas Batavi accesserunt, bellum eotempore nullum haberent. Et sic igitur nullum ius illis quaeri potuit, cumetiam si quas ab Indis pertulissent iniurias, eas longa pace et amiciscommerciis remisisse merito censeantur.

Quamquam ne fuit quidem quod bello obtenderent. Nam qui Barbaros bellopersequuntur ut Americanos Hispani, duo solent praetexere, quod ab illiscommercio arceantur, aut quod doctrinam verae religionis illi nolent agnoscere.Et commercia quidem Lusitani ab Indis impetrarunt, [2] ut hac in parte nihil habeant quod querantur.Alter vero obtentus nihilo est iustior, quam illeGraecorum in Barbaros, quo Boëthius respexit: [1]

- An distant quia dissidentque mores,

- Iniustas acies, et fera bella movent,

- Alternisque volunt perire telis?

- Non est iusta satis saevitiae ratio.

Ista autem et Thomae et Concili Toletani et Gregori etTheologorum, Canonistarum, Iurisprudentiumque fere omnium conclusio est: [2] Quantumcumque fides annuntiata sit Barbaris (nam de his qui subditiante fuerunt Christianis Principibus item de Apostatis alia est quaestio)probabiliter et sufficienter, et si noluerint eam respicere, non tamen licerehac ratione eos bello persequi, et spoliare bonis suis. [3]

Operae pretium est in hanc rem ipsa Caietani verba describere: [4] ‘Quidam’, ait, ‘infideles nec de iure nec de facto subsunt secundumtemporalem iurisdictionem Principibus Christianis, ut inveniuntur pagani, quinumquam imperio Romano subditi fuerunt, terras habitantes, in quibusChristianum numquam fuit nomen. Horum namque domini, quamvis infideles,legitimi domini sunt, sive regali sive politico regimine gubernantur; nec suntpropter infidelitatem a dominio suorum privati, cum dominium sitex iure positivo, et infidelitas ex divino iure, quodnon tollit ius positivum, ut superius in quaestione habitum est. Et de hisnullam scio legem quoad temporalia. Contra hos nullus Rex, nullus Imperator,nec Ecclesia Romana potest movere bellum ad occupandas terras eorum, autsubiciendos illos temporaliter; quia nulla subest causa iusta belli, cum IesusChristus Rex Regum, cui data est potestas in caelo et in terra, miserit adcapiendam possessionem mundi, non milites armatae militiae, sed sanctospraedicatores, sicut oves inter lupos. Vnde nec in testamento veteri, ubiarmata manu possessio erat capienda, terrae infidelium inductum lego bellumalicui propter hoc quod non erant fideles, sed quia nolebant dare transitum,vel quia eos offenderant, ut Madianitae, vel ut recuperarent sua, divinalargitate sibi concessa. Vnde GRAVISSIME PECCAREMVS, si fidem Christi Iesu perhanc viam ampliare contenderemus; nec essemus LEGITIMI DOMINI illorum, sedMAGNA LATROCINIA committeremus, et teneremur ad restitutionem, utpote INIVSTIDEBELLATORES AVT OCCVPATORES. Mittendi essent ad hos praedicatores boni viri,qui verbo et exemplo converterent eos ad Deum; et non qui eos opprimant,spolient, scandalizent, subiciant, et duplo gehennae filios faciant, morePharisaeorum’.

Et in hanc formam audimus saepe a Senatu in Hispania, et Theologis praecipueDominicanis decretum fuisse, sola verbi praedicatione non bello Americanos adfidem traducendos; libertatem etiam quae illis eo nomine erepta esset,restitui debere, quod a Paulo tertio Pontifice, etCarolo V Imperatore Hispaniarum Rege comprobatum dicitur.

Omittimus iam Lusitanos in plerisque partibus religionem nihil promovere, neoperam quidem dare, cum soli lucro invigilent. Immo et illud ibi verum esse,quod de Hispanis in America Hispanus scripsit, non miracula, non signa audiri,non exempla vitae religiosae, quae ad eandem fidem alios possent impellere, sedmulta scandala, multa facinora, multas impietates.

Quare cum et possessio et titulus deficiat possessionis, neque resdicionesque Indorum pro talibus haberi debeant quasi nullius ante fuissent,neque cum illorum essent, ab aliis recte acquiri potuerint, sequitur Indorumpopulos, de quibus nos loquimur, Lusitanorum proprios non esse, sed liberos, etsui iuris; de quo ipsi doctores Hispani non dubitant. [1]

CAPVT V: Mare ad Indos aut ius eo navigandi nonesse proprium Lusitanorum titulo occupationis

Si ergo in populos terrasque et diciones Lusitani ius nullum quaesiverunt,videamus an mare et navigationem, aut mercaturam sui iuris facere potuerint. Demari autem prima sit consideratio, quod cum passim in iure aut nullius, autcommune, aut publicum iuris gentium dicatur, hae voces quid significent itacommodissime explicabitur, si Poetas ab Hesiodo omnes, et Philosophos; etIurisconsultos veteres imitati in tempora distinguamus, ea, quae tempore fortehaud longo, certa tamen ratione, et sui natura discreta sunt. Neque nobis vitioverti debet si in iuris a natura procedentis explicatione auctoritate et verbiseorum utimur quos constat naturali iudicio plurimum valuisse.

Sciendum est igitur in primordiis vitae humanae aliud quam nunc estdominium, aluid communionem fuisse. [1] Nam dominium nunc proprium quid significat, quod scilicet ita estalicuius ut alterius non sit eodem modo. Commune autem dicimus, cuiusproprietas inter plures consortioquodam aut consensu collata est exclusis aliis.Linguarum paupertas coegit voces easdem in re non eadem usurpare. Et sic istanostri moris nomina ad ius illud pristinum similitudine quadam et imaginereferuntur. Commune igitur tunc non aliud fuit quam quod simpliciter proprioopponitur; dominium autem facultas non iniusta utendi re communi, quem usumScholasticis [1] visum est facti non iuris vocare, quia qui nunc in iure usus vocatur,proprium est quiddam, aut ut illorum more loquar, privative ad aliosdicitur.

Iure primo Gentium, quod et Naturale interdum dicitur, et quod poetae alibiaetate aurea, alibi Saturni aut Iustitiae regno depingunt, nihil proprium fuit;quod Cicero dixit: ‘Sunt autem privata nulla natura’. Et Horatius: [2]

- Nam PROPRIAE telluris ERVM NATVRA neque illum

- Nec me nec quemquam statuit.

Neque enim potuit natura dominos distinguere. Hoc igitursignificatu res omnes eo tempore communes fuisse dicimus, idem innuentes quodpoetae cum primos homines in medium quaesivisse, et Iustitiam casto foedere resmedias tenuisse dicunt; quod ut clarius explicent, negant ea tempore camposlimite partitos, aut commercia fuisse ulla.

- . . . . promiscua rura per agros

- Praestiterant cunctis COMMVNIA cuncta VIDERI. [3]

Recte additum est ‘videri’ propter translationem ut diximusvocabuli. Communio autem ista ad usum referebatur: [1]

- . . . . pervium cunctis iter,

- COMMVNIS VSVS omnium rerum fuit.

Cuius ratione dominium quoddam erat, sed universale, etindefinitum; Deus enim res omnes non huic aut illi dederat, sed humano generi,atque eo modo plures in solidum eiusdem rei domini esse non prohibebantur; quodsi hodierna significatione sumamus dominium, contra omnem est rationem. Hocenim proprietatem includit, quae tunc erat penes neminem. Aptissime autem illuddictum est: [2]

- omnia rerum

- Vsurpantis erant,

Ad eam vero, quae nunc est, dominiorum distinctionem non impetu quodam, sedpaulatim ventum videtur, initium eius monstrante natura. Cum enim res sintnonnullae, quarum usus in abusu consistit, aut quia conversae in substantiamutentis nullum postea usum admittunt, aut quia utendo fiunt ad usum deteriores,in rebus prioris generis, ut cibo et potu, proprietas statim quaedam ab usu nonseiuncta emicuit. [3] Hoc enim est proprium esse, ita esse cuiusquam ut et alterius esse nonpossit; quod deinde ad res posterioris generis, vestes puta, et res mobilesalias aut se moventes ratione quadam productum est.

Quod cum esset, ne res quidem immobiles omnes, agriputa, indivisae manere potuerunt; quamquam enim horumusus non simpliciter in abusu consistat, eorum tamen usus abusus cuiusdam causacomparatus est, ut arva et arbusta cibi causa, pascua etiam vestium; omniumautem usibus promiscue sufficere non possunt. Repertae proprietati lex positaest, quae naturam imitaretur. Sicut enim initio per applicationem corporalemusus ille habebatur, unde proprietatem primum ortam diximus, ita similiapplicatione res proprias cuiusque fieri placuit. Haec est quae dicituroccupatio, voce accommodatissima ad eas res quae ante in medio positae fuerant;quo Seneca Tragicus alludit: [1]

- IN MEDIO est scelus

- POSITVM OCCVPANTI.

Et Philosophus: [2] ‘Equestria OMNIVM equitum Romanorum sunt. In illis tamen locus meus fitPROPRIVS, quem OCCVPAVI’. Hinc Quintilianus dicit, [3] quod omnibus nascitur, industriae esse praemium; et Tullius, [4] factas esse veteri occupatione res eorum qui quondam in vacuavenerant.

Occupatio autem haec in his rebus quae possessioni renituntur, ut sunt feraebestiae, perpetua esse debet, in aliis sufficit, corpore coeptam possessionemanimo retineri. Occupatio in mobilibus est apprehensio, in immobilibusinstructio aut limitatio; unde Hermogenianus cumdominia distincta dicit, addit, agris terminos positos, aedificia collocata. [1] Hic rerum status a poetis indicatur:

- Tum laqueis captare feras, et fallere visco Inventum.

- Tum primum subiere domos. [2]

- COMMVNEMQVE PRIVS, ceu lumina solis et auras

- Cautus humum longo signavit LIMITE mensor. [3]

Celebratur post haec; ut Hermogenianus indicat, commercium cuiusgratia

Fluctibus ignotis insultavere carinae. [4]

Eodem autem tempore et respublicae institui coeperunt. Atque ita earum quaea prima communione divulsa erant duo facta sunt genera. Alia enim sunt publica,hoc est, populi propria (quae est genuina istius vocis significatio) alia mereprivata, hoc est, singulorum. Occupatio autem publica eodem modo sit, quoprivata. Seneca: [5] ‘Fines Atheniensium, aut Campanorum vocamus, quos deinde inter sevicini privata terminatione distinguunt’. Gens enim unaquaeque

PARTITA FINES regna constituit, novas Extruxit VRBES. [1]

Hoc modo dicit Cicero agrum Arpinatem Arpinatum dici, TusculanumTusculanorum: ‘similisque est’, inquit, ‘privatarum possessionum descriptio. Exquo quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae naturae fuerant COMMVNIA, quod cuiqueobtigit, id quisque teneat’. [2] Contra autem Thucydides [3] eam terram quae in divisione populo nulli obvenit, αόριστον, hoc est,indefinitam, et limitibus nullis circumscriptam vocat. [4]

Ex his quae hactenus dicta sunt duo intelligi possunt. Prius est, eas resquae occupari non possunt, aut occupatae numquam sunt, nullius proprias esseposse; quia omnis proprietas ab occupatione coeperit. Alterum vero, eas resomnes, quae ita a natura comparatae sunt, ut aliquo utente nihilominus aliisquibusvis ad usum promiscue sufficiant, eius hodieque condicionis esse, etperpetuo esse debere cuius fuerant cum primum a natura proditae sunt. HocCicero voluit: [5] ‘Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter omnibus ipsos, inter omnessocietas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum naturagenuit, est servanda communitas’. Sunt autem omnes res huius generis, in quibussine detrimento alterius alteri commodari potest. Hinc illud esse dicit Cicero: [6] ‘Non prohibere aqua profluente’. Nam aqua profluens qua talis non quaflumenest, inter communia omnium a Iurisconsultis refertur:et a Poeta: [1]

- Quid prohibetis AQV AS? VSVS COMMVNIS aquarum est.

- Nec solem PROPRIVM NATVRA nec AERA fecit,

- Nec tenues VNDAS: in PVBLICA munera veni.

Dicit haec non esse natura propria, sicut Vlpianus [2] natura omnibus patere, tum quia primum a natura prodita sunt, et innullius adhuc dominium pervenerunt (ut loquitur Neratius [3] ); tum quia ut Cicero dicit, a natura ad usum communem genita videntur.Publica autem vocat tralatitia significatione, non quae ad populum aliquem, sedquae ad societatem humanam pertinent, quae publica Iuris gentium in Legibusvocantur, hoc est, communia omnium, propria nullius.

Huius generis est Aër, duplici ratione, tum quia occupari non potest, tumquia usum promiscuum hominibus debet. Et eisdem de causis commune est omniumMaris Elementum, infinitum scilicet ita, ut possideri non queat, et omniumusibus accommodatum: sive navigationem respicimus, sive etiam piscaturam. Cuiusautem iuris est mare, eiusdem sunt si qua mare aliis usibus eripiendo suafecit, ut arenae maris, quarum pars terris continua litus dicitur. [4] Recte igitur Cicero: [5] ‘quid tam COMMVNE quam Mare fluctuantibus,LITVS eiectis’? Etiam Vergilius auram, undam, lituscunctis patere dicit.

Haec igitur sunt illa quae Romani vocant communia omnium iure naturali [1] aut quod idem esse diximus, publica iurisgentium, sicut et usum eorummodo communem, modo publicum vocant. Quamquam vero etiam ea nullius esse, quodad proprietatem attinet, recte dicantur, multum tamen differunt ab his quaenullius sunt, et communi usui attributa non sunt, ut ferae, pisces, aves; namista si quis occupet, in ius proprium transire possunt, illa vero totiushumanitatis consensu proprietati in perpetuum excepta sunt propter usum, quicum sit omnium, non magis omnibus ab uno eripi potest, quam a te mihi quod meumest. Hoc est quod Cicero dicit inter prima esse Iustitiae munera, rebuscommunibus pro communibus uti. Scholastici dicerent esse communia aliaaffirmative, alia privative. Distinctio haec non modo Iurisprudentibus usitataest, sed vulgi etiam confessionem exprimit; unde apud Athenaeum convivator marecommune esse dicit, at pisces capientium fieri. Et in Plautina Rudente servodicenti, [2] ‘Mare quidem commune certost omnibus’, assentit piscator, addentiautem, ‘In mari inventust communi’ recte occurrit:

Meum quod rete atque hami nancti sunt, meum potissimumst.

Mare igitur proprium omnino alicuius fieri non potest, quia natura communehoc esse non permittit, sed iubet, immo ne litus quidem; [1] nisi quod haec addenda est interpretatio; ut si quid earum rerum pernaturam occupari possit, id eatenus occupantis fiat, quatenus ea occupationeusus ille promiscuus non laeditur. Quod merito receptum est; nam cum ita sehabet, cessat utraque exceptio per quam evenisse diximus, ne omnia in eiusproprium transcriberentur.

Quoniam igitur inaedificatio species est occupationis, in litore licetaedificare, si id fieri potest sine ceterorum incommodo, [2] ut Pomponius loquitur, quod ex Scaevola explicabimus, nisi ususpublicus, hoc est communis impediretur. Et qui aedificaverit, soli dominusfiet, quia id solum nec ullius proprium, nec ad usum communem necessarium fuit.Est igitur occupantis; sed non diutius quam durat occupatio, quia reluctarimare possessioni videtur, exemplo ferae, quae si in naturalem se libertatemreceperit, non ultra captoris est, ita et litus postliminio mari cedit.

Quicquid autem privatum fieri occupando, idem et publicum, hoc est populiproprium posse ostendimus. [3] Sic litus Imperi Romani finibus inclusum, populi Romani esse Celsusexistimat; quod si ita est, minime mirandum est,eundem Populum subditis suis occupandi litoris modum per Principem autPraetorem potuisse concedere. Ceterum et haec occupatio non minus quam privataita restringenda est, ne ulterius porrigatur, quam ut salvus sit ususIurisgentium. Nemo igitur potest a Populo Romano [1] ad litus maris accedere prohiberi, et retia siccare, et alia facere,quae semel omnes homines in perpetuum sibi licere voluerunt.

Maris autem natura hoc differt a litore, quod mare nisi exigua sui parte necinaedificari facile, nec includi potest; et ut posset, hoc ipsum tamen vixcontingeret, sine usus promiscui impedimento. Si quid tamen exiguum itaoccupari potest, id occupanti conceditur. Hyperbole est igitur [2]

- Contracta pisces aequora sentiunt

- Iactis in altum molibus.

Nam Celsus iactas in mare pilas eius esse dicit qui iecerit. [3] Sed id non concedendum si deterior maris usus eo modo futurus sit. EtVlpianus eum qui molem in mare iacit, ita tuendum dicit si nemo damnum sentiat.Nam si cui haec res nocitura sit, interdictum utique, ‘Ne quid in loco publicofiat’ competiturum. Vt et Labeo, si quid tale in mare struatur, interdictumvult competere, ‘Ne quid in mari, quo portus, statio, iterve navigiis deteriussit, fiat’. [4]

Quae autem navigationis eadem piscatus habenda est ratio, ut communis maneatomnibus. Neque tamen peccabit si quis in maris diverticulo piscandi locum sibipalis circumsepiat, atque ita privatum faciat; sicut Lucullus exciso apudNeapolim monte ad villam suam maria admisit. [1] Et huius generis, puto fuisse piscinas maritimas quarum Varro etColumella meminerunt. Nec Martialis alio spectavit, cum de Formiano Apollinarisloquitur: [2]

- Si quando NEREVS sentit Aeoli regnum,

- Ridet procellas tuta de SVO mensa.

Et Ambrosius: [3] ‘Inducis mare intra praedia tua ne desint belluae’. Hinc apparerepotest quae mens Pauli fuerit, cum dicit, [4] si maris proprium ius ad aliquem pertineat, utipossidetis interdictum ei competere. Esse quidem hoc interdictum adprivatas causas comparatum, non autem ad publicas, (in quibus etiam eacomprehenduntur quae iure gentium communi facere possumus) sed hic iam agi deiure fruendo quod ex causa privata contingat, non publica, sive communi. Namteste Marciano, quicquid occupatum est et occupari potuit, [5] id iam non est iurisgentium, sicut est mare. Exempli causa, si quisLucullum aut Apollinarem in privato suo, quatenus diverticulum marisincluserant, piscari prohibuisset, dandum illis interdictumPaulus putavit non solum iniuriarum actionem, obcausam scilicet privatae possessionis. [1]

Immo in diverticulo maris, sicut in diverticulo fluminis, si locum talemoccuparim, ibique piscatus sim, maxime si animum privatim possidendi pluriumannorum continuatione testatus fuerim, alterum eodem iure uti prohibebo; ut exMarciano colligimus, non aliter quam in lacu qui mei dominii est. Quod verumquam diu durat occupatio, quemadmodum in litore antea diximus. Extradiverticulum idem non erit, ne scilicet communis usus impediatur. [2]

Ante aedes igitur meas aut praetorium ut piscari aliquem prohibeantusurpatum quidem est, sed nullo iure, adeo quidem ut Vlpianus contempta eausurpatione si quis prohibeatur iniuriarum dicat agi posse. [3] Hoc Imperator Leo (cuius Legibus non utimur) contra iuris rationemmutavit, voluitque προθυρα, hoc est, vestibula maritima eorum esse propria, quioram habitarent, ibique eos ius piscandi habere; [4] quod tamen ita procedere voluit, ut septis quibusdam remoratoriis quasἐποχας Graeci vocant,locus ille occuparetur; existimans nimirum non fore ut quis exiguam marisportionem alteri invideret qui ipse toto mari ad piscandum admitteretur. Certeut quis magnam maris partem, etiam si possit, publicis utilitatibus eripiat,non tolerandae est improbitatis, in quam merito Vir Sanctus invehitur: [5] ‘SPATIA MARIS sibi vindicant IVRE MANCIPII,pisciumque iura sicut vernaculorum conditione sibi servitii subiectacommemorant. Iste, inquit, SINVS maris meus est; ille alterius. Dividuntelementa sibi potentes’.

Est igitur Mare in numero earum rerum quae in commercio non sunt, [1] hoc est, quae proprii iuris fieri non possunt. Vnde sequitur si proprieloquamur, nullam Maris partem in territorio populi alicuius posse censeri. Quodipsum Placentinus sensisse videtur, cum dixit: Mare ita esse commune, ut innullius dominio sit nisi solius Dei; et Ioannes Faber, cum mare asseritrelictum in suo iure, et esse primaevo, quo omnia erant communia. [2] Alioquin nihil different quae sunt omnium communia ab his quae publicaproprie dicuntur, ut mare a flumine. Flumen populus occupare potuit, utinclusum finibus suis, mare non potuit.

Territoria autem sunt ex occupationibus populorum, ut privata dominia exoccupationibus singulorum. Vidit hoc Celsus, qui clare satis distinguit interlitora, [3] quae Populus Romanus occupare potuit, ita tamen ut usui communi nonnoceretur, et mare quod pristinam naturam retinuit. Nec ulla lex diversumindicat. [4] Quae vero leges a contrariaesententiae auctoribus citantur, aut de insulisloquuntur, quas clarum est occupari potuisse, aut de portu qui non communisest, sed proprie publicus.

Qui vero dicunt mare aliquod esse Imperi Romani, dictum suum itainterpretantur, ut dicant ius illud in mare ultra protectionem etiurisdictionem non procedere; quod illis ius a proprietate distinguunt; necforte satis animadvertunt idipsum quod Populus Romanus classes praesidionavigantium disponere potuit, et deprehensos in mari piratas punire, non exproprio, sed ex communi iure accidisse, quod et aliae liberae gentes in marihabent. Illud interim fatemur, potuisse inter gentes aliquas convenire, utcapti in maris hac vel illa parte, huius aut illius reipublicae iudiciumsubirent, atque ita ad commoditatem distinguendae iurisdictionis in mari finesdescribi, quod ipsos quidem eam sibi legem ferentes obligat, [1] at alios populos non item; neque locum alicuius proprium facit, sed inpersonas contrahentium ius constituit.

Quae distinctio ut naturali rationi consentanea est, ita Vlpiani responsoquodam comprobatur, qui rogatus an duorum praediorum maritimorum dominus,alteri eorum quod venderet servitutem potuisset imponere, ne inde in certomaris loco piscari liceret, respondet: rem quidem ipsam, mare scilicet,servitute nulla affici potuisse, quia per naturam hoc omnibus pateret, sed cumbona fides contractus legem venditionis servari exposceret, personaspossidentium et in ius eorum succedentium per istam legem obligari.Verum est loqui Iurisconsultum de praediis privatis,et lege privata, sed in territorio et lege populorum eadem hic est ratio, quiapopuli respectu totius generis humani privatorum locum obtinent.

Similiter reditus qui in piscationes maritimas constituti Regalium numerocensentur, non rem, hoc est mare, aut piscationem, sed personas obligant. [1] Quare subditi, in quos legem ferendi potestas Reipublicae aut Principiex consensu competit, ad onera ista compelli forte poterunt; sed exteris iuspiscandi ubique immune esse debet, ne servitus imponatur mari quod servire nonpotest.

Non enim maris eadem quae fluminis ratio est: [2] quod cum sit publicum, id est populi, ius etiam in eo piscandi a populoaut principe concedi aut locari potest, ita ut ei qui conduxit, etiaminterdictum Veteres dederint, de loco publico fruendo, addita condicione si iscui locandi ius fuerit, fruendum alicui locaverit; [3] quae condicio in mari evenire non potest. Ceterum qui ipsam piscationemnumerant inter Regalia, ne quidem illum locum quem interpretabantur satisinspexerunt, quod Iserniam et Alvotum non latuit.

Demonstratum est [4] nec populo nec privato cuipiam iusaliquod proprium in ipsum mare (nam diverticulumexcipimus) competere posse, cum occupationem nec natura, nec usus publici ratiopermittat. Huius autem rei causa instituta fuerat haec disputatio, ut appareretLusitanos mare quo ad Indos navigatur sui iuris non fecisse. Nam utraque ratioquae proprietatem impedit, in hac causa est quam in ceteris omnibus infinitoefficacior. Quod in aliis difficile videtur, in hac omnino fieri non potest;quod in aliis iniquum iudicamus, in hac summe barbarum est, atqueinhumanum.

Non de mari interiore hic agimus, quod terris undique infusum alicubi etiamfluminis latitudinem non excedit, de quo tamen satis constat locutos RomanosIurisconsultos, cum nobiles illas adversus privatam avaritiam sententiasediderunt; de Oceano quaeritur, quem immensum, infinitum, rerum parentem, caeloconterminum antiquitas vocat, cuius perpetuo humore non fontes tantum etflumina et maria, sed nubes, sed ipsa quodammodo sidera pasci veterescrediderunt; qui denique per reciprocas aestuum vices terram hanc humanigeneris sedem ambiens, neque teneri neque includi potest, et possidet veriusquam possidetur.

In hoc autem Oceano non de sinu aut freto, nec de omni quidem eo quod elitore conspici potest controversia est. Vindicant sibi Lusitani quicquid duosOrbes interiacet, tantis spatiis discretos, ut plurimis saeculis famam sui nonpotuerint transmittere. Quod si Castellanorum, qui in eadem suntcausa, portio accedat, parvo minus omnis Oceanusduobus populis mancipatus est, aliis tot gentibus ad Septentrionum redactisangustias; multumque decepta est Natura, quae cum elementum illud omnibuscircumfudit, omnibus etiam suffecturum credidit. In tanto mari si quis usupromiscuo solum sibi imperium et dicionem exciperet, tamen immodicaedominationis affectator haberetur; si quis piscatu arceret alios, insanaecupiditatis notam non effugeret. At qui etiam navigatum impedit, quo nihil ipsiperit, de eo quid statuemus?

Si quis ab igni qui totus suus est, ignem capere, lumen suo de lumine,alterum prohiberet, lege hunc humanae societatis reum peragerem: quia vis eaest istius naturae:

Vt nihilominus ipsi luceat, cum illi accenderit. [1]

Quid ni enim quando sine detrimento suo potest, alteri communicet, in iisquae sunt accipienti utilia, danti non molesta. [2]

Haec sunt quae Philosophi [3] non alienis tantum, sed et ingratis praestari volunt. Quae vero inrebus privatis invidia est, eadem in re communi non potest non esse immanitas,improbissimum enim hoc est, quod naturae instituto, consensu gentium, meum nonminus quam tuum est, id te ita intercipere, ut ne usum quidem mihi concedas,quo concesso nihilominus id tuum sit, quam antea fuit.

