THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

JOWETT
THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH INTRODUCTION, MARGINAL ANALYSIS
ESSAYS, NOTES AND INDICES

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CONTAINING THE NOTES

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NOTES
ON ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS.

BOOK I. 1. 1.

The order of the first paragraph is disturbed by the repetition of the statement that every community aims at some good. The meaning will be clearer if drawn out in a technical form:

Every community aims at some good:
Every city is a community; and therefore
Every city aims at some good.

Upon which rests a second syllogism with added determinants:

Whereas all communities aim at some good, the highest aim at the highest good:
The city is the highest community; and therefore
The city aims at the highest good.

Compare the opening of the Nicom. Ethics, i. 1. § 1,—

πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις καὶ προαίρεσις ἁγαθοῦ πιθὸς ἐφίστατο δοκεῖ διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήματο πᾶγαθὸν οὐ πάντ’ ἐφίσται.

Similarly the Metaphysics begin with a general proposition, πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἶδέναι ὁρέγονται φύσει; and the Posterior Analytics, πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϊσταμένης γίνεται γνώσεως.

The connexion of what follows in § 2, if there be any, is not easy to trace: ‘But a community is a complex organisation;’ Or, ‘But we must not suppose the different forms of communities to be the same;’ Or, the agreement described in the first sentence may be contrasted with the difference of opinion in the second;—

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'We are all agreed about the end of the state, but we are not equally agreed about the definition of the ruler.'

1. 2. "Οσοι μὲν οὖν οίκνται πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ οἰκονομικῶν καὶ διοικητικῶν εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

The starting-point of Aristotle's enquiry here, as in many other passages, is a criticism of Plato. See Politicus, 259 C, φανερὸν ὡς ἑπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντι ἐστὶ ταῦτα: ταὐτὴν δὲ εἰτε βασιλικὴν εἰτε πολιτικὴν εἰτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὄνομαζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερόμεθα.

This criticism is further worked out in ii. c. 1–5; cp. especially, c. 2, §§ 2–8, where Aristotle shows that the state is composed of dissimilar elements. An opposite view is maintained, or appears to be maintained by Socrates in Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 12, where he says, ἦ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν; and § 7, where the good οἰκονόμος is said to be the good στρατηγός. This is a paradoxical way of insisting on the interdependence or identity of different callings; Aristotle rather dwells upon their diversity.

1. 2. οἶκν ἀν μὲν ὀλέγων. Sc. ἄρχων ὡ, or ἄρχη.

A general notion gathered from the words πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν κ.τ.λ.

1. 2. καὶ πολιτικῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ.,

sc. τῶν ἄρχωντα λέγουσι.

1. 2. τῆς ἑπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης,

sc. πολιτικῆς, to be supplied either from the previous part of the sentence, or from the word πολιτικῶν which follows:—'According to the principles of the science which deals with this subject.' Cp. i. 8. § 7, θὰλασσαν τοιαύτην, where τοιαύτην is to be explained from ὀλίγειας which precedes: and in the same chapter, § 9, τοιαύτη κτήσις, where τοιαύτη (meaning 'in the sense of a bare livelihood') is gathered from αὐτόφυος and μὴ δ' ἄλλαγῆς in the previous section; and ii. 4. § 4, δει δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἄρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεατερίζειν; where τοιούτους, meaning 'disunited,' is a notion supplied from the preceding words,—ἵππον γὰρ ἐσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων τῶν τίκων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν: and ii. 6. § 22, ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεὶ συμποιητά τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, where the
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idea of an 'imperfect' state, like that contained in Plato's Laws, has to be gathered from the whole preceding passage.

κατὰ τὴν ύφηγημένην μέθοδον.

i.e. the method of analysis which resolves the compound into the simple. Cp. c. 8. § 1, ὀλος δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τῶν ύφηγημένων τρόπων, ἐπεὶ όρ καὶ ὁ δούλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἡν.

ὑφηγημένη, 'which which we have followed,' not merely in the Ethics, as Schneider and others; for the same expression occurs N. E. ii. § 9 (κατὰ τῶν ύφηγημένων τρόπων), and therefore can hardly refer to them, but 'generally' or 'in this discussion.' The μέθοδος, like the λόγος in Plato, goes before and we follow. Cp. De Gen. Anim. 3. 758 a. 28, and note on c. 13. § 6.

ὁσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀνωθετῶν ἀνάγεται. 1. 3. διαιρεῖν (ταύτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντὸς), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἥν ἐν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ύφομενα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐτεχνικῶν ἐνδέχεται λοβείν περὶ ἐκαστον τῶν ρήτερων.

τοῦτων may either refer 1) to ἥν ἐν σύγκειται, i.e. the elements of the state which he is going to distinguish in this book; or 2) to the different kinds of rule mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Bernays, Susemihl): in the latter case it is paraphrased by περὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ρήτερων, in the next clause. (For the vague antecedent to τοῦτων cp. supra c. 2. §§ 2, 12, etc., etc.) Aristotle treats of 'the kinds of rule' in Book iii. cc. 7, 8, and in the fourth and sixth books.

καὶ, according to the first explanation = 'as about the state so about the elements of the state,' according to the second, = 'about kinds of government as well as about other things.' ὁσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ... καὶ περὶ τούτων is repeated or resumed in ὁσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτως at the beginning of the next paragraph, c. 2. § 1.

The argument is to the effect that if we analyse forms of government into their parts, or into their kinds, we shall see that they differ in something besides number—e.g. in the nature of the authority exercised in them, or in the character of their magistracies, or in the classification of their citizens. (Cp. iv. 4. § 7 ff.) That states consist not only of their elements, but have in them something analogous to the principle of life in the human
frame, is a truth strongly felt by Plato (Rep. v. 462 D), less strongly by Aristotle (infra c. 2. § 13).

2. 1. \( \varepsilon i \delti \tau i \, \varepsilon \xi \, \alpha \rho \chi \iota \varsigma \tau a \, \pi r\acute{a} \gamma \mu \alpha \tau a \, \phi \nu \acute{o} \mu e n a \, \beta l \acute{e} \phi \epsilon i e n, \, \acute{a} s p e r \, \epsilon n \, t o i s \, \acute{a} l l o i s, \, k a i \, \epsilon n \, t o i s \, \kappa \alpha l l i s t e \, \acute{a} n \, o u t o w \, \theta e o r \acute{e} s e i e n. \)

Aristotle does not mean that politics are to be studied in the light of history; but rather that the complex structure of the state is to be separated into the simple elements out of which it appears to be created. Yet the two points of view are not always distinguished by him; and his method of procedure is often historical (e.g. in Book v) as well as analytical.

2. 2. \( \kappa a i \, \epsilon n \, \ldots \, \phi u t o i s \, \phi u s i k o i t o \, \varepsilon \phi i e s t h a i, \, \acute{a} i o n \, a u t \acute{a}, \, \tau o i o i t o n \, \kappa a t a l i s e i n \, \acute{e} t e r o n. \)

Aristotle, like Plato (Symp. 186), attributed sex to plants, male and female being combined in the same plant. The analogy of plants and animals is drawn out; De Gen. Anim. i. c. 23.

2. 2. \( \tau a u t a \, \rho o e i n, \)

sc. \( t a \, \pi r o o r \acute{o} m e n a \, \acute{e} t o t o \, \alpha \rho \chi o n t o s, \) another instance of the vague antecedent (c. 1. § 2 and c. 2. § 12).

2. 3. \( t h \nu \, \Delta l e f i k e i n \, m \acute{a} x a i r a n. \)

Evidently an instrument that could serve other purposes than that of a knife. Compare the \( \delta b e l i s k o l \acute{i} k h n o n \) mentioned in iv. 15. § 8. The Delphian knife is described by Hesychius as \( l a m b \acute{s} n o u s e a \, \mu i r o s a \chi e t o s \, \mu e r o s \, o u t h r o o t, \) ‘having an iron part added to it in front.’ The name is in some way connected with the sacrifice at Delphi, and is said in the appendix to the Proverbiorum Centuria, 1. 94 (p. 393 Schneidewin) to have passed into a proverb directed against the meanness of the Delphians in taking a part of the sacrifices and in charging for the use of the sacrificial knife. (See Goettling, Commentatio de Machaera Delphica, Jena, 1856.) We may agree with Schlosser in thinking that the matter is unimportant.

2. 4. \( t o \, \phi \acute{u} s e i \, \alpha \rho \chi o n \, o u k \, \acute{e} k h o n t o s, \ldots \, \gamma i n e t a i \, h \, k o w n a i a \, a i t \acute{e} t o n \, d o u i l e i s \, k a i \, d o u l o u n. \)

‘Among barbarians women are slaves. The reason is that all barbarians are equally slaves: there is no ruling principle among them such as gives the true relation of husband and wife, of master and slave; they are all upon a level.’ Cp. infra, cc. 12, 13.
NOTES, BOOK I. 2.

2. 5.

\[ \text{εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν.} \]

2. 5.

\[ \text{For wants which recur every day,' and therefore can never be left unsatisfied.} \]

2. 5.

\[ \text{ὁμοκάπτους.} \]

2. 5.

\[ \text{'Sitting in the smoke of one fire' is read by MSS. of the better class, P* L*, corr. M*, William de Moerbek; ὁμοκάπτους by the rest (Susemihl). The meaning of the latter word 'fed at the same manger' is better suited to the context.} \]

2. 5.

\[ \text{There was a time when the κώμη or village community had an important place in Greek life. Cp. iii. 9. § 14, where it is joined with γένος (πόλις δὲ ἡ γεννών καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους), and Thucydides, i. 5: ib. 10 (κατὰ κόμως δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, sc. τῆς Ἐπάρτης). Such communities lasted into historical times in Ἑτολία, Ἀκαρνανία, Ἀρκαδία, and even in Λακωνία. During the life of Aristotle himself the villages of Arcadia had been united by Ἐπαμινόνδας in the city of Μεγαλόπολις (cp. note on ii. 2. § 3).} \]

2. 6.

\[ \text{πρὸ τῆς ἁμαρτανόμενας, παιδάς τε καὶ παιδων παίδας.} \]

2. 6.

\[ \text{The tie of relationship is still acknowledged in the village, which in its most natural form is only a larger family or a colony of the family.' (There should be a comma in the Greek after ὁμογελάκτας; the words παιδάς τε κ.τ.λ. though construed with καλοῦσι, being really an explanation of ὀικία.) The form of the village community is most natural, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say, for the purposes of plunder or self-defence, but when the family becoming enlarged leaves its original seat and finds a new home. The expression ὀικία ὀικίας is not strictly accurate, for the village might grow up on the same spot.} \]
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

Cp. Cicero de Officiis, i. 17, 'Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque; qui cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exuent. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures pro-pinningu. Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum.'

ὁμογάλακτες, a rare term for γενναίτα τι φράτερες.

2. 6. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἔβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τὰ τὸ ἔθνη ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνήλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ αὐτίκα βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτίτου, ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῖς ἐστιν ὅ λέγει Ὅμηρος, 'θεμιστοῦ δὲ ἔκαστος παῖδων ἦ γ᾽ ἀλόχον.'

σποράδες γὰρ καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἄρχαῖον ὄκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τούτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὡστε καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἄρχαιον ἔβασιλεύων· ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἐαυτῶς ὀφθαλμοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

The argument is as follows: The rise of the village from the family explains also the existence of monarchy in ancient Hellas. For in the family the eldest rules. This rule of the eldest in the family is continued into the village, and from that passes into the state. In support of his opinion Aristotle quotes what Homer says of the Cyclopes (a passage also quoted by Plato, Laws 680, in a similar connexion), and he further illustrates it by men's ideas about the Gods, to whom they attribute a regal or patriarchal form of government, such as their own had been in primitive times.

τὰ ἔθνη here as in ii. 5. § 2 (see note in loco), a general term for barbarians.

ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνήλθον.

Aristotle is here speaking of one kind of monarchy, which may be called the patriarchal. In iii. 14. § 12, he attributes the rise of monarchy to the benefits conferred on the inhabitants of a country in peace or war by distinguished individuals, whereas in this passage he assigns to it a patriarchal origin. Both accounts
have probably a certain degree of truth in them. And doubtless
in history either form of monarchy may have taken the place of
the other; a series of undistinguished kings may have been in-
terrupted by the hero or legislator, and the hero or legislator may
have transmitted his power to his posterity. Cp. also iv. 13. § 12.

Either 'the relation of the members of the κόμη (γένος) to one
another,' or 'to the original οἰκία.'

'θεμιστεύει δὲ έκαστος παίδων ἢδ' ἀλόχων.'

Odyssey ix. 114; again alluded to in Nicom. Ethics x. § 13,
kukloptikos θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢδ' ἀλόχων.

διστερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδή λαυτοίς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι οὕτω καὶ τοὺς
βίους τῶν θεῶν.

This is especially true of the Greeks, who limited the divine by
the human; in other mythologies the idea of a superior being who
could not be conceived, led to extravagance and grotesqueness.
And even among the Greeks, the light of fancy was always
breaking in, though not in such a manner as to impair the
harmony of the poetical vision.

tέλειος πόλις.

Opposed to πρώτη (§ 5).

γυνομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζην ἔνεκεν, ὄσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζην.

'The state is created for the maintenance of life, but when once
established has a higher aim.'

όσα partly derives its meaning from γυνομένη, 'having a true
being' opposed to 'coming into being' (cp. οὕσια and γένεσις).

ἡ δὲ φώσις τέλος ἵκτιν.

By Aristotle the end of a thing is said to be its nature; the best
and alone self-sufficing development of it. From this tran-
scendental point of view the state is prior to the individual, the
whole to the part (§ 12). But he is not always consistent in his
use of language; for while in this passage he speaks of the state
as the end or final cause of the οἰκία, in Nic. Ethics viii. 12. § 7 he
also speaks of the οἰκία as prior to the state and more necessary

ἐπερ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωνίαι.
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS.

‘If the original elements of the state exist by nature, the state
must exist by nature.’ But is the argument sound? are not two
senses of the word nature here confused?

2. 9. τῶν φύσεων ἡ πόλις.
i.e. because it is the end, the fulfilment, the self-sufficing, the
good: yet there is another sense of the word φύσης, which is not
applicable to the state.

2. 10. φύσει τοιούτος καὶ πολέμου ἑπιθυμητής, ἀρκορ δὲ εἰς ἄσπερ ἐν πεττοῖσ.
Lit. ‘For the alien, who is by nature such as I have described, is
also a lover of war.’

The margin of one MS. supported by the old Latin Version
(which gives ‘sicut in volatilibus’) reads πεττοίοις. πεττόις is the
reading of one late MS., πεττοῖς apparently of all the rest. In
support of the last a very difficult epigram of Agathias (Pal.
Anthology, ix. 482) is adduced in which the term ἀγας occurs in
the description of a game played with dice and similar to our back-
gammon; the game is not however called πεττοῖ, nor does the
description answer to the game of πεττοῖ. The word ἀγας, when
applied to a game, may mean either ‘exposed’ or ‘blocked,’ and
so incapable of combination or action. With ἐν πεττοίοις, ἀγας might
be interpreted of birds of prey which fly alone, the solitary opposed
to the gregarious: cp. παυτὸς ἄγελαίου γαγοῦ in the next sentence.

But neither ἐν πεττοῖς nor ἐν πεττοίοις can be precisely explained.
The variations of reading (omission of ἀγας ὑπ’ alteration into ἀνεφ
γαγοῦ τυχάνων) shew that the copyists were in a difficulty. We can
only infer that whether applied to birds or to the pieces of a game,
the word ἀγας is here used as a figure representing the solitude of
a savage who has no city or dwelling-place.

2. 10. δι’ ὑπ’. 
Either 1) *‘why,’ or 2) ‘that.’ In either case the reason is sup-
plied from what follows (§ 11):—‘Man has the faculty of speech,
and speech was given him that he might express pleasure and
pain, good and evil, the ideas which lie at the basis of the state.’