Tum vero etiam qui alienis incumbunt, aut communia intercipiunt, certaquadam possessione se tuentur. Quia enim prima, ut diximus, occupatio resproprias fecit, idcirco imaginem quandam dominii praefert quamvis iniustadetentio. At Lusitani num sicuti terras solemus, sic mare illud impositispraediis ita undique cinxerunt, ut in ipsorum manu esset quos vellentexcludere? An vero tantum hoc abest, ut ipsi etiam, cum adversus alios populosmundum dividunt, non ullis limitibus aut natura, aut manu positis, sedimaginaria quadam linea se tueantur? quod si recipitur et dimensio talis adpossidendum valet, iamdudum nobis Geometrae terras, Astronomi etiam caelumeriperent.

Vbi hic igitur est ista, sine qua nulla dominia coeperunt, corporis adcorpus adiunctio? Nimirum apparet in nulla re verius dici posse, quod Doctoresnostri prodiderunt, [1] Mare cum sit incomprehensibile, non minus quam aër, nullius populibonis potuisse applicari.

Si vero ante alios navigasse, et viam quodammodo aperuisse, hoc vocantoccupare, quid esse potest magis ridiculum? Nam cum nulla pars sit maris, inquam non aliquis primus ingressus sit, sequetur omnem navigationem ab aliquoesse occupatam. Ita undique excludimus. Quin et illi qui terrarum orbemcircumvecti sunt, totum sibi Oceanum acquisivisse dicendi erunt. Sed nemonescitnavem per mare transeuntem non plus iuris, quamvestigii relinquere. Verum etiam quod sibi sumunt neminem ante ipsos eumOceanum navigasse, id minime verum est. Magna enim pars eius de quo agiturmaris, ambitu Mauritaniae, iam olim navigata est; ulterior et in orientemvergens victoriis Magni Alexandri lustrata est, usque in Arabicum sinum. [1]

Olim autem hanc navigationem Gaditanis percognitam fuisse, multa argumentosunt. Caio Caesare Augusti filio in Arabico sinu res gerente signa navium exHispaniensibus naufragiis agnita. Et quod Caelius Antipater tradidit, vidissese qui ex Hispania in Aethiopiam commercii gratia navigasset. Etiam Arabibus,si verum est, quod Cornelius Nepos testatus est, Eudoxum quendam sua aetate cumLathyrum Regem Alexandriae fugeret, Arabico sinu egressum Gades usquepervectum. Poenos autem, qui re maritima plurimum valuerunt, eum Oceanum nonignorasse longe clarissimum est, cum Hanno Carthaginis potentia florentecircumvectus a Gadibus ad finem Arabiae, praeternavigato scilicet promontorioquod nunc Bonae Spei dicitur, (vetus videtur nomen Hesperion ceras fuisse) omneid iter, situmque litoris et insularum scripto complexus sit, testatusque adultimum non mare sibi, sed commeatum defuisse.

Ab Arabico autem sinu ad Indiam, Indicique Oceani insulas, et auream usqueChersonesum, quam esse Iapanem credunt plerique, etiam re Romana florentenavigari solitum, iter a Plinio descriptum, [2] legationes ab Indis adAugustum, ad Claudium etiam ex Taprobane insula,deinde gesta Traiani et tabulae Ptolemaei satis ostendunt. Iam suo temporeStrabo [1] Alexandrinorum mercatorum classem ex Arabico sinu, ut Aethiopiaeultima, ita et Indiae, petiisse testatur, cum olim paucis navibus id auderetur.Inde magna populo Romano vectigalia; addit Plinius [2] impositis sagittariorum cohortibus piratarum metu navigatum; solamqueIndiam quingenties sestertium, si Arabiam addas et Seres, millies annis omnibusRomano Imperio ademisse; et merces centuplicato venditas.

Et haec quidem vetera satis arguunt primos non fuisse Lusitanos. In singulisautem sui partibus Oceanus ille et tunc cum eum Lusitani ingressi sunt, etnumquam non cognitus fuit. Mauri enim, Aethiopes, Arabes, Persae, Indi, eammaris partem cuius ipsi accolae sunt, nescire neutiquam potuerunt.

Mentiuntur ergo qui se mare illud invenisse iactant.

Quid igitur, dicet aliquis, parumne videtur, quod Lusitani intermissammultis forte saeculis navigationem primi repararunt, et, quod negari nonpotest, Europaeis gentibus ignotam ostenderunt, magno suo labore, sumptu,periculo?Immo vero si in hoc incubuerunt ut quod solireperissent id omnibus monstrarent, quis adeo est amens, qui non plurimum seillis debere profiteatur? Eandem enim gratiam, laudemque et gloriam immortalemilli promeruerint, qua omnes contenti fuerunt rerum magnarum inventores,quotquot scilicet non sibi, sed humano generi prodesse studuerunt. SinLusitanis suus ante oculos quaestus fuit, lucrum quod semper maximum est inpraevertendis negotiationibus, illis sufficere debuit. Et scimus itinera primaproventus interdum quater decuplos, aut etiam uberiores dedisse, quibus factumut inops diu populus ad repentinas divitias subito prorumperet, tanto luxusapparatu, quantus vix beatissimis gentibus in supremo progressae diu fortunaefastigio fuit.

Si vero eidem in hoc praeiverunt, ne quisquam sequeretur, gratiam nonmerentur, cum lucrum suum respexerint; lucrum autem suum dicere non possunt,cum eripiant alienum. Neque enim illud certum est nisi ivissent eo Lusitani,iturum fuisse neminem. Adventabant enim tempora, quibus ut artes pene omnes,ita et terrarum et marium situs clarius in dies noscebantur. Excitassentvetera, quae modo retulimus, exempla, et si non uno impetu omnia patuissent, atpaulatim promota velis fuissent litora alio semper aliud monstrante. Factumdenique fuisset,quod fieri potuisse Lusitani docuerunt, cum multiessent populi non minus flagrantes mercaturae et rerum externarum studio.Venetis qui multa iam Indiae didicerant, cetera inquirere promptum fuit.Gallorum Brittonum indefessa sedulitas, Anglorum audacia coepto non defuisset.Ipsi Batavi multo magis desperata aggressi sunt.

Nulla igitur aequitatis ratio, ne probabilis quidem ulla sententia aLusitanis stat. Omnes enim qui mare volunt imperio alicuius subici posse, id eiattribuunt qui proximos portus et circumiacentia litora in dicione habet. [1] At Lusitani in illo immenso litorum tractu paucis exceptis praesidiisnihil habent quod suum possint dicere.

Deinde vero etiam qui Mari imperaret, nihil tamen posset ex usu communideminuere, sicut Populus Romanus arcere neminem potuit, quo minus in litoreimperi Romani cuncta faceret, quae iure gentium permittebantur. [2] Et si quicquam eorum prohibere posset, puta piscaturam qua diciquodammodo potest pisces exhauriri, at navigationem non posset, per quam marinihil perit.

Cui rei argumentum est longe certissimum, quod ex Doctorum sententia anteretulimus, etiam in terra, quae cum populis, tum hominibus singulis inproprietatem attributa est; iter tamen, certe inerme et innoxium, nulliusgentishominibus iuste negari; sicut et potum ex flumine.Ratio apparet, quia cum unius rei naturaliter usus essent diversi, eum dumtaxatgentes divisisse inter se videntur, qui sine proprietate commode haberi nonpotest, contra autem eum recepisse, per quem domini condicio deterior non essetfutura.

Omnes igitur vident eum qui alterum navigare prohibeat nullo iure defendi,cum eundem etiam iniuriarum teneri Vlpianus dixerit; [1] ali autem etiam interdictum utile prohibito competere existimaverint. [2]

Et sic Batavorum intentio communi iure nititur, cum fateantur omnes,permissum cuilibet in mari navigare etiam a nullo Principe impetrata licentia;quod Legibus Hispanicis diserte expressum est. [3]

CAPVT VI: Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esseLusitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae

Donatio Pontificis Alexandri, quae a Lusitanis mare aut ius navigandis solissibi vindicantibus, cum inventionis deficiat titulus, secundo loco adducipotest, satis ex iis quae ante dicta sunt vanitatis convincitur. Donatio enimnullum habet momentum in rebus extra commercium positis. Quare cum mare aut iusin eo navigandi proprium nulli hominum esse possit, sequitur neque dari aPontifice neque a Lusitanis accipi potuisse. Praeterea cum supra relatum sit exomnium sani iudicii hominum sententia Papam non esse dominum temporalem totiusorbis, ne Maris quidem esse satis intelligitur; quamquam etsi id concederetur,tamen ius annexum Pontificatui in Regem aliquem aut populum pro parte nullatransferri debuisset. Sicut nec Imperator posset Imperi provincias in suos ususconvertere, aut pro suo arbitrio alienare. [1]

Illud saltem nemo negaturus est, cui aliquid sit frontis, cum ius disponendiin temporalibus Pontifici nemo concedat, nisi forte quantum eius rerumspiritualium necessitas requirit, ista autem de quibus nunc agimus, marescilicet et ius navigandi, lucrum et quaestum merum, non pietatis negotiumrespiciant, sequi nullam hac in re fuisse illiuspotestatem. Quid, quod ne Principes quidem, hoc est, domini temporales possuntullo modo a navigatione aliquem prohibere, cum si quod habent ius in mari idsit tantum iurisdictionis ac protectionis? Etiam illud notissimum est apudomnes, ad ea facienda quae cum lege Naturae pugnant, nullam esse Papaeauctoritatem. [1] Pugnat autem cum lege Naturae, ut mare aut eius usum quisquam habeatsibi proprium, ut iam satis demonstravimus. Cum denique ius suum auferre alicuiPapa minime possit, quae erit facti istius defensio, si tot populos immerentes,indemnatos, innoxios ab eo iure quod ad ipsos non minus quam ad Hispanospertinebat uno verbo voluit excludere?

Aut igitur dicendum est nullam esse vim eiusmodi pronuntiationis, aut quodnon minus credibile est, eum Pontificis animum fuisse, ut Castellanorum etLusitanorum inter se certamini intercessum voluerit, aliorum autem iuri nihildiminutum.

CAPVT VII: Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esseLusitanorum titulo praescriptionis aut consuetudinis

Vltimum iniquitatis patrocinium in praescriptione solet esse autconsuetudine. Et huc igitur Lusitani se conferunt; sed utrumque illispraesidium certissima iuris ratio praecludit. Nam praescriptio a iure estcivili, unde locum habere non potest inter reges, aut inter populos liberos; [1] multo autem minus ubi ius naturae aut gentium resistit, quod iurecivili semper validius est. Quin et ipsa lex civilis praescriptionem hicimpedit. [2] Vsucapi enim, aut praescriptione acquiri prohibentur, quae in bonisesse non possunt, deinde quae possideri vel quasi possideri nequeunt, et quorumalienatio prohibita est. Haec autem omnia de mari et usu maris veredicuntur.

Et cum publicae res, hoc est populi alicuius nulla temporis possessionequaeri posse dicantur, sive ob rei naturam, sive ob eorum privilegium adversusquos praescriptio ista procederet, quanto iustius humano generi, quam unipopulo id beneficium dandum fuit in rebus communibus? Et hoc estquod Papinianus scriptum reliquit, [1] ‘praescriptionem longae possessionis ad obtinenda loca iurisgentiumpublica concedi non solere’; eiusque rei exemplum dat in litore, cuius parsimposito aedificio occupata fuerat. Nam eo diruto, et alterius aedificio ineodem loco postea exstructo, exceptionem opponi non posse; quod deindesimilitudine rei publicae illustrat, nam et si quis in fluminis diverticulopluribus annis piscatus sit, postea, interrupta scilicet piscatione, alterumeodem iure prohibere non posse.

Apparet igitur Angelum et qui cum Angelo dixerunt [2] Venetis et Genuensibus per praescriptionem ius aliquod in sinum marissuo litori praeiacentem acquiri potuisse, aut falli, aut fallere, quod saneIurisconsultis nimium est frequens, cum sanctae professionis auctoritatem, nonad rationes et leges, sed ad gratiam conferunt potentiorum. Nam Martiani quidemresponsum, de quo et ante egimus, si recte cum Papiniani verbis comparetur, [3] non aliam accipere potest interpretationem, quam eam quae et Iohanniolim et Bartolo probata est, et nunc a doctis omnibus recipitur: [4] ut scilicet ius prohibendi procedat quamdiu durat occupatio,non autem si ea omissa sit; omissa enim non prodest,nec si per mille annos fuisset continuata, ut recte animadvertit Castrensis. Etquamvis hoc voluisset Martianus, quod minime credendus est cogitasse, in quoloco occupatio conceditur, in eodem praescriptionem concedi, tamen absurdumerat quod de flumine publico dictum erat ad Mare commune, et quod dediverticulo ad sinum proferre, cum haec praescriptio usum quae est Iuregentiumcommunis, impeditura sit, illa autem publico usui non admodum noceat. Alterumautem Angeli argumentum quod ex aquaeductu sumitur, [1] eodem Castrensi monstrante, ut a quaestione alienissimum, ab omnibusmerito exploditur.

Falsum igitur est talem praescriptionem etiam eo tempore gigni, cuiusinitium omnem memoriam excedat. Vbi enim lex omnem omnino tollitpraescriptionem, ne istud quidem tempus admittitur, hoc est, ut Felinusloquitur, [2] materia impraescriptibilis tempore immemoriali non sitpraescriptibilis. Fatetur haec vera esse Balbus; [3] sed Angeli sententiam receptam dicit hac ratione, quia tempus extramemoriam positum idem valere creditur privilegio, cum titulus amplissimus extali tempore praesumatur. Apparet hinc non aliud illos sensisse, quam si parsaliqua reipublicae, puta Imperi Romani, supra omnem memoriam usa esset taliiure, ei dandam praescriptionem hoc colore, quasi Principisconcessio praeiisset. Quare cum nemo sit dominustotius generis humani, qui ius illud adversus homines omnes homini, aut populoalicui potuisset concedere, sublato illo colore, necesse est etiampraescriptionem interimi. Et sic ex illorum etiam sententia inter reges autpopulos liberos prodesse nihil potest lapsus infiniti temporis.

Vanissimum autem et illud est quod Angelus docuit, etiamsi ad dominiumpraescriptio proficere non potest, tamen dandam esse possidenti exceptionem.Nam Papinianus disertis verbis exceptionem negat: [1] et aliter non potuit sentire, cum ipsius saeculo praescriptio nihilesset aliud quam exceptio. Verum igitur est quod et leges Hispanicae exprimunt [2] in his rebus quae communi hominum usui sunt attributae, nullius omninotemporis praescriptionem procedere, cuius definitionis illa praeter ceterasratio reddi potest, quod qui re communi utitur, ut communi ut videtur, nonautem iure proprio, et ita praescribere non magis quam fructuarius potest vitiopossessionis. [3]

Altera haec etiam non contemnenda est, quod in praescriptione temporis cuiusmemoria non exstat, quamvis titulus et bona fides praesumantur, tamen si reipsa appareat titulum omnino nullum dari posse, et sic manifesta sit fidesmala, quae in populo maxime quasi uno corpore perpetua essecensetur, et ex duplici defectu praescriptio corruit. [1] Tertia vero, quia res haec est merae facultatis, quae nonpraescribitur, ut infra demonstrabimus.

Sed nullus est finis argutiarum. Inventi sunt qui in hoc argumento apraescriptione consuetudinem distinguerent, ut illa scilicet exclusi, ad hancconfugerent. Discrimen autem quod hic statuunt sane ridiculum est: expraescriptione aiunt ius unius quod ab eo aufertur alteri applicari; [2] sed cum aliquod ius ita alicui applicatur ut alteri non auferatur, tumdici consuetudinem; quasi vero cum ius navigandi quod communiter ad omnespertinet, exclusis aliis ab uno usurpatur, non necesse sit omnibus perirequantum uni accedit. Errori huic ansam dederunt Pauli verba non recte accepta,qui cum de iure proprio maris ad aliquem pertinente loqueretur, [3] fieri hoc posse dixit Accursius per privilegium aut consuetudinem: quodadditamentum ad Iurisconsulti textum nullo modo accedens mali potiusconiectoris esse videtur quam boni interpretis. Mens Pauli supra explicata est.Ceterum illi si vel sola Vlpiani verba, [4] quae paulo ante praecedunt, satis considerassent, longe aliud dicturierant. Fatetur enim ut quis ante aedes meas piscari prohibeatur, esse quidemusurpatum; [1] hoc est receptum consuetudine, sed nullo iure,ideoque iniuriarum actionem prohibito non denegandam.

Contemnit igitur hunc morem, et usurpationem vocat, ut et inter ChristianosDoctores Ambrosius. [2] Et merito. Quid enim clarius quam non valere consuetudinem, quae iurinaturae, aut gentium ex adverso opponitur? [3] Consuetudo enim species est iuris positivi, quod legi perpetuaeobrogare non potest. Est autem lex illa perpetua ut Mare omnibus usu communesit. Quod autem in praescriptione diximus, idem in consuetudine verum est, siquis eorum qui diversum tradiderunt, sensus excutiat, non aliud reperturum,quam consuetudinem privilegio parari. Atqui adversus genus humanum concedendiprivilegium nemo habet potestatem; quare inter diversas respublicas consuetudoista vim non habet.

Verum omnem hanc quaestionem diligentissime tractavit Vasquius, [4] decus illud Hispaniae, cuius nec in explorando iure subtilitatem, necin docendo libertatem umquam desideres. Is igitur posita thesi: ‘Loca publicaet iure gentium communia praescribi non posse’, quam multis firmat auctoribus;exceptiones deinde subiungit ab Angelo et aliis confictas, quas supraretulimus. Haec autem examinaturus recte iudicat istarum rerum veritatempendere a vera iuris, tam naturae quam gentium cognitione. Ius enim naturae cumadivina veniat providentia, esse immutabile. Huiusautem iuris naturalis partem esse ius gentium, primaevum quod dicitur, diversuma iure gentium secundario sive positivo, quorum posterius mutari potest. Nam siqui mores cum iure gentium primaevo repugnent, hi non humani sunt ipso iudice,sed FERINI, corruptelae et abusus, non leges et usus. Itaque nullo temporepraescribi potuerunt, nulla lata lege iustificari, nullo multarum etiam gentiumconsensu, hospitio, et exercitatione stabiliri, quod exemplis aliquot etAlphonsi Castrensis Theologi Hispani testimonio confirmat. [1]

‘Ex quibus apparet’, inquit, ‘quam suspecta sit sententia eorum, quod supraretulimus, existimantium Genuenses, aut etiam Venetos posse non iniuriaprohibere alios navigare per Gulfum aut pelagus sui maris, quasi aequora ipsapraescripserint, id quod non solum est contra leges; [2] sed etiam est contra ipsum ius naturae, aut gentium primaevum, quodmutari non posse diximus. Quod sit contra illud ius constat, quia non solummaria aut aequora eo iure communia erant sed etiam reliquae omnes resimmobiles. Et licet ab eo iure postea recessum fuerit ex parte, puta quoaddominium et proprietatem terrarum, quarum dominium iure Naturae commune,distinctum et divisum, sicque ab illa communione segregatum fuit; tamen [3] diversum fuit et est in dominio maris,quod ab origine Mundi, ad hodiernum usque diem est,fuitque semper in communi, nulla ex parte immutatum, ut est notum’.

‘Et quamvis ex LVSITANIS magnam turbam saepe audiverim in hac esse opinioneut eorum Rex ita praescripserit navigationem INDICI Occidentalis (forteOrientalis) eiusdemque VASTISSIMI MARIS, ita ut reliquis gentibus aequora illatransfretare non liceat, et ex nostrismet HISPANIS VVLGVS in eadem opinionefere esse videtur, ut per VASTISSIMVM IMMENSVMQVE PONTVM ad Indorum regionesquas potentissimi Reges nostri subegerunt reliquis mortalium navigare,praeterquam Hispanis ius minime sit, quasi ab eis id ius praescriptum fuerit,tamen istorum omnium non minus INSANAE sunt opiniones, quam eorum qui quoadGenuenses et Venetos in eodem fere SOMNIO esse adsolent, quas sententiasINEPTIRE vel ex eo dilucidius apparet, quod istarum nationum singulae contraseipsas nequeunt praescribere: hoc est, non respublica Venetiarum contrasemetipsam, non respublica Genuensium contra semetipsam, non Regnum Hispanicumcontra semetipsum, non Regnum Lusitanicum contra semetipsum. [1] Esse enim debet differentia inter agentem et patientem’.

‘Contra reliquas vero nationes longe minus praescribere possunt, quia iuspraescriptionum est mere civile, ut fuse ostendimus supra. Ergo tale ius cessatcum agitur inter principes vel populos, superiorem non recognoscentes intemporalibus. Iura enim mere civilia cuiuscumque regionis,quoad exteros populos, nationes, vel etiam hominessingulos, non magis sunt in consideratione, quam si re vera esset tale ius, autnumquam fuisset, et ad ius commune gentium primaevum vel secundariumrecurrendum est, eoque utendum, quo iure talem maris praescriptionem etusurpationem admissam non fuisse satis constat. Nam, et hodie usus aquarumcommunis est, non secus quam erat ab origine Mundi. Ergo et in aequoribus etaquis nullum ius est aut esse potest humano generi, praeterquam quoad usumcommunem. Praeterea de iure naturali et divino est illud praeceptum, ut Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri non facias. Vnde cumnavigatio nemini possit esse nociva nisi ipsi naviganti, par est ut neminipossit, aut debeat impediri, ne in re sua natura libera, sibique minime noxianavigantium libertatem impediat, et laedat contra dictum praeceptum et contraregulam praesertim cum omnia intelligantur esse permissa, quae non reperiunturexpressim prohibita. [1] Quinimo non solum contra ius naturale esset, velle impedire talemnavigationem, sed etiam tenemur contrarium facere, hoc est, prodesse iis quibuspossumus, cum id sine damno nostro fieri potest’.

Quod cum multis auctoritatibus tam divinis quam humanis confirmasset,subiungit postea: [2] ‘Ex superioribus etiam apparet suspectam esse sententiam IohannisFabri, Angeli, Baldi, et Francisci Balbi, quos supra retulimus, existimantiumloca iuris gentium communia, et si acquiri non possint praescriptione, possetamen acquiri consuetudine,quod omnino FALSVM est, eaque traditio CAECA ETNVBILA est, OMNIQVE RATIONIS LVMINE CARENS, legemque verbis non rebus imponens. [1] In exemplis enim de Mari Hispanorum, LVSITANORVM, Venetorum,Genuensium, et reliquorum, constat consuetudine ius tale navigandi, et aliosnavigare prohibendi non magis acquiri quam praescriptione. [2] Vtroque enim casu ut apparet, eadem est ratio. Et quia per iura etrationes supra relatas id esset contra naturalem aequitatem, nec ullaminduceret utilitatem, sed solam laesionem, sicque ut lege expressa introducinon possent, ita etiam nec lege tacita, qualis est consuetudo. [3] Et tempore id non iustificaretur, sed potius deterius et iniurius indies fieret’.

Ostendit deinde ex prima terrarum occupatione posse populo ut venandi ius,ita piscandi in suo flumine competere, et postquam illa semel ab antiquacommunione separata sunt, ita ut particularem applicationem admittant,praescriptione temporis eius, cuius initi memoria non exstet, quasi tacitapopuli concessione acquiri posse. Hoc autem per praescriptionem contingere, nonper consuetudinem, quia solius acquirentis condicio melior fiat, reliquorumvero deterior. Et cum tria enumerasset quae requiruntur, ut ius proprium influmine piscandi praescribatur:

‘Quid autem’, subdit, ‘quoad mare? Et in eo magis estquod etiam concursus istorum trium non sufficeret adacquirendum ius. Ratio differentiae inter mare ex una parte, et terram etflumina ex altera, quia illo casu ut olim ita et hodie, et semper, tam quoadpiscandum quam quoad navigandum mansit integrum ius gentium primaevum, nequeumquam fuit a communione hominum separatum, et alicui, vel aliquibusapplicatum. Posteriore autem casu, nempe in terra vel fluminibus aliud fuit, utiam disseruimus’.

‘Sed quare ius gentium secundarium, ut eam separationem quoad terras etflumina facit, quoad mare facere desiit? respondeo, quia illo casu expediebat.Constat enim quod si multi venentur, aut piscentur in terra vel flumine, facilenemus feris, et flumen piscibus evacuatum redditur, id quod in mari non est.Item fluminum navigatio facile deterior sit et impeditur per aedificia, quod inmari non est. Item per aquaeductus facile evacuatur flumen, non ita in mari; [1] ergo in utroque non est par ratio’.

‘Nec ad rem pertinet, quod supra diximus, communem esse usum aquarum,fontium etiam et fluminum. Nam intelligitur quoad bibendum et similia, quaefluminis dominium aut ius habenti vel minime vel levissime nocent. [2] Minima enim in consideratione non sunt. Pro nostris sententiis facit,quia iniqua nullo tempore praescribuntur, et ideo lex iniqua nullo temporepraescribitur, aut iustificatur’. Mox: ‘Etquae sunt impraescriptibilia ex legis dispositione,nec per mille annos praescriberentur’; quod innumeris doctorum testimoniisfulcit. [1]

Nemo iam non videt, ad usum rei communis intercipiendum nullam quantivistemporis usurpationem prodesse. Cui adiungendum est etiam eorum qui dissentiuntauctoritatem huic quaestioni non posse accommodari. Illi enim de Mediterraneoloquuntur, nos de Oceano; illi de sinu, nos de immenso mari, quae in rationeoccupationis plurimum differunt. Et quibus illi indulgent praescriptionem, illilitora mari continua possident, ut Veneti et Genuenses, quod de Lusitanis dicinon posse modo patuit.

Immo et si prodesse posset tempus, ut quidam posse putant in publicis quaesunt, populi, tamen non ea adsunt quae necessario requiruntur. Primum enimdocent omnes desiderari, ut is qui praescribit huiusmodi actum, eum exercueritnon longo dumtaxat tempore, sed memoriam excedente; deinde ut tanto temporeeundem actum nemo alius exercuerit, nisi concessione illius, vel clandestine;praeterea ut alios uti volentes prohibuerit, scientibus quidem et patientibusiis ad quos ea res pertinebat; nam etsi exercuissetsemper, et quosdam exercere volentes prohibuisset semper, non tamen omnes, quiaalii fuerunt prohibiti, alii vero libere exercuerunt, id quidem non sufficeret,ex Doctorum sententia.

Apparet autem debere haec omnia concurrere, tum quia praescriptionipublicarum rerum lex inimica est, tum ut videatur praescribens iure suo nonautem communi usus, idque non interrupta possessione.

Cum autem tempus postulatur, cuius initi non exstet memoria, non sempersufficit, ut optimi interpretes ostendunt, probare saeculi lapsum; sed constareoportet famam rei a maioribus ad nos transmissam, ita ut nemo supersit quicontrarium viderit, aut audierit. Occasione rerum Africanarum in ulterioraprimum Oceani inquirere coeperunt regnante Iohanne Lusitani, [1] anno salutis millesimo quadringentesimo septuagesimo septimo. Vigintipost annis, sub Rege Emanuele promontorium Bonae spei praeternavigatum est,seriusque multo ventum Malaccam, et insulas remotiores, ad quas Batavi navigarecoeperunt anno millesimo quingentesimo nonagesimo quinto, non dubie intra annumcentesimum. Iam vero etiam eo quod intercessit tempore aliorum usurpatioadversus alios etiam omnes impedivit praescriptionem. Castellani ab annomillesimo quingentesimo decimo non possessionem Lusitanis maris circa Moluccasambiguamfecere. Galli etiam et Angli non clanculum, sed viaaperta eo perruperunt. Praeterea accolae totius tractus Africani, aut Asiaticipartem maris quisque sibi proximam piscando et navigando perpetuo usurparunt,numquam a Lusitanis prohibiti.

Conclusum igitur sit, ius nullum esse Lusitanis quo aliam quamvis gentem anavigatione Oceani ad Indos prohibeant.

CAPVT VIII: Iure gentium inter quosvis liberam essemercaturam

Quod si dicant Lusitani cum Indis commercia exercendi ius quoddam propriumad se pertinere, eisdem fere omnibus argumentis refellentur. Repetemus breviteret aptabimus.

Iure Gentium hoc introductum est, ut cunctis hominibus inter se libera essetnegotiandi facultas, quae a nemine posset adimi. [1] Et hoc, sicut post dominiorum distinctionem continuo necessarium fuit,ita originem videri potest antiquiorem habuisse. Subtiliter enim Aristotelesμεταβλητιϰὴν dixit,ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆςϰατὰ φύσιν αυταρϰείας, [2] hoc est, negotiatione suppleri id quod naturae deest, quo commodeomnibus sufficiat. Oportet igitur communem esse iure gentium non tantumprivative, sed et positive, ut dicunt magistri, sive affirmative. [3] Quae autem illo modo sunt iuris gentium, mutari possunt: quae hoc modo,non possunt. Id ita intelligi potest.

Dederat natura omnia omnibus. Sed cum a rerum multarum usu, quas vitadesiderat humana, locorum intervallo homines arcerentur, quia ut supra diximus,non omnia ubiqueproveniunt, opus fuit traiectione; nec adhuc tamenpermutatio erat, sed aliis vicissim rebus apud alios repertis suo arbitrioutebantur; quo fere modo apud Seres dicitur rebus in solitudine relictis solamutantium religione peragi commercium. [1]

Sed cum statim res mobiles monstrante necessitate, quae modo explicata est,in ius proprium transissent, inventa est permutatio, qua quod alteri deest exeo quod alteri superest suppleretur. [2] Ita commercia victus gratia inventa est Homero Plinius probat. [3] Postquam vero res etiam immobiles in dominos distingui coeperunt,sublata undique communio non inter homines locorum spatiis discretos tantum,verum etiam inter vicinos necessarium fecit commercium; quod ut faciliusprocederet, nummus postea adinventus est, dictusἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου quod institutum sitcivile. [4]

Ipsa igitur ratio omnium contractuum universalis,ἡ μεταβλητιϰή a natura est; modi autemaliquot singulares ipsumque pretium,ἡ χρηματιστιϰή ab instituto; [5] quae vetustiores iuris interpretes non satis distinxerunt. Fatenturtamen omnes proprietatem rerum, saltem mobilium aiure gentium primario prodire, itemque contractus omnes quibus pretium nonaccedit. [1] Philosophi [2] τῖςμεταβλητιϰς quamtranslationem vertere licebit, genera statuunt duo: τὴνἐμποριϰὴνϰαὶ τὴνϰαπηλιϰ[Editor: illegible character]ν quarumἐμποριϰ[Editor: illegible character] quae ut vox ipsaindicat inter gentes dissitas, ordine naturae prior est, et sic a Platoneponitur. [3] Καπηλιϰηeadem videtur esse quae παράστασις [4] Aristoteli, tabernaria sive stataria negotiatio inter cives. IdemAristoteles [5] τὴνἐμποριϰήν dividit in ναυϰληρίαν et φορτηγίαν quarumhaec terrestri itinere, illa maritimo merces devehit. Sordidior autem estϰαπηλιϰή contra honestiorἐμποριϰή et maritima maxime, quiamulta multis impertit. [6]

Vnde navium exercitionem ad summam rempublicam pertinere dicit Vlpianus;institorum non eundem esse usum; quia illa omnino secundum naturam necessariaest. Aristoteles: [7] ἔστιγὰρἡ μεταβλητιϰὴ πάντων, αρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτονἐϰ τοῦϰατὰ φύσιν, τ[Editor: illegible character] τὰ μὲν πλείω, τὰ δὲἐλάττω τῶνἱϰαν϶νἔχειν τοὺς ανθρωπους, ‘est enimtranslatio rerum omnium coepta ab initio, ab eo quod est secundum naturam, cumhomines partim haberent plura, quam sufficerent, partim etiam pauciora’.Seneca: [8] ‘quae emeris, vendere; gentium ius est’.

Commercandi igitur libertas ex iure est primario gentium,quod naturalem et perpetuam causam habet, ideoquetolli non potest, et si posset non tamen posset nisi omnium gentium consensu:tantum abest ut ullo modo gens aliqua gentes duas inter se contrahere volentesiuste impediat.

CAPVT IX: Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esseLusitanorum titulo occupationis

Primum inventio aut occupatio hic locum non habet, quia ius mercandi non estaliquid corporale, quod possit apprehendi; neque prodesset Lusitanis etiamsiprimi hominum cum Indis habuissent commercia, quod tamen non potest non essefalsissimum. Nam et cum initio populi in diversa iere, aliquos necesse estprimos fuisse mercatores, quos tamen ius nullum acquisivisse certo est certius.Quare si Lusitanis ius aliquod competit, ut soli cum Indis negotientur, idexemplo ceterarum servitutum, ex concessione oriri debuit aut expressa auttacita, hoc est praescriptione; neque aliter potest.

CAPVT X: Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esseLusitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae

Concessit nemo, nisi forte Pontifex, qui non potuit. [1] Nemo enim quod suum non est concedere potest. At Pontifex, nisi totiusMundi temporalis sit Dominus, quod negant sapientes, ius etiam commerciorumuniversale sui iuris dicere non potest. Maxime vero cum res sit ad solumquaestum accommodata, nihilque ad spiritualem procurationem pertinens, extraquam cessat, ut fatentur omnes, Pontificia potestas. Praeterea si Pontifexsolis illud Lusitanis ius tribuere vellet idemque adimere hominibus ceteris,duplicem faceret iniuriam: Primum Indis, quos ut extra Ecclesiam positosPontifici nulla ex parte subditos esse diximus. His igitur cum nihil quodipsorum est adimere possit Pontifex, etiam ius illud quod habent cumquibuslibet negotiandi adimere non potuit. Deinde aliis hominibus omnibusChristianis et non Christianis, quibus idem illud ius adimere non potuit sinecausa indicta. Quid quod ne temporales quidem Domini in suis imperiis prohiberepossunt commerciorum libertatem, uti rationibus et auctoritatibus antedemonstratum est?

Sicut et illud confitendum est, contra ius perpetuum naturae gentiumque,unde ista libertas originem sumpsit in omne tempus duratura, nullam valerePontificis auctoritatem.

CAPVT XI: Mercaturam cum Indis non esseLusitanorum propriam iure praescriptionis aut consuetudinis

Restat praescriptio, seu consuetudinem mavis dicere. [1] Sed nec huius nec illius vim esse aliquam inter liberas nationes, autdiversarum gentium Principes, nec adversus ea quae primigenio iure introductasunt, cum Vasquio ostendimus. Quare et hic ut ius mercandi proprium fiat, quodproprietatis naturam non recipit, nullo tempore efficitur. Itaque nec titulushic adfuisse potest, nec bona fides, quae cum manifesto desinit, praescriptiosecundum Canones non ius dicetur, sed iniuria.

Quin et ipsa mercandi quasi possessio non ex iure proprio contigissevidetur, sed ex iure communi quod ad omnes aequaliter pertinet; sicut contra,quod aliae nationes cum Indis contrahere forte neglexerunt, id non Lusitanorumgratia fecisse existimandi sunt, sed quia sibi expedire crediderunt; quod nihilobstat quo minus ubi suaserit utilitas, id facere possint, quod antea nonfecerint. Certissima enim illa regula a doctoribus traditur, [2] in his quae sunt arbitrii seu merae facultatis, ita ut per se actumtantum facultatis eius, non autem ius novum operentur, nec praescriptionis necconsuetudinis titulo annos etiam mille valituros: quod etaffirmative et negative procedit, ut docet Vasquius.Nec enim quod libere feci facere cogor, nec quod non feci omittere.

Alioquin quid esset absurdius quam ex eo quod singuli non possumus cumsingulis semper contrahere, salvum nobis in posterum non esse ius cum illis,usus tulerit, contrahendi? Idem Vasquius et illud rectissime, ne infinitoquidem tempore effici, ut quid necessitate potius, quam sponte factumvideatur.

Probanda itaque Lusitanis foret coactio, quae tamen ipsa cum hac in re iurinaturae sit contraria, et omni hominum generi noxia, ius facere non potest. [1] Deinde illa coactio durasse debuit per tempus, cuius initii non exstetmemoria; id vero tantum hinc abest, ut ne centum quidem anni exierint, ex quotota fere negotiatio Indica penes Venetos fuit, per Alexandrinas traiectiones. [2] Debuit etiam talis esse coactio, cui restitum non sit. At restiteruntGalli et Angli, aliique. Neque sufficit aliquos esse coactos, sed ut omnescoacti sint requiritur, cum per unum non coactum servetur in causa communilibertatis possessio. Arabes autem et Sinenses a saeculis aliquot ad hunc usquediem perpetuo cum Indis negotiantur.

Nihil prodest ista usurpatio.

CAPVT XII: Nulla aequitate niti Lusitanos inprohibendo commercio

Ex his quae dicta sunt satis perspicitur eorum caeca aviditas, qui, nequemquam in partem lucri admittant, illis rationibus conscientiam suam placarestudent, quas ipsi magistri Hispanorum qui in eadem sunt causa manifestaevanitatis convincunt. [1] Omnes enim qui in rebus Indicis usurpantur colores iniuste captariquantum ipsis licet, satis innuunt, adduntque numquam eam rem serio Theologorumexamine probatam. Illa vero querela quid est iniquius, quod dicunt Lusitaniquaestus suos exhauriri copia contra licentiam? Inter certissima enim Iurisenuntiata est, nec in dolo eum versari, nec fraudem facere, ne damnum quidemalteri dare videri, qui iure suo utitur; quod maxime verum est, si non utalteri noceatur, sed rem suam augendi animo quippiam fiat. [2] Inspici enim debet id quod principaliter agitur, non quod extrinsecusin consequentiam venit. Immo si proprie loquimur cum Vlpiano, non ille damumdat, sed lucro quo adhuc alter utebatur eum prohibet.

Naturale autem est et summo iuri atque etiam aequitaticonveniens, ut lucrum in medio positum suum quisquemalit quam alterius, etiam qui ante perceperat. [1] Quis ferat querentem opificem quod alter eiusdem artis exercitio ipsiuscommoda evertat? Batavorum autem causa eo est iustior, quia ipsorum hac inparte utilitas cum totius humani generis utilitate coniuncta est, quam Lusitanieversum eunt. [2] Neque hoc recte dicetur ad aemulationem fieri, ut in re simili ostenditVasquius: aut enim plane hoc negandum est, aut asseverandum non ad bonam modo,verum etiam ad optimam aemulationem fieri, iuxta Hesiodum: [3] ἀγαθὴ δ’Ἔρις ηδεβροτοῖσι ‘bona lismortalibus haec est’. Nam etiam si quis pietate motus, inquit ille, frumentumin summa penuria vilius venderet, impediretur improba duritie eorum hominum,qui saeviente penuria suum carius fuerant vendituri. Verum est talibus modisminui aliorum reditus: nec id negamus, ait, ‘sed minuuntur cum universorumhominum commodo: ET VTINAM omnium PRINCIPVM et TYRRANORVM ORBIS reditus itaminuerentur’.

Quid ergo tam iniquum videri potest, quam Hispanos vectigalem habereTerrarum Orbem, ut nisi ad illorum nutum nec emere liceat nec vendere? [4] In cunctis civitatibus dardanarios odio atque etiam poenis prosequimur;nec ullum tam nefarium vitae genus videtur, quam ista annonae flagellatio. [5] Merito quidem. Naturae enim faciuntiniuriam, quae in commune fecunda est: [1] neque vero censeri debet in usus paucorum reperta negotiatio, sed utquod alteri deest alterius copia pensaretur, iusto tamen compendio omnibusproposito, qui laborem ac periculum transferendi in se suscipiunt.

Hoc ipsum igitur quod in republica, id est, minore hominum conventu, graveet perniciosum iudicatur, in magna illa humani generis societate ferendumneest? ut scilicet totius mundi monopolium faciant populi Hispani? InvehiturAmbrosius in eos qui maria claudunt, [2] Augustinus in eos qui itinera obstruunt; Nazianzenus in [3] coemptores suppressoresque mercium, qui ex inopia aliorum soli quaestumfaciunt, et ut ipse facundissime loquiturϰαταπραγματεύονταιτῆς ενδείας. Quin et divini sapientis sententia publicis diris devovetursacerque habetur, qui alimenta supprimendo vexat annonam:ὅ συνέχων σῖτον δημοϰαταρατος.

Clament igitur Lusitani quantum, et quam diu libebit: ‘Lucra nostradeciditis’. Respondebunt Batavi: ‘Immo nostris invigilamus. Hocne indignaminiin partem nos venire ventorum et maris? Et quis illa vobis lucra mansurapromiserat? Salvum est vobis, quo nos contenti sumus’.

CAPVT XIII: Batavis ius commercii Indicani qua pace,qua indutiis, qua bello retinendum

Quare cum et ius et aequum postulet, libera nobis ita ut cuiquam esse Indiaecommercia, superest, ut sive cum Hispanis pax, sive indutiae fiunt, sive bellummanet, omnino eam, quam a natura habemus libertatem tueamur. Nam ad pacem quodattinet, notum est eam esse duorum generum: aut enim pari foedere, aut imparicoitur. Graeci [1] istam vocant συνθήϰην ἐξ ἴσου hanc σπονδὰς ἐξ ἐπιταγμάτων illa virorum est, haec ingeniorumservilium. Demosthenes in oratione de libertate Rhodiorum: [2] ϰαί τοιχρὴ τους βουλομένουςἐλευθέρους εἰ̂’ναι τὰςἐϰ τῶν επιταγμάτων συνθήϰας φεύγειν,ἁς εγγὺς δουλείας οὔσας, ‘eos qui volunt esseliberi oportet omnes condiciones quibus leges imponuntur ita fugere tamquamquae proximae sunt servituti’. Tales autem sunt omnes quibus pars altera iniure suo imminuitur, iuxta Isocratis definitionem [3] vocantis τὰτοὺςἑτέρουςἐλαττοῦντα παρὰ τὸ δίϰαιον. Si enim, ut inquit Cicero, [4] ‘suscipienda bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pacevivatur’, sequitur eodem auctore, pacem esse vocandam, non pactionemservitutis, sed tranquillam libertatem; quippe cum et Philosophorum etTheologorumcomplurium [1] iudicio pax et iustitia nominibus magis quam re differant, sitque paxnon qualiscumque, sed ordinata concordia.

Indutiae autem si fiunt satis apparet ex ipsa indutiarum natura non deberemedio earum tempore condicionem cuiusquam deteriorem fieri, cum fermeinterdicti uti possidetis instar obtineant.

Quod si in bellum trudimur hostium iniquitate, debet nobis causae aequitasspem ac fiduciam boni eventus addere. Nam [2] ὑπὲρ ὧνἂνἐλαττῶνται μεχρὶ δυνατοῦ πάντες πολεμοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πλεονεϰτεῖν οὐχ οὕτως, ‘pro his in quibus iniuria afficiuntur omnesquantum omnino possunt depugnant: at propter alieni cupiditatem non item’; quodet Alexander Imperator ita expressit: τὸ μὲνἄρχεινἀδίϰωνἒργων οὐϰ ἀγνάμοναἔχει τὴν πρόϰλησιν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὀχλοῦντας αποσείεσθαιἔϰ τε τῆς αγαθῆς συνειδήσεωςἔχει τὸ θαῤῥαλέον,ϰαὶ εϰ τοῦ μὴἀδιϰεῖνἀλλ’ἀμύνασθαιὑπάρχει τὸ εὔελπι, ‘eius a quo coepitiniuria, provocatio maxime invidiosa est; at cum depelluntur aggressores, sicutbona conscientia fiduciam secum fert, ita quia de vindicanda non de inferendainiuria laboratur, spes etiam adsunt optimae’.

Si ita necesse est, perge gens mari invictissima, nec tuam tantum, sedhumani generis libertatem audacter propugna.

- Nec te, quod classis centenis remigat alis,

- Terreat: INVITO labitur illa MARI:

- Quodve vehunt prorae Centaurica saxa minantes,

- Tigna cava et pictos experiere metus.

- Frangit et attollit vires in milite causa;

- Quae nisi iusta subest, excutit arma pudor. [3]

Si iusta multi, et ipse Augustinus, [1] arma crediderunt eo nomine suscipi, quod per terras alienas iterinnoxium negaretur, quanto illa erunt iustiora, quibus maris, quod naturae legecommune est, usus communis et innoxius postulatur? Si iuste oppugnatae suntgentes quae in suo solo commercia aliis interdicebant, quid illae quae populosad se nihil pertinentes per vim distinent, ac mutuos earum commeatusintercludunt? Si res ista in iudicio agitaretur, dubitari non potest quae aviro bono expectari deberet sententia, ait Praetor: [2] ‘Quo minus illi in flumine publico navem agere, ratem agere, quoveminus per ripam exonerare liceat, vim fieri veto’. De mari et litore in eandemformam dandum interdictum docent interpretes, exemplo Labeonis, qui cuminterdiceret Praetor: [3] ‘Ne quid in flumine publico ripave eius facias, quo statio itervenavigio deterius sit, fiat’; simile dixit interdictum competere in mari: [4] ‘Ne quid in mari inve litore facias, quo portus, statio, intervenavigio deterius sit, fiat’.

Immo et post prohibitionem, si quis scilicet in mari navigare prohibitussit, aut non permissus rem suam vendere, aut re sua uti, iniuriarum eo nominecompetere actionem Vlpianus respondit. [5] Theologi insuper et qui tractant casus, quos vocant, conscientiarum,concordes tradunt,eum qui alterum vendere aut emere impediat,utilitatemve propriam publicae ac communi praeponat, aut ullo modo alterum ineo quod est iuris communis impediat, ad restitutionem teneri omnis damni viriboni arbitrio.

Secundum haec igitur vir bonus iudicans, Batavis libertatem commerciorumadiudicaret, Lusitanos et ceteros, qui eam libertatem impediunt, vetaret vimfacere, et damna restituere iuberet. Quod autem in iudicio obtineretur, id ubiiudicium haberi non potest, iusto bello vindicatur. Augustinus: [1] ‘Iniquitas partis adversae iusta ingerit bella’. Et Cicero: [2] ‘Cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum pervim, confugiendum ad posterius, si uti non licet priore’. Et Rex Theodoricus:‘Veniendum tunc ad arma, cum locum apud adversarium iustitia non potestreperire’. Et quod proprius est nostro argumento, [3] Pomponius eum qui rem omnibus communem cum incommodo ceterorum usurpet,MANV PROHIBENDVM respondit. Theologi quoque tradunt, sicuti pro rerum cuiusquedefensione bellum recte suscipitur, ita non minus recte suscipi, pro usu earumrerum quae naturali iure debent esse communes. Quare ei qui itinera praecludat,evectionemque mercium impediat, etiam non expectata ulla publica auctoritate, via facti, ut loquuntur, posse occurri.

Quae cum ita sint, minime verendum est, ne aut Deuseorum conatus secundet, qui ab ipso institutum iusnaturae certissimum violant, aut homines ipsi eos inultos patiantur, qui soloquaestus sui respectu communem humani generis utilitatem oppugnant.

CVM SVB HOC TEMPVS PLVRIMAE REGISHISPANIARVM LITTERAE IN MANVS NOSTRAS VENISSENT, QVIBVS IPSIVS ET LVSITANORVMINSTITVTVM MANIFESTE DETEGITVR, OPERAE PRETIVM VISVM EST EX IIS, QVAE PLERAEQVEEODEM ERANT ARGVMENTO, BINAS IN LATINVM SERMONEM TRANSLATAS EXHIBERE.

Domine Martine Alphonse de Castro, Prorex amice, ego Rex multam tibi salutemmitto:

Cum hisce litteris perveniet ad te exemplum typis impressum Edicti quodfaciendum curavi, quo, ob rationes quas expressas videbis, aliasque meis rebusconducentes prohibeo commercium omne externorum in ipsis partibus Indiaealiisque regionibus transmarinis. Quandoquidem res haec est momenti atque ususmaximi, et quae effici summa cum industria debeat, impero tibi, ut simulatquelitteras has et edictum acceperis, publicationem eius omni diligentia procuresin omnibus locis ac partibus istius imperi, idque ipsum quod edicto contineturexsequaris sine ullius personae exceptione, cuiuscumque qualitatis, aetatis,condicionisve sit, citra omnem moram atque excusationem, procedasque adimpletionem mandati via merae exsecutionis, nullo admisso impedimento,appellatione, aut gravamine in contrarium, cuiuscumque materiae generis autqualitatis. Iubeo itaque hoc ipsum impleri per eos ministros ad quos exsecutiopertinet, iisque significari, non modo eos qui contra fecerint malam operammihi navaturos, sed eosdem me puniturum privatione officiorum in quibus mihiserviunt.

Quia autem relatum est mihi commorari in istis partibusexternos multos variarum nationum, Italos, Gallos,Germanos, Belgas, quorum pars maior, quantum intelligimus, eo venit per Persidaet Turcarum imperium, non per hoc regnum, adversus quos si ex huius Edictipraescripto ac rigore procedatur, posse inde nonnullas difficultates sequi, siilli ad Mauros inimicos perfugiant, vicinisque munitionum mearum dispositionemindicent, rationesque monstrent quae rebus meis nocere possent, exsequi te hocedictum volo prout res et tempus ferent, atque ea uti prudentia, qua illaedifficultates evitentur, curando ut omnes externos in potestate tua habeaseosque custodias pro cuiusque qualitate, ita ut adversus imperium nostrum nihilvaleant attentare, utque ergo omnino eum finem consequar quem hoc Edicto mihiproposui.

Scriptae Vlyssipone XXVIII Novembris, Anno MDCVI. Subsignatum erat Rex.Inscriptio. Pro Rege. Ad Dominum Martinum Alfonsum de Castro Consiliarium suum,et suum Proregem Indiae.

Prorex amice Rex multam salutem tibi mitto:

Etsi pro certo habeo tua praesentia, iisque viribus cum quibus in partesaustrinas concessisti, perduelles Hollandos,qui illic haerent, nec minus indigenas qui eisreceptum praebent, ita castigatos fore, ut nec hi, nec illi tale quicquam inposterum audeant; expediet tamen, ad res tuendas, ut iustam classem, eiqueoperi idoneam, cum tu Goam redibis, in istis Maris partibus relinquas, eiusqueimperium et summam praefecturam mandes Andreae Hurtado Mendosae, aut si quem eimuneri aptiorem iudicabis, quemadmodum pro tuo in me affectu confido, ea in renon aliud te respecturum quam quod rebus meis erit utilissimum.

Scriptae Madritii XXVII Ian. MDCVII. Signatum Rex. Inscriptio. Pro Rege. AdDominum Martinum Alfonsum de Castro suum Consiliarium, et suum ProregemIndiae.

TO THE RULERS AND TO THE FREE AND INDEPENDENTNATIONS OF CHRISTENDOM

The delusion is as old as it is detestable with which many men, especiallythose who by their wealth and power exercise the greatest influence, persuadethemselves, or as I rather believe, try to persuade themselves, that justiceand injustice are distinguished the one from the other not by their own nature,but in some fashion merely by the opinion and the custom of mankind. Those mentherefore think that both the laws and the semblance of equity were devised forthe sole purpose of repressing the dissensions and rebellions of those personsborn in a subordinate position, affirming meanwhile that they themselves, beingplaced in a high position, ought to dispense all justice in accordance withtheir own good pleasure, and that their pleasure ought to be bounded only bytheir own view of what is expedient. This opinion, absurd and unnatural as itclearly is, has gained considerable currency; but this should by no meansoccasion surprise, inasmuch as there has to be taken into consideration notonly the common fraily of the human race by which we pursue not only vices andtheir purveyors, but also the arts of flatterers, to whom power is alwaysexposed.

But, on the other hand, there have stood forth in every age independent andwise and devout men able to root out this false doctrine from the minds of thesimple, and to convict its advocates of shamelessness. For they showed that Godwas the founder and ruler of the universe, and especially that being the Fatherof all mankind, He had not separated human beings, as He had the rest of livingthings, into different species and various divisions, but had willed them to beof one race and to be known by one name; thatfurthermore He had given them the same origin, thesame structural organism, the ability to look each other in the face, languagetoo, and other means of communication, in order that they all might recognizetheir natural social bond and kinship. They showed too that He is the supremeLord and Father of this family; and that for the household or the state whichHe had thus founded, He had drawn up certain laws not graven on tablets ofbronze or stone but written in the minds and on the hearts of every individual,where even the unwilling and the refractory must read them. That these lawswere binding on great and small alike; that kings have no more power againstthem than have the common people against the decrees of the magistrates, thanhave the magistrates against the edicts of the governors, than have thegovernors against the ordinances of the kings themselves; nay more, that thosevery laws themselves of each and every nation and city flow from that Divinesource, and from that source receive their sanctity and their majesty.

Now, as there are some things which every man enjoys in common with allother men, and as there are other things which are distinctly his and belong tono one else, just so has nature willed that some of the things which she hascreated for the use of mankind remain common to all, and that others throughthe industry and labor of each man become his own. Laws moreover were given tocover both cases so that all men might use common property without prejudice toany one else, and in respect to other things so that each man being contentwith what he himself owns might refrain from laying his hands on the propertyof others.

Now since no man can be ignorant of these facts unless he ceases to be aman, and since races blind to all truth except what they receive from the lightof nature, have recognized their force, what, O Christian Kings and Nations,ought you to think, and what ought you to do?