2. 12. ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν.
toútwν, sc. ‘of these perceptions,’ or rather ‘of those who have
these perceptions.’ For the vague antecedent see note on § 2.
NOTES, BOOK I. 2.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσις κ.τ.λ.

In idea the state is prior to the family, as the whole is prior to the part, for the true or perfect family cannot exist until human nature is developed in the state: but in time, and in history, the family and the village are prior to the state. The state is φύσει πρότερον, but the family χρόνω πρότερον. See above, note on § 8, and Categ. c. 12, 14 a, 26.

διαφθαρείσα γὰρ ἐσται τοιαύτη.

Referring either 1) to ὁμώνυμος:—'When the powers of the hand are destroyed (διαφθαρείσα) it will only be such in an equivocal sense;' or 2) *to ὀσπερ λίθινη 'it will be like a stone hand.' Cp. Sir J. F. Stephen's *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, p. 128, 'A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body.'

οὐ μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἡ ἑκαστος, δὴλον εἰ γὰρ μὴ 2. 14. αὐτάρκης ἑκαστος χωρισθεῖσ, ὁμολογος τοις ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ἄλον.

This is a resumption of the words; καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει κ.τ.λ. in § 12. 'That the state exists by nature and is prior to the individual is proved by the consideration that the individual is not self-sufficing; he is therefore a part, like every other part, relative to the whole and so implying it.'

ὁστε ἢ θηριον ἢ θεός.

Compare the old scholastic aphorism derived from Aristotle that 'the man who lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a devil;' quoted by Burke, 'Thoughts on the causes of the present discontent,' vol. i. p. 340, edit. 1826.

φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμή.

'True, the political instinct is implanted in all men by nature: yet he who brought them together in a state was the greatest of benefactors': or 2) with a less marked opposition: 'The political instinct is natural; and he who first brought men together [and so developed it] was the greatest of benefactors.'

Here as elsewhere Aristotle presupposes a given material, upon which, according to the traditional Greek notion, the legislator works. Society is born and grows, but it is also made.
2. 16. δ' ἄνθρωπος ὄπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τάναντι ἐστὶ χρήσθαι μάλιστα.  

1) ὀπλα ἔχων = ὀπλισμένος, the words φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ being datives of the instrument. It seems strange at first sight to speak of φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ as capable of a wrong direction. We might rather have expected Aristotle to have distinguished φρόνησις from what in Nic. Eth. vi. 12. § 9, is called δεινότης, (an intellectual capacity which may receive a good direction and become φρόνησις; but may also when receiving a bad direction become πανορμία) and ἀρετῇ, from what in the same passage of the Ethics is spoken of as mere φυσική ἀρετῇ (Nic. Eth. vi. 13. §§ 1 and 2) or in the Magna Moralia i. c. 35, 1197 b. 39, ἀσ ὀμαί τως ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἄνθρωπα καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ., which may become injurious unless directed by reason (ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεράς φαίνονται οὕτως, Nic. Eth. vi. 13, § 1). But the transfer of certain words from a good to a neutral sense or from a technical to a general one is common in Aristotle; and in the fluctuating state of philosophical language may be expected to occur. We must not suppose that he always employed words in the same senses; or that he had a scientific vocabulary fixed by use and ready on all occasions. 

2) Bernays and others translate 'Man is by nature equipped with arms or instruments for wisdom and virtue;' i.e. Man has a natural capacity which may be developed into φρόνησις and ἀρετῇ, or may degenerate into their opposites. This gives an excellent meaning and agrees in the use of words as well as in thought with the passage in the Ethics referred to above. But the construction of the dative in the sense of 'for' after ὀπλα ἔχων is impossible. Or if 3) the datives are taken with φύεται, a construction which is quite possible, the words ὀπλα ἔχων become pointless. In this uncertainty of the construction the general meaning is clear; viz., that 'man has intelligence and an aptitude for virtue, gifts which are in the highest degree capable of abuse.'

ἐπὶ τάναντι ἐστὶ χρήσθαι μάλιστα. There is an inaccuracy in these words; for it is not virtue and knowledge which can be turned to the worst uses (cp. Rhet. i. 1355 b. 4) but the finer nature which is alone capable of virtue. Cp. Goethe's Faust, Prologue in Heaven, where Mephistopheles says, 'Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein;' and Nic. Eth. vii. 6.
§ 7, Ἑλετον δὲ θρώτης κακίας φοβερότερον δὲ. Compare also Plato Repub. vi. 495 A, B, where it is said that the best, i.e. the greatest natures, if they are ill educated, become the worst:—καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἑργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιούς καὶ οἱ τάγματι, οἰ ἄν τισὶν τύχοντες μυπτες: ὑμηρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδένι μέγα οὐδέποτε οὖν ἵδιον οὖντε πόλεων ὄριον.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικάν' ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἦστιν' ἡ 2. 16. δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίτης.

'But the virtue of justice unites men in states (i.e. is the quality opposed to the lawlessness which makes men lower than the beasts), and executive justice is the ordering of political society and the decision of what is just.'

In this passage δίκη is the 'administration of justice': δικαιοσύνη, 'the virtue of justice': τὸ δίκαιον, 'the principle of justice to be applied in each case.'

οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ δὲ αὐθες οἰκία συνίσταται: οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ 3. 1. δούλων καὶ ἐλευθερῶν.

αὐθες = 'in turn.' 'As the state is made up of households, so the household in turn is made up of lesser parts; and a complete household includes both slaves and freemen.' Of these elements of the household Aristotle now proceeds to speak.

τὰτον δ' ἐστι δικαστικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνάμμιμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνήρ 3. 2. σύζυγος) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητικῆ.

Not finding common words which express his idea, Aristotle gives new senses to γαμική and τεκνοποιητικῆ. In ordinary Greek they would have meant 'of or referring to marriage,' and 'to the procreation of children': here he extends their meaning to the whole marital or parental relation. It was natural in the beginning of philosophy to make new words, or to give new meanings to old ones; cp. Plato, Theest. 182 A, where he calls ποιότης an ἄλλοκοτον ἐνομα, and Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 9, where the relation of husband and wife is termed by a periphrasis τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον, or τὸ πρὸς γυναῖκα δίκαιον: cp. also c. 12. § 1 infra, where πατρικὴ is used for what is here called τεκνοποιητική. That Aristotle found many words wanting in his philosophical vocabulary, we gather from Nic. Eth. ii. 7. §§ 2,
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

3, 8, 11, De Interp. c. 2 and 3, and infra iii. i. § 7, where similar remarks are made upon ἀναμονήσια, upon the anonymous mean of φιλοσοφια and ἀφιλοσοφια, upon ἀφιλεία the excess of courage, and upon ὁνομα ἀφιλετον, ῥήμα ἀφιλετον, ἀφιλετο τρχη.

3. 2. ἔστωσαν δ' αὗτα τρεῖς ἡς ἐκπομεν.

'Let us assume the relationships, by whatever names they are called, to be three, those which I have mentioned.' Cp. περὶ τριῶν § 1 above. The passage would read more smoothly if αἳ were inserted before τρεῖς: 'let there be those three.'

3. 4. τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν.

Many traces of this sophistic or humanistic feeling occur in Greek Poetry, especially in Euripides: some of the most striking are collected by Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles, vol. ii. pp. 34-36:—

Eurip. Ion, 854-856,—

ἐν γὰρ τι τοῖς δούλουσιν αἰσχῶν φέρει τοῦνα: τὰ δ' άλλα πάντα τῶν ἑλευθέρων οὐδεὶς κακῶν δοῦλος, ὅσις ἑσθλός ἦ.

ib. Helena, 726 ff.,—

κακὸς γὰρ ὅσις μὴ σέβει τὰ δεσποτῶν καλ ἐγγεγέγρα καὶ ἐγνώδεις κακοῖς.

ἐγὼ μὲν εἰπὼν, κεὶ πέφυχ' ἐμῶν λάτρει, ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις ἡμιμημένοις δοῦλουσιν, τοῦνα οὐκ ἔχων ἑλευθέρον τῶν νοών δὲ.

ib. Melanippe, fr. 515,—

δοῦλον γὰρ ἑσθλόν τοῦνα οὐ διαφερεῖ πολλοί δ' ἀμείωνος εἰσὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων.

Philem. apud Stobæum,—

κἂν δοῦλος ἦ τίς, οὐδεὶν ἠττον, δέσποτα, ἀνθρώπος οὐτός ἔστιν, ἢ ἀνθρώπος ἦ.

ib. fr. 39,—

κἂν δοῦλος ἐστι, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτε· ἦ δ' αὖ Τύχη τὸ σώμα κατεδοὐλώσατο.

3. 4. βίαιον γὰρ.
Either 1) *= παρὰ φύσιν or simply 2) 'brought about by violence'; θεία may be opposed either to φύσις or νόμος or both.

Ωσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκάων ἡ ἐν ἑνὶ ὑπάρχειν τὰ ἁ. 1. οἰκεία ὁργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ὁργον, οὗτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The first six words ὁσπερ . . . τέχναις are read as in Bekker supported by some MSS. There is also MS. authority for the omission of δὲ; and for the omission of both δὲ and ἐν.

Retaining Bekker's reading, we must either 1) *translate, as in the text, making the apodosis to ἐπελ οὖν begin with καὶ ἡ κητική; or 2) δὲ after ὁσπερ may be regarded as marking the apodosis; or 3) the sentence may be an anacoluthon; as frequently after ἐπελ in Aristotle (cp. Rhet. ii. 25, i.402 b. 26 ἐπει γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν δι᾿ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν κ.τ.λ.). If we omit δὲ, the apodosis still begins with ὁσπερ.

ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις: The arts which have a definite sphere, such as the art of the pilot, or of the carpenter, contrasted with the ill defined arts of politics or household management, cp. c. 13, § 13 ὁ γὰρ βάςανος τεχνητὰς ἀφαιρισμένης τινὰ ἔχει δοιλείαν.

Instead of Bekker's reading οὗτο καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν another reading οὗτο καὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸ has been proposed on the authority of the old translation (Moebek) 'sic et yconomico.' But τῶν οἰκονομικῶν is more idiomatic and has the support of the greater number of MSS. Sc. οἰκεία ὁργανα δεὶ ὑπάρχειν.

καὶ ὁσπερ ὁργανον πρὸ ὁργανῶν.

Not 'instead of' but 'taking precedence of':—the slave is in idea prior to the tool which he uses. He is an instrument, but he is also a link between his master and the inferior instruments which he uses and sets in motion.

For the use of πρὸ cp. the proverb quoted in c. 7. § 3 δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσποτοῦ. So the hand is spoken of as ὁργανον πρὸ ὁργανῶν (De Part. Anim. iv. 10, 687 a. 21).

ἐι γὰρ ἥδυνατο κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is as follows:—'There are not only lifeless but living instruments; for the lifeless instrument cannot execute its purpose without the living.'
4. 4. It was said that a possession is an instrument for maintaining life, and there seems to be no reason why both κτήματα and ὑπηρέτης should not be regarded as different aspects of wealth (cp. infra c. 8. § 15, ὁ δὲ πλούτος ὑπηρέτης ἐστιν ἕκταμον καὶ πολιτικὸν, and Plato Politicus 287 D, who feels the difficulty of specialising the notion of an ὑπηρέτης: 'there is plausibility in saying that everything in the world is the instrument of doing something'). But here the term instrument, used in a narrower sense, is opposed to a possession, and regarded as a mere instrument of production. A parallel distinction is drawn between production and action, and the slave is described as the instrument of action. But he is also spoken of as the 'instrument preceding instruments' (§ 2), words which rather indicate the minister of production. Aristotle passes from one point of view to another without marking the transition.

He wants to discriminate the household slave from the artisan; but in the attempt to make this distinction becomes confused. The conception of the slave on which he chiefly insists is that he is relative to a master and receives from him a rule of life: c. 13. §§ 12–14. He therefore differs from the artisan.

tὰ λεγόμενα, e.g. instruments such as the shuttle, etc.

4. 5. ὁ δὲ βίος πράξεως, οὐ ποιήσας ἐστιν, διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξιν.

'Life is action, and therefore the slave, i.e. the household slave, is the minister of action, because he ministers to his master's life.'

4. 5. τὸ γὰρ μόριον ὑπὸ μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ μόριον, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλον.


4. 5. ἄλλος ἐκεῖνον.

The master although relative to the slave has an existence of his own, but the slave's individuality is lost in his master.

5. 1. τῷ λόγῳ διεισάγαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων καταμαθεῖν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between reasoning and
facts, the analogy of nature supplying the theory, the observation
of the differences which exist among mankind, the fact. Cp. infra
vii. 1. § 6, and Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 1 ; ix. 8. § 2 ; x. 1. § 4, and Plato (Polit.
278 D), who speaks of the 'long and difficult language of facts.'
The verbal antithesis of λόγος and ἔργον, which in Thucydides is
often merely rhetorical, enters deeply into the philosophy of
Aristotle. There is however no real opposition between them
any more than between the a priori and a posteriori reasoning of
modern philosophers, which are only different modes of proving or
of conceiving the same fact.

5. 2.

εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς.
‘From their very birth,’ or, with a logical turn, ‘to go no further
than the state of birth;’ cp. c. 13. § 6, καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ἐφίγηται περὶ
tὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, τὸ δὲ ζῶν πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.

5. 3.

ἐπού δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρξει, τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, ἦστι τι τούτων ἔργων.
‘As ruler and subject, they may be said to have a work or
function—the one to command, the other to obey, apart from any
other work or function.’

εἰτ’ ἐκ συνεχῶν εἰτ’ ἐκ διμημένων.

For the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cp.
Categ. 6. r. p. 4 b. 20, and Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 4. The human frame
would be an instance of the first, musical harmony or a chorus or an
army of the second. The πολις may be said to partake of the nature
of both in being one body and having many offices or members.

καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐπιπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχους καὶ γὰρ ἐν 5. 4.

τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τις ἄρχῃ, οἷον ἄρμοις.

1) The connexion is as follows: ‘This principle of a superior
is found in living beings, but not confined to them. *It is derived
from the universal nature, for it pervades all things, inanimate as
well as animate’ (so Bernays). It is remarkable that Aristotle
recognises a common principle pervading alike organic and in-
organic nature.

2) Or ἐκ is partitive; see Bonitz, Index Arist. 225 b. 11 ff. ‘Out
of all the kingdom of nature this is found [especially] in living
beings’ (Stahr, Susemihl). But according to this interpretation,
the addition of μάλιστα after ἐνυπάρχει, suggested by Susemihl, appears
to be indispensable to the meaning.

οἷον ἀρμονίας.

Either 1)* 'as in musical harmony there is a ruling principle
determining the character of the harmony;' or 2) 'as harmony is
a ruling principle governing the combinations of sounds.' The
first accords best with the common meaning of the word ἀρμονία
and with the use of the genitive.

5. 4. ἐξωτερικωτέρας.

'Somewhat foreign to the present subject,' not in the sense of
ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

5. 4. τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, διὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον
ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον.

i. e. 'the living creature, as soon as we begin to analyse it, is
found to consist of soul and body.'

The opposition expressed by δὲ in τὸ δὲ ζῷον is as follows: 'not
to speak of the whole of nature, but of the living creature only.'

For πρῶτον (which is to be taken with συνέστηκε) meaning either
'to go no further,' or 'as the first result of analysis,' cp. πρῶτον
ἐν ζῴῳ δεινορρήσῃ infra § 6, and the similar use of εὖθὺς supra § 2.

5. 5. δεὶ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἐχουσί μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς
dιεφθαρμένοις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9. § 8 and Cicero Tusc. Disput. i. 14 'num dubi-
tas quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura?'

5. 6. ἄστι δ' οὖν ἄσπερ λέγομεν.

A resumption of the words τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον above.

5. 6. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ.