If any one thinks it hard that those things are demanded of him which theprofession of a religion so sacred requires, the very least obligation of whichis to refrain from injustice, certainly every one can know what his own duty isfrom the very demands he makes of others. There is not one of you who does notopenly proclaim that every man is entitled to manage and dispose of his ownproperty; there is not one of you who does not insist that all citizens haveequal and indiscriminate right to use rivers and public places; not one of youwho does not defend with all his might the freedom of travel and of trade.

If it be thought that the small society which we call a state cannot existwithout the application of these principles (and certainly it cannot), why willnot those same principles be necessary to uphold the social structure of thewhole human race and to maintain the harmony thereof? If any one rebels againstthese principles of law and order you are justly indignant, and you even decreepunishments in proportion to the magnitude of the offense, for no other reasonthan that a government cannot be tranquil where trespasses of that sort areallowed. If king act unjustly and violently against king, and nation againstnation, such action involves a disturbance of the peace of that universalstate, and constitutes a trespass against the supreme Ruler, does it not? Thereis however this difference: just as the lesser magistrates judge the commonpeople, and as you judge the magistrates, so the King of the universe has laidupon you the command to take cognizance of the trespasses of all other men, andto punish them; but He has reserved for Himself the punishment of your owntrespasses. But although He reserves to himself the final punishment, slow andunseen but none the less inevitable, yet He appoints to intervene in humanaffairs two judges whom the luckiest of sinners does not escape, namely,Conscience, or the innate estimation of oneself, and Public Opinion, or theestimation of others.These two tribunals are open to those who are debarredfrom all others; to these the powerless appeal; in them are defeated those whoare wont to win by might, those who put no bounds to their presumption, thosewho consider cheap anything bought at the price of human blood, those whodefend injustice by injustice, men whose wickedness is so manifest that theymust needs be condemned by the unanimous judgment of the good, and cannot becleared before the bar of their own souls.

To this double tribunal we bring a new case. It is in very truth no pettycase such as private citizens are wont to bring against their neighbors aboutdripping eaves or party walls; nor is it a case such as nations frequentlybring against one another about boundary lines or the possession of a river oran island. No! It is a case which concerns practically the entire expanse ofthe high seas, the right of navigation, the freedom of trade!! Between us andthe Spaniards the following points are in dispute: Can the vast, the boundlesssea be the appanage of one kingdom alone, and it not the greatest? Can any onenation have the right to prevent other nations which so desire, from selling toone another, from bartering with one another, actually from communicating withone another? Can any nation give away what it never owned, or discover whatalready belonged to some one else? Does a manifest injustice of long standingcreate a specific right?

In this controversy we appeal to those jurists among the Spanish themselveswho are especially skilled both in divine and human law; we actually invoke thevery laws of Spain itself. If that is of no avail, and those whom reasonclearly convicts of wrong are induced by greed to maintain that stand, weinvoke your majesty, ye Princes, your good faith, ye Peoples, whoever andwherever ye may be.

It is not an involved, it is not an intricate question that I am raising. Itis not a question of ambiguous points oftheology which seem to be wrapped in the deepestobscurity, which have been debated already so long and with such heat, thatwise men are almost convinced that truth is never so rarely found as whenassent thereto is forced. It is not a question of the status of our governmentand of independence not won by arms but restored. On this point those can reacha right decision who have an accurate knowledge of the ancestral laws andhereditary customs of the people of the Netherlands, and who have recognizedthat their state is not a kingdom illegally founded but is a government basedupon law. In this matter, however, just judges no longer compelled tosubordinate their convictions have been persuaded; the public authority of manynations has entirely satisfied those who were seeking a precedent; and theadmissions of our adversaries have left even the foolish and malevolent no roomfor doubt.

But what I here submit has nothing in common with these matters. It callsfor no troublesome investigation. It does not depend upon an interpretation ofHoly Writ in which many people find many things they cannot understand, norupon the decrees of any one nation of which the rest of the world very properlyknows nothing.

The law by which our case must be decided is not difficult to find, seeingthat it is the same among all nations; and it is easy to understand, seeingthat it is innate in every individual and implanted in his mind. Moreover thelaw to which we appeal is one such as no king ought to deny to his subjects,and one no Christian ought to refuse to a non-Christian. For it is a lawderived from nature, the common mother of us all, whose bounty falls on all,and whose sway extends over those who rule nations, and which is held mostsacred by those who are most scrupulously just.

Take cognizance of this cause, ye Princes, take cognizance of it, yeNations! If we are making an unjust demand, you know what your authority andthe authority ofthose of you who are our nearer neighbors has alwaysbeen so far as we are concerned. Caution us, we will obey. Verily, if we havedone any wrong in this our cause, we will not deprecate your wrath, nor eventhe hatred of the human race. But if we are right, we leave to your sense ofrighteousness and of fairness what you ought to think about this matter andwhat course of action you ought to pursue.

If today the custom held of considering that everything pertaining tomankind pertained also to one’s self, we should surely live in a much morepeaceable world. For the presumptuousness of many would abate, and those whonow neglect justice on the pretext of expediency would unlearn the lesson ofinjustice at their own expense.

We have felt that perhaps we were not entertaining a foolish hope for ourcause. At all events we are confident that you will all recognize after dulyweighing the facts in the case that the delays to peace can no more be laid toour charge than can the causes of war; and as hitherto you have been indulgent,even favorably disposed to us, we feel sure that you will not only remain inthis mind, but be even more friendly to us in the future. Nothing more to bedesired than this can come to men who think that the first condition ofhappiness is good deeds; the second, good repute.

CHAPTER I: By the Law of Nations navigation is freeto all persons whatsoever

My intention is to demonstrate briefly and clearly that the Dutch—that is tosay, the subjects of the United Netherlands—have the right to sail to the EastIndies, as they are now doing, and to engage in trade with the people there. Ishall base my argument on the following most specific and unimpeachable axiomof the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit ofwhich is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel toevery other nation, and to trade with it.

God Himself says this speaking through the voice of nature; and inasmuch asit is not His will to have Nature supply every place with all the necessariesof life, He ordains that some nations excel in one art and others in another.Why is this His will, except it be that He wished human friendships to beengendered by mutual needs and resources, lest individuals deeming themselvesentirely sufficient unto themselves should for that very reason be renderedunsociable? So by the decree of divine justice it was brought about that onepeople should supply the needs of another, in order, as Pliny the Roman writersays, [1] that in this way, whatever has been produced anywhere should seem tohave been destined for all. Vergil also sings in this wise:

- “Not every plant on every soil will grow,” [2]

and in another place:

“Let others better mould the running mass Of metals,” etc. [3]

Those therefore who deny this law, destroy this most praiseworthy bond ofhuman fellowship, remove the opportunities for doing mutual service, in a worddo violence to Nature herself. For do not the ocean, navigable in everydirection with which God has encompassed all the earth, and the regular and theoccasional winds which blow now from one quarter and now from another, offersufficient proof that Nature has given to all peoples a right of access to allother peoples? Seneca [1] thinks this is Nature’s greatest service, that by the wind she unitedthe widely scattered peoples, and yet did so distribute all her products overthe earth that commercial intercourse was a necessity to mankind. Thereforethis right belongs equally to all nations. Indeed the most famous jurists [2] extend its application so far as to deny that any state or any rulercan debar foreigners from having access to their subjects and trading withthem. Hence is derived that law of hospitality which is of the highestsanctity; hence the complaint of the poet Vergil:

- “What men, what monsters, what inhuman race,

- What laws, what barbarous customs of the place,

- Shut up a desert shore to drowning men,

- And drive us to the cruel seas again.” [3]

And:

- “To beg what you without your want may spare—

- The common water, and the common air.” [4]

We know that certain wars have arisen over this very matter;such for example as the war of the Megarians against theAthenians, [1] and that of the Bolognese against the Venetians. [2] Again, Victoria [3] holds that the Spaniards could have shown just reasons for making warupon the Aztecs and the Indians in America, more plausible reasons certainlythan were alleged, if they really were prevented from traveling or sojourningamong those peoples, and were denied the right to share in those things whichby the Law of Nations or by Custom are common to all, and finally if they weredebarred from trade.

We read of a similar case in the history of Moses, [4] which we find mentioned also in the writings of Augustine, [5] where the Israelites justly smote with the edge of the sword theAmorites because they had denied the Israelites an innocent passage throughtheir territory, a right which according to the Law of Human Society ought inall justice to have been allowed. In defense of this principle Herculesattacked the king of Orchomenus in Boeotia; and the Greeks under their leaderAgamemnon waged war against the king of Mysia [6] on the ground that, as Baldus [7] has said, high roads were freeby nature. Again, as we read in Tacitus, [1] the Germans accused the Romans of ‘preventing all intercourse betweenthem and of closing up to them the rivers and roads, and almost the very air ofheaven’. When in days gone by the Christians made crusades against theSaracens, no other pretext was so welcome or so plausible as that they weredenied by the infidels free access to the Holy Land. [2]

It follows therefore that the Portuguese, even if they had been sovereignsin those parts to which the Dutch make voyages, would nevertheless be doingthem an injury if they should forbid them access to those places and fromtrading there.

Is it not then an incalculably greater injury for nations which desirereciprocal commercial relations to be debarred therefrom by the acts of thosewho are sovereigns neither of the nations interested, nor of the element overwhich their connecting high road runs? Is not that the very cause which for themost part prompts us to execrate robbers and pirates, namely, that they besetand infest our trade routes?

CHAPTER II: The Portuguese have no right by title ofdiscovery to sovereignty over the East Indies to which the Dutch makevoyages

The Portuguese are not sovereigns of those parts of the East Indies to whichthe Dutch sail, that is to say, Java, Ceylon, [*] and many of the Moluccas. This I prove by the incontrovertible argumentthat no one is sovereign of a thing which he himself has never possessed, andwhich no one else has ever held in his name. These islands of which we speak,now have and always have had their own kings, their own government, their ownlaws, and their own legal systems. The inhabitants allow the Portuguese totrade with them, just as they allow other nations the same privilege.Therefore, inasmuch as the Portuguese pay tolls, and obtain leave to trade fromthe rulers there, they thereby give sufficient proof that they do not go thereas sovereigns but as foreigners. Indeed they only reside there on suffrance.And although the title to sovereignty is not sufficient, inasmuch as possessionis a prerequisite—for having a thing is quite different from having the rightto acquire it—nevertheless I affirm that in those places the Portuguese have notitle at all to sovereignty which is not denied them by the opinion of learnedmen, even of the Spaniards.

First of all, if they say that those lands have come under theirjurisdiction as the reward of discovery, THEY LIE, both in law and in fact. Forto discover a thing is not only to seize it with the eyes but to take realpossession thereof,as Gordian [1] points out in one of his letters. For that reason the Grammarians [2] give the same signification to the expressions ‘to find’ or ‘todiscover’ and ‘to take possession of’ or ‘to occupy’; and all the Latin withwhich I am acquainted tells us that the opposite of ‘to find’ [3] is ‘to lose’. However, natural reason itself, the precise words of thelaw, and the interpretation of the more learned men [4] all show clearly that the act of discovery is sufficient to give aclear title of sovereignty only when it is accompanied by actual possession.And this only applies of course to movables or to such immovables as areactually inclosed within fixed bounds and guarded. [5] No such claim can be established in the present case, because thePortuguese maintain no garrisons in those regions. Neither can the Portugueseby any possible means claim to have discovered India, a country which wasfamous centuries and centuries ago! It was already known as early as the timeof the emperor Augustus as the following quotation from Horace shows:

- “That worst of evils, poverty, to shun

- Dauntless through seas, and rocks, and fires you run

- To furthest Ind,” [6]

And have not the Romans described for us in the most exact waythe greater part of Ceylon? [7] And as far as the other islands are concerned, not only the neighboringPersians and Arabs, but even Europeans, particularlythe Venetians, knew them long before the Portuguese did.

But in addition to all this, discovery per se gives nolegal rights over things unless before the alleged discovery they were res nullius. [1] Now these Indians of the East, on the arrival of the Portuguese,although some of them were idolators, and some Mohammedans, and therefore sunkin grievous sin, had none the less perfect public and private ownership oftheir goods and possessions, from which they could not be dispossessed withoutjust cause. [2] The Spanish writer Victoria, [3] following other writers of the highest authority, has the most certainwarrant for his conclusion that Christians, whether of the laity or of theclergy, cannot deprive infidels of their civil power and sovereignty merely onthe ground that they are infidels, unless some other wrong has been done bythem.

For religious belief, as Thomas Aquinas [4] rightly observes, does not do away with either natural or human lawfrom which sovereignty is derived. Surely it is a heresy to believe thatinfidels are not masters of their own property; consequently, to take from themtheir possessions on account of their religious belief is no less theft androbbery than it would be in the case of Christians.

Victoria then is right in saying [5] that the Spaniards have no more legal right over the East Indiansbecause of their religion, than the East Indians would have had over theSpaniards if they had happened to be the first foreigners to come to Spain. Norare the East Indians stupid and unthinking; on the contrary they areintelligent and shrewd,so that a pretext for subduing them on the ground oftheir character could not be sustained. Such a pretext on its very face is aninjustice. Plutarch said long ago that it was greed that furnished the pretextfor conquering barbarous countries, and it is not unsuspected that greedylonging for the property of another often hid itself behind a pretext ofcivilizing barbarians. And now that well-known pretext of forcing nations intoa higher state of civilization against their will, the pretext once monopolizedby the Greeks and by Alexander the Great, is considered by all theologians,especially those of Spain, [1] to be unjust and unholy.

CHAPTER III: The Portuguese have no right ofsovereignty over the East Indies by virtue of title based on the PapalDonation

Next, if the partition made by the Pope Alexander VI [*] is to be used by the Portuguese as authority for jurisdiction in theEast Indies, then before all things else two points must be taken intoconsideration.

First, did the Pope merely desire to settle the disputes between thePortuguese and the Spaniards?

This was clearly within his power, inasmuch as he had been chosen toarbitrate between them, and in fact the kings of both countries had previouslyconcluded certain treaties with each other on this very matter. [1] Now if this be the case, seeing that the question concerns only thePortuguese and Spaniards, the decision of the Pope will of course not affectthe other peoples of the world.

Second, did the Pope intend to give to two nations, each one third of thewhole world?

But even if the Pope had intended and had had the power to make such a gift,still it would not have made the Portuguese sovereigns of those places. For itis not a donation that makes a sovereign, it is the consequent delivery of athing [2] and the subsequent possession thereof.

Now, if any one will scrutinize either divine or human law, not merely witha view to his own interests, he willeasily apprehend that a donation of this kind,dealing with the property of others, is of no effect. I shall not enter hereupon any discussion as to the power of the Pope, that is the Bishop of theRoman Church, nor shall I advance anything but a hypothesis which is acceptedby men of the greatest erudition, who lay the greatest stress on the power ofthe Pope, especially the Spaniards, who with their perspicacity easily see thatour Lord Jesus Christ when he said “My kingdom is not of this world” therebyrenounced all earthly power, [1] and that while He was on earth as a man, He certainly did not havedominion over the whole world, and if He had had such dominion, still by noarguments could such a right be transferred to Peter, or be transmitted to theRoman Church by authority of the ‘Vicar of Christ’; indeed, inasmuch as Christhad many things to which the Pope did not succeed, [2] it has been boldly affirmed—and I shall use the very words of thewriters—that the Pope is neither civil nor temporal Lord of the whole world. [3] On the contrary, even if the Pope did have any such power on earth,still he would not be right in using it, because he ought to be satisfied withhis own spiritual jurisdiction, and be utterly unable to grant that power totemporal princes. So then, if the Pope has any power at all, he has it, as theysay, in the spiritual realm only. [4] Therefore he has no authority over infidel nations, for they do notbelong to the Church. [5]

It follows therefore according to the opinions ofCajetan and Victoria and the more authoritative ofthe Theologians and writers on Canon Law, [1] that there is no clear title against the East Indians, based either onthe ground that the Pope made an absolute grant of those provinces as if hewere their sovereign, or on the pretext that the East Indians do not recognizehis sovereignty. Indeed, and in truth, it may be affirmed that no such pretextas that was ever invoked to despoil even the Saracens.

CHAPTER IV: The Portuguese have no right ofsovereignty over the East Indies by title of war

Since it is clear, (as Victoria also says), [1] from the refutation of any claim to title from the Pope’s Donation,that the Spaniards when they sailed to those distant lands did not carry withthem any right to occupy them as provinces, only one kind of title remains tobe considered, namely, that based upon war. But even if this title could bejustified, it would not serve to establish sovereignty, except by right ofconquest, that is to say, occupation would be a prerequisite. But thePortuguese were as far as possible from occupation of those lands. They werenot even at war with most of the peoples whom the Dutch visited. So thereforeno legal claim could be established there by the Portuguese, because even ifthey had suffered wrongs from the East Indians, it might reasonably beconsidered by the long peace and friendly commercial relations that thoseinjuries had been forgiven.

Indeed there was no pretext at all for going to war. For those who force warupon barbarous peoples, as the Spaniards did upon the aborigines of America,commonly allege one of two pretexts: either that they have been refused theright to trade, or that the barbarians are unwilling to acknowledge thedoctrines of the True Faith. But as the Portuguese actually obtained from theEast Indians the right to trade, [2] they have, on that score at least, nogrounds of complaint. Nor is there any betterjustification for the other pretext than the one alleged by the Greeks againstthe barbarians, to which Boëthius makes the following allusion:

- “Unjust and cruel wars they wage,

- And haste with flying darts the death to meet or deal.

- No right nor reason can they show;

- ’Tis but because their lands and laws are not the same.” [1]

Moreover the verdict of Thomas Aquinas, of the Council of Toledo, ofGregory, and of nearly all theologians, canonists, and jurists, is as follows: [2] However persuasively and sufficiently the True Faith has been preachedto the heathen—former subjects of Christian princes or apostates are quiteanother question—if they are unwilling to heed it, that is not sufficient causeto justify war upon them, or to despoil them of their goods. [3]

It is worth while on this point to quote the actual words of Cajetan: [4] ‘There are some infidels who are neither in law nor in fact under thetemporal jurisdiction of Christian princes; just as there were pagans who werenever subjects of the Roman Empire, and yet who inhabit lands where the name ofChrist was never heard. Now their rulers, though heathen, are legitimaterulers, whether the people live under a monarchical or a democratic régime.They are not to be deprived of sovereignty over their possessionsbecause of their unbelief, since sovereignty is amatter of positive law, and unbelief is a matter of divine law, which cannotannual positive law, as has been argued above. In fact I know of no law againstsuch unbelievers as regards their temporal possessions. Against them no King,no Emperor, not even the Roman Church, can declare war for the purpose ofoccupying their lands, or of subjecting them to temporal sway. For there is nojust cause for war, since Jesus Christ the King of Kings, to whom all power wasgiven in heaven and on earth, sent out for the conquest of the world not armedsoldiers, but holy disciples, “as sheep in the midst of wolves.” Nor do I readin the Old Testament, when possession had to be obtained by force of arms, thatthe Israelites waged war on any heathen land because of the unbelief of itsinhabitants; but it was because the heathen refused them the right of innocentpassage, or attacked them, as the Midianites did; or it was to recover thepossessions which had been bestowed upon them by divine bounty. Wherefore weshould be most miserable sinners if we should attempt to extend the religion ofJesus Christ by such means. Nor should we be their lawful rulers, but, on thecontrary, we should be committing great robberies, and be compelled to makerestitution as unjust conquerors and invaders. There must be sent to them aspreachers, good men to convert them to God by their teaching and example; notmen who will oppress them, despoil them, subdue and proselytize them, and “makethem twofold more the children of hell than themselves,” [*] after the manner of the Pharisees’.

Indeed I have often heard that it has been decreed by the Council of Spain,and by the Churchmen, especially the Dominicans, that the Americans (Aztecs andIndians) should be converted to the Faith by the preaching of the Word alone,and not by war, and even that their liberty ofwhich they had been robbed in the name of religionshould be restored. This policy is said to have received the approval of PopePaul III, and of Emperor Charles V, King of the Spains.

I pass over the fact that the Portuguese in most places do not further theextension of the faith, or indeed, pay any attention to it at all, since theyare alive only to the acquisition of wealth. Nay, the very thing that is trueof them, is the very thing which has been written of the Spaniards in Americaby a Spaniard, namely, that nothing is heard of miracles or wonders or examplesof devout and religious life such as might convert others to the same faith,but on the other hand no end of scandals, of crimes, of impious deeds.

Wherefore, since both possession and a title of possession are lacking, andsince the property and the sovereignty of the East Indies ought not to beconsidered as if they had previously been res nullius, andsince, as they belong to the East Indians, they could not have been acquiredlegally by other persons, it follows that the East Indian nations in questionare not the chattels of the Portuguese, but are free men and sui juris. This is not denied even by the Spanish juriststhemselves. [1]

CHAPTER V: Neither the Indian Ocean nor the rightof navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of occupation

If therefore the Portuguese have acquired no legal right over the nations ofthe East Indies, and their territory and sovereignty, let us consider whetherthey have been able to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the sea and itsnavigation or over trade. Let us first consider the case of the sea.

Now, in the legal phraseology of the Law of Nations, the sea is calledindifferently the property of no one ( res nullius ), or acommon possession ( res communis ), or public property ( res publica ). It will be most convenient to explain thesignification of these terms if we follow the practice of all the poets sinceHesiod, of the philosophers and jurists of the past, and distinguish certainepochs, the divisions of which are marked off perhaps not so much by intervalsof time as by obvious logic and essential character. And we ought not to becriticised if in our explanation of a law deriving from nature, we use theauthority and definition of those whose natural judgment admittedly is held inthe highest esteem.

It is therefore necessary to explain that in the earliest stages of humanexistence both sovereignty and common possession had meanings other than thosewhich they bear at the present time. [1] For nowadays sovereignty means a particular kind of proprietorship,such in fact that it absolutely excludes like possession by any one else. Onthe other hand, we call a thing ‘common’ when its ownershipor possession is held by several persons jointlyaccording to a kind of partnership or mutual agreement from which all otherpersons are excluded. Poverty of language compels the use of the same words forthings that are not the same. And so because of a certain similarity andlikeness, our modern nomenclature is applied to that state of primitive law.Now, in ancient times, ‘common’ meant simply the opposite of ‘particular’; and‘sovereignty’ or ‘ownership’, meant the privilege of lawfully using commonproperty. This seemed to the Scholastics [1] to be a use in fact but not in law, because what now in law is calleduse, is a particular right, or if I may use their phraseology, is, in respectto other persons, a privative right.

In the primitive law of nations, which is sometimes called Natural Law, andwhich the poets sometimes portray as having existed in a Golden Age, andsometimes in the reign of Saturn or of Justice, there was no particular right.As Cicero says: ‘But nothing is by nature private property’. And Horace: [2] ‘For nature has decreed to be the master of private soil neither him,nor me, nor anyone else’. For nature knows no sovereigns. Therefore in thissense we say that in those ancient times all things were held in common,meaning what the poets do when they say that primitive men acquired everythingin common, and that Justice maintained a community of goods by means of aninviolable compact. And to make this clearer, they say that in those primitivetimes the fields were not delimited by boundary lines, and that there was nocommercial intercourse. Avienus says: [3] ‘It seemed that all lands without distinction were common to all’.

The word ‘seemed’ is rightly added, owing to the changed meaning of thewords, as we have noted above.But that kind of common possession relates to use, asis seen from a quotation from Seneca: [1]

- “Every path was free,

- All things were used in common.”

According to his reasoning there was a kind of sovereignty, butit was universal and unlimited. For God had not given all things to thisindividual or to that, but to the entire human race, and thus a number ofpersons, as it were en masse, were not debarred from beingsubstantially sovereigns or owners of the same thing, which is quitecontradictory to our modern meaning of sovereignty. For it now impliesparticular or private ownership, a thing which no one then had. Avienus hassaid very pertinently: [2] ‘All things belonged to him who had possession of them’.

It seems certain that the transition to the present distinction ofownerships did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself pointing outthe way. For since there are some things, the use of which consists in theirbeing used up, either because having become part of the very substance of theuser they can never be used again, or because by use they become less fit forfuture use, it has become apparent, especially in dealing with the firstcategory, such things as food and drink for example, that a certain kind ofownership is inseparable from use. [3] For ‘own’ implies that a thing belongs to some one person, in such away that it cannot belong to any other person. By the process of reasoning thiswas next extended to things of the second category, such as clothes andmovables and some living things.

When that had come about, not even immovables, such,for instance, as fields, could remain unapportioned.For although their use does not consist merely in consumption, nevertheless itis bound up with subsequent consumption, as fields and plants are used to getfood, and pastures to get clothing. There is, however, not enough fixedproperty to satisfy the use of everybody indiscriminately.

When property or ownership was invented, the law of property was establishedto imitate nature. For as that use began in connection with bodily needs, fromwhich as we have said property first arose, so by a similar connection it wasdecided that things were the property of individuals. This is called‘occupation’, a word most appropriate to those things which in former times hadbeen held in common. It is this to which Seneca alludes in his tragedyThyestes,

“Crime is between us to be seized by one.” [1]

And in one of his philosophical writings he also says: [2] ‘The equestrian rows of seats belong to all the equites; nevertheless,the seat of which I have taken possession is my own private place’. Further,Quintilian remarks [3] that a thing which is created for all is the reward of industry, andCicero says [4] that things which have been occupied for a long time become theproperty of those who originally found them unoccupied.

This occupation or possession, however, in the case of things which resistseizure, like wild animals for example, must be uninterrupted or perpetuallymaintained, but in the case of other things it is sufficient if after physicalpossession is once taken the intention to possess is maintained. Possession ofmovables implies seizure, and possession ofimmovables either the erection of buildings or somedetermination of boundaries, such as fencing in. Hence Hermogenianus, inspeaking of separate ownerships, adds the boundaries set to the fields and thebuildings thereon constructed. [1] This state of things is described thus by the poets Vergil andOvid:

- “Then toils for beasts, and lime for birds, were found,” [2]

- Then first men made homes.

- “Then landmarks limited to each his right,

- For all before was common as the light.” [3]

In still another place, as Hermogenianus points out, Ovidpraises commerce, for the sake of which: [4]

- ‘Ships in triumph sail the unknown seas’.

At the same time, however, states began to be established, andso two categories were made of the things which had been wrested away fromearly ownership in common. For some things were public, that is, were theproperty of the people (which is the real meaning of that expression), whileother things were private, that is, were the property of individuals.Ownership, however, both public and private, arises in the same way. On thispoint Seneca says: [5] ‘We speak in general of the land of the Athenians or the Campanians. Itis the same land which again by means of private boundaries is divided amongindividual owners’.‘For each nation’, Seneca says in another place,‘made its territories into separate kingdoms and built new cities’. [1] Thus Cicero says: “On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said tobelong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar isthe assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some ofthose things which by nature had been common property became the property ofindividuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to hislot.” [2] On the other hand Thucydides [3] calls the land which in the division falls to no nation,ἀόριστος, that is,undefined, and undetermined by boundaries. [4]

Two conclusions may be drawn from what has thus far been said. The first is,that that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been occupied, cannot bethe property of any one, because all property has arisen from occupation. Thesecond is, that all that which has been so constituted by nature that althoughserving some one person it still suffices for the common use of all otherpersons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition aswhen it was first created by nature. This is what Cicero meant when he wrote:“This then is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men andall to all; and under it the common right to all things that nature hasproduced for the common use of man is to be maintained.” [5] All things which can be used without loss to any one else come underthis category. Hence, says Cicero, comes the well known prohibition: [6] ‘Deny no one the water that flows by’. For running water considered assuch and not as astream, is classed by the jurists among the thingscommon to all mankind; as is done also by Ovid: [1] ‘Why do you deny me water? Its use is free to all. Nature has madeneither sun nor air nor waves private property; they are public gifts’.

He says that these things are not by nature private possession, but that, asUlpian claims, [2] they are by nature things open to the use of all, both because in thefirst place they were produced by nature, and have never yet come under thesovereignty of any one, as Neratius says; [3] and in the second place because, as Cicero says, they seem to have beencreated by nature for common use. But the poet uses ‘public’, in its usualmeaning, not of those things which belong to any one people, but to humansociety as a whole; that is to say, things which are called ‘public’ are,according to the Laws of the law of nations, the common property of all, andthe private property of none.

The air belongs to this class of things for two reasons. First, it is notsusceptible of occupation; and second its common use is destined for all men.For the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless thatit cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the useof all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or offisheries. Now, the same right which applies to the sea applies also to thethings which the sea has carried away from other uses and made its own, suchfor example as the sands of the sea, of which the portion adjoining the land iscalled the coast or shore. [4] Cicero therefore argues correctly: [5] ‘What is so common asthe sea for those who are being tossed upon it, theshore for those who have been cast thereon’. Vergil also says that the air, thesea, and the shore are open to all men.

These things therefore are what the Romans call ‘common’ to all men bynatural law, [1] or as we have said, ‘public’ according to the law of nations; andindeed they call their use sometimes common, sometimes public. Nevertheless,although those things are with reason said to be resnullius, so far as private ownership is concerned, still they differ verymuch from those things which, though also res nullius, have not been marked out for common use, such for example as wild animals,fish, and birds. For if any one seizes those things and assumes possession ofthem, they can become objects of private ownership, but the things in theformer category by the consensus of opinion of all mankind are forever exemptfrom such private ownership on account of their susceptibility to universaluse; and as they belong to all they cannot be taken away from all by any oneperson any more than what is mine can be taken away from me by you. And Cicerosays that one of the first gifts of Justice is the use of common property forcommon benefit. The Scholastics would define one of these categories as commonin an affirmative, the other in a privative sense. This distinction is not onlyfamiliar to jurists, but it also expresses the popular belief. In Athenaeus forinstance the host is made to say that the sea is the common property of all,but that fish are the private property of him who catches them. And in Plautus’Rudens when the slave says: [2] ‘The sea is certainly common to all persons’, the fisherman agrees; butwhen the slave adds: ‘Then what is found in the common sea is common property’,he rightly objects, saying: ‘But what my net and hooks have taken, isabsolutely my own’.

Therefore the sea can in no way become the private property of any one,because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use. [1] Neither can the shore become the private property of any one. Thefollowing qualification, however, must be made. If any part of these things isby nature susceptible of occupation, it may become the property of the one whooccupies it only so far as such occupation does not affect its common use. Thisqualification is deservedly recognized. For in such a case both conditionsvanish through which it might eventuate, as we have said, that all of it wouldpass into private ownership.

Since therefore, to cite Pomponius, building is one kind of occupation, itis permissible to build upon the shore, if this can be done withoutinconvenience to other people; [2] that is to say (I here follow Scaevola) if such building can be donewithout hindrance to public or common use of the shore. And whoever shall haveconstructed a building under the aforesaid circumstances will become the ownerof the ground upon which said building is; because this ground is neither theproperty of any one else, nor is it necessary to common use. It becomestherefore the property of the occupier, but his ownership lasts no longer thanhis occupation lasts, inasmuch as the sea seems by nature to resist ownership.For just as a wild animal, if it shall have escaped and thus recovered itsnatural liberty, is no longer the property of its captor, so also the sea mayrecover its possession of the shore.

We have now shown that whatever by occupation can become private propertycan also become public property, that is, the private property of a wholenation. [3] And so Celsus considered the shore included within the limits of theRoman Empire to be the property of the Roman people.There is not therefore the least reason for surprisethat the Roman people through their emperors or praetors was able to grant toits subjects the right of occupying the shore. This public occupation, however,no less than private occupation, was subject to the restriction that it shouldnot infringe on international rights. Therefore the Roman people could notforbid any one from having access to the seashore, [1] and from spreading his fishing nets there to dry, and from doing otherthings which all men long ago decided were always permissible.

The nature of the sea, however, differs from that of the shore, because thesea, except for a very restricted space, can neither easily be built upon, norinclosed; if the contrary were true yet this could hardly happen withouthindrance to the general use. Nevertheless, if any small portion of the sea canbe thus occupied, the occupation is recognized. The famous hyperbole of Horacemust be quoted here: “The fishes note the narrowing of the waters by piers ofrock laid in their depths.” [2]

Now Celsus holds that piles driven into the sea belong to the man who drovethem. [3] But such an act is not permissible if the use of the sea be therebyimpaired. And Ulpian says that whoever builds a breakwater must see to it thatit is not prejudicial to the interests of any one; for if this construction islikely to work an injury to any one, the injunction ‘Nothing may be built onpublic property’ would apply. Labeo, however, holds that in case any suchconstruction should be made in the sea, the following injunction is to beenforced: ‘Nothing may be built in the sea whereby the harbor, the roadstead,or the channel be rendered less safe for navigation’. [4]

Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies also to fishing,namely, that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless there shall be noprejudice if any one shall by fencing off with stakes an inlet of the sea makea fish pond for himself, and so establish a private preserve. Thus Lucullusonce brought the water of the sea to his villa by cutting a tunnel through amountain near Naples. [1] I suspect too that the seawater reservoirs for fish mentioned by Varroand Columella were of this sort. And Martial had the same thing in mind when hesays of the Formian villa of Apollinaris: [2] ‘Whenever Nereus feels the power of Aeolus, the table safe in its ownresources laughs at the gale’. Ambrose also has something to say on the samesubject: [3] ‘You bring the very sea into your estates that you may not lack forfish’. In the light of all this the meaning of Paulus is clear when he says [4] that if any one has a private right over the sea, the rule uti possidetis applies. This rule however is applicableonly to private suits, and not to public ones, among which are also to beincluded those suits which can be brought under the common law of nations. Buthere the question is one which concerns the right of use arising in a privatesuit, but not in a public or common one. For according to the authority ofMarcianus whatever has been occupied and can be occupied [5] is no longer subject to the law of nations as the sea is. Let us takean example. If any one had prevented Lucullus or Apollinaris from fishing inthe private fish ponds which they had made by inclosing a small portion of thesea, according to the opinion of Paulus they would have the right of bringingan injunction, not merely an action for damages basedon private ownership. [1]

Indeed, if I shall have staked off such an inclosure in an inlet of the sea,just as in a branch of a river, and have fished there, especially if by doingso continuously for many years I shall have given proof of my intention toestablish private ownership, I shall certainly prevent any one else fromenjoying the same rights. I gather from Marcianus that this case is identicalwith that of the ownership of a lake, and it is true however long occupationlasts, as we have said above about the shore. But outside of an inlet this willnot hold, for then the common use of the sea might be hindered. [2]

Therefore if any one is prevented from fishing in front of my town house orcountry seat, it is a usurpation, but an illegal one, although Ulpian, whorather makes light of this usurpation, does say that if any one is so preventedhe can bring an action for damages. [3] The Emperor Leo, whose laws we do not use, contrary to the intent ofthe law, changed this, and declared that the entrances, or vestibules as itwere, to the sea, were the private property of those who inhabited the shore,and that they had the right of fishing there. [4] However he attached this condition, that the place should be occupiedby certain jetty or pile constructions, such as the Greeks callἐποχαί, thinkingdoubtless that no one who was himself allowed to fish anywhere in the sea wouldgrudge any one else a small portion of it. To be sure it would be anintolerable outrage for any one to snatch away, even if he could do so, frompublic use a large area of the sea; an act which is justly reprehended by theHoly Man, [5] who says: ‘The lords of the earth claim forthemselves a wide expanse of sea by jus mancipii, and they regard the right of fishing as aservitude over which their right is the same as that over their slaves. Thatgulf, says one, belongs to me, and that gulf to some one else. They divide thevery elements among themselves, these great men’!

Therefore the sea is one of those things which is not an article ofmerchandise, [1] and which cannot become private property. Hence it follows, to speakstrictly, that no part of the sea can be considered as the territory of anypeople whatsoever. Placentinus seems to have recognized this when he said: ‘Thesea is a thing so clearly common to all, that it cannot be the property of anyone save God alone’. Johannes Faber [2] also asserts that the sea has been left sui juris, and remains in the primitive condition where all things were common. If it wereotherwise there would be no difference between the things which are ‘common toall’, and those which are strictly termed ‘public’; no difference, that is,between the sea and a river. A nation can take possession of a river, as it isinclosed within their boundaries, with the sea, they cannot do so.

Now, public territory arises out of the occupation of nations, just asprivate property arises out of the occupation of individuals. This isrecognized by Celsus, who has drawn a sharp distinction between the shores ofthe sea, [3] which the Roman people could occupy in such a way that its common usewas not harmed, and the sea itself, which retained its primitive nature. Infact no law intimates a contrary view. [4] Such laws as are cited by writers who are ofthe contrary opinion apply either to islands, whichevidently could be occupied, or to harbors, which are not ‘common’, but‘public’, that is, ‘national’.

Now those who say that a certain sea belonged to the Roman people explaintheir statement to mean that the right of the Romans did not extend beyondprotection and jurisdiction; this right they distinguish from ownership.Perchance they do not pay sufficient attention to the fact that although theRoman People were able to maintain fleets for the protection of navigation andto punish pirates captured on the sea, it was not done by private right, but bythe common right which other free peoples also enjoy on the sea. We recognize,however, that certain peoples have agreed that pirates captured in this or inthat part of the sea should come under the jurisdiction of this state or ofthat, and further that certain convenient limits of distinct jurisdiction havebeen apportioned on the sea. Now, this agreement does bind those who areparties to it, [1] but it has no binding force on other nations, nor does it make thedelimited area of the sea the private property of any one. It merelyconstitutes a personal right between contracting parties.

This distinction so conformable to natural reason is also confirmed by areply once made by Ulpian. Upon being asked whether the owner of two maritimeestates could on selling either of them impose on it such a servitude as theprohibition of fishing in a particular part of the sea, he replied that thething in question, evidently the sea, could not be subjected to a servitude,because it was by nature open to all persons; but that since a contract made ingood faith demands that the condition of a sale be respected, the presentpossessors and those who succeed totheir rights were bound to observe that condition. Itis true that the jurist is speaking of private estates and of private law, butin speaking here of the territory of peoples and of public law the samereasoning applies, because from the point of view of the whole human racepeoples are treated as individuals.

Similarly, revenues levied on maritime fisheries are held to belong to theCrown, but they do not bind the sea itself or the fisheries, but only thepersons engaged in fishing. [1] Wherefore subjects, for whom a state or a ruler is by common consentcompetent to make laws, will perhaps be compelled to bear such charges, but sofar as other persons are concerned the right of fishing ought everywhere to beexempt from tolls, lest a servitude be imposed upon the sea, which is notsusceptible to a servitude.

The case of the sea is not the same as that of a river, [2] for as a river is the property of a nation, the right to fish in it canbe passed or leased by the nation or by the ruler, in such a way (and the likeis true with the ancients) that the lessee enjoys the operation of theinjunction de loco publico fruendo by virtue of the clause‘He who has the right to lease has leased the exclusive right of enjoyment’. [3] Such a condition cannot arise in respect to the sea. Finally those whocount fishing among the properties of the Crown have not examined carefullyenough the very passage which they cite to prove their contention, as Isernia [*] and Alvotus [†] have noticed.

It has therefore been demonstrated [4] that neither a nation nor an individual can establish any right ofprivate ownershipover the sea itself (I except inlets of the sea),inasmuch as its occupation is not permissible either by nature or on grounds ofpublic utility. The discussion of this matter has been taken up for thisreason, namely, that it may be seen that the Portuguese have not establishedprivate ownership over the sea by which people go to the East Indies. For thetwo reasons that stand in the way of ownership are in this case infinitely morepowerful than in all others. That which in other cases seems difficult, is hereabsolutely impossible; and what in other cases we recognize as unjust is heremost barbarous and inhuman.

The question at issue then is not one that concerns an INNER SEA, one whichis surrounded on all sides by the land and at some places does not even exceeda river in breadth, although it is well known that the Roman jurists cited suchan inner sea in their famous opinions condemning private avarice. No! thequestion at issue is the OUTER SEA, the OCEAN, that expanse of water whichantiquity describes as the immense, the infinite, bounded only by the heavens,parent of all things; the ocean which the ancients believed was perpetuallysupplied with water not only by fountains, rivers, and seas, but by the clouds,and by the very stars of heaven themselves; the ocean which, althoughsurrounding this earth, the home of the human race, with the ebb and flow ofits tides, can be neither seized nor inclosed; nay, which rather possesses theearth than is by it possessed.

Further, the question at issue does not concern a gulf or a strait in thisocean, nor even all the expanse of sea which is visible from the shore. [Butconsider this!!] The Portuguese claim as their own the whole expanse of the seawhich separates two parts of the world so far distant the one from the other,that in all the preceding centuries neither one has so much as heard of theother. Indeed, if we take into account the share of the Spaniards, whose claimis the same as that of the Portuguese, only a littleless than the whole ocean is found to be subject to two nations, while all therest of the peoples in the world are restricted to the narrow bounds of thenorthern seas. Nature was greatly deceived if when she spread the sea aroundall peoples she believed that it would also be adequate for the use of themall. If in a thing so vast as the sea a man were to reserve to himself fromgeneral use nothing more than mere sovereignty, still he would be considered aseeker after unreasonable power. If a man were to enjoin other people fromfishing, he would not escape the reproach of monstrous greed. But the man whoeven prevents navigation, a thing which means no loss to himself, what are weto say of him?

If any person should prevent any other person from taking fire from his fireor a light from his torch, I should accuse him of violating the law of humansociety, because that is the essence of its very nature, as Ennius hassaid:

“No less shines his, when he his friend’s hath lit.” [1]

Why then, when it can be done without any prejudice to his own interests,will not one person share with another things which are useful to therecipient, and no loss to the giver? [2] These are services which the ancient philosophers [3] thought ought to be rendered not only to foreigners but even renderedfor nothing. But the same act which when private possessions are in question isjealousy can be nothing but cruelty when a common possession is in question.For it is most outrageous for you to appropriate a thing, which both byordinance of nature and by common consent is as much mine as yours, soexclusively that you will not grant me a right of use in it which leaves it noless yours than it was before.

Nevertheless, even those who lay burdens upon foreigners, or appropriatethings common to all, rely upon a possession which is to some extent real. Forsince original occupation created private property, therefore detention of athing, though unjust, gives an appearance of ownership. But have the Portuguesecompletely covered the ocean, as we are wont to do on land, by laying outestates on it in such a way that they have the right to exclude from that oceanwhom they will? Not at all! On the contrary, they are so far from having doneso, that when they divide up the world to the disadvantage of other nations,they cannot even defend their action by showing any boundaries either naturalor artificial, but are compelled to fall back upon some imaginary line. Indeed,if that were a recognized method, and such a delimitation of boundaries weresufficient to make possession valid, our geometers long since would have gotpossession of the face of the earth, our astronomers of the very skies.

But where in this case is that corporal possession or physicalappropriation, without which no ownerships arise? There appears to be nothingtruer than what our learned jurists have enunciated, namely, [1] that since the sea is just as insusceptible of physical appropriationas the air, it cannot be attached to the possessions of any nation.

But if the Portuguese call occupying the sea merely tohave sailed over it before other people, and to have, as it were, opened theway, could anything in the world be more ridiculous? For, as there is no partof the sea on which some person has not already sailed, it will necessarilyfollow that every route of navigation is occupied by some one. Therefore wepeoples of today are all absolutely excluded. Why will not those men who havecircumnavigated the globe be justified in saying that they have acquired forthemselves the possession of the whole ocean! But thereis not a single person in the world who does not knowthat a ship sailing through the sea leaves behind it no more legal right thanit does a track. And as for the assumption of the Portuguese that no one hassailed that ocean before themselves, that is anything but true. For a greatpart of that sea near Morocco, which is in dispute, had already been navigatedlong before, and the sea as far east as the Arabian gulf has been made famousby the victories of Alexander the Great, as both Pliny and Mela tell us. [1]

There is also much to substantiate the belief that the inhabitants of Cadizwere well acquainted long ago with this route, because when Gaius Caesar, [*] the son of Augustus, held command in the Arabian gulf, pieces werefound of shipwrecks recognized as Spanish. Caelius Antipater also has told usin his writings that he himself saw a Spaniard who had sailed from Spain toEthiopia on a commercial voyage. Also the Arabians knew those seas, if thetestimony of Cornelius Nepos is to be believed, because he says that in his ownday a certain Eudoxus, fleeing from Lathyrus, king of Alexandria, sailed fromthe Arabian gulf and finally reached Cadiz. However, by far the most famousexample is that of the Carthaginians. Those most famous mariners were wellacquainted with that sea, because Hanno, when Carthage was at the height of herpower, sailing from Cadiz to the farthest confines of Arabia, and doubling thepromontory now known as the Cape of Good Hope (the ancient name seems to havebeen Hyperion Ceras), described in a book the entire route he had taken, theappearance of the coasts, and the location of the islands, declaring that atthe farthest point he reached the sea had not yet given out but his provisionshad.

Pliny’s description of the route to the East, [2] the embassiesfrom the Indies to Augustus, and those from Ceylon tothe emperor Claudius, and finally the accounts of the deeds of Trajan, and thewritings of Ptolemaeus, all make it quite clear that in the days of Rome’sgreatest splendor voyages were made regularly from the Arabian gulf to India,to the islands of the Indian ocean, and even so far as to the goldenChersonesus, which many people think was Japan. Strabo says [1] that in his own time a fleet of Alexandrian merchantmen set sail fromthe Arabian gulf for the distant lands of Ethiopia and India, although fewships had ever before attempted that voyage. The Roman people had a largerevenue from the East. Pliny says [2] that cohorts of archers were carried on the boats engaged in trade asprotection against pirates; he states also that every year India alone paidinto the Roman imperial treasury 500,000 sesterces, [*] or 1,000,000 sesterces if the revenues from Arabia and China be added;further, that the merchandise brought from the East sold for one hundred timesits original cost.

These examples cited from ancient times are sufficient proof that thePortuguese were not the first in that part of the world. Long before they evercame, every single part of that ocean had been long since explored. For howpossibly could the Moors, the Ethiopians, the Arabians, the Persians, thepeoples of India, have remained in ignorance of that part of the sea adjacentto their coasts!

Therefore they lie, who today boast that they discovered that sea.

Well then, some one will say, does it seem to be a matter of little momentthat the Portuguese were the first to restore a navigation interrupted perhapsfor many centuries, and unknown—as cannot be denied—at least to the nations ofEurope, at great labor and cost and danger to themselves?On the contrary, if they had laid weight upon thefact that they were pointing out to all what they alone had rediscovered, thereis no one so lacking in sense that he would not acknowledge the greatestobligation to them. For the Portuguese will have earned the same thanks,praise, and immortal glory with which all discoverers of great things have beencontent, whenever they have striven to benefit not themselves but the wholehuman race. But if the Portuguese had before their eyes only their ownfinancial gain, surely their profit, which is always the largest for thosefirst in a new field of enterprise, ought to have satisfied them. For we knowthat their first voyages returned a profit sometimes of forty times theoriginal investment, and sometimes even more. And by this overseas trade it hascome about that a people, previously for a long time poor, have leaped suddenlyinto the possession of great riches, and have surrounded themselves with suchoutward signs of luxurious magnificence as scarcely the most prosperous nationshave been able to display at the height of their fortunes.

But if these Portuguese have led the way in this matter in order that no onemay follow them, then they do not deserve any thanks, inasmuch as they haveconsidered only their own profit. Nor can they call it their profit, becausethey are taking the profit of some one else. For it is not at all demonstrablethat, if the Portuguese had not gone to the East Indies, no one else would havegone. For the times were coming on apace in which along with other sciences thegeographical locations of seas and lands were being better known every day. Thereports of the expeditions of the ancients mentioned above had aroused people,and even if all foreign shores had not been laid open at a single stroke as itwere, yet they would have been brought to light gradually by sailing voyages,each new discovery pointing the way to the next. And so there would finallyhave been accomplished what the Portuguese showedcould be done, because there were many nations with no less ardor than theirsto engage in commerce and to learn of foreign things. The Venetians, whoalready knew much about India, were ready to push their knowledge farther; theindefatigable zeal of the French of Brittany, and the boldness of the Englishwould not have failed to make such an attempt; indeed the Dutch themselves haveembarked upon much more desperate enterprises.

Therefore the Portuguese have neither just reason nor respectable authorityto support their position, for all those persons who assume that the sea can besubjected to the sovereignty of any one assign it to him who holds in his powerthe nearest ports and the circumjacent shores. [1] But in all that great extent of coast line reaching to the East Indiesthe Portuguese have nothing which they can call their own except a fewfortified posts.

And then even if a man were to have dominion over the sea, still he couldnot take away anything from its common use, just as the Roman people could notprevent any one from doing on the shores of their dominions all those thingswhich were permitted by the law of nations. [2] And if it were possible to prohibit any of those things, say forexample, fishing, for in a way it can be maintained that fish are exhaustible,still it would not be possible to prohibit navigation, for the sea is notexhausted by that use.

The most conclusive argument on this question by far however is the one thatwe have already brought forward based on the opinions of eminent jurists,namely, that even over land which had been converted into private propertyeither by states or individuals, unarmed and innocent passage is not justly tobe denied to persons of any country, exactly as the right to drink from a riveris not to bedenied. The reason is clear, because, inasmuch as oneand the same thing is susceptible by nature to different uses, the nations seemon the one hand to have apportioned among themselves that use which cannot bemaintained conveniently apart from private ownership; but on the other hand tohave reserved that use through the exercise of which the condition of the ownerwould not be impaired.

It is clear therefore to every one that he who prevents another fromnavigating the sea has no support in law. Ulpian has said [1] that he was even bound to pay damages, and other jurists have thoughtthat the injunction utile prohibito could also be broughtagainst him. [2]

Finally, the relief prayed for by the Dutch rests upon a common right, sinceit is universally admitted that navigation on the sea is open to any one, evenif permission is not obtained from any ruler. And this is specificiallyexpressed in the Spanish laws. [3]

CHAPTER VI: Neither the Sea nor the right ofnavigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by virtue of title based on thePapal Donation

The Donation of Pope Alexander, inasmuch as the title based on discovery isseen to be deficient, may next be invoked by the Portuguese to justify theirexclusive appropriation of the sea and the right of navigation thereon. Butfrom what has been said above, that Donation is clearly convicted of being anact of empty ostentation. For a Donation has no effect on things outside therealm of trade. Wherefore since neither the sea nor the right of navigating itcan become the private property of any man, it follows that it could not havebeen given by the Pope, nor accepted by the Portuguese. Besides, as has beenmentioned above, following the opinion of all men of sound judgment, it issufficiently well recognized that the Pope is not the temporal lord of theearth, and certainly not of the sea. Even if it be granted for the sake ofargument that such were the case, still a right attaching to the Pontificateought not to be transferred wholly or in part to any king or nation. Similarlyno emperor could convert to his own uses or alienate at his own pleasure theprovinces of his empire. [1]

Now, inasmuch as no one concedes to the Pope in temporal matters a jus disponendi, except perhaps in so far as it is demandedby the necessity of spiritual matters, and inasmuch as the things now underdiscussion, namely, the sea and the right of navigating it, are concerned onlywith money and profits, not with piety, surely every one withany brains at all will agree that the Pope has nojurisdiction here. What of the fact that not even rulers, that is to say,temporal lords, can prohibit any one from navigation, since if they have anyright at all upon the sea it is merely one of jurisdiction and protection! Itis also a fact universally recognized that the Pope has no authority to commitacts repugnant to the law of nature. [1] But it is repugnant to the law of nature, as we have already provedbeyond a doubt, for any one to have as his own private property either the seaor its use. Finally, since the Pope is wholly unable to deprive any one of hisown rights, what defense will there be for that Donation of his, if by a wordhe intended to exclude so many innocent, uncondemned, and guiltless nationsfrom a right which belongs no less to them than to the Spaniards?

Therefore, either it must be affirmed that a pronunciamento of this sort hasno force, or, as is no less credible, that it was the desire of the Pope tointercede in the quarrel between the Spaniards and the Portuguese, and that hehad no concomitant intention of violating the rights of others.

CHAPTER VII: Neither the Sea nor the right ofnavigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of prescription orcustom

The last defense of injustice is usually a claim or plea based onprescription or on custom. To this defense therefore the Portuguese haveresorted. But the best established reasoning of the law precludes them fromenjoying the protection of either plea.

Prescription is a matter of municipal law; hence it cannot be applied asbetween kings, or as between free and independent nations. [1] It has even less standing when it is in conflict with that which isalways stronger than the municipal law, namely, the law of nature or nations.Nay, even municipal law itself prevents prescription in this case. [2] For it is impossible to acquire by usucaption or prescription thingswhich cannot become property, that is, which are not susceptible of possessionor of quasi-possession, and which cannot be alienated. All of which is truewith respect to the sea and its use.

And since public things, that is, things which are the property of a nation,cannot be acquired by mere efflux of time, either because of their nature, orbecause of the prerogatives of those against whom such prescription would act,is it not vastly more just that the benefits accruing from the enjoyment ofcommon things should be given to the entire human race than to one nationalone? On this pointPapinian has said: [1] ‘Prescription raised by long possession is not customarily recognizedas valid in the acquisition of places known to international law as “public” ’.As an example, to illustrate this point, he cites a shore some part of whichhad been occupied by means of a building constructed on it. But if thisbuilding should be destroyed, and some one else later should construct abuilding on the same spot, no exception could be taken to it. Then heillustrates the same point by the analogous case of a respublica. If, for example, any one has fished for many years in a branch ofa river, and has then stopped fishing there, after that he cannot prevent anyone else from enjoying the same right that he had.