Psychology, like logic, is constantly made by Aristotle and
Plato the basis or form of politics. The individual is the image of
the state in the complexity of his life and organisation, and the rela-
tions of the parts of the state are expressed and even suggested by
the divisions of the soul, and the relations of mind and body.

5. 7. τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως.

Cp. supra c. 2. § 2 ἄρχου δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν.
I. e. for the animals, for the body, for the female sex, for τὰ παθητικὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, to which he has just referred as inferiors.

διό καὶ ἄλλοι ἐστὶν.

'Because he is by nature capable of belonging to another, he does belong to another.'

τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ξάφα οὐ λόγον αἰσθανόμενα, ἄλλα παθήματι ὑπηρετεῖ καὶ ἢ 5. 9. χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρῶν.

'The difference between the slave and the animal is that the slave can apprehend reason but the animal cannot; the use of them is much the same.'

Aristotle is chiefly dwelling on the resemblance between the slave and the animal: but in noting the difference, he has not duly subordinated it to the general tone of the passage. Hence an awkwardness in the connection.

'Nature would in fact like, if she could, to make a difference between the bodies of freemen and slaves . . . but her intention is not always fulfilled; for some men have the bodies and some the souls of freemen: that is to say, they are deficient in the other half. The bodies of freemen and the souls of freemen are found indifferently among freemen and slaves: or, referring τοὺς μὲν to the freemen and τοὺς δὲ to the slaves: 'the one (the freemen) may have the bodies only of freemen, i. e. the souls of slaves, the others (the slaves) may have the souls of freemen.'

Δυνάμεω ὀκτω must be taken both with σώματα and ψυχᾶς.

βούλεται expresses, first of all, 'intention' or 'design'; secondly, 'tendency.' The personal language easily passes into the impersonal. Cp. for the use of βούλομαι Nic. Eth. v. 8. § 14, βούλεται μένων μᾶλλον, sc. τὸ νόμομα, and infra c. 12. § 2. For the general
thought, cp. Theognis (line 535 Bergk), o&rfyov oule&h k&oula idheia &ph&nuv | &al' a&i' sk&alh, ka&h&na lo&h&ov &x&i.

5.11. &al' o&h' oum&i&os y&h&ion idheiv to te ti' yuxi&h s&l&lo kai to tou oum&ma.

The connection is,—'There is as great difference between souls as between bodies or even greater, but not in the same degree perceptible.' For the 'sight of the invisible' cp. Plat. Phaedr. 250 D, 'For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though not by that is wisdom seen,' and the words preceding.

5.11. oti m&nh to&h'n e&i' f&usai tu&h' ou m&nh yle&h&ropoi, ou de dou&lai, fa&nepoi ou m&nh and ou de are not subdivisions of tu&h', which is itself partitive, but there appears to be a pleonastic confusion of two constructions; 1) tu&h' m&nh yle&h&ropoi tu&h' de dou&lai; and 2) ou m&nh yle&h&ropoi ou de dou&lai. In other words the construction beginning with tu&h' has varied into ou m&nh—ou de.

6.2. do&th' y&h'tara gr&aph&ntai para&n&mou.

'But a convention by which captives taken in war are made slaves, is a violation of nature, and may be accused of illegality like the author of an unconstitutional measure.' The more common view is expressed in Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. § 73, v&mpoi y&h' en pa&h' an&h'&pos a&h'dh' e&stw, ou &i' pol&emo&nto&h' p&h&lai al&h', tou&h' pl&ntw'n e&i' kai ta s&h&mata tou&h' en y' p&h'le kai ta x&h&mata.

6.3. a&h'ton de tou&h' tis &h'mi&as&h't&h'se, kai o poi&h' tou&h' &h'gous e&pal&t&tev, oti pr&h'&n tu&h' &r&h'th y&h'xa&nta x&h'rhgxai kai bi&h'&s&h&i'&h'w&i' t&h'mata, kai e&stw a&i' to krap'tou en y'pero&h' &h'g&h'ou tu&h', &o&th' do&k&h' mh &h'n&h' &r&h'th' e&i'&h' t'n b'&h'w, &al' peri to&h' di&h'&n m&h'&n' e&i'&h' &h'mi&as&h'th'se. &h'da y&h' to&h' to&h' m&nh' &h'g&h'oi&h'&k'&h' t'&i'&h'&n&h' e&i'&h', to&h' &h' a&i'&th' to&h' di&h'&n&h'&r', to&h' to&h' kreu't&a&h' &h'r'he, &epi' di&h'&st&t'h'n ge x&h'rh&h' tou&h' tou&h' &h'gous ou' &h'x'&h'&n' ou'&h'&n' e&h'&h'&n' ou'&h'&n' pi&h'&h'&n' &h'perou &h'gous, ou ou de&i to&h' b&h'lt&a&h' kai' &r&h'th' &h'r'he kai de&h's&h'e&h'.

c poi&h' tou&h' &h'gous, &a. 'Not 'makes the reasons ambiguous' (Liddell and Scott), but 'makes the arguments pass from one side to the other,' or, 'makes them overlap' or 'invade each other's territory,' as in the Homeric phrase, oum&i&os pol&h'mou | pi'&r&h' epai-
NOTES, BOOK I. 6.

λάβοντες (II. xiii. 358, 9), and in iv. 10. § 2,—τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δῦο
μὲν διείλομεν ἐν ὑμῖν περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν
dύναμιν ἐπαλάττειν πῶς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. vi. 1. § 3,—ταῦτα
γὰρ συνδυαζοῦμεν τοις τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλάττειν, δι' ἀριστοκρατίας τὶ
dιλιγαρχίας ἐστὶ καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικώτερας. See also infra c. 9.
§ 15. Virtue and power are opposed: but from one point of
view the arguments cross over or pass into one another, because
there is an element of virtue in power and of power in virtue.

Διὰ γὰρ τούτο, κ.τ.λ. The translation given in the text nearly agrees
with that of Bernays: the phrase τούτων τῶν λόγων in § 4 refers, not
to the τῶς λόγους of § 3, but to the two positions which imme-
diately precede; the first, that justice is benevolence; the second,
that justice is the rule of a superior. These two positions, according
to Aristotle, have a common ground, which explains why such a
difference of opinion can exist (§ 3). This common ground is the
connexion between ἀρετή and βία; the point in dispute being
whether the principle of justice is benevolence or power (§§ 3, 4).
If these two propositions are simply kept apart and not allowed to
combine, there will follow the silly and unmeaning result that the
superior in virtue is not entitled to rule: 'but there is no force or
plausibility in this' [and therefore they cannot be kept apart, but
must be combined]. Aristotle is arguing from his own strong con-
viction, which is repeated again and again in the Politics, that the
superior in virtue has a right to rule. He continues: 'There are
others who maintain that what is legal is just; but they contradict
themselves, for what is allowed by law may be in a higher sense
illegal. Captives taken in war are by law usually enslaved, yet the
war may be unjust, and the persons may be 'nature's freemen,'
and unworthy to be made slaves. But all these views are untenable;
and so Aristotle shews negatively that his own view (expressed in
c. 6. §§ 1 and 3) is right, namely, that there is a slavery which is
natural and just, because based on the superior virtue of the
master, and therefore combining power and right; and that there
is a slavery which is unnatural and unjust, because based on mere
violence; also that the argument from the right of the conqueror
is invalid.

c 2
The chief difficulties in this complicated passage are the following:—

(1) The opposition of justice to virtue, which is, perhaps, only to virtue in the lower sense of the word.

(2) What is the meaning of διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο (§ 4)? See Eng. text.

(3) Is εὖνοι a) a principle excluding slavery (Bernays), or b) justifying slavery, as existing for the protection of the inferior races (cp. 5.§ 11, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν, 6.§ 10 and iii. 6.§ 6)? The thesis that 'justice is benevolence' is held by Aristotle to be not inconsistent with slavery, that is, with the just rule of a superior.

(4) Do the words διαστάντων χαρίς (a) 'being kept apart and not combined, placed in bare opposition,' or b) 'being set aside' Both uses of διαστασθαι are justified by examples; in support of the former we may quote Ar. de Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a. 30, δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα (sc. of Empedocles) διειστήκει χαρίς ἕπο τοῦ νείκους, and supra c. 5. §§ 2, 8; and this meaning agrees better with the context.

(5) Do the words ἄρειοι λόγοι refer a) to one of the two preceding propositions, or b) to a further alternative? It is doubtful whether they are Greek, if taken in the sense of 'the latter,' or 'one of these two propositions.' It is better to translate 'the other view,' which is explained by what follows, ὡς οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., being the view which denies the natural right of the superior in virtue to rule, and which here as elsewhere, iii. 13. 25, is regarded by Aristotle as absurd. (See discussion of this passage in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. II.)

No philosopher is known to have asserted that δικαιοσύνη is εὖνοι. Aristotle in Nic. Eth. viii. 1. § 4, 9. §§ 1–3 notes some resemblances between δικαιοσύνη and φιλία, and we may cite as parallel the Christian maxim, 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'

6. 5. Ὅλως δ' ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς οἷοντα, δικαίον τινὸς.

'There are some again who identify law and justice.' Ὅλως may be taken either 1) with τιθέας, 'they maintain in general terms,' i.e. holding to some general notion of justice; or 2)* with ἀντεχόμενοι, 'holding absolutely to a kind of justice.'

6. 5. ἀμα δ' οὗ φάσιν.

'But in the same breath they say the opposite,' i.e. they are
compelled by facts, if they think for a moment, to contradict themselves. The language is slightly inaccurate; for it is not they who contradict themselves, but the facts which refute them.

Either one or two distinct grounds are alleged: 1) the cause of war may be unjust, and then the slave ought not to be a slave; or 2) the cause of war may be unjust, and also the slave, being a Greek, ought not to be a slave.


Theodectes was a younger contemporary, and, according to Suidas, scholar of Aristotle. During the earlier portion of his life he had studied rhetoric under Isocrates, and is said by Dionysius to have been one of the most famous of rhetoricians. His works are often quoted by Aristotle, e.g. Rhet. ii. 23, 1399 a. 7, παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου. Ἐις ποιον λέρον ἲσαξη-κεν; τίνας θεον οὐκ ἔτειμηκεν, διότι θεός νομίζει, ἤν τε ποιεῖ νομίζει; Nic. Eth. vii. 7. § 6, οὔ γαρ ἐὰν τις ἰσχυρῶς καὶ ἐπιρράλλουσών ἤθενὼς ἠπτᾶται ἵ τυπάν, βαμμαστόν, ἄλλα καὶ συγγυμνοτύχικόν, εἰ αὐτοῖς, ὅστε ὁ Θεοδέκτους Φιλοκτήτης ἦπε τοῦ ἐχεῖν πεπληγμένον, and in several other passages. See Bonitz.

When they speak of Hellenes as everywhere free and noble, they lay down the principle that slave and free are distinguished by the criterion of bad and good.'

Not 'nature sometimes intends this and sometimes not,' for
she always intends it; nor ‘nature always intends this, but often cannot accomplish it,’ which does violence to the order of the words πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι: but ‘this nature often intends, when unable to accomplish it,’ πολλάκις adhering to both clauses.

6. 9. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις.

ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, sc. the objection to slavery with which chapter 6 commenced, ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάνασσα φάσκοντες.

6. 9. καὶ οὖν εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἔλευθεροι.

'And that men are not by nature, the one class [all] slaves and the other [all] freemen, is evident,' repeating ὅτι. Aristotle had maintained at the end of chapter 5, ὅτι μὲν τοῖνοι εἰσὶν φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἔλευθεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερῶν: here he affirms the opposite of his former statement; but he does not explain in what way the two statements are to be reconciled with one another. 'Nature has divided mankind into slaves and freemen, but she has not consistently carried out the division; and there are slaves and freemen who were not the creation of nature.'

The words εἰσὶ καὶ are inserted before οὖν εἰσὶν by Bekker, (ed. 2); 'if there are some who are by nature slaves and some who are by nature freemen, there are some who are not.' The change has no authority, and is not required by the sense.

6. 9. ἐν τισὶ διάβρωσε τὸ τοιοῦτον, δὲν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν.

'Such a distinction has been made in some cases, and in these it is expedient that one should serve another rule;' δὲν is substituted for οὖς, that it may be in regimen with τῷ μὲν.

6. 9. ἤστε καὶ δεσπόζειν.

'And consequently the master over his slaves,' i.e. if they and he are fitted, the one to serve, the other to command.

6. 10. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τε καὶ φιλία δοῦλοι καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 11. § 7, § μὲν οὖν δοῦλος οἰκ ἐστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτῶν, § δὲ ἄθρωπος. The qualification contained in the last three words shows the contradiction of Aristotle’s position.
NOTES, BOOK I. 7.

Aristotle returns to the thesis with which he commenced; ‘From these considerations, too, i.e. from the natural and permanent difference of freemen and slaves, our old doctrine (i. 1. § 2) that the rule of a master differs from that of a king or statesman, the art of governing a family from the art of governing freemen,’ is clearly proven.

7.3.

‘Slaves have various duties, higher and lower, and therefore the science which treats of them will have many branches; and there is a corresponding science of using slaves, which is the science of the master; yet neither is implied in the terms master or slave; who are so called not because they have science, but because they are of a certain character.’ Yet the two propositions are not inconsistent: Plato would have said that the master must have science, and not have denied that he must be of a certain character.

7.3.

Aristotle clearly uses the word πρὸ in the sense of precedence as supra c. 4. § 2, ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανων. Such a hierarchy among servants as well as masters is not unknown in modern society.

But compare iv. 6. § 6, where he says that the rich having to take care of their property have no leisure for politics.

7.3.

The awkward manner of their introduction leads to the suspicion that they are a gloss, suggested by the passage just cited. The sense of οἷον is explanatory and so corrective; not, as Bernays,
for example, the art of justly acquiring slaves approximates to the art of war or hunting; for this would apply equally to every mode of acquiring slaves, and the meaning given to τις is feeble; but I mean to say,' or 'I am speaking of the just mode of acquiring slaves which is a kind of war or of hunting.' (See Bonitz, *Index Arist.,* s.v. *οἰκο.*)

8. 1. ἄλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τῶν ὀφθηγμένων τρόπων, ἐπεῖπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τί ἦν.

'We have been speaking (ἡ) of the possession of slaves which is a part of property, and according to our usual method of resolving the whole into its parts, we will now proceed to consider generally the other parts of property.' For ὀφθηγμένων cp. note on c. 1. § 3.

8. 1. πότερον ἡ χρηματιστική ἡ αυτή τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle proceeds to show that the art of money-making is not the same with the management of the family; it is only subordinate to it. But subordinate in what way? Bearing in mind his own distinction of instrumental and material, he argues that it provides material to the household, but is not the same with household management.

8. 3. ἄστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. = 'the question arises' or 'we are led to ask first of all, whether tillage is a part of the management of a household; or rather whether we must not include all the various ways of providing food,' which are then described at length.

The digression which follows is intended to contrast χρηματιστική in all its branches with οἰκονομική, and to prepare for the distinction between the natural and unnatural modes of acquisition.

The sentence is irregular, the clause ἄστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. following as if ἐστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρήσωμεν without εἰ had preceded. The words ἐστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ κ.τ.λ. are to be repeated with πότερον μέρος τί.

8. 4. ἄλλα μὲν εἶδη γε πολλά τροφῆς.

'The question has been asked, Is the whole provision of food a part of money-making?—But then we should remember that there are several kinds of food.'
NOTES, BOOK I. 8.

πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τὴν τούτων.

8. 5.
tὰς ῥαστώνας κ.τ.λ. ‘For their convenience and the obtaining’; the words may also be regarded as a hendiadys, ‘for the opportunity of obtaining.’

τούτων. Sc. καρποῦ, ζώων, understood from ζωοφάγα, καρποφάγα.

According to the common notion the life of the hunter precedes 8. 6. that of the shepherd; Aristotle places the shepherd first, apparently because the least exertion is required of him. The remark arises out of the previous sentence, in which he divided the lives of men according to the facility with which they obtained food. Cp. Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks.

θάλασσαν τοιαῦτην.

8. 7.

αὐτόφυτον.

8. 8.
Either 1)* ‘immediately obtained from the products of nature’
= ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, or 2) = αὐτουργῶν, ‘by their own labour.’

tὸν ἐνδείκτατον βίον.

8. 8.
Bernays reads ἐνδείκτερον without MS. authority, but there is no need to make any change. The meaning is that they supplement the extreme poverty (ἐνδείκτατον) of one kind of life by another: the two together give them a comfortable subsistence.

8. 10.
Scalaphotokéi.

Cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 1, 732 b. 10, τῶν β’ ἀναλματον τὰ ἄναλμα σκαλαφο- 

tοκεῖ. The term ‘vermiparous’ is not strictly correct: for all animals are either viviparous or oviparous. But Aristotle appears not to have been aware that the larva of the insect comes from an egg.

8. 10.

A pleonasm common in Aristotle: cp. ἡ τῆς ἀμύδος, τοῦ σπέρματος, 

τῶν καταμηνίων, φύσις, Hist. Animal. passim. (See Bonitz, Index 

Aristi., p. 838 a. 8 ff.)

διετε ὡμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰκτέοι καὶ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐκείνων 8. 11. 

εἰναι καὶ τὰλλα ζέα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμέρα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ
Aristotle is tracing the design of nature in the creation of animals and plants, first at their birth, secondly at their maturity. She has provided food taken from the parents in various forms for the young of animals at or about the time of their birth, and, after they are born, she has provided one to sustain the other, plants for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of man. The principle that the lower exist for the sake of the higher is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle. The belief that the animals are intended for his use is natural to man because he actually uses a small part of them. Yet Plato would remind us (Politicus 263 D) that ‘a crane or some other intelligent animal’ would have a different account to give of the matter.

Compare Butler, Analogy, Pt. I., ch. vii.: ‘It is highly probable, that the natural world is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the moral, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds.’ Yet how far the idea of design is applicable to nature, how far we can argue from a fact to an intention, and how far such a conception, whether in ancient or modern times, has enlightened or has blinded the minds of philosophical enquirers,—are questions not easily determined.

The opposition is between the young of animals before and after birth, answering imperfectly to κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν, and εἰθὶ καὶ τελεωθείσαι: the first is illustrated in § 10, the second in § 11. There is no necessity for omitting (with Gottling and Bernays) γενομένοις, which is found with a slight variation, γενο-μένοις, in all MSS. and confirmed by Moerbeke who has ‘genitis.’ For the use of γενομένοις=‘after they are born’ cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 12. § 5, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆαι αὐτῶι (sc. οἱ γονεῖς) καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆαι.

8. 12. ἕ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς πολεμικῆς).

Cp. Plat. Soph. 222 C, where hunting is the genus of which war is a species: and Laveleye (Primitive Property, c. 7, p. 100, English trans.), who speaks of the warlike character of hunting tribes, citing this passage.
In this sentence two clauses are compressed into one:—'one kind of acquisition is according to nature, and this is a part of household management.'

\[\text{κατὰ φύσιν is equivalent to } \frac{οὐ\text{ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστι}, \text{and is best taken,}}{\text{not with οἰκονομικῇ (Bernays) but with κτητικῇ, as is shown by the use of the words infra § 15: } δὲ μὲν τοῖνοι ἔστι τις κτητικῇ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δὲ ἢν αἰτίαι, δήλου.}

8 de ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχη, δὲν ἔστι θησαυρισμός 8.13.

\[\text{δ ἰδι is a confused expression referring grammatically to } \text{εἷδος κτητικῆς or } \text{τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος, but in sense to the property with which this art of acquisition is concerned. It need not be read with Bernays καθ' δ ἰδι, for the inexact antecedent is common in Aristotle.}

\[\text{αὐτὴν refers to κτητικῇ or possibly to φύσις: the nominative to } \text{ὑπάρχῃ is either the same as to ὑπάρχειν, i.e. } \text{δικήματα understood from εἷδος κτητικῆς, or θησαυρισμός χρήματων ἐστὶ πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαία, the genitive } \text{δὲν being substituted by attraction for the nominative } \text{=ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ χρήματα ἔστι θησαυρισμός. It must be admitted that the words } \text{δὲν ἔστι would be better away: they read awkwardly, and, if this were a sufficient reason for rejecting them, might be deemed spurious.}

\[\text{πλούτου } \delta' \text{ ὀδηγὸν τῆρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.}


\[\text{Solon, Fr. xii. 71 Bergk. The line is also found in Theognis 227 with a slight variation, ἀνθρώποις for ἀνδράσι κεῖται.}

8.15.

\[\text{κεῖται ὡς ὀσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις.}

\[\text{A slight inaccuracy: either 1) πλούτῳ understood=τῇ τέχνη τοῦ πλούτου: or 2) ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις may be taken to mean the subjects of the other arts: or vaguely= in the other arts': or 3) τῇ κατὰ φύσιν κτητικῇ may be supplied from the beginning of the sentence.}

8.16.

\[\text{οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἀπειρον οὐδεμᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης ὅτε πληθεῖ σοφτε μεγεθεί, } \text{8.15. }

\[\text{δὲ πλούτου ὄργανον πλήθος ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.}

Life, according to Aristotle, is subject, like the arts, to a limit, and requires only a certain number of implements.
Cp. the passage in the Republic (i. 349, 350) in which it is shewn from the analogy of the arts that the just and the wise do not aim at excess. Here as elsewhere 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' whereas evil is undefined. Cp. also Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 14, ὅ τι ἄρα ἀκαθώ τοῦ ἀπειροῦ, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πειραματικοῦ: and Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks, 'the definition of wealth as signifying instruments is philosophically correct but departs too widely from the custom of language.'

8. 15. δὴ ἦν αἰτίαν.
Sc. because provision has to be made for the uses of life.

9. 1. δὴ ἦν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας.
'Oowing to which,' or 'to the nature of which,' 'there appears to be no limit,' etc.

9. 1. έστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει.
So Plato divides κτισματική into θηρευτική and ἀλλακτική, Soph. 223 ff.

9. 2. ἐκάστου κτισμάτος διότι ἡ χρήσις.
Cp. Adam Smith's 'Value in use' and 'Value in exchange'; Wealth of Nations, Book i. c. 4, though the order of the two ideas is inverted. For to Aristotle the value in use or teleological value is the truer and better, to Adam Smith as a political economist the value in exchange is prior in importance.

9. 4. οὐσον γὰρ Ἰκανὸν αὐτοῖς.
Sc. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

9. 5. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοιμώνων πάσων, οὶ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἔτερων οὐκ ὅταν δὲ χείρασιν ἰσοίσθαι τὰς μεταθεσις.
Bernays inserts ἐτέρων before ἐτέρων, which he would translate 'different persons want different things,' and he assumes the idea of want to be implied in κεχωρισμένοι. But it is difficult to understand this explanation. A fair meaning may be elicited from the text, as it stands:—1) 'In families they shared in all things alike; when they were dispersed they had many things as before, but not all the same'; or 2) καὶ ἔτερων may be taken more simply: 'they shared in many things as before, and had many other things as well'; i.e. the enlargement of society gave rise to new wants. The
word ἐκοιμώνονταί κακά εἰς εἰς is not equally applicable to both clauses; in the second clause some other word like εἰς or ἐπτάντο is wanted.

For κεχωρισμένοι compare ii. 2. § 3, Διοίκητε δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλει ἔθνος ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας ὡς κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες.

οἱ μὲν, sc. οἱ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ, 'mankind in the first stage of society'; οἱ δὲ, sc. πλεῖον τῆς κοινωνίας οὖσαν further explained by κεχωρισμένοι, 'mankind after their dispersion.'

ἀν in the words which follow is to be connected with τὰς μεταδόσεις.

καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν. 9. 5.

καὶ which is found in all the MSS., though omitted in William de Moerbeke, merely emphasizes the whole clause 'As moreover some barbarian nations still do.' There is no need to introduce ἄν after καὶ without MS. authority, as Bernays has done.

eἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας. 9. 6.

Lit. 'to fill up what was wanting of the self-sufficingness intended by nature;' or 'to fill up what nature demanded in order to make man self-sufficing;' = eἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδείας ὡς τε αὐτάρκη εἶναι.

κατὰ λόγον. 'In a natural way'; 'as might be expected.' 9. 7.

ἐνενκοστάρας γνωμένης τῆς βοθείας.

'When the supply began to come more from foreign countries,' etc. 9. 7.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νουσίματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις. 9. 7.

'Of necessity there arose a currency.'


ὁ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον. 9. 8.

'Money belongs to the class of things which are in themselves useful and convenient for the purposes of life,' although there may be circumstances under which it is a mere sham (ἀήρος); see § 11.

πορισθέντος οὖν ἡδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκᾶς ἀλλαγῆς δότερον εἶδος θάτερον τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ κατηλλικὸν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινό-
μενον, είτα δὲ εἰμπειράς ἤδη τεχνικότερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον
πλείουτον ποιήσει κέρδος.

θάτερον εἶδος, i.e. 'other' than what Aristotle before called ἐν εἶδος
κτητικής (c. 8. § 13) which he had not yet distinguished from κατηκλική.
He admits that the simpler forms of exchange are necessary; but
he also supposes that there are two uses to which the art of money-
making may be applied, the one, the storing up of the necessaries
of life, which he approves, the other, retail trade which he condemns.
A prejudice against money, which is further developed in the con-
demnation of usury (c. 10. §§ 4, 5) underlies the whole tone of
thought. We may note that κατηκλική, though here applied to trade
in general, carries with it the disparaging association of shopkeeping.
πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον is dependent on δὲ εἰμπειράς.

9. 11. For the story of Midas see Ovid, Met. xi. 90–145. It is obvious
that Midas would have suffered equally if his touch had produced
food or clothing or any other article of commerce. In his account
of money Aristotle seems to be perplexed between its usefulness
and its uselessness, and between the good and bad consequences
which flow from it.

9. 12. τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.
Money is the element, i.e. the instrument of exchange. It is also
the limit or end of it. Exchange is not possible without money
and seeks for nothing beyond it.

There is no limit to the art of making money any more than to
medicine or other arts; for we want to have as much health and
wealth as we can. But there is a limit if we regard wealth as only
a means to an end, i.e. to the maintenance of a household. The
passage is not very clearly expressed, owing partly to the double
meaning of the word πέρας, (1) 'limit' or 'measure,' as opposed to
the infinite or indefinite ἐπιείρον, and (2) 'end' as opposed to
'means.' Aristotle probably intends to say that the art of money
making is unlimited, having no other end but wealth, which is also
unlimited; whereas in the art of household management, the limit
or end is fixed by natural needs.
There is another confusion in this chapter. Aristotle tries to make a difference in kind between the legitimate and illegitimate use of exchange, but the difference is really one of degree. Trade is not rendered illegitimate by the use of coin, which is natural and necessary. The source of the confusion is that he never regards exchange on the great scale as the saving of labour, but only as the means of creating superfluous wealth.

The art of money-making, like the other arts, is limited in the means, but unlimited in the end; as the physician seeks health without limit, so the money-maker seeks wealth without limit.' Yet the analogy is defective; for there is no accumulation of health in the same sense in which there may be an accumulation of wealth. The physician stands really on the same footing with the manager of the household; for both equally seek to fulfill to the utmost their respective functions, the one to order the household, the other to improve the health of the patient, and there is a limit to both. The opposition of means and ends is also questionable; for the end may be regarded as the sum of the means, and would not an unlimited end, if such a conception is allowable, imply unlimited means, or the unlimited use of limited?

For the two uses of money-making being concerned with the same thing, namely coin or wealth, they run into each other.'

The emendation of Bernays is unnecessary.
9. 15. \( \tau \acute{t} \varepsilon \gamma \alpha \rho \alpha \upsilon \alpha \tau \eta \zeta \eta \varepsilon \tau \iota \chi \rho \acute{e} \sigma \epsilon \varsigma \kappa \tau \iota \varsigma \varsigma \), \( \alpha \lambda \lambda \iota \tau \iota \varsigma \mu \iota \varsigma \), \( \delta \delta \varsigma \mu \iota \varsigma \mu \iota \varsigma \), \( \tau \iota \varsigma \mu \iota \varsigma \mu \iota \varsigma \). 

\( \chi \rho \acute{e} \sigma \epsilon \varsigma \kappa \tau \iota \varsigma \varsigma \). ‘For acquisition belongs to the same use of \( \chi \rho \acute{e} \sigma \epsilon \varsigma \kappa \tau \iota \varsigma \varsigma \),’ i.e. in all acquisition chrematistic is used in the same way, though the ends differ, for the end in the one case is external, i.e. the supply of the household, in the other case, mere accumulation.

9. 16. \( \delta \delta \varsigma \iota \delta \varepsilon \kappa \oomicron \upsilon \varepsilon \varphi \delta \varphi \xi \gamma \iota \iota \mu \iota \varsigma \varphi \mu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \varsigma \), \( \tau \iota \varsigma \delta \varepsilon \iota \zeta \iota \mu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \). 

Even good men desire pleasures, and therefore wealth, just because these (\( \tau \iota \varsigma \delta \varepsilon \iota \iota \mu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigma \nu \iota \varsigm
forced. Nature is here said to provide food, but no real distinction can be drawn between the provision of food by nature and the acquisition or appropriation of it by the labour of man, cp. § 3.

10.1.  

\( \text{i. e. } \dot{e} k \text{ to} \dot{o} \mu o\nu, \dot{e} k \text{ de}, \tau \dot{a} t \dot{a} \text{ diabéwai } \propto r o s \dot{k} e i \tau o w o i k o n o m o v. \)

10.2.  

\( \text{i. e. } \dot{e} k \text{ to} \dot{o} \mu o \nu, ' \text{ thereupon,' i.e. } \dot{e} k \text{ to} \dot{o} \lambda \dot{a} \beta \dot{e} w i v \mu a r \dot{a} \phi \dot{u} \dot{s} e w o i ; \tau \dot{a} t \dot{a} \text{ diabéwai, 'to order them,' i.e. the things which nature gives [for the use of the household]; or } \dot{e} k \text{ to} \dot{o} \mu o\nu = ' \text{from what is given by nature.' } \tau \dot{a} t \dot{a} \text{ diabéwai, 'to set in order,' i.e. to select and arrange the things necessary for the household.} \)

10.3.  

\( \text{Kal yap } \acute{a} \varphi \rho \dot{e} \rho \varphi \acute{e} \iota \dot{e} \iota e i v \dot{a} n \tau i s. \)

\( \text{Were this otherwise? '(as in the translation) i.e. 'if the duty of the manager of a household consisted in producing and not in using, then he would be equally concerned with money-making and with medicine. And so he is to a certain extent concerned with both, but unlike the physician or the maker of money only to a certain extent, whereas they pursue their vocations without limit.'} \)

10.4.  

\( \text{Kal peri } \iota \gamma \iota m i a i a s. \)

\( \text{About health as well as about wealth.} \)

10.5.  

\( \text{mála} \text{sta } \delta \epsilon \nu, \kappa a b \acute{a} p e r \acute{e} \ri t \text{ ai } \pi \acute{r} \acute{a} t e r o u, \delta e i \phi \dot{o} \acute{s} e i \text{ to} \dot{u} \text{to } \upsilon \acute{a} \rho \chi e i w. \)

\( \text{to} \dot{u} \text{to refers to some general idea, such as 'the means of life,' to be gathered from } \dot{t} \acute{a} \chi \rho \acute{m} a t a \text{ in the preceding sentence.} \)

10.6.  