Wherefore it appears that Angeli [2] and his followers who have said that the Venetians and Genoese wereable to acquire by prescription certain specific rights in the gulfs of the seaadjacent to their shores, either are mistaken, or are deceiving others; a thingwhich happens all too frequently with jurists when they exercise the authorityof their sacred profession not for justice and law, but in order to gain thegratitude of the powerful. There is also an opinion of Marcianus, already citedabove in another connection, which, when carefully compared with the words ofPapinian, [3] can have no other interpretation than the one formerly adopted byJohannes and Bartolus, [*] and now accepted by all learned men, [4] namely, that the jus prohibendi is in effect onlywhile occupation lasts; it loses its force if occupationcease; and occupation once interrupted, even if ithad been continuous for a thousand years, loses its rights, as Paul de Castro [*] justly observes. And even if Marcianus had meant—which certainly wasnot in his mind at all—that acquisition by prescription is to be recognizedwherever occupation is recognized, still it would have been absurd to applywhat had been said about a public river to the common sea, or what had beensaid about an inlet or a river branch to a bay, since in the former caseprescription would hinder the use of something common to all by the law ofnations, and in the latter case would work no small injury to public use.Moreover, another argument brought forward by Angeli based on the use ofaqueducts, [1] has quite properly been rejected by every one, being, as de Castropointed out, entirely aside from the point.

It is not true then that such prescription rises even at a time beyond theperiod of the memory of man. For since the law absolutely denies allprescription, not even immemorial time has any effect on the question; that is,as Felinus [2] says, things imprescriptible by nature do not become prescriptible bythe mere efflux of immemorial time. Balbus admits the truth of these arguments, [3] but says that the opinion of Angeli is to be accepted on the groundthat time immemorial is believed to have the same validity as prerogative forsetting up a title, since a perfect title is presumed from such efflux of time.Hence it appears that the jurists thought if some part of a state, say of theRoman empire for example, at a period before the memory of man had exercisedsuch a right, that a title by prescription wouldhave to be admitted on that ground, exactly as ifthere had been a previous grant from a Prince. But inasmuch as there is no onewho is sovereign of the whole human race with competence to grant to any man orto any nation such a right against all other men, with the annihilation of thatpretext, title by prescription is also necessarily destroyed. Therefore theopinion of the jurists is that not even an infinite lapse of time is able toset up a right as between kings or independent nations.

Moreover Angeli brought forward a most foolish argument, affirming that evenif prescription could not create ownership, still an exception ought to be madein favor of a possessor. Papinian however in unmistakable words says there isno exception, [1] nor could he think otherwise, because in his day prescription wasitself an exception. It is therefore true, as expressed also in the laws ofSpain, [2] that prescription based on no matter how immemorial a time, sets up notitle to those things which are recognized as common to the use of mankind. Onereason among others which can be given for this definition is that any one whouses a res communis does so evidently by virtue of commonand not private right, and because of the imperfect character of possession hecan therefore no more set up a legal title by prescription than can ausufructuary. [3]

A second reason not to be overlooked is that although a title and good faithare presumed in a prescriptive right created by the efflux of immemorial time,nevertheless if it appears from the nature of the thing itself that no title atall can be established, and if thus there becomes evident bad faith—a thingheld to be permanent in a nation as well as in an individual—then prescriptionfails because of adouble defect. [1] Also a third reason is that we have under consideration a merelyfacultative right which is not prescriptible, as we shall show below. [*]

But there is no end to their subtilties. There are jurists who in this casewould distinguish custom from prescription, so that if they are debarred fromthe one, they may fall back upon the other. But the distinction which they setup is most absurd. They say that the right of one person which is taken awayfrom him is given to another by prescription; [2] but that when any right is given to any one in such a way that it isnot taken away from any one else, then it is called custom. As if indeed theright of navigation, which is common to all, upon being usurped by some one tothe exclusion of all others, would not necessarily when it became the propertyof one be lost to all!

This error receives support from misinterpretation of what Paulus has to sayabout a private right of possession on the sea. [3] Accursius [†] said that such a right could be acquired by privilege or custom. Butthis addition which in no way agrees with the text of the jurist seems to berather the interpretation of a mischievous guesser than of a faithfulinterpreter. The real meaning of the words of Paulus has been alreadyexplained. Besides, if more careful consideration had been given to the wordsof Ulpian [4] which almost immediately precede those of Paulus, a very differentassertion would have been made. For Ulpian acknowledges that if any one isprohibited from fishing in front ofmy house, such prohibition is a usurpation of right, [1] allowed, it is true, by custom, but based on no law, and that an actionfor damages could not be denied the person thus prohibited from fishing.

He therefore condemns this practice, and calls it a usurpation; of theChristian jurists Ambrose [2] does likewise, and both are right. For what is clearer than that customis not valid when it is diametrically opposed to the law of nature or ofnations? [3] Indeed, custom is a sort of affirmative right, which cannot invalidategeneral or universal law. And it is a universal law that the sea and its use iscommon to all. Moreover what we have said about prescription applies with equaltruth and force to custom; and if any one should investigate the opinions ofthose who have differed upon this matter, he would find no other opinion butthat custom is established by privilege. No one has the power to confer aprivilege which is prejudicial to the rights of the human race; wherefore sucha custom has no force as between different states.

This entire question however has been most thoroughly treated by Vasquez, [4] that glory of Spain, who leaves nothing ever to be desired when itcomes to subtle examination of the law or to the exposition of the principlesof liberty. He lays down this thesis: ‘Places public and common to all by thelaw of nations cannot become objects of prescription’. This thesis he supportsby many authorities, and then he subjoins the objections fabricated by Angeliand others, which we have enumerated above. But before examining theseobjections he makes the just and reasonable statement that the truth of allthese matters depends upon a true conception both of the law of nature and thelaw of nations.For, since the law of nature arises out of DivineProvidence, it is immutable; but a part of this natural law is the primary orprimitive law of nations, differing from the secondary or positive law ofnations, which is mutable. For if there are customs incompatible with theprimary law of nations, then, according to the judgment of Vasquez, they arenot customs belonging to men, but to wild beasts, customs which are corruptionsand abuses, not laws and usages. Therefore those customs cannot becomeprescriptions by mere lapse of time, cannot be justified by the passage of anylaw, cannot be established by the consent, the protection, or the practice evenof many nations. These statements he confirms by a number of examples, andparticularly by the testimony of Alphonse de Castro [1] the Spanish theologian.

‘It is evident therefore’, he says, ‘how much to be suspected is the opinionof those persons mentioned above, who think that the Genoese or the Venetianscan without injustice prohibit other nations from navigating the gulfs or baysof their respective seas, as if they had a prescriptive right to the very wateritself. Such an act is not only contrary to the laws, [2] but is contrary also to natural law or the primary law of nations,which we have said is immutable. And this is seen to be true because by thatsame law not only the seas or waters, but also all other immovables were res communes. And although in later times there was apartial abandonment of that law, in so far as concerns sovereignty andownership of lands—which by natural law at first were held in common, thendistinguished and divided, and thus finally separated from the primitivecommunity of use;—nevertheless [3] it was different as regards sovereignty over the sea, which from thebeginning of the world down to thisvery day is and always has been a rescommunis, and which, as is well known, has in no wise changed from thatstatus.

‘And although’, he continues, ‘I have often heard that a great manyPortuguese believe that their king has a prescriptive right over the navigationof the vast seas of the West Indies (probably the East Indies too) such thatother nations are not allowed to traverse those waters; and although the commonpeople among our own Spaniards seem to be of the same opinion, namely, thatabsolutely no one in the world except us Spaniards ourselves has the leastright to navigate the great and immense sea which stretches to the regions ofthe Indies once subdued by our most powerful kings, as if that right has beenours alone by prescription; although, I repeat, I have heard both these things,nevertheless the belief of all those people is no less extravagantly foolishthan that of those who are always cherishing the same delusions with respect tothe Genoese and Venetians. Indeed the opinions of them all appear the moremanifestly absurd, because no one of those nations can erect a prescriptionagainst itself; that is to say, not the Venetian republic, nor the Genoeserepublic, nor the kingdom of Spain nor of Portugal can raise prescriptionsagainst rights they already possess by nature. [1] For the one who claims a prescriptive right and the one who suffers bythe establishment of such a claim must not be one and the same person.

‘Against other nations they are even much less competent to raise aprescription, because the right of prescription is only a municipal right, aswe have shown above at some length. Therefore such a right ceases to have anyeffect as between rulers or nations who do not recognize a superior in thetemporal domain. For so far as the merely municipal laws of any place areconcerned, they do notaffect foreign peoples, nations, or even individuals,any more than if they did not exist or never had existed. Therefore it wasnecessary to have recourse to the common law of nations, primary as well assecondary, and to use a law which clearly had not admitted any suchprescription and usurpation of the sea. For today the use of the waters iscommon, exactly as it has been since the creation of the world. Therefore noman has a right nor can acquire a right over the seas and waters which would beprejudicial to their common use. Besides, there is both in natural and divinelaw that famous rule: ‘Whatsoever ye would that men should not do to you, donot ye even so to them’. Hence it follows, since navigation cannot harm any oneexcept the navigator himself, it is only just that no one either can or oughtto be interdicted therefrom, lest nature, free in her own realm, and leasthurtful to herself, be found impeding the liberty of navigation, and thusoffending against the accepted precept and rule that all things are supposed tobe permitted which are not found expressly forbidden. [1] Besides, not only would it be contrary to natural law to wish toprevent such free navigation, but we are even bound to do the opposite, thatis, bound to assist such navigation in whatever way we can, when it can be donewithout any prejudice to ourselves’.

After Vasquez had established his point by the help of many authorities bothhuman and divine, he added: [2] ‘It appears then, from what has gone before that the opinion held byJohannes Faber, Angeli, Baldus, and Franciscus Balbus, whom we have citedabove, is not to be trusted, because they think that places common by the lawof nations, even if not open to acquisition by prescription, can neverthelessbe acquired by custom; but this is entirely false, andis a teaching which is both obscure and vague, whichlacks the faintest glimmer of reasonableness, and which sets up a law in wordbut not in fact. [1] For it is well established from the examples taken from the seas of theSpaniards, Portuguese, Venetians, Genoese, and others, that an exclusive rightof navigation and a right of prohibiting others from navigation is no more tobe acquired by custom than by prescription. [2] And it is apparent that the reason is the same in both cases. And sinceaccording to the laws and reasons adduced above this would be contrary tonatural equity and would not bring benefit but only injury, therefore as itcould not be introduced by an express law, neither could it be introduced by atacit or implied law, and that is what custom is. [3] And far from justifying itself by any lapse of time, it rather becomesworse, and every day more injurious’.

Vasquez next shows that from the time of the earliest occupation of theearth every people possessed the right of hunting in its own territory, and offishing in its own rivers. After those rights were once separated from theancient community of rights in such a way that they admitted of particularattachments, they could be acquired by prescription based upon such an effluxof time that “the memory of its beginning does not exist,” as if by the tacitpermission of a nation. This comes about, however, by prescription and not bycustom, because only the condition of him who acquires is bettered, while thatof all other persons is made worse. Then after Vasquez had enumerated threeconditions which are requisite in order that a private right of fishing in ariver may become a right by prescription, he continues as follows:

‘But what are we to say as regards the sea? There ismore to say about it, because even the combination ofthe three conditions mentioned is not sufficient here for the acquisition ofsuch a right. The reason for the difference between the sea on one hand andland and rivers on the other, is that in the case of the sea the same primitiveright of nations regarding fishing and navigation which existed in the earliesttimes, still today exists undiminished and always will, and because that rightwas never separated from the community right of all mankind, and attached toany person or group of persons. But in the latter case, that of the land andrivers, it was different, as we have already set forth.

‘But why, it is asked, does the secondary law of nations which brings aboutthis separation when we consider lands and rivers cease to operate in the sameway when we consider the sea? I reply, because in the former case it wasexpedient and necessary. For every one admits that if a great many persons hunton the land or fish in a river, the forest is easily exhausted of wild animalsand the river of fish, but such a contingency is impossible in the case of thesea. Again, the navigation of rivers is easily lessened and impeded byconstructions placed therein, but this is not true of the sea. Again, a riveris easily emptied by means of aqueducts but the sea cannot be emptied by anysuch means. [1] Therefore there is not equal reason on both sides.

‘Neither does what we have said above about the common use of waters,springs, and rivers, apply in this case, for common use is recognized in themall for purposes of drinking and the like, such usages namely as do not injureat all or in the slightest degree him who owns a river or has some other rightin one. [2] These are trifles for which we have no time. What makes for ourcontention is the fact that no lapse of time will give a prescriptive right toanything unjust. Therefore an unjust law is not capable oferecting a prescriptive right or of being justifiedby efflux of time’. A little farther on Vasquez says: ‘Things which areimprescriptible by the disposition of the law, may not become objects ofprescription even after the lapse of a thousand years’. This statement hesupports by countless citations from the jurists. [1]

Every one perceives that no usurpation no matter how long continued iscompetent to intercept the use of a res communis. And itmust also be added, that the authority of those who hold dissenting opinionscannot possibly be applied to the question here at issue. For they are talkingabout the Mediterranean, we are talking about the Ocean; they speak of a gulf,we of the boundless sea; and from the point of view of occupation these arewholly different things. And too, those peoples, to whom the authorities justmentioned concede prescription, the Venetians and Genoese for example, possessa continuous shore line on the sea, but it is clear that not even that kind ofpossession can be claimed for the Portuguese.

Further, even if mere lapse of time, as some think, could establish a rightby prescription over public property, still the conditions absolutelyindispensable for the creation of such a right are in this case absent. Theconditions demanded are these: first, all jurists teach that he who sets up aprescriptive right of this sort shall have been in actual possession not onlyfor a considerable period, but from time immemorial; next, that during all thattime no one else shall have exercised the same right of possession unless bypermission of that possessor or clandestinely; besides that, it is necessarythat he shall have prevented other persons wishing to use his possession fromso doing, and that such measures be a matter of common knowledge and done bythe suffrance of those concerned in the matter. For even ifhe had continuously exercised his right ofpossession, and had always prevented from using his possession some of those who wished to do so, but not all; then, because some had beenprevented from exercising and others freely allowed toexercise that use, that kind of possession according to the opinion of thejurists, is not sufficient to establish a right by prescription.

It is clear therefore that all these conditions should be present, bothbecause law is opposed to the prescription of public things, and in order thathe who sets up such a prescription may seem to have used his own private right,not a public right, and that too by continuous possession.

Now, inasmuch as time beyond the period of the memory of man is demanded forthe creation of a prescriptive right, it is not always sufficient, as the bestcommentators point out, to prove the lapse of a hundred years, but as no onewould be alive who had seen or heard the contrary, the tradition handed down tous by our ancestors ought to be undisputed. It was during the reign of KingJohn, [1] in the year of our Lord 1477, at the time of the wars in Africa, thatthe Portuguese began to push their discoveries first into the more distantparts of the Ocean. Twenty years later, during the reign of King Emmanuel, theyrounded the Cape of Good Hope, and somewhat later yet, reached Malacca, and theislands beyond, the very islands, indeed, to which the Dutch began to sail inthe year 1595, that is, well within a hundred years of the time that thePortuguese first arrived. And in truth even in that interval, the usurpation ofrights there by other parties had interrupted the competence of everybody elseto create a prescriptive right. For example, from the year 1519, the Spaniardsrendered the possession by the Portuguese of the sea around the Malaccas a veryuncertain one. Even the French andEnglish made their way to those newly discoveredplaces not secretly, but by force of arms. And besides these, the inhabitantsof the entire coast of Africa and Asia constantly used for fishing andnavigation that part of the sea nearest their own several coasts, and werenever interdicted from such use by the Portuguese.

The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that the Portuguese are inpossession of no right whereby they may interdict to any nation whatsoever thenavigation of the Ocean to the East Indies.

CHAPTER VIII: By the Law of Nations trade is free toall persons whatsoever

If however the Portuguese claim that they have an exclusive right to tradewith the East Indies, their claim will be refuted by practically all the samearguments which already have been brought forward. Nevertheless I shall repeatthem briefly, and apply them to this particular claim.

By the law of nations the principle was introduced that the opportunity toengage in trade, of which no one can be deprived, [1] should be free to all men. This principle, inasmuch as its applicationwas continually necessary after the distinctions of private ownerships weremade, can therefore be seen to have had a very remote origin. Aristotle, in avery clever phrase, in his work entitled the Politics, [2] has said that the art of exchange is a completion of the independencewhich Nature requires. Therefore trade ought to be common to all according tothe law of nations, not only in a negative but also in a positive, or as thejurists say, affirmative sense. [3] The things that come under the former category are subject to change,those of the latter category are not. This statement is to be explained in thefollowing way.

Nature had given all things to all men. But since men were prevented fromusing many things which were desirable in every day life because they lived sofar apart,and because, as we have said above, everything wasnot found everywhere, it was necessary to transport things from one place toanother; not that there was yet an interchange of commodities, but that peoplewere accustomed to make reciprocal use of things found in one another’sterritory according to their own judgment. They say that trade arose among theChinese in about this way. Things were deposited at places out in the desertand left to the good faith and conscience of those who exchanged things oftheir own for what they took. [1]

But when movables passed into private ownership (a change brought about bynecessity, as has been explained above), straightway there arose a method ofexchange by which the lack of one person was supplemented by that of whichanother person had an over supply. [2] Hence commerce was born out of necessity for the commodities of life,as Pliny shows by a citation from Homer. [3] But after immovables also began to be recognized as private property,the consequent annihilation of universal community of use made commerce anecessity not only between men whose habitations were far apart but evenbetween men who were neighbors; and in order that trade might be carried onmore easily, somewhat later they invented money, which, as the derivation ofthe word shows, is a civic institution. [4]

Therefore the universal basis of all contracts, namely exchange, is derivedfrom nature; but some particular kinds of exchange, and the money paymentitself, are derived from law; [5] although the older commentators on the law have not made thisdistinction sufficiently clear. Nevertheless allauthorities agree that the ownership of things,particularly of movables, arises out of the primary law of nations, and thatall contracts in which a price is not mentioned, are derived from the samesource. [1] The philosophers [2] distinguish two kinds of exchange using Greek words which we shall takethe liberty to translate as ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ trade. The former, as theGreek word shows, signifies trade or exchange between widely separated nations,and it ranks first in the order of Nature, as is shown in Plato’s Republic. [3] The latter seems to be the same kind of exchange that Aristotle callsby another Greek word [4] which means retail or shop trade between citizens. Aristotle makes afurther division of wholesale trade into overland and overseas trade. [5] But of the two, retail trade is the more petty and sordid, andwholesale the more honorable; but most honorable of all is the wholesaleoverseas trade, because it makes so many people sharers in so many things. [6]

Hence Ulpian says that the maintenance of ships is the highest duty of astate, because it is an absolutely natural necessity, but that the maintenanceof hucksters has not the same value. In another place Aristotle says: “For theart of exchange extends to all possessions, and it arises at first in a naturalmanner from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much.” [7] And Seneca is also to be cited in this connection for he has said thatbuying and selling is the law of nations. [8]

Therefore freedom of trade is based on a primitive right of nations whichhas a natural and permanent cause; andso that right cannot be destroyed, or at all eventsit may not be destroyed except by the consent of all nations. So far is thatfrom being the case, that any one nation may justly oppose in any way, anyother two nations that desire to enter into a mutual and exclusive contractualrelation.

CHAPTER IX: Trade with the East Indies does notbelong to the Portuguese by title of occupation

Neither discovery nor occupation [which have been fully treated in ChaptersII and V], is to be invoked on the point here under consideration, because theright of carrying on trade is not something corporal, which can be physicallyseized; nor would discovery or occupation help the case of the Portuguese evenif they had been the very first persons to trade with the East Indies, althoughsuch a claim would be entirely untenable and false. For since in the beginningpeoples set out along different paths, it was necessary that some become thefirst traders, nevertheless it is absolutely certain that those traders did noton that account acquire any rights. Wherefore if the Portuguese have any rightby virtue of which they alone may trade with the EastIndies, that right like other servitudes ought to arise from concession, eitherexpress or tacit, that is to say, from prescription. Otherwise no such rightcan exist.

CHAPTER X: Trade with the East Indies does notbelong to the Portuguese by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation

No one has granted it except perhaps the Pope, and he did not have thepower. [1] For no one can give away what he does not himself possess. But thePope, unless he were the temporal master of the whole world, which sensible mendeny, cannot say that the universal right in respect of trade belongs to him.Especially is this true since trade has to do only with material gains, and hasno concern at all with spiritual matters, outside of which, as all admit, Papalpower ceases. Besides, if the Pope wished to give that right to the Portuguesealone, and to deprive all other men of the same right, he would be doing adouble injustice. In the first place, he would do an injustice to the people ofthe East Indies who, placed as we have said outside the Church, are in no waysubjects of the Pope. Therefore, since the Pope cannot take away from themanything that is theirs, he could not take away their right of trading withwhomsoever they please. In the second place, he would do an injustice to allother men both Christian and non-Christian, from whom he could not take thatsame right without a hearing. Besides, what are we to say of the fact that noteven temporal lords in their own dominions are competent to prohibit thefreedom of trade, as has been demonstrated above by reasonable andauthoritative statements?

Therefore it must be acknowledged, that the authority of the Pope hasabsolutely no force against the eternal law of nature and of nations, fromwhence came that liberty which is destined to endure for ever and ever.

CHAPTER XI: Trade with the East Indies does notbelong to the Portuguese by title of prescription or custom

Last of all, prescription, or if you prefer the term, custom. [1] We have shown that according to Vasquez, neither prescription norcustom had any force as between free nations or the rulers of differentpeoples, or any force against those principles which were introduced byprimitive law. And here as before, mere efflux of time does not bring it topass that the right of trade, which does not partake of the nature ofownership, becomes a private possession. Now in this case neither title norgood faith can be shown, and inasmuch as good faith is clearly absent,according to legal rules prescription will not be called a right, but aninjury.

Nay, the very possession involved in trading seems not to have arisen out ofa private right, but out of a public right which belongs equally to all; so onthe other hand, because nations perhaps neglected to trade with the EastIndies, it must not be presumed that they did so as a favor to the Portuguese,but because they believed it to be to their own best interests. But nothingstands in their way, when once expediency shall have persuaded them, to preventthem from doing what they had not previously done. For the jurists [2] have handed down as incontestable the principle that where thingsarbitrable or facultative are such that they produce nothing more than thefacultative act per se, but do not create a new right,that in all such cases not even a thousand years will create a title byprescription or custom.This, as Vasquez points out, acts both affirmativelyand negatively. For I am not compelled to do what I have hitherto done of myown free will, nor am I compelled to stop doing what I have never done.

What moreover could be more absurd then to deduce from the fact that we asindividuals are not able always to conclude a bargain with other individuals,that there is not preserved to us for the future the right of bargaining withthem if opportunity shall have offered? The same Vasquez has also most justlysaid that not even the lapse of infinite time establishes a right which seemsto have arisen from necessity rather than choice.

Therefore in order to establish a prescriptive right to the trade with theEast Indies the Portuguese would be compelled to prove coercion. But since insuch a case as this coercion is contrary to the law of nature and obnoxious toall mankind, it cannot establish a right. [1] Next, that coercion must needs have been in existence for so long atime that “the memory of its beginning does not exist”; that, however, is sofar from being the case that not even a hundred years had elapsed since theVenetians controlled nearly the entire trade with the East Indies, carrying itvia Alexandria. [2] Again, the coercion ought to have been such that it was not resisted;but the English and the French and other nations besides, did resist it.Finally, it is not sufficient that some be coerced, but itis indispensable that all be coerced, because thepossession of freedom of trade is preserved to all by a failure to use coercionupon even one person. Moreover, the Arabians and the Chinese are at the presentday still carrying on with the people of the East Indies a trade which has beenuninterrupted for several centuries.

Portuguese usurpation is worthless.

CHAPTER XII: The Portuguese prohibition of trade hasno foundation in equity

From what has been said thus far it is easy to see the blind cupidity ofthose who in order not to admit any one else to a share in their gains, striveto still their consciences by the very arguments which the Spanish jurists,interested too in the same case, show to be absolutely empty. [1] For they intimate as clearly as they can that as regards India all thepretexts employed, are far fetched and unjust. They add that this right wasnever seriously approved by the swarm of theologians. Indeed, what is moreunjust than the complaint made by the Portuguese that their profits are drainedoff by a freedom which is incompatible with their license? An incontrovertiblerule of law lays down that a man who uses his own right is justly presumed tobe contriving neither a deceit nor a fraud, in fact not even to be doing anyone an injury. This is particularly true, if he has no intention to harm anyone, but only to increase his own property. [2] For what ought to be considered is the chief and ultimate intent notthe irrelevant consequence. Indeed, if we may with propriety agree with Ulpian,he is not doing an injury, but he is preventing some one from getting a profitwhich another was previously enjoying.

Moreover it is natural and conformable to the highest law as well as equity,that when a gain open to all is concerned every person prefers it for himselfrather than foranother, even if that other had already discoveredit. [1] Who would countenance an artisan who complained that another artisanwas taking away his profits by the exercise of the same craft? But the cause ofthe Dutch is the more reasonable, because their advantage in this matter isbound up with the advantage of the whole human race, an advantage which thePortuguese are trying to destroy. [2] Nor will it be correct to say, that this is done in rivalry, as Vasquezshows in a similar case. For clearly we must either deny or affirm that this isdone not only in honorable but in most honorable rivalry, and, according toHesiod, ‘This rivalry is honorable for mortal men’. [3] For, says Vasquez, if any one should be so moved by love for his fellowmen that he sells grain in hard times for a lower price than usual, he woulddiminish the wicked oppression of those men who in the same season of cruelfinancial stringency would have sold their grain at a higher price than usual.But, some one will object, by such methods the profits of others will be madeless. ‘We do not deny it’, says Vasquez, ‘but they are made less to thecorresponding advantage of all other men. And would that the profits of allRulers and Tyrants of this world could be thus lessened’!

Indeed can anything more unjust be conceived than for the Spaniards to holdthe entire world tributary, so that it is not permissible either to buy or tosell except at their good pleasure? [4] In all states we heap odium upon grain speculators and even bring themto punishment; and in very truth there seems to be no other sort of business sodisgraceful as that of forcing up prices in the grain market. [5] That is notto be wondered at, for such speculators are doing aninjury to nature, who, as Aristotle says, is fertile for all alike. [1] Accordingly it ought not to be supposed that trade was invented for thebenefit of a few, but in order that the lack of one would be counterbalanced bythe oversupply of another, a fair return also being guaranteed to all who takeupon themselves the work and the danger of transport.