\( \text{pantì } \gamma \acute{a} \rho \epsilon \xi \mu \dot{e} v, \varepsilon \dot{e} \nu \text{ y} ' \text{i} \text{e} t \acute{a} i, \text{ tro} \acute{p} \acute{f} i h \text{ } \dot{t} \acute{a} \text{ leiptómen} \acute{o} u \acute{e} s \text{t} \acute{i} n. \)

\( \text{tò leiptómenon } = \text{tò leiptómenon } \acute{e} v \acute{e} k \acute{e} i n \acute{a} v \varepsilon \dot{e} \xi \text{ o} \dot{e} \text{ y} ' \text{i} \text{e} t \acute{a} i, \text{ the residuum or that from which the offspring parts, } i.e. \text{ milk, white of egg, etc.: cp. De Hist. Anim. i. 5, 489 b. 8, ϕ \dot{e} v n \ldots \varepsilon \xi \text{ o} \dot{e} \text{ y} ' \text{i} \text{e} t \acute{a} i } \text{ tò } \chi u \text{n} \acute{a} \text{men} \acute{o} u \text{ } \acute{e} k \acute{e} \mu \text{r} \acute{e} i o u t \acute{t} \acute{h} \acute{e} \acute{r} \dot{h} \acute{e} \acute{n}, \text{ tò } \delta \text{'} \acute{a} l l o \text{ tro} \acute{p} \acute{f} i h \text{ tò } \chi u \text{n} \acute{a} \text{men} \acute{o} u \acute{e} s \acute{t} \acute{i} n: \text{ and supra c. 8. § 10.} \)

\( \text{d} \acute{i} \acute{d} \text{ kàt} \acute{a} \phi \dot{o} \acute{s} w o \acute{e} s \acute{t} \acute{i} n } \acute{h} \text{ x} \acute{r} \text{m} \acute{a} \text{t} \acute{i} \text{t} \acute{i} k \acute{h} \acute{p} \acute{a} \acute{s} \acute{i} k \acute{h} \acute{p} \acute{a} s \acute{i} w \acute{a} p \acute{o} \acute{d} \text{ tò w o k a r} \acute{t} \acute{o} w k a i \text{ tò w o } \chi u \text{n} \acute{a} \text{men} \acute{o} u \acute{e} s \acute{t} \acute{i} n. \)

\( \text{Fruits and animals are the gifts of nature and intended for the subsistence of man (cp. c. 8): hence (d)6), with some equivocation, the trade in them is said to be natural.} \)

\( \text{d} \acute{o} \text{ d} \acute{e} \text{ tò k} \acute{o} k o s \text{ y} ' \text{i} \text{e} t \acute{a} i } \text{n} \acute{a} \text{m} \acute{i} s \acute{a} m a \text{ v} \acute{o} \text{m} \acute{i} s \acute{i} m a t o s.} \)

\( \text{Cp. Arist. Nub. 1286, tò tò tò } \delta \text{' } \acute{e} s \acute{e} t } \acute{o} \text{ d} \acute{o} \text{ tò k} \acute{o} k o s \text{ t} \acute{i} \text{ } \theta \acute{h} \acute{r} i o u n ; \text{ Thesm. 845, } \text{d} \acute{e} z ' \text{i g} \acute{e} w n \epsilon \iota \text{ tò k} \acute{o} k o s \text{ t} \acute{e} k \acute{o} u s \acute{a} t o i o u t o n \text{ t} \acute{o} k o u n.} \)

\( \text{VOL. II.} \)
It has been customary, since Bentham wrote, to denounce Usury Laws on the ground 1) that they are ineffectual, or worse, 2) that they are unjust both to lender and borrower, because they interfere with the natural rate of interest. But in primitive states of society, as in India at the present day, they may have been more needed and more easy to enforce. In a simple agricultural population where the want of capital is greatly felt, and land is the only security, the usurer becomes a tyrant; hence the detestation of usury. The other and better side of usury, that is to say, the advantage of transferring money at the market rate from those who cannot use it to those who can, was not understood by Aristotle any more than the advantage of exchanging commodities. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 555 E.; Laws v. 742.

11. 1. τὰ τοιαῦτα τήν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τήν δὲ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.
1*) 'To speculate about such matters is a liberal pursuit; the practice of them is servile.' In modern language 'a gentleman may study political economy, but he must not keep a shop.' Cp. infra § 5, peri ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἰρητικῆς καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρους ἀριθμολογεῖται χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικῶν δὲ τὸ ἑνδιατρῆσθαι: and iv. 15. § 4, ἀλλὰ ταύτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὡς εἰσεῖν: οὐ γάρ πως κρίνει γέγονεν ἀμφισβητοῦντων περὶ τὸν ὑνόματος. ἔχει δὲ τῷ ἀλλήν διασφημικὴν πραγματείαν: also iii. 8. § 1, τῷ δὲ peri ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μένου ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖων εἰσι τὸ μὴ παρορ瑨 μηδὲ τὶ καταλέιπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν peri ἐκάστου ἀλήθειαν.

Or again 2) 'Speculation is free; but in practice we are limited by circumstances;' i.e. speculation on such matters may go to any extent or take any direction, but in practice we must restrict ourselves to the necessities of the case, e.g. the nature of the soil, climate, neighbourhood, etc. § 5 infra may be quoted in defence of either explanation, the words χρήσιμον πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας supporting the second, φορτικῶν τὸ ἑνδιατρῆσθαι the first. ἐμπειρίαν connects with ἔμπειρον which follows: 'experience of live-stock is one of the useful parts of money-making.'
SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF ΚΤΗΤΙΚΗ, in c. 11. §§ 1-4.

ΚΤΗΤΙΚΗ (sometimes called χρηματιστική, ch. 8. § 1).

1. θηρευτική (which is κατὰ φύσιν, c. 8. § 12)
   - πρὸς τὰ θηρία
     (=πολεμική in one of its divisions),
     cp. vii. 14. § 21
   - πρὸς τοὺς φόσαι δούλους

2. χρηματιστική (c. 9. § 1)
   - 1. ἡ κατὰ φύσιν (c. 9. § 12)
   - 2. ἡ μεταξῖ (c. 11. § 4)
   - 3. ἡ παρὰ φύσιν
     (μεταβλητική, c. 10. § 4)

   subdivided c. 11. §§ 1, 2 into:
   - a. κτήσις ἐποιεῖ, βοῶν, προβάτων, etc.
   - b. γεωργία, divided into (1) ψιλή,
     (2) περιπετεμένη.
   - c. μελιτοργία.
   - d. κηπευτική in c. 9. § 4.
   - e. κυνήγια.

   - f. τεκτονική (of which the worst form is
dοβολοστική)
   - g. μυθαραία

   - 1. ναυπηγεία.
   - 2. φορτηγεία.
   - 3. παράστασις.
   - 1. ἡ τῶν βασανίσων τεχνῶν.
   - 2. ἡ τῶν ἀτέχνων.
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11. 3.  ναυληρια, φορτηγια.

υαυληρια= 'commerce by sea,' φορτηγια= 'commerce by land.'

The word ναυληρια may also be taken in the narrower sense of
'owning of ships'; and φορτηγια in the sense of 'carrying whether
by sea or land.' But this explanation of the words does not afford
so natural a division.

11. 3.  διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἐτέρα ἐτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ
πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἑπικαρπίαν.

It is not certain whether in this sentence Aristotle is speaking of
trades in general without reference to the three previous divisions,
or, of the divisions themselves, commerce by sea being the more
profitable, commerce by land the more secure mode of trading.
The opposition of τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ favours the more general
application of the words.

11. 4, 5.  οἶνον ὑλοστοια τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἡδή περιελήφθε
κάθεπτι' πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλουμένων ἐστίν.

In these words Aristotle is illustrating 'the third or mixed kind
of chrematistic,' which is concerned not only with fruits of the earth
and animals, but with other products dug out of the earth and
manufactured by man.

ἡδή, 'mining again is not a simple art, but already—or, not to
speak of other species—contains in itself many subdivisions.'

11. 6, 7.  εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικῶτατα μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βασιν-
σῶτατα δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λαβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικῶτατα δὲ ὅπου τοῦ
σώματος πλεῖστα χρήσεις, ἀγεννήτατα δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετής.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστίν ἐνίοτε γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is with the word καθόλου in § 5. Aristotle,
although he declines to go into the particulars of these arts, gives
some general characteristics of them.

In the sentence which follows, the clause ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστίν skips the
intervening passage εἰσὶ δὲ . . . ἀρετῆς, and goes back to the pre-
vious subject. In another author we might suspect a gloss. But
there are many such dislocations in Aristotle's Politics; e.g.
iii. 4. §§ 11–13. For the meaning cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b. 31,
ἀναγκαίον τῶν παρά τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι.
NOTES, BOOK I. 12.

οἶνον Χάριτι δή.

δή is to be taken with οἶνον like ὀλως δή, ὀστω δή, καὶ δή with a slight emphasis, and sometimes with a word interposed, e.g. καὶ πλούτω δή, Nic. Eth. iv. 1. § 6.

Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου.

Thales is referred to in the Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 5 and by Plato in the Theaetetus (p. 174 A) as a type of the unpractical philosopher. ‘But even he could have made a fortune, if he had pleased.’

tυγχάνει δὲ καθάλον τι δὲν.

Cp. § 12. The device attributed to Thales is only an application of the general principle of creating a monopoly.

ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλήν ποιήσας ὑπερβολήν κ.τ.λ.

I.e. he bought up all the iron when it was very cheap, and having a monopoly sold it rather, but not very, dear.

δραμα Θάλεω.

δραμα, which is the reading of all the MSS., is used in the metaphorical sense of ‘idea’ here required, only in Pseudo-Demosthenes, 1460. 26, perhaps a sufficient authority for the meaning of a word.

*εὐρημα (Camerarius): θεώρημα (Coraes): δράμα (Prof. Campbell) may be suggested. Cp. Plat. Theaet. 150 A.

ἐπὶ δὲ τρία μέρη, κ.τ.λ.

The apodosis is lost; the suppressed thought that ‘all three parts are concerned with man’ is resumed in the next chapter.

καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἀρχεῖ καὶ τέκνων.

Sc. τὸν ἄνδρα. Supply for the construction either ἢν μέρος εἰκονομικῆς οὐ ἔρηται αὐτῶν from the preceding words.

ἐξ ἱσού γὰρ εἶναι βουλέται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηθεῖν. ὅμως δὲ, 12. 2.

ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἀρχή τὸ δ’ ἀρχητα, ἵναι διαφοράν εἶναι καὶ σχῆματι καὶ λόγοι καὶ τιμαῖς, ὄσπερ καὶ Ἀμασίς εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου.

Βουλέται sc. ἡ πολιτεία οἳ ἡ πολιτική ἀρχή, understood from ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς: ‘where there is a politeia, political equality is implied. All other differences, such as titles of honour, are temporary and official only.’ The construction of ἵναι may be similarly explained. Or both may be taken impersonally.
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"Idnais, who made his foot-pan into a god, as he had himself been made into a king, cp. Herod. ii. 172. The connexion is as follows: ‘Among equals, where one rules and another is ruled, we make an artificial distinction of names and titles, but this is not the case in the relation of husband and wife, because the distinction between them exists already and is permanent.’

12. 3. τὸ δ’ ἄρρεν ἄρει πρὸς τὸ δῆλον τοίτον ἔχει τῶν τρόπων.

Resuming the words in § 1 γυναικῶς μὲν πολιτικῶς, and adding the distinction that the relation between husband and wife, unlike that between ruler and subject in a πολιτεία, is permanent (ἀεί). This permanence of relation between husband and wife makes it rather an ‘aristocratical’ than a ‘constitutional’ rule, and in Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5 and Eud. Eth. vii. 9. § 4 it is so described.

13. 2. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξων.

Supply ἀριστή τις before τῶν ἄλλων—assisted by οἴδεμια in the following clause. Cp. infra § 13, συντόθομος δ’ οὐδείς, οἰδε τῶν ἄλλων τεχνίτων. The words τῶν τοιούτων are used inaccurately ‘of such habits,’ meaning the habits which have virtues like these.

13. 5. ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ’ εἶναι διαφοράς, ἅπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἄρχομένων.

‘Both require virtue, and of these virtues there will be different kinds since the natural subject differs [from the natural ruler]’; or, with Bernays, ‘corresponding to the difference in the subject classes,’ cp. infra clause 7. But why only in the subject?—a difficulty which seems to have been felt by those copyists or editors who, supported by Moerbeke, insert ἄρχοντων καὶ before ἄρχομένων. Better: ‘There will be differences of virtue in the ruling and subject classes, similar to those which [we have already noted to exist] in the natural subject.’

13. 6. καὶ τοῖτο εὖδος ὑφήγηται περὶ τὴν ψυχήν.

1) ‘And this is immediately suggested by the soul’: or 2) ‘And this, without looking further, is the leading or guiding principle in the soul.’ There is a rule of superior and inferior, not only in states, but in the soul itself.

The verb ὑφήγηται in this passage is taken passively by Bonitz,
and this distinction was indicated in the soul.' Cp. Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. i. 2. 3, δήλον ὅτι καθόπερ ὑφήγηται περὶ τούτων λεκτίου. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. supra c. 5. §§ 2-6.

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By inserting ἐπεὶ. before φύσει, altering τὰ πλεῖον ἄρχοντα into τὰ πλεῖον ἄρχοντα, and omitting ἀναγκαῖον before ἔχει a few lines lower down, Bernays has ingeniously fused the whole train of thought with its many involutions, into a single consistent sentence. But in such a complex passage, an anacoluthon seems more probable, and Bernays' alterations are considerable and unsupported by MS. authority. Cp. Nic. Eth. iii. 5. § 17, for a similar passage, which has also been arranged so as to form a continuous sentence; also c. 8. § 3; c. 12. § 1; iii. 9. § 6, and note. The words ἄλλον γὰρ ὑπόπουν go back to ταῖς ἡθικὰς ἀρετάς.

... and this distinction was indicated in the soul.' Cp. Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. i. 2. 3, δήλον ὅτι καθόπερ ὑφήγηται περὶ τούτων λεκτίου. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. supra c. 5. §§ 2-6.

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allow,—that there must be a common idea of virtue; this Gorgias
the Sophist in the infancy of philosophy is unable to understand,
and in reply can only enumerate separate virtues. The tendency
in the Aristotelian writings to refer to Plato, the mention of
Gorgias, and the opposition between the general idea of virtue and
the particular virtues sufficiently prove that the passage in the
Meno is intended.

Aristotle is contrasting the lot of the slave and of the artisan.
The slave is in one respect better off than the artisan because he
is directed by a master, whereas the artisan has no intelligence but
his own by which to guide his life. He too is a slave without the
advantages of slavery. Thus Socialist writers, like Lassalle and
others, in recent times have contrasted unfavourably the lot of
the modern operative with that of the medieval serf. We may
note in modern times the civilizing influence of domestic service
on the homes and manners of the poor. Many a household
servant in England has received an impress from a master or
mistress, and in Aristotle's language, 'has derived a virtue from
them.' Cp. iii. § 4, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαῖον οἱ μὲν εἰς λειτουργούντες τὰ
τωάντα δούλου, οἱ δὲ καὶ οἱ βίανασι καὶ θήτες, where, in a similar spirit,
Aristotle contrasts the duties of the artisan, which are rendered to
the community, with the duties of the slave, which are rendered to
the individual.

These strange words may be translated literally: 'But not in so
far as he possesses an art of the master such as would direct the
slave in his particular employment;' i.e. it is not as the teacher of
a craft but as a master that he imparts virtue to his slave.

The slave is relative to the master. His virtues are all received
from him, and cannot be imparted by any chance instructor. Nor
does the master instruct him in any art. But the artisan stands
in no relation to another; he has a separate art (§ 13) which he
exercises independently. He is without any ennobling influence
external to himself, whereas the slave is inspired by his master.

13. 14. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δοῦλους ἀποτεροῦντες καὶ
NOTES, BOOK I. 13.

These words may mean: either 1)* 'who do not allow us to converse with slaves,' or 2) 'who do not allow to slaves the gift of reason.' In either case there is a reference to Plato, Laws, vi. 777, 778.

peri de andros kai gynaikos kai teknon kai patros, tie te peri ekaston 13. 15.
auton ariths, kai tie pro's sphi'as autous omyias, ti to kalos kai mi kalos
es, kai pod de to men ev diwkein to de kakos faygein, ev tois peri tais
politeias anaikaioun etelbein.

This is one of the many promises in the Politics which are unfulfilled. Cp. iv. 15. § 3, a passage which is sometimes quoted in this connexion. But the reference is only to the office of paiadoimos and gynaikonimos.
BOOK II.

1. 1. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ’ αὐτὰς ἄτερον μὴ δοκῇ πάντως εἰναι σοφίζοντες βουλομένων.

    τὸ ζητεῖν is the nominative of μὴ δοκῇ: πάντως is to be taken closely with μὴ, 'and that our object in seeking for a new state is not at all to make a display of ingenuity; but to supply defects in states which are known to us, both in those which are actually existing and also in theoretical states like that of Plato.' μὴ δοκῇ and δοκῶμεν are dependent on ἦν.

1. 1. ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

    'To undertake' or 'take upon oneself,' a curious and idiomatic use of the word, found also in Plato and Thucydides. See Bonitz (Liddell and Scott), s.v.

1. 2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς ὃ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολίται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως.

    εἰς ὃ τῆς is required by the sense and is supported by the old Latin Translation. All the Greek MSS. however read ἑστήκης.

1. 3. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, either the title of the book (cp. iv. c. 4. § 11; c. 7. § 1), or 'in the state which is described by Plato.'

    The comments of Aristotle on Plato's Republic and Laws, contained in this and the following chapters, can hardly be dealt with properly in single notes. They are full of inaccuracies and inconsistencies. But the nature of these comments, which throw great light on the character of ancient criticism in general, will be best appreciated when they are brought together and compared with one another in a comprehensive manner. I have therefore reserved much of what has to be said about them for an essay 'On the
Criticisms of Plato in Aristotle. Both in the essay and in the notes I have been much indebted to Susemihl.

The argument of Socrates does not show that these enactments are to be approved for the reason which he gives [viz. as tending to unity]; and, regarded as a means to the end which he attributes to the state, unless some new explanation of them is offered, they are impossible.' Bernays places a comma after πρός, which he takes with κιν. Sc. τὸ τέλος, or generally 'what Plato means by unity.' The equality among citizens which is elsewhere (iii. 16. § 2; iv. 11. § 8; vii. 8. § 4) said to be the true and natural principle, is not inconsistent with a difference of character and of pursuits.

The clause ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κάμας ὀσι κεχωρισ- 2. 3. μένου τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλείοιν Ἀρκάδες.

The clause ὅταν μὴ κ.τ.λ. may be a description either 1)* of the
44  ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

ἐθνός, 'when the inhabitants of a country are not yet distributed in villages'; or 2) of the πόλις, 'when they are no longer dispersed in villages.' According to 1), the Arcadians are placed below, according to 2), above the ordinary condition of village communities.

1) Taking the first rendering, we may compare Plato's Symposium, 193 A, ἀν ὅ ἐντὸς ἡμῖν διαφθοράς ἔχων ἔντω ποιῶν καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. But Arcadia was also the most backward state in Hellas, the type of primitive simplicity. Hence, without referring to the dispersion of the Mantineans by the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 6) it is possible that Aristotle is speaking, not of their actual, but of their primitive and traditional state.

2) On the other hand he may be using the Arcadians as an example, not of the ἐθνός but of the πόλις, and contrasting their condition, when centralized in Megalopolis by Epaminondas, with the ruder life of earlier times. They would certainly have furnished the latest illustration of a συνόικια. We may paraphrase 'When they are not scattered in villages, but, like the Arcadians, have a central city.'

It may be argued on the other side that Aristotle would not have used the Arcadians who were the most backward of Hellenes, as the type of a civilized, but of a semi-barbarous, nation. To Aristotle the ἐθνός is a lower stage than the πόλις. He had no idea of a nation in the higher sense; nor did he see how ill adapted the Greek πόλις was to the larger order of the world, which was springing up around him, or how completely it had outlived its objects.

2. 3. ἐξ ὧν δὲ δὲ ἐν γενέσθαι, ἐδει διαφέρει.

The state like the nation is not a mere aggregate, but has an organic unity of higher and lower elements.

2. 4. διὸ ὁπερ τὸ ἱκον τὸ ἀντιπεποθός σῶζει τὰς πόλεις, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡπικοῖς εἰρήται πρότερον.

Euclid in his 6th Book uses ἀντιπεποθέουν to express the relation of reciprocal proportion. Probably the ethical significance of the term among the Pythagoreans was derived from its mathematical
NOTES, BOOK II. 2.

use. Cf. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 1, and Alex. Aphrod. on Met. i. 5, τῆς μὲν δικαιοσύνης θῶν ἐπολεμάνωτε τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς τε καὶ ἴσον, etc. (Scholia in Arist. Ed. Berol. 539 b. 12.)

διαμένειν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς. Here, and in vii. 13. § 5, Aristotle quotes the Ethics in the Politics, as he quotes the Politics in the Rhetoric (i. 8, 1366 a. 21). But probably the references have been interpolated.

διαμένειν εἰ ν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς. These words are a reflection on the proposed arrangement, not unlike the satirical remarks of Socrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2. § 9), and in the Republic ii. 374. But the connexion is imperfectly drawn out:—Aristotle, while making this reflection upon the inconvenience of the practice, admits in the next sentence that the alternation of rulers and subjects is in some cases the only arrangement possible. To Plato it seemed essential that the division between rulers and ruled should be permanent, like the division of labour in the arts, between one craftsman and another. Aristotle says, 'yes, if possible,' but this permanence is not always attainable, for where there is equality and freedom among the citizens, they must rule in turn (vii. c. 9 ; cp. also infra, c. 11. § 13).

ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ διωκτόν . . . εἰ δραχῆς.

'However desirable it may be that the same should rule, yet, if they cannot, but justice requires that all, being by nature equal, should share in the government, then they must rule by turns.'

ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τούς ἴσους ἐκεῖν ὀμοίως τοῖς εἰς 2. 6.

ἀρχῆς.

ἐν τούτοις, sc. among those who are naturally equal and have a right to share in the government.

μιμεῖσθαι, 'to imitate,' i.e. to come as near as we can to 'this principle of succession,' dependent on ἐκουσιν.

τοῖς εἰς ἀρχῆς, sc. ἐκουσιν. Like 'the original rulers, who have yielded to them;' or, without supplying ἐκουσιν, nearly the same meaning may be obtained. Cp. Book iii. 6. § 9, a passage which helps to explain this, διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, δὴν ἢ καὶ ἱσότητα τῶν
The equalisation of rulers and ruled is attained in two ways:  
1) by succession; 2) by the variety of offices which the same person may hold,—that is to say, instead of going out of office, he may pass from one office to another, from higher to lower and conversely; the alderman may become a common councillor or the common councillor an alderman. Or, 2) the words are a passing thought suggested by ἄλλοι γενόμενοι, confirmatory of the view that the State consists of dissimilars. There is a further variety; not only do they come into and go out of office, as if they were no longer the same persons, but they have different offices.

When each man can speak of his own wife, his own son, or his own property, the clear conviction which he entertains may tend to produce unity, but this is not the meaning of those who would have all things in common; they mean “all,” not “each.”

The absolute unity of ‘all’ in the sense of ‘each’ is not what Plato intended, and is in fact impracticable. The unity of all in the abstract, i.e. of the whole state, excluding individuals, does not tend to harmony. Such a unity is really inconceivable; a state without individuals is a μάταιον εἴδος. (Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 10.) The term ‘all,’ like the term ‘one,’ is ambiguous, and has a different meaning when applied to the state and to the individuals of whom the state is composed.

The fallacy is that these words may mean ‘all’ or ‘both,’ either in a collective or individual sense.

The fallacy consists in assuming that odd and even are the same because two odd numbers when added together
are even: e.g. the odd numbers, $5 + 7 = 12$, which is an even number; or that five is both odd and even, because it is composed of three which is an odd and two which is an even number. See Arist. Sophist. Elench. c. 4. 162 a. 33. Cp. infra c. 5. § 27, o$\nu$ γαρ των αυτων το ευθαμοιν άντερ το άρτιον, κ.τ.λ.

και έν τοις λαγοις κ.τ.λ. ‘For the word πάντες is fallacious, and indeed the use of this and other analogous terms is a source of contentious syllogisms in arguments.’ καί, ‘not only in this instance, but in arguments generally.’

The fallacy referred to is that of σίνθεσις and διαίρεσις. cp. Soph. Elench. c. 20. 177 a. 33 ff.

η δυσον έκαστον ἐπιβάλλει.

Either, ‘only so far as comes in the way of,’ or, ‘is the business of each,’ or, with a slight difference of meaning, ‘only so far as it touches or affects each.’ Cp. i. 13. § 8, διο τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελειῶν έχειν δει τὴν ήθικὴν άρετὴν τῶν δ’ άλλων έκαστον δυσον επιβάλλει αυτοῖς.

καί οὕτω οίχ ὡς έκαστον.

‘Every man will have a thousand sons, and these do not properly belong to him individually, but equally to all.’

ἐτι οὕτως έκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εύ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ή κακῶς, 3. 5. ὅπιστος τυγχαίνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἄν, οἶον ἐμὸς ή τοῦ δείνος, τούτον τὸν τρόπον λέγον καθ’ έκαστον τῶν χιλίων.

οὕτως, ‘on this principle’; ἐμὸς = ἐμὸς ρατί. ‘Further, on this principle [of common parentage], each one says of the citizen who fares ill or well, “he is mine,” whatever fraction he himself may be of the whole number; I mean that (οἶον) he will say, “he is mine,” or, “his,” and this will be his way of speaking about each of Plato’s thousand citizens.’ The words have a reference to Plat. Rep. v. 463 E, μάλιστα συμφωνήσουσιν ενὸς τινος ή εύ ή κακῶς πράττοντος . . . οτι τὸ ἐμὸν εύ πράττει ή τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς. The citizen speaks as one in a thousand of all the rest: he gives a thousandth part of his affection to each and all of the thousand persons who are the objects of it. Or, to put the matter in another way: we may suppose the citizens to be conversing with each other: they say, ‘my son is doing well,’ or, ‘is not doing well,’ being each of them a thousandth part
of the whole, and those of whom they speak being likewise each of them a thousandth part.

A different view of this passage has been taken in the Text. More stress is laid on the words τῶν εἴδ. ἧ κακῶς πράσσοντα: the parent is supposed to appropriate the youth who is doing well, and to disown the one who is doing badly: ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εἶδ. ἦ κακῶς πράσσοντα = ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εἶδ. πράσσοντα, οὐκ ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν κακῶς πράσσοντα. It must be remembered that, according to Aristotle, the true children are liable to be discovered by their likeness to their parents.

τῶν χιλίων, as if Plato had made his state to consist of a thousand citizens; cp. infra c. 6. § 5. This is only an inference from Rep. iv. 423 A, in which Plato says that the ideal state, even if consisting of no more than a thousand soldiers, would be invincible.

3. 7. ὃ μὲν γὰρ νῦν κ.τ.λ.

In Plato’s state they are all “mine”: in ordinary states there are many sorts of relationship, and the same person may be a father or a brother or a cousin of some one or other; there are likewise remoter degrees of affinity, and remoter still the tie of fellow wardsman or fellow tribesman. Even a distant cousinship is preferable to that shadow of a relationship which supersedes them all.’

3. 7. ὃ δ’ ἀνεψιῶν, ἡ καὶ ἅλλην τινὰ συγγένειαν.

The variety of human relations as ordinarily conceived is contrasted with the monotony of Plato’s society in which the state and the family are identified.

3. 7. κρείττον γὰρ ἰδιὸν ἀνεψιῶν εἶναι ἢ τῶν τράπουν τοῦτον νῦν.

A resumption of πότερον οὖσα κρείττον; ‘Is not the present practice better? for it is better to have a cousin of your own than to have a son after Plato’s fashion.’

3. 9. φασώ τινες ..., τῶν τάς τῆς γῆς περιόδου πραγματευομένων εἶναι τις τῶν ἄνω λαβὼν κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαφεύγονται κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας.

Cp. Herod. iv. 180, τῷ ἄν ὁθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῷ παιδίῳ, τοῦτον παῖς νουμένοι, who is speaking, however, not of Upper, but of Lower Libya.
NOTES, BOOK II. 4.

Δύν αἰδήν δοιλόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τούς μὴ 4. 1.

πάρρῳ τῆς συγγενείας ἰστα, ὀστερ πρὸς τούς ἀπωθεῖν.

'Crimes of violence are worse in the republic of Plato because they are attended with impiety, and they are more likely to be committed because natural relationships are undiscoverable.' Aristotle here mixes up Plato's point of view and his own. He does not remark that Plato having abolished family relations is not really chargeable with the occurrence of offences which arise out of them. Perhaps he would have retorted that the natural relationship could not be thus abolished.

κάι γενομένων, τῶν μέν γνωριζόντων ἐνδείκται τὰς νομίσομενα γίνεσθαι 4. 1.

λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν.

τῶν δὲ is opposed to τῶν μέν, though not parallel with it = 'but in the other case,' as if τῶν μέν without γνωριζόντων had preceded. Or a comma may be placed after τῶν μέν, and γνωριζόντων may be separated from it. 'And when offences take place, in the one case men having knowledge of them, the customary expiations may be made, in the other case they cannot.'

ἀποσιν δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς τινος τὸ συνεναι μοῦνον ἀφελεῖν 4. 2.

τῶν ἐρώτων, τὸ δ’ ἐράν μὴ καλύτασι, μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις τὰς ἀλλας, αὐτὶ πρὸς ἔτων εἶναι πᾶσων ἐστὶν ἀπερεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφοὶ πρὸς ἀδελφόν ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐράν μοῦνον.

The instance quoted, παρὶ πρὸς ἔτων, shews that the reference is to Rep. iii. 403, but Aristotle has been hasty or forgetful in his citation. Plato does not say that he will allow the practice of lovers to prevail between father and son, or brother and brother, but that the endearments of lovers shall be only such as might be practised without offence between members of the same family. τὸ ἐράν evidently in the lover's sense of the word.

τοικε δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.

'If the legislator desire to keep the inferior classes in a state of weakness, and communism is a source, not of strength, but of weakness, then it is better adapted to them than to the guardians'—that is, according to Aristotle's view of communism, not Plato's. Cp. vii. 9. § 8 ; c. 10. § 13 where he argues that the legislator should vol. ii.
destroy as far as possible any tie of race among the slave population. And the traditional policy of slave-holding countries has been to deprive the slave of education and of family rights.

4. 4. τοιούτους.  
Sc. ἵππον φιλικοῦς gathered from ἵππον φιλία.

4. 5. καὶ δὴ ἣν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴεται δειν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα.  
Supply τοιούτων (from the preceding) τῆς αἰτίας δὲ ἣν, viz. unity.  
Cp. supra c. 2. § 1, καὶ δὲ ἥν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νεομοθετῆσαι τὸν τρόπον τούτον ὁ Σωκράτης οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.

4. 6. ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φησὶ τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἵσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὁς τῶν ἔρωτων διὰ τὸ σφιδρὰ φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν συμφωνοῦν καὶ γενέται τί καὶ δυο ὄντων ἀμφότερον ἕνα. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγμη ἀμφότεροι ἐφαύρωμι ἡ τὸν ἑνα ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τῆς φιλίας ἀναγκαίων ἵβαρη γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς τοι方式. καὶ ἥσσοντα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἢ ὑπὸ πατέρα ἢ πατέρα ὑπὸν.  

Socrates wishes to have the city entirely one: now such a unity is either attained or not attained: if attained like that of the lovers in the Symposium (called here ἔρωτικοι λόγοι), p. 192, it would be suicidal. But it is not attained, for he only succeeds in creating a very loose tie between his citizens.