Is the same thing then which is considered grievous and pernicious in thesmaller community of a state to be put up with at all in that great communityof the human race? Shall the people of Spain, forsooth, assume a monopoly ofall the world? Ambrose inveighs against those who interfere with the freedom ofthe sea; [2] Augustine against those who obstruct the overland routes; and Gregoryof Nazianzus [3] against those who buy goods and hold them, and thus (as he eloquentlysays) make profits for themselves alone out of the helplessness and need ofothers. Indeed in the opinion of this wise and holy man any person who holdsback grain and thus forces up the market price ought to be given over to publicpunishment and be adjudged worthy of death.

Therefore the Portuguese may cry as loud and as long as they shall please:‘You are cutting down our profits’! The Dutch will answer: ‘Nay! we are butlooking out for our own interests! Are you angry because we share with you inthe winds and the sea? Pray, who had promised that you would always have thoseadvantages? You are secure in the possession of that with which we are quitecontent’.

CHAPTER XIII: The Dutch must maintain their right oftrade with the East Indies by peace, by treaty, or by war

Wherefore since both law and equity demand that trade with the East Indiesbe as free to us as to any one else, it follows that we are to maintain at allhazards that freedom which is ours by nature, either by coming to a peaceagreement with the Spaniards, or by concluding a treaty, or by continuing thewar. So far as peace is concerned, it is well known that there are two kinds ofpeace, one made on terms of equality, the other on unequal terms. The Greeks [1] call the former kind a compact between equals, the latter an enjoinedtruce; the former is meant for high souled men, the latter for servile spirits.Demosthenes in his speech on the liberty of the Rhodians [2] says that it was necessary for those who wished to be free to keep awayfrom treaties which were imposed upon them, because such treaties were almostthe same as slavery. Such conditions are all those by which one party islessened in its own right, according to the definition of Isocrates. [3] For if, as Cicero says, [4] wars must be undertaken in order that people may live in peaceunharmed, it follows that peace must be called not a pact which entails slaverybut which brings undisturbed liberty, especially as peace and justice accordingtothe opinion of many philosophers and theologians [1] differ more in name than in fact, and as peace is a harmoniousagreement based not on individual whim, but on well ordered regulations.

If however a truce is arranged for, it is quite clear from the very natureof a truce, that during its continuance no one’s condition ought to change forthe worse, inasmuch as both parties stand on the equivalent of a uti possidetis.

But if we are driven into war by the injustice of our enemies, the justiceof our cause ought to bring hope and confidence in a happy outcome. “For,” asDemosthenes has said, “every one fights his hardest to recover what he haslost; but when men endeavor to gain at the expense of others it is not so.” [2] The Emperor Alexander has expressed his idea in this way: ‘Those whobegin unjust deeds, must bear the greatest blame; but those who repelaggressors are twice armed, both with courage because of their just cause, andwith the highest hope because they are not doing a wrong, but are warding off awrong’.

Therefore, if it be necessary, arise, O nation unconquered on the sea, andfight boldly, not only for your own liberty, but for that of the human race.“Nor let it fright thee that their fleet is winged, each ship, with an hundredoars. The sea whereon it sails will have none of it. And though the prows bearfigures threatening to cast rocks such as Centaurs throw, thou shalt find thembut hollow planks and painted terrors. ’Tis his cause that makes or mars asoldier’s strength. If the cause be not just, shame strikes the weapon from hishands.” [3]

If many writers, Augustine himself [1] among them, believed it was right to take up arms because innocentpassage was refused across foreign territory, how much more justly will arms betaken up against those from whom the demand is made of the common and innocentuse of the sea, which by the law of nature is common to all? If those nationswhich interdicted others from trade on their own soil are justly attacked, whatof those nations which separate by force and interrupt the mutual intercourseof peoples over whom they have no rights at all? If this case should be takeninto court, there can be no doubt what opinion ought to be anticipated from ajust judge. The praetor’s law says: [2] ‘I forbid force to be used in preventing any one from sailing a ship ora boat on a public river, or from unloading his cargo on the bank’. Thecommentators say that the injunction must be applied in the same manner to thesea and to the seashore. Labeo, for example, in commenting on the praetor’sedict, [3] ‘Let nothing be done in a public river or on its bank, by which alanding or a channel for shipping be obstructed’, said there was a similarinterdict which applied to the sea, namely, [4] ‘Let nothing be done on the sea or on the seashore by which a harbor, alanding, or a channel for shipping be obstructed’.

Now after this explicit prohibition, if any one be prevented from navigatingthe sea, or not allowed to sell or to make use of his own wares and products,Ulpian says that he can bring an action for damages on that ground. [5] Also the theologians and the casuists agree that he who preventsanother from buying or selling, or who puts hisprivate interests before the public and commoninterests, or who in any way hinders another in the use of something which ishis by common right, is held in damages to complete restitution in an amountfixed by an honorable arbitrator.

Following these principles a good judge would award to the Dutch the freedomof trade, and would forbid the Portuguese and others from using force to hinderthat freedom, and would order the payment of just damages. But when a judgmentwhich would be rendered in a court cannot be obtained, it should with justicebe demanded in a war. Augustine [1] acknowledges this when he says: ‘The injustice of an adversary brings ajust war’. Cicero also says: [2] “There are two ways of settling a dispute; first, by discussion;second, by physical force; we must resort to force only in case we may notavail ourselves of discussion.” And King Theodoric says: ‘Recourse must then behad to arms when justice can find no lodgment in an adversary’s heart’.Pomponius, however, has handed down a decision which has more bearing on ourargument [3] than any of the citations already made. He declared that the man whoseized a thing common to all to the prejudice of every one else must beforcibly prevented from so doing. The theologians also say that just as war isrighteously undertaken in defense of individual property, so no lessrighteously is it undertaken in behalf of the use of those things which bynatural law ought to be common property. Therefore he who closes up roads andhinders the export of merchandise ought to be prevented from so doing via facti, even without waiting for any publicauthority.

Since these things are so, there need not be the slightestfear that God will prosper the efforts of those whoviolate that most stable law of nature which He himself has instituted, or thateven men will allow those to go unpunished who for the sake alone of privategain oppose a common benefit of the human race.

APPENDIX Two letters of PhilipIII, King of Spain

As several letters of the King of Spain have come of late into our hands, inwhich his design and that of the Portuguese is clearly disclosed, it seemedworth while to translate into Latin two of them which had particular bearingupon the controversy at issue, and to append them here.

LETTER I

To Don Martin Alphonse de Castro, our beloved viceroy, I,the King, send many greetings:

Together with this letter will come to you a copy printed in type of anedict which I have taken much pains to draw up, by which, for reasons which youwill see expressed, and for other reasons which are consonant with myinterests, I prohibit all commerce of foreigners in India itself, and in allother regions across the seas. As this matter is of the greatest importance andserviceableness, and ought to be carried out with the highest zeal, I commandyou, as soon as you shall have received this letter and edict, to further withall diligence its publication in all places and districts under yourjurisdiction, and to carry out the provisions of the edict without exception ofany person whatsoever, no matter what his quality, age, or condition, andwithout delay and excuse, and to proceed to the fulfilment of this command withthe full power of your authority, no delay, appeal, or obstacle to thecontrary, being admitted, of any kind, sort, or quality.

Therefore I order that this duty be discharged by thoseofficers to whom its execution belongs, and that theybe informed that not only will those who disobey serve me ill, but that I willpunish them by depriving them of the offices in which they now serve me.

Further, inasmuch as it has been reported to me that within yourjurisdiction there are sojourning many foreigners of different nations,Italians, French, Germans, and men of the Low Countries, the larger part ofwhom as we know came there by way of Persia and Turkey, and not through ourrealm; and inasmuch as, if this edict be rigidly enforced against those personsto the letter, some inconveniences might follow, if they should escape to theMoors, our enemies, and make known to our neighbors the disposition of myforces, and thus show ways that they might be able to harm my dominion:Therefore, I wish you to carry out the provisions of this edict as theexigencies of circumstances and occasion demand, and to use all prudencenecessary in order to avoid those difficulties, taking especial pains to keepall foreigners in your power, and to guard them in accordance with theirindividual rank, so that they may have no opportunity to attempt anythingprejudicial to our power, that thus I may attain fully that end which I haveset forth in this edict.

Given at Lisbon, on the 28th of November in the year of our Lord, 1606.Signed by the king, and addressed: For the king, to Don Martin Alphonso deCastro, his Councillor, and Viceroy for the East Indies.

LETTER II

To our beloved viceroy, I, the King send manygreetings:

Although I consider it absolutely certain that your presence and the forceswhich you took with you into those Eastern regions, guarantee that our enemies,the Dutch,who infest those quarters as well as the natives whogive them a welcome reception, will be so thoroughly punished that neither theone nor the other will ever dare such practices in the future: still it will beexpedient for the protection of our interests, that, when you shall return toGoa, you leave in those parts of the sea a fleet large and capable enough to dothe business, and also that you delegate the supreme command of that fleet toAndrea Hurtado de Mendoza, or to any one else whom you shall consider betterfitted for this post. I rely upon your affection for me, knowing that in thismatter you will do nothing but what will be most useful to my interests.

Given at Madrid the 27th day of January in the year of our Lord 1607. Signedby the king, and addressed: For the king, to Don Martin Alfonso de Castro, hisCouncillor, and Viceroy for the East Indies.

1

For the freedom of the seas and the relation of Grotius to the doctrine, seeErnest Nys’s Les Origines du Droit International (1894),pp. 379–387, and the same author’s Etudes de DroitInternational et de Droit Politique, 2 série (1901), Une Bataille de Livres, pp. 260–272. For an account inEnglish see Walker’s History of the Law of Nations, Vol. I(1899), pp. 278–283.

For an interesting sketch of the illustrious author of the Mare Liberum, see Motley’s The Life and Deathof John of Barneveld, Vol. II, Chap. XXII; for an analysis of Grotius’views on the law of nations, see Hallam’s Introduction to theLiterature of Europe (4th edition), Vol. II, Part III, Chap. IV, Sec. III;for an account of Grotius as a humanist, see Sandys’ History ofClassical Scholarship (1908), Vol. II, pp. 315–319.

2

Hugonis Grotii De Jure Praedae, edited, with anintroduction, by H. G. Hamaker, and published at The Hague in 1868 by MartinusNijhoff.

1

In support of the view that Grotius appeared as counsel in cases arising outof captures made by vessels in the service of the Dutch East India Company, andthat the treatise, De Jure Praedae, is a legal brief, seeR. Fruin’s Een Onuitgegeven Werk van Hugo De Groot in Verspreide Geschriften, Vol. III, pp. 367–445. Thefollowing passages are quoted from this remarkable essay:

“While busy with the sale of the goods [of the captured merchantman Catherine, which had been unloaded in the Amsterdamarsenal], the process of adjudicating the booty before the admiralty court wasconducted in the usual forms. Claimants: Advocate General of Holland, the Boardof eight Aldermen, and Admiral Heemskerck; . . . on Thursday, September 9,1604, final sentence was rendered, and ‘the merchantman together with the goodstaken from it were declared forfeited and confiscated’ ” (pp. 389–390).

“Hulsius in some measure replaces what the fire at the Marine Arsenal hasrobbed us of; among other records he has preserved for us in his Achte Schiffart the sentence pronounced in this matter bythe admiralty, and of which we have knowledge from no other sources. From it welearn the grounds upon which the claimants demanded the adjudication of thebooty. These grounds are the same twelve which De Groot discusses in his book.. . . This concordance can be explained on the ground that De Groot must havehad acquaintance with the sentence; but he was not a man merely to repeat whatothers had before him witnessed. I should be inclined to feel that in theprocess he had served as counsel for the Company, and that he himself was oneof the authors of the written claim upon which the sentence was based. It wouldnot then be surprising if in his book he should develop at greater length andthrow light upon what had already been set forth in the claim” (pp.390–391).

“I cannot state definitely that Hugo De Groot was persuaded by the Directorsto write such an argument; I have been unable to discover any evidence to thatend. That he was in close relations with the Company, he himself says in aletter of later date, addressed to his brother. Nor can there be any doubt thatin writing his work he made use of the archives of the United Company and ofits predecessor. If the supposition, which I have elsewhere ventured to make iscorrect, that is to say, that in the conduct of the case he appeared asadvocate for the Company, it would then appear most probable that, afterconsultation with the directors, he set about writing his book, which was to bea second plea in their behalf” (p. 403).

1

For the account which Grotius himself gives of the incident, see his Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis ab Obitu Philippi Regisusque ad Inducias Anni 1609, written in 1612, but first published in 1658,Book 1, p. 429.

For a fuller account of the circumstances under which the treatise on thelaw of prize was written, see Hamaker’s edition of the De JurePraedae, pp. vii-viii. The distinguished historian and scholar, Robert J.Fruin, after an exhaustive examination of the evidence, informed Hamaker thatGrotius was retained by the Company to prepare the commentary on the law ofprize. The English translation of Hamaker’s exact statement reads as follows:“Fruin is of the opinion that he [Grotius] undertook this work at the instanceof the Company, and that he appeared in it as their spokesman.”

For an analysis of the commentary De Jure Praedae andthe circumstances under which it was written, see Jules Basdevant’s study onGrotius, pp. 131–137, 155–179, in Pillet’s Les Fondateurs duDroit International (1904).

1

Selden’s Mare Clausum was not the only defense ofEngland, nor was the Mare Liberum the only lance whichGrotius broke for the freedom of the seas. In 1613 William Welwod, professor ofCivil Law at the University of Aberdeen, published a little book entitled An Abridgement of all the Sea-Lawes, in which hemaintained the English side of the question, of which Title XXVII, pp. 61–72,deals with the community and property of the seas. Two years later Welwodpublished a second work, this time in Latin, entitled DeDominio Maris Juribusque ad Dominium praecipue Spectantibus Assertia Brevis acMethodica.

Grotius prepared, but did not publish, a reply to Welwod’s first attack,entitled Defensio Capitis Quinti Maris Liberi Oppugnati aGulielmo Welwodo Juris Civilis Professore, Capite XXVII ejus Libri ScriptiAnglica Sermone cui Titulum Fecit Compendium Legum Maritimarum. It wasdiscovered at the same time as the commentary De JurePraedae and was published in 1872 in Muller’s MareClausum, Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der rivaliteit van Engeland en Nederlandin de zeventiende eeuw.

1

Panegyricus 29, 2: quod genitum esset usquam, id apud omnes natum essevidetur.

2

Vergil, Georgics II, 109.

3

Vergil, Aeneid VI, 847–853.

1

Naturales Quaestiones III, IV.

2

Institutes II, 1 (De rerum divisione, § 1); Digest 1, 8, 4 (eod. tit., L.Nemo igitur); cf. Gentilis, De jure belli I, 19; cf. Code IV, 63, 4 (Decommerciis, L. Mercatores).

3

Vergil, Aeneid I, 539–540.

4

Vergil, Aeneid VII, 229–230.

1

Diodorus Siculus XI; Plutarch, Pericles XXIX, 4.

2

Sigonius, De regno Italiae.

3

Victoria, De Indis II, n. 1–7; Covarruvias, in c. Peccatum, § 9, n. 4, ibiQuinta.

4

Numbers XXI, 21–26.

5

Augustinus, Locutionum IV (de Numeris), 44; Et Estius, c. ult. 23, 4, 2.

6

Sophocles, Trachiniae.

7

Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia III, 293.

1

Tacitus, Historiae IV, 64.

2

Andreas Alciatus, Commentaria VII, 130; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, p. 2 §9; Bartolus on Code 1, 11 (De paganis, L. 1).

1

Code VIII, 40, 13 (De fideiussoribus, L. Si Barsagoram).

2

Nonius Marcellus, De varia significatione sermonum, in verbo ‘occupare’ (p.562, Lindsay); cf. Connanus, Commentarii juris civilis III, 3; cf. DonellusCommentarii de jure civili IV, 10.

3

[‘invenire esse’ would seem to be the reading demanded rather than‘invenisse.’]

4

Institutes II, 1, 13 (De rerum divisione, § Illud quaesitum est).

5

Digest XLI, 2, 3 (De adquirenda possessione, § Neratius).

6

Epistulae I, 1, 44–45.

7

Pliny, Naturalis historia VI, 22.

1

Digest XLI, 1, 3 (De adquirendo rerum dominio).

2

Covarruvias in c. Peccatum § 10, n. 2, 4, 5.

3

De potestate civili I, 9.

4

Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 12.

5

De Indis I, n. 4–7, 19.

1

Vasquius, Preface (n. 5) to Controversiae illustres.

1

Cf. Osorium.

2

Institutes II, 1, 40 (De rerum divisione, § Per traditionem).

1

Luke XII, 14; John XVIII, 36; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 25.

2

Victoria XVI, n. 27.

3

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 21; Turre Cremata II, c. 113; Hugo onDist. XCVI, C. VI (Cum ad verum); Bernhardus, De consolatione ad Eugenium II;Victoria, De Indis I, n. 27; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum § 9, n. 7.

4

Matthew XVII, 27; XX, 26; John VI, 15.

5

Victoria, De Indis I, n. 28, 30; Covarruvias on I Corinthians V in fine;Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 12, a. 2; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 29.

1

Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 66, a. 8; Silvius, De infidelibus § 7;Innocentius on Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, III, 34, 8 (De voto, c. Quod superhis); Victoria, De Indis I, n. 31.

1

De Indis I, n. 31.

2

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 24; Victoria, De Indis II, n. 10.

1

De consolatione philosophiae IV, carmen 4, 7–10.

2

Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 8; Dist. XLV, C. V (De Iudeis), C.III (Qui sincera); Innocentius, cf. note 1, page 17; Bartolus on Code I, 11, 1(De paganis); Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 9, 10; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 28.

3

Matthew X, 23.

4

On Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 4, 66, a. 8.

1

Victoria, De Indis II, 1.

1

Castrensis on Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure); Dist. I,C. VII (Ius naturale).

1

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 1, n. 10; Lib. VI, V, 12, 3 (Deverborum significatione, c. Exiit, qui seminat); Clem. V, 11 (De verborumsignificatione, c. Exivi de paradiso).

2

Sermones II, 2, 129–130.

3

Avienus, Aratus 302–303.

1

Seneca, Octavia 413–414.

2

Avienus, Aratus 302.

3

Digest VII, 5 (De usu fructu earum rerum, quae usu consumuntur velminuuntur); Extravag. XIV, 3 et 5 (De verborum significatione, c. Adconditorem, et c. Quia quorundam); Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 78.

1

Thyestes 203–204 (F. CXXII).

2

De beneficiis VII, 12, 3.

3

Ps. Quintilianus, Declamatio XIII (Pro paupere).

4

Cicero, De officiis I.

1

Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure).

2

Vergil, Georgics I, 139–140 [Tum primum etc. is probably meant to explainthe following lines 140–159].

3

Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 135–136.

4

Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 134 (exsultavere, Magnus).

5

De beneficiis VII, 4, 3.

1

Octavia 431–432.

2

De officiis I, 21,

3

Thucydides I, 139, 2.

4

Duarenus on Digest I, 8 (De divisione rerum).

5

De officiis I, 51.

6

De officiis I, 52.

1

Ovid, Metamorphoses VI, 349–351 (aquis, 349, and ad publica, 351,Merkel).

2

Digest VIII, 4, 13 (Communia praediorum, L. Venditor).

3

Digest XLI, 1, 14 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in litore); Comines,Memoirs III, 2; Donellus IV, 2; Digest XLI, 3, 49 (De usucapionibus).

4

Digest I, 8, 10 (De divisione rerum, L. Aristo).

5

Cicero, De officiis I, 52.

1

Institutes II, 1, 1 et 5 (De rerum divisione, § Et quidem naturali; §Litorum); Digest I, 8, 1, 2, 10 (De rerum divisione); Digest XLI, 1, 14 et 50(De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in litore, et L. Quamvis); Digest XLVII,10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum § si quis me); Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quidin loco publico, L. Litora) et 4–7.

2

975, 977, 985 (IV, 3).

1

Donellus IV, 2.

2

Digest XXXIX, 2, 24 (De damno infecto, L. Fluminum); other references sameas note 1, page 29.

3

Donellus IV, 2 et 9; also references in note 1, page 29.

1

Digest I, 8, 4 (De divisione rerum, L. Nemo igitur); XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid inloco publico, L. Litora).

2

Horace, Odes III, i, 33–34.

3

Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (as in note 1); 8, 2 (eod. tit., L. Praetor, §Adversus).

4

Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L. Ait praetor, § Si in mari).

1

Pliny, Naturalis historia IX, 54, 170.

2

Martial, Epigrammata X, 30, 19–20.

3

De Nabuthe, cap. 3.

4

Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane si maris).

5

Cf. note 1, page 31.

1

Digest XLIV, 3, 7 (De diversis, L. Si quisquam).

2

Digest XLI, 3, 45 (De usucapionibus, L. Praescriptio).

3

Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § Si quis me).

4

Novella Leonis, 102, 103, 104; cf. Cuiacium XIV, 1.

5

Hexameron V, 10, 27.

1

Donellus IV, 6.

2

Joannes Faber on Institutes II, 1 (§ Litorum); Digest XIV, 2, 9 (De LegeRhodia, L. Ἀξίωσις).

3

Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Litora).

4

Digest V, 1, 9 (De iudiciis, L. Insulae); XXXIX, 4, 15 (De publicanis, L.Caesar); Gloss. on Digest I, 8, 2 (De divisione rerum, L. Quaedam); InstitutesII, 1; Baldus on Quaedam (above).

1

Baldus, Quibus modis feudi amittuntur, c. In principio, 2 col.; Code XI, 13,1; Angelus on Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane); Digest VIII, 4, 13(Communia praediorum, L. Venditor fundi) et 4 (L. Caveri).

1

C. Quae sint Regalia, in Feudis.

2

Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, 5; 1, q. 6, n. 4.

3

Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § 7, v. conductori);XLIII, 9, 1 (De loco publico fruendo).

4

Cf. note 1.

1

Ennius: ‘Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, cum illi accenderit’. Vahlen, [2] Fab. Inc. 398 (Telephus?).

2

Cicero, De officiis I, 51.

2

Cicero, De officiis I, 51.

3

Seneca, De beneficiis III, 28.

1

Johannes Faber on Institutes II, 1, 5 (De rerum divisione, § Litorum).

1

Pliny, Naturalis historia II, 69; VI, 27 [(31) Vol. 1, pp. 482–488 Mayhoff];Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis III.

2

Pliny, Naturalis historia VI, 20 (23).

1

Geographica II et XVII.

2

L. c. XII, 19.

1

Gloss. on Lib. VI, I, 6, 3 (De electione, c. Ubi periculum, § Porro); onDigest II, 12, 3 (De feriis, L. Solet [Grotius has Licet]).

2

Digest I, 8, 4 (De divisione rerum, L. Nemo igitur); Gentilis, De jure belliI, 19.

1

Digest XLIII, 8, 2 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Praetor ait, § Si quis inmari).

2

Gloss. on Digest XLIII, 14 (Ut in flumine publico).

3

Baldus on Digest I, 8, 3 (De divisione rerum, L. Item lapilli); Zuarius,Consilia duo de usu maris I, 3, part. tit. 28, L. 10 et 12.

1

Victoria, De Indis I, n. 26.

1

Silvestris, In verbo Papa. n. 16.

1

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 51.

2

Donellus, V, 22 et seq.; Digest XVIII, 1, 6 (De contrahenda emptione, L. SedCelsus); XLI, 3, 9 (De usucapionibus, L. Usucapionem), 25 (L. Sine); Lib. VI,V, 12 (De regulis iuris, Reg. Sine possessione); Digest L, 16, 28 (De verborumsignificatione, L. ‘Alienationis’); XXIII, 5, 16 (De fundo dotali, L. Sifundum).

1

Digest XLI, 3, 45 (De usucapionibus); Code VIII, 11, 6 (De operis publicis,L. Praescriptio); XI, 43, 9 (De aquaeductu, L. Diligenter); Digest XLIII, 11, 2(De via publica, L. Viam); XLI, 3, 49 (De usucapionibus, L. ult.).

2

Consilia 286; Thema tale est: inter caetera capitula pacis.

3

Digest XLIV, 3, 7 (De diversis temporalibus praescriptionibus, L. Siquisquam).

4

Duarenus, De usucapionibus, c. 3; Cuiacius on Digest XLI, 3, 49 (Deusucapionibus, L. ult.); Donellus V, 22 on Digest XLI, 1, 14 (De adquirendorerum dominio, L. Quod in litore).

1

Code XI, 43, 4 (De aquaeductu, L. Usum aquae); cf. eod. tit., L. Diligenter;cf. Digest XLIII, 20, 3 (De aqua cottidiana et aestiva, L. Hoc iure, § Ductusaquae).

2

On Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, II, 26, 11 (De praescriptionibus, c.Accedentes).

3

De praescriptionibus IV, 5, q. 6, n. 8.

1

On Digest XLI, 3, 49 (De usucapionibus, L. ult.).

2

Par. 3, tit. 29, l. 7 in c. Placa.; Zuarius, Consilia, num. 4.

3

Fachinham VIII, c. 26 et c. 33; Duarenus, De praescriptionibus, parte 2, §2, n. 8; § 8, n. 5 et 6.

1

Fachinham VIII, c. 28.

2

Angelus Aretinus in rubr. Digest I, 8 (De divisione rerum); Balbus, l. c.,n. 2; cf. Vasquium, Controversiae illustres c. 29, n. 38.

3

On Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane).

4

Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § ult.)

1

Cf. Gloss. eodem loco.

2

De officiis ministrorum I, 28; Gentilis I, 19 (sub finem).

3

Auth. Ut nulli Iudicum § 1, c. cum tanto de consuetudine.

4

Controversiae illustres c. 89, n. 12 et seq.

1

De potestate legis poenalis II, 14, part. 572.

2

Digest XLI, 1, 14 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quod in litore); XLI, 3(De usucapionibus, L. fin. in prin.); Institutes II, 1, 2 (De rerum divisione,§ Flumina, v. omnibus); Digest XLIV, 3, 7 (De diversis temporalibuspraescriptionibus, L. Si quisquam); XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane simaris).

3

Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure); Institutes I, 2 (Deiure naturali et gentium et civili, § 2, v. ius autem gentium).

1

Digest XLI, 3, 4, 26 (27) (De usucapionibus, L. Sequitur § Si viam);Institutes IV, 6, 14 (De actionibus, § Sic itaque); Ut dictis juribus et L. cumfilio, ubi multa per Bartolum et Jason on Digest XXX, 11 (De Legatis I, L. Cumfilio; part. I in pr. qu. 3 et 4).

1

Digest I, 5, 4 (De statu hominum, L. Libertas); Institutes I, 3, 1 (De iurepersonarum, § Et libertas); Digest XLIII, 29, 1 et 2 (De homine liberoexhibendo); XLIV, 5, 1 (Quarum rerum actio non datur, L. Iusiurandum, § Quaeonerandae); Code III, 28, 35 (De inofficioso testamento, L. Si quando, § Illud,v. adstringendos); Digest IV, 6, 28 (Ex quibus causis maiores, L. Nec non, §‘Quod eius’).