ὁς τῶν ἔρωτων, a rare construction after λέγειν.  

ἡ τὸν ἑνα. 'If they are to be absorbed in one another, both individualities cannot subsist, though one may.’

4. 7. οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τῆς οἰκείωτητα τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄνομάτων τοιῶν διαφρονίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιωτῇ, ἡ πατέρα ὡς νιῶν ἡ νιῶ ὡς πατρός, ἡ ὡς ἀδελφοῦς ἀλλήλων.  
ἀναγκαῖον ἐν is to be taken with συμβαίνει, ἥκιστα with διαφρονίζειν.  
The latter word has two constructions, 1) with τινὰ for subject, and οἰκείωτα as object; 2) with πατέρα, νιῶ for subjects, and the genitives νιῶν, πατρός following, e. g. ἡ πατέρα διαφρονίζειν ὡς νιῶν.

4. 8. τὸ τε ἰδιὸν καὶ τὸ ἄγαπητὸν.  
ἄγαπητόν, 'that which is to be cherished or valued,' like ἄγαπητός in Plat. (? ) Alcibiades I. 131 E, ὃς ἐγένετο, ὃς ὑπέκειν, Ἀλκιβιάδη τῷ
NOTES, BOOK II. 5.

καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν [εἰς] τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

4. 10. Aristotle is referring to the case of the citizens who pass from one rank to another. Those who are raised to the condition of the guardians and those who are degraded from it have both lost the natural relationships of brothers and sisters, parents and children. But the natural relations still exist although the names of them have disappeared; and therefore they are now less likely to be respected. Here again Aristotle is confusing his own point of view with that of Plato.

παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν must be explained as a confusion of rest and motion, lit. ‘those who [having been transferred from the other citizens] are now among the guardians.’ The words εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας have been explained as a pleonasm—‘in relation to the other citizens’ (οὐ προσαγωγεῖσθαι ἀδελφοῖς, κ.τ.λ.), ‘they do not call them brothers.’ But the use of εἰς in a different sense in two successive lines is objectionable. It is possible that the words εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας are an error of the copyist, who may have repeated the words of the previous line. The omission of εἰς (which is wanting in Moerbeke and in two good MSS., M*, P†, but inserted as a correction in one of them, and found in all the rest) is the best way of amending the passage.

καὶ δὲ ἓκεινα χαρῖς,

5. 2. sc. τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας.

πάτερον . . . τὰς τε κόρας κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιστον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις.

5. 2. These words are a statement of the general question which is afterwards subdivided into three cases, though the carelessness of the language might at first sight lead to the inference that Aristotle is putting the third case only. Hence Bernays has been led, un-
5. 2.  ὅπερ ἑνα ποιεῖ τῶν θυνῶν.

Thην as in i. 2. § 6, a vague expression for ἑρδαροι and generally opposed to πόλεις or Ἑλληνες: also any loosely organised people; ii. 2. § 3; applied to the more general divisions of Hellas, vii. 7. § 4. The cases of Sparta, infra § 7, and of Tarentum, vi. § 10, are not in point, even if their practice could be regarded as communism.

5. 3.  ἐτέρων μὲν οὖν δυντῶν τῶν γεωργῶντων ἄλλος ἢ ἐν ἑα τρόπος καὶ ράφων.

If the land were cultivated by serfs there would be no disputes among the cultivators, for having no property, they would have nothing to quarrel about.

5. 4.  τῶν συναποθημένων κοινωνίαι, σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

Either* 'fellow-travellers' or 'fellow-settlers in a foreign city.' Whether the κοινωνίαι were formed for the purposes of business or only of companionship is not determined. With the words σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. supply προσκρούων.

5. 5.  καὶ ἐπικοσμηθέν ἃ διενέγκαι.

A condensed expression put for ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, διαφέρει, καὶ ἐπικοσμηθέν ('when it has been improved'), οὗ μικρὸν ἃ διενέγκαι.

5. 6.  αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν.

Either 1), 'for the division of labour will give rise to no complaints,' i.e. will prevent complaints, ἐπιμελεῖαι being taken as the nominative to οὗ ποιήσουσιν: or 2) regarding (as the words πρὸς ἀλλήλους and the following clause μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιδιόκουσιν seem to indicate) αἱ μὲν ἐπιμελεῖαι as nom. absolute, or the construction of the sentence as changing, we may translate, 'Every one having a distinct occupation, men will not complain of one another.'

5. 6.  δὲ ἄρθην δὲ.

'But where there is virtue there will be in practice community of goods among friends.'
NOTES, BOOK II. 5.

5. 6.

Sketched out or faintly indicated.' For ἰπογράφεων, cp. De Gen. Anim. ii, 743 b. 24, οἱ γραφεῖς ἰπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφοιοι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζύφον.

5. 7.

οὖν καὶ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν 6. 7. ἵδιοι, ἐτὶ ὅ ἰππος καὶ κυσίν, κὰν δεηθάσιν ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

χώρα as opposed to πόλις:—'When on a journey in the country, they take the produce in the fields.' The apodosis (i.e. some such words as χρῶνται ἐφοδίων) is omitted. Cp. Xen. Respub. Lac. 6, §§ 1, 3, 4, Ἐκαντια γε μὴν ἠγνω καὶ τάδε τοῖς πλείστοις. Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεις τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐκατός καὶ παίδων καὶ οἰκετῶν καὶ χρημάτων ἄρχοντων ὃ δὲ Δυνόμοις, κατασκευᾶσαι βουλόμενος ὡς ἀν μηδὲν βλάπτοντες ἀπολαύοντες τι οἱ πολίται ἀλλήλων ἀγαθῶν, ἐποίησε παίδων ἐκατόν ὁμοίων τῶν οὐατοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἄρχειν. . . . . . ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ οἰκέταις, ἐν τῆς δεηθένη, χρησθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. Καὶ κυνὸν δὲ ἐπηνυτικὸν συνήψε κοινωνίαν διότι οἱ μὲν θεόμενοι παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ ἐκέπαι, ὃ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸς σχολάζων ἢδεσιν ἐκπέμπει. Καὶ ἰππος δὲ ἀσαυτὸς χρῶνται ὁ γὰρ ἀσθενής ή δεηθές ἀχήματος ή ταχὺ ποι βουληθεὶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἂν που ἧν ἰππὸν ὄντα, λαβὼν καὶ χρησάμενος καλῶς ἀποκαθιστῆσαι, κ.τ.λ. Also Plat. Laws, viii. 845 A, ἐὰν δὲ ξένος ἐπιδημῆσαι ὑπάρχου ἐπιθυμῇ φαγεῖν διασπορευμένος τὰς ὀδοὺς, τῆς μὲν γενναιας ἀπείσθαι, ἐὰν βούληταί, μεθ' ἐνος ἀκολούθου χωρίς τιμῆς, ξένω δεχόμενος, τῆς δὲ ἀγρόικων λεγομάνης καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων ὁ νόμος εἰργάτω μὴ κοινωνεῖν ἢ μὲν τούς ξένους.

5. 8.

ὅπος δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι. ‘Of such an unselfish character as to place their property at the service of others.’

tο δὲ φιλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως, κ.τ.λ. 5. 9.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8; Rhet. i. 11. § 26; Plato’s Laws, v. 731 E.

tῶν τοιούτων. 5. 9.

‘Not only money, but anything towards which there can be an excess of love.’ Cp. note on i. 1. § 2.

ἀναροῦτιν ἑργα . . σωφροσύνης περὶ τὰς γυναίκας. 5. 10.

Yet Plato in his Republic aimed really at an impossible strictness
in the relation of the sexes, and is very far from allowing his
guardians to indulge in sensuality.

5. 11. Ἐντράσωτος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος δὲν εἶναι
dόξειν· ὁ γὰρ ἀκροφυλέοις ἀσμένοις ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἐνεσθαι φιλίαν
τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πάντες πρὸς ἀπαντας, ἐλλάς τε καὶ ἄτιν καθηγορῆ γίνετο τῶν ὕπορχότων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γυμνόπεδων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν
οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκαι τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυ-
ρίων κρίσεως καὶ πλουσίων κολακείας.

The flow and regularity of this sentence remind us of the
opening of Book vii, noticed by Bernays. Cp. for a similar regu-
larity supra c. 1.

Mankind quickly become enamoured of socialistic theories,
especially when they are interspersed with attacks on existing

5. 12. δὲν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκουωνησίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν.
A similar unwillingness to ascribe to institutions what is due to
human nature may be remarked elsewhere: e.g. c. 7. § 8, ἢ τις δὲ εἶ
τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς
ἐπιθυμίας ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ.
The emphatic negative δὲν οὐδὲν γίνεται for δὲν γίνεται is curious.

5. 12. ἄλλα θεωροῦμεν διέγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνίων διαφερομένους πρὸς πολ-
λοὺς συμβάλλουσας τοὺς κεκτημένους ἵδια τὰς κτήσεις.
To what Aristotle may be alluding is not very clear. He may
have remarked that there were more quarrels among Pythagorean
sects, as well as among friends who had become fellow-travellers,
than among other men. A similar reflection has often been made
on the religious communities of later times. Or he may be referr-
ing to disputes arising in 'guilds' or 'clubs,' or partnerships in
business. διαφερομένους is to be repeated with κεκτημένους. The
meaning is that the owners of common property are comparatively
few, and that therefore their quarrels, though relatively more
frequent, do not so often come under our notice.

5. 15. ἄλλα δὲι πλῆθος δὲν, ὀσπερ εἰρηται πρῶτον, διὰ τὴν παιδείαν κοινὴν καὶ
μίαν ποιεῖν.

Aristotle takes up a position half way between the communism
of Plato and the existing practice of states. He would have men lend or give to their neighbours more than they do, but he would not enforce by law a community of goods; he would unite them by education, but would not destroy family life.

ὅσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Δακεδαλίῳ καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συστιτοῖς ὁ 5. 15.

This remark more truly applies to Crete, where the common tables were provided at the public expense (c. 10. § 7), than to Sparta, where he who could not afford to contribute to his mess lost the rights of citizenship (c. 9. §§ 30–32). Still in both there was a common mode of life; and an element of communism was introduced by the legislator. Compare also the remarkable description of the effect of Lacedaemonian training (iv. 9. §§ 6–9) in producing the same simple habits of life both among rich and poor; and Xen. De Rep. Laced. 6. §§ 1, 3, 4.

πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὑρηται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ 5. 16. χρῶνται γινώσκοντες.

οὗ συνήκται, lit. 'they have not been put together,' implying that no comparison has been made of them, nor inference drawn from them. In other cases the inference has been drawn, but not applied to a practical use. As in Pol. vii. 10. § 7, and Metaph. xi. 8, 1074 b. 8 (ὁ δὲ τός καρδίας ἄλλα λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, οὗ βεβίως φυσικὸ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, βεβίῳ ἀν εὑρήθαι νομίζειν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένοις καὶ ταῦτα τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οὐ νεώτερα περιεφέσωσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν), and several other passages, Aristotle supposes the inventions of arts and laws to have been made many times over. Compare Plat. Laws iii. 677 A foll.

μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένεσθαι φανερῶς, εἰ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ὅσοι τὴν τοιαύτην 5. 17. ποιησάμεν κατασκευαζόμενην. 'In the actual process of creation.'

5. 17. μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων.

αὐτὰ refers to some general subject gathered from τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. The neuter is supported by τὰ μὲν and τὰ δὲ, which follow.

5. 17. ἄπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαμιάνοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

1) 'Which already,' i.e. as a matter of fact, without having recourse to Plato's ideal, the Lacedaemonians are actually carrying out; or 2), 'which at this very time the Lacedaemonians are trying to carry out [as though they had fallen into desuetude]' (Schneider). For the use of νῦν compare ii. 8. 6.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν according to 1), (as often in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon) is used pleonastically—'to do carry out.' So τῶν ἐπιχειροῦσιν νεώτεροι (v. 7. § 13) τῶν νεώτεροις τῶν. And Plato's Phaedrus, 265 E, μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγγέλλει μέρος μηδὲν.

5. 20. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας ὅλων φρούρων, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

1) The emphasis is on τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δὲ. 'He makes one class to consist of the guardians, who are a sort of garrison, and he makes husbandmen, [or, 'to these he opposes the husbandmen'] and the artisans and the rest of the citizens.' 2) Bernays translates, 'For he makes the guardians a sort of garrison and the husbandmen and the artisans and the others, citizens [held in check by the garrison],' making a pause at τοὺς ἄλλους. Cp. Rep. iv. 419. But the opposition between φρούρων and πολίτας is harsh. For the φρούρων or φύλακες had a special right to the name citizens, whereas the husbandmen, as is implied in §§ 23, 28, are hardly to be reckoned in the State at all. Cp. c. 6. §§ 2, 3. Yet it may be argued on the other hand, that Aristotle has only an imperfect recollection of Plato; that he 'snatches' at the word φρούρωντας, and puts into the mouth of Socrates an objection which really proceeds from Adeimantus, though afterwards paradoxically admitted by Socrates himself. Nor is it possible to set any limits to the misinterpretations of Plato passing under the name of Aristotle. The first way of taking the passage is confirmed by c. 8. § 2 infra: ἐποίει γὰρ ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργοῖς, τρίτω δὲ τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχουν.

5. 23. ἄλλα γὰρ εἰς ἀναγκαία ταῦθ' ἁμοίως εἰτε μή, νῦν γ' οὐδὲν διάφρασται.
NOTES, BOOK II. 5.

Here, again, the antecedent to ταῦτα is to be gathered generally from the context, = 'whether these communistic institutions are equally necessary for the inferior and for the superior classes,' &c. Cp. note on i. 2. § 2.

νῦν γε.

5. 23.

'As far, at least, as his book shows.' Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἑξομένων.

5. 23.

Sc. οὖν διάφορα from the previous sentence. 'And as to matters connected with these, what is to be their government, what their education, what their laws, nothing has been determined.' A repetition of § 18. The emendation ἄρχομενον (Congreve) is unnecessary and out of place; for Aristotle has already disposed of the subject class in § 22, and at § 24 he returns to speak of the members of the state generally.

κἂν εἰ κοινὰ αἱ κτίσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες.

5. 24.

Sc. τις οἰκονομήσει; or more generally, 'What then'? Two cases are supposed: 1) what if wives are common and possessions private; and 2) what if possessions and wives are both common.

ἀτοπὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολὴν, ὅτι δὲ τὰ 5. 24.

οὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς ἄνδραῖς οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

The language is not exact; ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολὴν = to argue from the comparison of the animals. οἷς: sc. τοῖς θηρίοις.

'The rulers must always be the same; for they cannot change 5. 26.

the metal or quality which is infused into their souls by nature.' But then Plato supposes the whole ruling class to be guardians, divided only as young and old into warriors and counsellors (as in the state described in vii. 9. § 5); and he provides for exceptional merit by the transfer from one class to another. The actual governing class are men advanced in years (Rep. vii. 536 ff.), and Aristotle himself acknowledges (vii. 14. § 5) that the division of functions between young and old is natural, and that the young wait their turn and do not rebel against such an arrangement.

ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν εἰθαμομοίαν ἄφαιρομενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὥθην φησὶ δεῖν 5. 27.

εἰθαμομοία ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τῶν νομοθέτης. ἀδύνατον δὲ εἰθαμομοίων ὥθην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόστων τὴν εἰθαμομοία.