2

Code III, 44, 7 (De religiosis et sumptibus funerum, L. Statuas).

1

Code VI, 43 (Communia de legatis, Contra L. 2, cum vulgatis).

2

Digest IX, 2, 32 (Ad legem Aquiliam, L. Illud).

3

Dist. IV, C II (Erit autem lex); Digest I, 3, 1 et 2 (De legibus), 32 (eod.tit., L. De quibus, cum seq.); Decretales Gregorii Papae IX, II, 26, 20 (Depraescriptionibus, c. Quoniam).

1

Digest XLIII, 13 (Ne quid in flumine publico flat).

2

Digest IV, 4, 3 (De minoribus, L. 3, § Scio); Vasquius, De successionumprogressu I, 7.

1

Balbus, De praescriptionibus 5 in pr. in qu. 11, illius 5, quaest. pr. Gl.in cap. inter caetera 16, q. 3; Castrensis, De potestate legis poenalis II, 14;Balbus, and Angelus, on Code VII, 39, 4 (De praescriptione XXX vel XL annorum,L. Omnes).

1

Osorius, De rebus Emmanuelis regis Lusitaniae I.

1

Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia et iure, L. Ex hoc iure); et ibi Bartolus.

2

Aristotle, Politica I, 9 (1257 30).

3

Cf. Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 8.

1

Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis III, 7.

2

Digest XVIII, 1, 1 (De contrahenda emptione, L. Origo).

3

Naturalis historia XXXIII, 1.

4

Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 5, 5, 11 (1133 20):οὐϕύσειἀλλὰ νόμῳἐστί; Politica I, 9(1257 10).

5

Dist. I, C. VII (Ius naturale); Aristotle, l. c.

1

Castrensis ex Cino et aliis n. 20 et 28 on Digest I, 1, 5 (De iustitia etiure, L. Ex hoc iure).

2

Plato, Sophista 223 .

3

Plato, Republic II (p. 371) cited in Digest L, 11, 2 (De nundinis).

4

Politica I, 11 (1258 22–23).

5

καὶ ταύτης μέρητρία, ναυκληρία, ϕορτηγία, παράστασις are the exact words.

6

Cicero, De officiis I, 150–151; Aristotle, Politica I, 9.

7

L. c. (1257 14–17).

8

De beneficiis V, 8.

1

Cf. cap. III et VI.

1

Cf. cap. VII.

2

Gloss. et Bartolus on Digest XLIII, 11, 2 (De via publica, L. Viampublicam); Balbus 4, 5 pr. qu. 1; Panormitanus on Decretales Gregorii Papae IX,III, 8, 10 (De concessione praebendae, c. Ex parte Hastenen.); Digest XLI, 2,41 (De adquirenda possessione, L. Qui iure familiaritatis); Covarruvias in c.possessor. 2, § 4; Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 10 et 12.

1

Vasquius, l. c. n. 11.

2

Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia XIX.

1

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c, 10, n. 10; Victoria, De Indis I, 1, n.3; Digest VI, 1, 27 (De rei vindicatione, L. Sin autem, § penult.) L, 17, 55 et151 (De diversis regulis, L. Nullus videtur, et L. Nemo damnum); XLII, 8, 13(Quae in fraudem creditorum, L. Illud constat); XXXIX, 2, 24 (De damno infecto,L. Fluminum, § ult.); Bartolus on Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L, 1, §5); Castrensis on Code III, 34, 10 (De servitutibus, L. Si tibi); Digest XXXIX,3, 1 (De aqua, L. Si cui, § Denique).

2

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 3 et seq.; Digest XXXIX, 2, 26(De damno infecto, L. Proculus).

1

Vasquius, l. c.

2

Vasquius, l. c. n. 5.

3

Ἒργα καὶἩμέραι 24.

4

Code IV, 59 (De monopoliis, L. 1).

5

Caietanus on Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 77, a. 1, ad 3.

1

Aristotle, Politica I, 9.

2

Hexameron V, 10, 4, q. 44.

3

In funere Basilii.

1

Thucydides, Isocrates, Andocides.

2

Isocrates, Archidamos 51.

3

Panegyricus 176.

4

De officiis I, 35.

1

Polus Lucanus apud Stobaeum, De iustitia (III, p. 362 Wachsmut-Hense);Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromateis; Augustinus, De civitate Dei IV, 15.

2

Demosthenes, De libertate Rhodiorum XV, 10 (p. 193 R.).

3

Propertius IV, vi, 47–52.

1

De civitate Dei V, 1.

2

Digest XLIII, 14, 1 (Ut in flumine publico navigare liceat).

3

Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L. 1, in principio).

4

Digest XLIII, 12, 1 (De fluminibus, L. 1, § Si in mari aliquid).

5

Digest XLIII, 8, 2 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. 2, § Si quis); XLVII, 10, 13et 24 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum actio, et L. Si quis proprium); Silvestris,In verbo ‘restitutio’, 3 sub finem; Oldradus et Archidiaconus on Digest XLVIII,12, 2 (De lege Iulia de annona), and XLVII, 11, 6 (De extraordinariiscriminibus. L. Annonam).

1

De civitate Dei IV.

2

De officiis I, 34.

3

Digest XLI, 1, 50 (De adquirendo rerum dominio, L. Quamvis quod in litore);Henricus von Gorcum, De bello justo 9.

1

Panegyric 29, 2.

2

Georgics II, 109 [Dryden’s translation, II, 154].

3

Aeneid VI, 847–853 [Dryden’s translation, VI, 1168–1169].

1

Natural Questions III, IV.

2

Institutes II, 1; Digest I, 8, 4; cf. Gentilis, De jure belli I, 19; cf.Code IV, 63, 4 [Grotius refers particularly to his famous predecessor AlbericusGentilis (1552–1608), an Italian who came to England and was appointed to thechair of Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford. He published his De JureBelli in 1558].

3

Aeneid I, 539–540 [Dryden’s translation, I, 760–763].

4

Aeneid VII, 229–230 [Dryden’s translation, VII, 313–314].

1

Diodorus Siculus XI; Plutarch, Pericles XXIX, 4. [The Athenian decreeprohibiting the Megarians from trading with Athens or any part of the AthenianEmpire was one of the leading causes of the Peloponnesian War.]

2

Carlo Sigonio [(1523–1584), an Italian humanist, in his work] On the Kingdomof Italy.

3

Victoria, De Indis II, n. 1–7; Covarruvias, in c. Peccatum, § 9, n. 4, ibiQuinta [Franciscus de Victoria (1480–1546), the famous Spanish Scholastic, aDominican, and Professor of Theology at Salamanca from 1521 until his death.His thirteen Relectiones (De Indis is no. V) were published (‘vitiosa etcorrupta’) in 1557 after his death; the 1686 Cologne edition is held to be thebest.

Diego Covarruvias (1512–1577), styled the Bartolo of Spain. He shouldprobably be credited with formulating the reform decrees of the Council ofTrent. The 5 vol. Antwerp 1762 edition of his works is the best.]

4

Numbers XXI, 21–26.

5

Locutionum IV (on Numbers), 44; Estius, c. ult. 23, 4, 2 [Estius (?-1613)was a Dutch commentator on the Epistles of St. Paul and on the works of St.Augustine].

6

[Grotius refers to the Trachiniae of Sophocles, but probably from memory,for there is no such reference in that play.]

7

Baldus de Ubaldis, Consilia III, 293 [Baldus (1327–1406) was a pupil of thegreat Bartolus].

1

Histories IV, 64 [In connection with the revolt of Civilis].

2

Andrea Alciati, Commentaria VII, 130; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, p. 2 § 9;Bartolus on Code I, 11 [Alciati (1492–1550) was made Comes Palatinus by theEmperor Charles V, and offered a Cardinal’s hat by Pope Paul III, which herefused, but he did become a Protonotarius Apostolicus].

*

[Taprobane was the ancient name of Ceylon. Milton speaks of it in ParadiseRegained IV, 75:

“And utmost Indian Isle Taprobane.”]

1

Code VIII, 40, 13 [Probably Fabius Claudius Gordianus Fulgentius (468–533),a Benedictine monk, one of the Latin Fathers].

2

Nonius Marcellus, On the various significations of speech, under the word‘occupare’; cf. Connan, Commentaries on the civil law III, 3; Donellus[Doneau], Commentaries on the civil law IV, 10. [François de Connan(1508–1551), a French jurisconsult, a pupil of Alciati; Hugues Doneau(1527–1591) a famous jurisconsult, who wrote many volumes of commentaries onthe Digest and the Code.]

3

[See note on opposite page.]

4

Institutes II, 1, 13.

5

Digest XLI, 2, 3.

6

Letters I, 1, 44–45 [Francis’s translation, English Poets XIX, 726].

7

Pliny, Natural History, VI, 22.

1

Digest XLI, 1, 3.

2

Covarruvias in c. Peccatum § 10, n. 2, 4, 5.

3

De potestate civili I, 9.

4

Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 12 [Thomas Aquinas (1227–1274), one of the mostfamous of the Schoolmen and Theologians, spoken of often as Aquila Theologorum,and Doctor Angelicus].

5

De Indis I, n. 4–7, 19.

1

Vasquius, Preface (n. 5) to Controversiae illustres.

*

[The Cambridge Modern History, I, 23–24, has a good paragraph upon thisfamous Papal Bull of May 14, 1493 (modified June 7, 1494, by treaty ofTordesillas).]

1

[Grotius cites Osorius, but gives no reference.]

2

Institutes II, 1, 40.

1

Luke XII, 14; John XVIII, 36; Victoria, De Indis I, n. 25.

2

Victoria XVI, n. 27.

3

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 21; Torquemada II, c. 113; Hugo onDist. XCVI, C. VI; St. Bernard, Admonitory epistle to Pope Eugene III, book 2;Victoria, De Indis I, n. 27; Covarruvias in c. Peccatum § 9, n. 7.

4

Matthew XVII, 27; XX, 26; John VI, 15.

5

Victoria, De Indis I, n. 28, 30; Covarruvias on I Corinthinas V, at the end;Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 12, a. 2; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 29 [Bestedition of Ayala is in The Classics of International Law, Carnegie Institutionof Washington, 2 vol., 1912].

1

Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 66, a. 8; Silvius, De infidelibus § 7;Innocent on the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, III, 34, 8; Victoria, De Indis I,n. 31. [Franciscus Silvius, or Sylvius, or du Bois (1581–1649), was a Belgiantheologian.]

1

De Indis I, n. 31.

2

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 24; Victoria, De Indis II, n. 10.

1

On the Consolation of Philosophy IV, 4, 7–10 [H. R. James’ translation, page194].

2

Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 10, a. 8; Dist. XLV, C. V, C. III;Innocent, see note 1, page 17; Bartolus on Code I, 11, 1; Covarruvias in c.Peccatum, § 9, 10; Ayala, De Jure I, 2, 28.

3

Matthew X, 23.

4

On Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 4, 66, a. 8 [Thomas de Cajetan(1469–1534), an Italian cardinal, wrote voluminous commentaries on ThomasAquinas, Aristotle, and the Bible].

*

Matthew XXIII, 15.

1

Victoria, De Indis II, 1.

1

Paul de Castro on Digest I, 1, 5; Dist. I, C. VII.

1

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 1, n. 10; Lib. VI, V, 12, 3; Clem. V,11.

2

Satires II, 2, 129–130.

3

Aratus 302–303.

1

Octavia 413–414 [Translation by E. I. Harris (Act II, Scene 1)].

2

Aratus 302.

3

Digest VII, 5; Extravagantes of Pope John XXII, XIV, 3 and 5; ThomasAquinas, Summa II. II, q. 78.

1

203–204 [E. I. Harris’ translation (Act II, Scene 1)].

2

De beneficiis VII, 12, 3.

3

Speech XIII, In behalf of the poor man.

4

De officiis I.

1

Digest I, 1, 5.

2

Vergil, Georgics I, 139–140 [Dryden’s translation I, 211].

3

Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 135–136 [Dryden’s translation I (English Poets XX,432)].

4

Ovid, Metamorphoses I, 134.

5

De beneficiis VII, 4, 3.

1

Octavia 431–432 [Grotius here takes a slight liberty with the context].

2

De officiis I, 21 [Walter Miller’s (Loeb) translation, page 23].

3

History I, 139, 2.

4

Duaren [a French humanist (1509–1559)], on Digest I, 8.

5

De officiis I, 51 [Walter Miller’s (Loeb) translation, page 55].

6

De officiis I, 52.

1

Metamorphoses VI, 349–351.

2

Digest VIII, 4, 13.

3

Digest XLI, 1, 14; Comines, Memoirs III, 2; Donellus IV, 2; Digest XLI, 3,49. [Philippe de Comines (1445–1509), a French historian, and one of thenegotiators of the treaty of Senlis (1493).]

4

Digest I, 8, 10.

5

De officiis I, 52.

1

Institutes II, 1, 1 and 5; Digest I, 8, 1, 2, 10; XLI, 1, 14 and 50; XLVII,10, 13; XLIII, 8, 3, and 4–7.

2

Act IV, Scene 3 (975, 977, 985).

1

Donellus IV, 2.

2

Digest XXXIX, 2, 24; other references same as note 1, page 29.

3

Donellus IV, 2 and 9; also references in note 1, page 29.

1

Digest I, 8, 4; XLIII, 8, 3.

2

Odes III, i, 33–34 [Bennett’s (Loeb) translation, page 171].

3

Digest XLIII, 8, 3; 8, 2.

4

Digest XLIII, 12, 1.

1

Pliny, Natural History IX, 54, 170.

2

Epigrams X, 30, 19–20.

3

De Nabuthe, cap. 3.

4

Digest XLVII, 10, 14.

5

See note 1, page 31.

1

Digest XLIV, 3, 7.

2

Digest XLI, 3, 45.

3

Digest XLVII, 10, 13.

4

Novels of Leo, 102, 103, 104; See also Cujas XIV, 1.

5

Hexameron V, 10, 27 [St. Ambrose (c. 333–397), Bishop of Milan, ismeant].

1

Donellus IV, 6.

2

On Institutes II, 1; Digest XIV, 2, 9 [Johannes Faber (c. 1570-c. 1640) wasBishop of Vienna, and Court preacher to Emperor Ferdinand. He was knownpopularly as ‘Malleus Haereticorum’].

3

Digest XLIII, 8, 3.

4

Digest V, 1, 9; XXXIX, 4, 15; Glossators on Digest I, 8, 2; Institutes II,1; Baldus on L. Quaedam, in Digest I, 8, 2.

1

Baldus, Quibus modis feudi amittuntur, chapter beginning In principio,second column; Code XI, 13, 1; Angeli on Digest XLVII, 10, 14; Digest VIII, 4,13 and 4.

1

C. Quae sint Regalia, in Feudis.

2

Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, 5; 1, q. 6, n. 4.

3

Digest XLVII, 10, 13; XLIII, 9, 1.

*

[Andrea d’Isernia (c. 1480–1553), an Italian commentator, called oftenFeudistarum Patriarcha.]

†

[Probably a misprint for Alvarus (Alvarez).]

4

See note 1.

1

[Quoted in Cicero, De officiis I, 51, and here taken from Walter Miller’s(Loeb) translation, page 55.]

2

Cicero, De officiis I, 51.

3

Seneca, De beneficiis III, 28.

1

Johannes Faber on Institutes II, 1, 5.

1

Pliny, Natural History II, 69; VI, 27; Pomponius Mela, De situ orbisIII.

*

[Strictly speaking, Gaius was the grandson of Augustus, but was adopted ashis son.]

2

Natural History VI, 20.

1

Geography II and XVII.

2

Natural History XII, 19.

*

[A Roman sestertius was about four cents.]

1

Glossators on Lib. VI, I, 6, 3; on Digest II, 12, 3.

2

Digest I, 8, 4; Gentilis, De jure belli I, 19.

1

Digest XLIII, 8, 2.

2

Glossators on Digest XLIII, 14.

3

Baldus on Digest I, 8, 3; Zuarius, Consilia duo de usu maris I, 3, 28, L. 10and 12. [Philippus Zuerius (?—1606) of Antwerp.]

1

Victoria, De Indis I, n. 26.

1

Silvestris, In verbo Papa. n. 16.

1

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres, c. 51.

2

Donellus, V. 22 ff.; Digest XVIII, 1, 6; XLI, 3, 9, 25; Lib. VI, V, 12 (Reg.Sine possessione); Digest L, 16, 28; XXIII, 5, 16.

1

Digest XLI, 3, 45; Code VIII, 11, 6; XI, 43, 9; Digest XLIII, 11, 2; XLI, 3,49.

2

Consilia 286 [Angelus Aretinus a Gambellionibus (?-1445), a voluminouscommentator on the Digest and the Institutes].

3

Digest XLIV, 3, 7.

*

[Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314–1357) the most famous of the Post-glossators,was called by many of his biographers ‘Optimus auriga in hac civilisapientia’.]

4

Duren, De usucapionibus, c. 3; Cujas on Digest XLI, 3, 49; Donellus V, 22 onDigest XLI, 1, 14.

*

[The celebrated Italian jurist (?-1420 or 1437) of whom Cujas said: “Si vousn’avez pas Paul de Castro, vendez votre chemise pour l’acheter.” (Note frompage 55 of the French translation of Grotius by de Grandpont.)]

1

Code XI, 43, 4; cf. XI, 43, 9; cf. Digest XLIII, 20, 3.

2

On the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, II, 26, 11 [Felinus Maria Sandeus (c.1427–1503), Bishop of Lucca].

3

De praescriptionibus IV, 5, q. 6, n. 8 [Johannes Franciscus Balbus, a priestand jurisconsult at Muentz-hof].

1

On Digest XLI, 3, 49.

2

Par. 3, tit. 29, 1. 7 in c. Placa.; Zuarius, Consilia, num. 4.

3

Fachinham VIII, c. 26 and c. 33; Duaren, De praescriptionibus, parte 2, § 2,n. 8; § 8, n. 5 and 6. [Nicholas Fachinham (?-1407), a Franciscan, who taughtTheology at Oxford.]

1

Fachinham VIII, c. 28.

*

[See chapter XI.]

2

Angelus Aretinus on Digest I, 8; Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, 5, q. 6,n. 2; see Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 29, n. 38.

3

On Digest XLVII, 10, 14.

†

[Franciscus (?) Accursius (?-1259) (a pupil of the famous Monarcha jurisAzzo), with whose name the Glossa Magna is almost synonymous. He was calledAdvocatorum Idolum.]

4

Digest XLVII, 10, 13.

1

Glossators on the reference in note 4, page 51.

2

De officiis ministrorum I, 28; Gentilis I, 19.

3

Auth. Ut nulli Iudicum § 1, c. cum tanto de consuetudine.

4

Controversiae illustres c. 89, n. 12 ff. [Ferdinand Manchaea Vasquez(1509–1566) the famous Spanish jurisconsult, who held many high honors of therealm].

1

De potestate legis poenalis II, 14, part 572 [Alphonse de Castro (?-1558).Theologian at Salamanca, confessor to the Emperor Charles V.].

2

Digest XLI, 1, 14; XLI, 3; Institutes II, 1, 2; Digest XLIV, 3, 7; XLVII,10, 14.

3

Digest I, 1, 5; Institutes I, 2, § 2.

1

Digest XLI, 3, 4, 26 (27); Institutes IV, 6, 14; Bartolus and Jason onDigest XXX, 11.

1

Digest I, 5, 4; Institutes I, 3, 1; Digest XLIII, 29, 1–2; XLIV, 5, 1; CodeIII, 28, 35; Digest IV, 6, 28.

2

Code III, 44, 7.

1

Code VI, 43.

2

Digest IX, 2, 32.

3

Dist. IV, C. II; Digest I, 3, 1–2, 32; Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, II, 26,20.

1

Digest XLIII, 13.

2

Digest IV, 4, 3; Vasquius, De successionum progressu I, 7.

1

Balbus, De praescriptionibus 5, 11; 16, 3; Alphonse de Castro, De potestatelegis poenalis II, 14; Balbus and Angelus on Code VII, 39, 4.

1

Osorius, De rebus Emmanuelis regis Lusitaniae I [Hieronymus Osorius(1506–1580) was known as the Portuguese Cicero].

1

Digest I, 1, 5.

2

I, 9 (1257 30).

3

Cf. Covarruvias in c. Peccatum, § 8.

1

Pomponius Mela, De situ orbis III, 7.

2

Digest XVIII, 1, 1.

3

Natural History XXXIII, 1.

4

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5, 5, 11 (1133 20);Politics I, 9 (1257 10) [Nummus = νόμος. The fact thatthis is an incorrect derivation does not of course affect the argument].

5

Dist. I, C. VII; Aristotle, see note 4 above.

1

Castrensis from Cinus and others on Digest I, 1, 5.

2

Plato, Sophista 223 .

3

II (p. 371) cited in Digest L, 11, 2.

4

Politics I, 11 (1258 22–23).

5

[The text here is somewhat expanded.]

6

Cicero, De officiis I, 150–151; Aristotle, Politics I, 9.

7

Politics I, 9 (1257 14–17) [Jowett’s translation, Vol.I, page 15].

8

De beneficiis V, 8 [Not a quotation, but a summing up of the chapter].

1

See chapters III and VI.

1

See chapter VII.

2

On Digest XLIII, 11, 2; Balbus 4, 5 pr. qu. 1; Panormitanus on the Decretalsof Pope Gregory IX, III, 8, 10; Digest XLI, 2, 41; Covarruvias in c. possessor.2, § 4; Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 10 and 12.

1

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 11.

2

Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia XIX.

1

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 10, n. 10; Victoria, De Indis I, 1, n.3; Digest VI, 1. 27; L, 17, 55, 151; XLII, 8, 13; XXXIX, 2, 24; Bartolus onDigest XLIII, 12, 1; Castrensis on Code III, 34, 10; Digest XXXIX, 3, 1.

2

Vasquius, Controversiae illustres c. 4, n. 3 ff.; Digest XXXIX, 2, 26.

1

Vasquius, same reference.

2

Vasquius, same reference, n. 5.

3

In his Works and Days [The entire passage as translated by A. W. Mair(Oxford translation, page 1) is: “For when he that hath no business looketh onhim that is rich, he hasteth to plow and to array his house: and neighbourvieth with neighbour hasting to be rich: good is this Strife for men.”].

4

Code IV, 59.

5

Cajetan on Thomas Aquinas, Summa II. II, q. 77, a. 1, ad 3.

1

Politics I, 9.

2

Hexameron V, 10, 4, q. 44.

3

In funere Basilii.

1

Thucydides, Isocrates, Andocides.

2

Isocrates, Archidamos 51 [Grotius probably quoted here from memory].

3

Panegyric 176.

4

De officiis I, 35.

1

Polus Lucanus apud Stobaeum, De iustitia; Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromateis;Augustine, City of God IV, 15.

2

On the liberty of the Rhodians XV, 10 [Pickard-Cambridge’s translation I,page 59].

3

Propertius IV, vi, 47–52 [Butler’s (Loeb) translation, page 305].

1

City of God V, 1.

2

Digest XLIII, 14, 1.

3

Digest XLIII, 12, 1.

4

Digest XLIII, 12, 1.

5

Digest XLIII, 8, 2; XLVII, 10, 13 and 24; Silvestris, on the word‘restitutio’; Oldradus and Archidiaconus on Digest XLVIII, 12, 2, and XLVII,11, 6 [Oldrado de Ponte (?-1335), a Bologna canonist. Archidiaconus is probablythe Italian decretalist Guido Bosius.]

1

City of God IV.

2

De officiis I, 34 [Walter Miller’s (Loeb) translation, page 37].

3

Digest XLI, 1, 50; Heinrich von Gorcum, De bello justo 9.

Table of Contents

About Liberty Fund

About The Online Library of Liberty

Copyright and Fair Use

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

The Latin Text

The Translation

List of Abbreviations

Notes of Explanation

CAPITA DISSERTATIONIS HVGONIS GROTII DE MARE LIBERO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AD PRINCIPES POPVLOSQVE LIBEROS ORBIS CHRISTIANI

CAPVT I: Iure gentium quibusvis ad quosvis liberam esse navigationem

CAPVT II: Lusitanos nullum habere ius dominii in eos Indos ad quos Batavi navigant titulo inventionis

CAPVT III: Lusitanos in Indos non habere ius dominii titulo donationis Pontificiae

CAPVT IV: Lusitanos in Indos non habere ius dominii titulo belli

CAPVT V: Mare ad Indos aut ius eo navigandi non esse proprium Lusitanorum titulo occupationis

CAPVT VI: Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esse Lusitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae

CAPVT VII: Mare aut ius navigandi proprium non esse Lusitanorum titulo praescriptionis aut consuetudinis

CAPVT VIII: Iure gentium inter quosvis liberam esse mercaturam

CAPVT IX: Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esse Lusitanorum titulo occupationis

CAPVT X: Mercaturam cum Indis propriam non esse Lusitanorum titulo donationis Pontificiae

CAPVT XI: Mercaturam cum Indis non esse Lusitanorum propriam iure praescriptionis aut consuetudinis

CAPVT XII: Nulla aequitate niti Lusitanos in prohibendo commercio

CAPVT XIII: Batavis ius commercii Indicani qua pace, qua indutiis, qua bello retinendum

Cvm svb hoc tempvs plvrimae Regis Hispaniarvm litterae in manvs nostras venissent, qvibvs ipsivs et Lvsitanorvm institvtvm manifeste detegitvr, operae pretivm visvm est ex iis, qvae pleraeqve eodem erant argvmento, binas in Latinvm sermonem translatas exhibere.

TO THE RULERS AND TO THE FREE AND INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF CHRISTENDOM

CHAPTER I: By the Law of Nations navigation is free to all persons whatsoever

CHAPTER II: The Portuguese have no right by title of discovery to sovereignty over the East Indies to which the Dutch make voyages

CHAPTER III: The Portuguese have no right of sovereignty over the East Indies by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation

CHAPTER IV: The Portuguese have no right of sovereignty over the East Indies by title of war

CHAPTER V: Neither the Indian Ocean nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of occupation

CHAPTER VI: Neither the Sea nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation

CHAPTER VII: Neither the Sea nor the right of navigation thereon belongs to the Portuguese by title of prescription or custom

CHAPTER VIII: By the Law of Nations trade is free to all persons whatsoever

CHAPTER IX: Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portuguese by title of occupation

CHAPTER X: Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portuguese by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation

CHAPTER XI: Trade with the East Indies does not belong to the Portuguese by title of prescription or custom

CHAPTER XII: The Portuguese prohibition of trade has no foundation in equity

CHAPTER XIII: The Dutch must maintain their right of trade with the East Indies by peace, by treaty, or by war

APPENDIX Two letters of Philip III, King of Spain

LETTER I

LETTER II