This passage, like many others in the Politics, involves a miscon-
ception of Plato’s meaning. The literalism of Aristotle prevents him from seeing that Plato does not really take away the happiness of individuals in affirming that the happiness of the state must be considered first. He takes it away that he may afterwards restore a larger measure of it. He is only insisting that the doctrine of the priority of the whole to the part, which Aristotle holds in common with him (cp. Pol. i. 2. § 13), should be carried out in practice. Compare also Rep. iv. 420 B, C, and Politics vii. 9. § 7, (τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶδαμον ἀναγκαῖον ἵππαρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἴδαμον δὲ πόλιν οἷς εἰς μέρος τι βλέφαντες δὲι λέγειν αὐτής ἀλλ᾽ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας) where Aristotle appears to coincide with Plato in the doctrine which he here repudiates.

5. 27. Ὑπερ τὸ ἀρτιόν, κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that the even number may exist in the whole though not always in the parts (cp. note on c. 3. § 3 supra); but happiness must always exist in both.

6. 1–4. Socrates is here spoken of by implication (ὁ λιγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἰρήκειν, § 4) as if he were the chief speaker in the Laws, though he is not introduced at all. The Laws are quoted as Plato’s in c. 7. § 4.

6. 1. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὁλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης.

The list which follows is a very inadequate summary of the subjects contained in the Republic. Probably the metaphysical and imaginative portions of the work appeared to Aristotle poikiléi metaforai (Met. c. 9. 991 a. 22) and alien from politics.

6. 2. τὸ δὲ εἶν τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος τρίτων ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως.

‘And a third class taken from the warriors,’ (τῶν προπολεμοῦτων).

6. 3. περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνίτων, πότερον οὐδεμᾶς ἢ μετέχοσί τινος ἀρχῆς . . . οὐδὲν διώρικεν.

Yet Plato has expressly foretold, emphasizing his words by the declaration of an oracle, ‘that when a man of brass or iron guards the State it will then be destroyed’ (Rep. iii. 416, and supra c. 5. § 26), by which he clearly means that the third and fourth classes
are to be excluded from office. Nor would he have thought for a moment of a shoemaker, or agricultural labourer, exercising political rights. On the other hand, it is true to say that Plato has nowhere defined the position of the lower classes: he has thus evaded the question of slavery to which Aristotle was keenly alive. He acknowledges the difficulty of this question in the Laws v. 776 ff.

tois ἐξωθέν λόγοις.

I. e. with digressions, such as the attack upon the poets (Books ii and iii), the theory of knowledge (v, vi, vii), the doctrine of immortality (x). To Aristotle these appear irrelevant, though naturally entering into Plato's conception of the state, which includes philosophy and religion as well as politics.

τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλείστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν διότι, ὅλιγα δὲ θ. 4. περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐίρηκεν.

This statement is far from accurate. The truth is that in the Laws of Plato a nearly equal space is given to the constitution and to legislation; the latter half of the fifth book, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and a portion of the twelfth book being devoted to the constitution; the ninth, tenth, eleventh and the remainder of the twelfth to legislation.

καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν θ. 4. περιέχει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἐτέραν πολιτείαν.

For a similar use of the word κοινοτέραν cp. c. 6. § 16, εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκεύαζε ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ὅλων πολιτείαν, κ.τ.λ.

ἐτέραν πολιτείαν, sc. the Republic. The idea of good, the rule of philosophers, the second education in dialectic, the doctrine of another life, are the chief speculative elements, as the community of property, and of women and children, are the chief social or practical elements, of the Republic which vanish in the Laws (Laws v. 739). The spirit of the Republic is more ideal and poetical, of the Laws more ethical and religious. Plato may be said to 'bring round the Laws to the Republic' in the assimilation of male and female education, in the syssitia for women, in the assertion of the priority of the soul to the body and of her fellowship with the gods; in the final revelation of the unity of knowledge to
which he introduces his guardians at the end of the work (Laws xii. 965 ff.).

6. 5. τὴν μὲν χαλών.
   Cp. note on c. 3. § 5, supra.

6. 6. τὸ μὲν οὖν περίττων κ.τ.λ.
   This and the noble passage in the Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 1 (προσάντως τῆς τουλάχιστος ζητήσεως γυμνέως διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἰδή. Δύος δὲ τὸν ἰσοτιμον ένισταν καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρία γε τῆς φιλοσεβας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία αναρέαν, ἀλλος τε καὶ φιλοσόφους δυτικὰς ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ δυτικοις φίλους δυτικον προτιμᾶν τὴν αληθείαν) are a sufficient confutation of the idle calumnies spread abroad in later times respecting the quarrels of Plato and Aristotle, which only reflect the odium philosophicum of their respective schools. Cp. note, i. 13. § 10.

6. 6. χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βασιλεύσας κ.τ.λ.
   A strange remark: Aristotle himself mentions, apparently without surprise, that according to the ancient tradition the Spartan citizens had once numbered ten thousand, and he has himself testified that the country could support thirty thousand hoplites and fifteen hundred cavalry (c. 9. §§ 16, 17). Nor were the 5000 or rather 5040 citizens to be maintained in idleness, for each of them had to cultivate his lot.

6. 7. δεί μὲν οὖν ἐποιήθεσθαι κατ' εἰκῆ, μηδὲν μέντοι αἰῶνατον.
   Even the best state, according to Aristotle, is limited by the number of citizens who can readily act together and by other conditions. These conditions he accuses Plato of having disregarded. Cp. vii. 4. § 2, and 4. § 11.

Plato would not have admitted the impracticability of his ideal state. It might be hard to realise, but was not impossible, Rep. v. 471-474. In the Laws he resigns his ideal, though with reluctance, and acknowledging the conditions of actual life, he allows that there must be a second-best and even a third-best sample of states; Laws v. 739.

6. 7. Ετι δὲ καλὸς ἔχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνίωτας τόπους, εἰ δεὶ τὴν πολιν ζῆν βιον πολιτικὸν.
   Compare vii. 6. § 7, εἰ γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῆσεται βιον κ.τ.λ.
NOTES, BOOK II. 6.

[sc. ἡ πόλις]. The two passages mutually confirm each other and the comparison of them shows that neither here, with Muretus, nor in vii. 6. § 7, with Bekker (2nd edition), do we need to substitute πολεμικὸν for πολιτικὸν which in both passages is used to express International Relations. The addition of μὴ μονωτικῶν or μὴ μονωτερῶν in some MSS. after πολιτικῶν appears to be a gloss, probably suggested by vii. 2. § 16.

The same criticism—that a state must have a foreign as well as a domestic policy, is made once more on Phaleas in c. 7. § 14. Nations and cities can no more get rid of other nations and cities than man (except by going into the wilderness) can tear himself from the society of his fellows. Cp. Mazzini's forcible saying, 'Non-interference is political suicide.'

ei δὲ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βιον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν κοινὸν τῆς 6. 8. πόλεως ... ἀπελθοῦσιν.

'But if a person does not accept the life of action either for individuals or for states, still the country must be protected against her enemies.' In modern language, 'however much we may dislike war and the use of arms, there are cases in which the resistance to an enemy becomes a duty.'

ἀπελθοῦσιν, i.e. 'lest they renew the attempt.'

καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὅραν δεῖ, μήπως βελτιων ἐτέρως διορίσαι 6. 8. τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον.

Literally, 'Would it not be better to define the amount of property differently by defining it more clearly?'

ἀστερ ἄν εἰ τετευν ὅστε ζῆν εἰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον. 6. 8.

It is doubtful whether these words are to be taken 1) as an illustration of the want of clearness in Plato's definition, or 2) as a correction of it; e.g. 1) 'this is only saying, "enough to enable a man to live well."' But this explanation seems to require that the following words τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον should be translated 'this however is too general' (Bernays), giving a sense to μᾶλλον (=μᾶλλον ἡ δεί) which is doubtful unless suggested by the context, as in Rep. iii. 410 E, Phaedo 63 D. 2)* 'By the confused expression "Enough to live upon with temperance," he means only "enough to live upon well or virtuously; for this is the more general idea."'
6. 9. ἐξεις ἀπεται.

The MSS. give ἀπεται, corrected by Bekker from a marginal note in a copy of the Aldine edition into ἀπεται. But the words ἐξεις ἀπεται are unmeaning. It is possible that ἐξεις may be the true reading and ἀπεται the gloss or vice versâ. See note on text.

6. 10. ἀφείναι τὴν τεκνοποίαιν.

Another inaccurate criticism. For Plato expressly provides that the overplus of population should be sent to colonies (Laws v. 740).

6. 11. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτ' οὖν ὅμοιος ἀκριβῶς ἐξειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν.

'But this matter ought not to be regulated with the same strictness then and now,' i.e. it ought to be regulated with greater strictness in the imaginary state of the Laws than in existing states.

6. 11. παραζήγασ.

'For whom there is no place at the banquet of life.'—Malthus.

6. 12. τοῦτο δὲ τείναν τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἄν συμβαίνῃ τελευτῶν τινὰς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν.

'toûn állon, 'the sterility of others,' i.e. of others than those who have children, implied in the word γεννηθέντων.—'the death of some of the children and the sterility of some of the married couples.'

6. 13. Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τῶν οἰκος ἵκος φίληθε δεῖν διαμηνεύειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοῖς κλῆροις ἄνίσους ἵκον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος.

'iotous and anísoi are here used in slightly different senses, ιτουs referring to the numbers of the families, anísoi to the size of the lot. 'He thought that the number of the families should be the same, even although the original size of the lot was different.' That is to say he accepted the existing distribution of property among families, however disproportioned, and did not allow it to be afterwards altered.

Of Pheidon the Corinthian nothing is known; he has been identified with Pheidon the tyrant of Argos on the ground that Corinth lay in the Argive dominions (Müller, Doriàns i. 7. § 15). But no evidence is adduced of this assertion. The word Koprivios may have been a slip: (cp. for a similar or worse error, infra c. 11.
 NOTES, BOOK II. 6.

§§ 2, 15; v. 12. §§ 12, 14); but such a slip would be remarkable in a writer who has elsewhere called Pheidon tyrant of Argos, v. 10. § 6.

περὶ μὲν τούτων . . λεκτέων ἀπετερον.

There is no adequate fulfilment of this promise to resume the question hereafter. But cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15.

φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle is finding fault with Plato's vagueness:—'He says nothing but that the governors and governed should be made of a different wool.'

τὴν πάσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίσοι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας.

Cp. Laws, v. 744 E, where the proprietor is allowed to acquire (κτάσθαι) four times the value of his original inheritance. If we add in the original inheritance which was not acquired, the limit of property will be fivefold. There is no reason for supposing any mistake in this statement (Susemihl) or in c. 7. § 4.

καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δὲι σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ' οὖν συμφέρη 6. 15. πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.

One of the homesteads is to be in the city, another on the border (v. 745 E), the first to be the dwelling of the elders, the second of the son of the house (vi. 776 A). A plan similar to the one which he condemns is adopted by Aristotle in vii. 10. § 11: cp. note on text, in which the inconsistency of the two passages is pointed out.

ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλιστευόντων ἓστιν.

The normal idea of a πολιτεία is that it consists of the free citizens who carry arms and are its natural defenders. Cp. iii. 7. §§ 3, 4, ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύεται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν διόμεα πασῶν τῶν πολιτείων, πολιτεία' συμβαίνει δὲ εὐλόγως' ἔνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ εὐλόγους ἐνδέχεται, πλεῖους δ' ἴδῃ χαλεποῦ ἡμιβάσθαι πρὸς πάσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτῆ γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίγνεται διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προσπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχοντων αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὸ δύσλα, and see also Ib. c. 17. § 4; iv. 13. § 7; and Nic. Eth. viii. 10. 6.

τὴν γὰρ πρώτην πολιτείαν.

The same as the ἐτέρα πολιτεία (§ 4), i.e. the Republic of Plato.
6. 17. Here the Spartan is spoken of as a mixed constitution; in iv. c. 9. § 7, as a combination of aristocracy and democracy. So un-critical writers of the last century extol the English constitution as comprehending the elements of every other. It was thought by other nations as well as by ourselves to be an ideal which Europe should copy. But so far from being the fulfilment of a perfect design, it was really the growth of accident; the merit lay not in any wisdom of our ancestors, but in the willingness of the people to conform to circumstances which was so wanting among the Spartans. . . With the criticisms of Aristotle on the Lacedaemonian constitution it is interesting to compare the very similar criticism of Plato in the Laws, iv. 712 D, E, καὶ μὴ ἔμπνευον γε, δοξάσκοι τινάν Ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν τινάν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ τυραννικά δοκεῖ μοι προσευκέναι τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἑφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικόν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονεν καὶ τις ἐνιστῆ μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένη μᾶλλον εὐκόναι. τὸ δ' ἀλλ' ἐν πάντων ἄριστην ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι παντότεσσαν ἀτοπον. καὶ μὴ δὴ βασιλεία γε διὰ βιον τ' ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. εἰγὼ δὲ οὖν τούτων ἐξαίφνης ἄν ἐρωτηθῆς ὅτι ἔτοιμον ὅπερ εἶπον. σιδ' ἐφ' ἀκριματικος εἰπέν τις τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτείων. Cp. Cic. de Rep. ii. 23.

6. 18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἰρηται τούτοις ὡς δένω συγκείσαται τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν εἰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ τυραννίδος.

This is not really said, though in Laws (iv. 710ff.) Plato sketches an imaginary tyrant who is to mould the state to virtue.

6. 19. Φέρειν ἀρχοντας.

Φέρειν = 'to vote for,' used here as in Plato and Demosthenes with the accusative of the person.

6. 20. αἱροῦνται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμῆματος, εἰσὶ πάλιν ἵπτος ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰσὶ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν οὐ πάντων ἐπάναγκες ἵπτον ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις.

The general meaning is that the higher the qualification of the elected, the lower may be the qualification of the electors, or, vice versa, the lower the qualification of the elected, the higher must be the qualification of the electors; they should balance one another.
There remain, however, some difficulties in reconciling the text of the Politics with the statements of Plato.

What Plato says in the Laws (756) may be shortly stated as follows: 'For those who are to be elected out of the 1st and 2nd classes, all are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties if they abstain from voting; for those who are to be elected out of the 3rd class, only the three first classes are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties; for those who are to be elected out of the 4th class only the two first classes.

The text of the Politics as given by Bekker (which is that of all the MSS.) does not agree with the corresponding passage of Plato, and in one place at least is corrupt.

1) The words ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων can hardly be right if we are to get any sense out of the passage at all. Either τοῦ τετάρτου or τῶν τετάρτων must be omitted. Probably we should omit the latter, for τοῦ τετάρτου agrees best with τοῦ πρώτου τιμηματος and τοῦ δευτέρου ante, and τῶν τετάρτων may have crept into the text from the preceding τετάρτων. Either alternative is simpler than reading τετάρτων (for τετάρτων) as in 2nd Ald. edition.

But 2) if we are to make the passage agree with Plato, we should further omit τρίτων ἢ before τετάρτων. Cp. Laws, 756 D, where nothing is said about the third class.

Finally, we must allow that Aristotle may not have remembered or may have misunderstood the words of Plato. Such a supposition cannot be thought far-fetched, when we consider the numerous passages in which he has done unintentional injustice to his master, Pol. i. 13. § 10; ii. 4. § 2; ii. 5. § 27; ii. 6. § 5, etc. The words οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάνωγες, ἕπαιρεις, etc., do not imply that some of the class were compelled to vote. They are used as they are in Anal. Pr. ii. 15, 63, b 26 for the particular negative proposition, which is called by Aristotle indifferently τὸ οὐ παντὶ and τὸ οὐ τινὶ, from which of course we can logically infer nothing as to the particular affirmative.
66 ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

ἐκ τούτων. Whether the inference be true or false, it is difficult to elicit from the words which have preceded the grounds for maintaining that a polity should not be made up of democracy and monarchy. Strictly speaking they are only a more detailed statement of this proposition, not an argument in support of it.

In the passage which follows (ὅσαν ἔτειθάλη), Aristotle is looking forward to the discussion of what he calls πολιτεία, or 'constitutional government,' which like the constitution of the Laws, falls short of the ideal state, but is in advance of most existing forms.

τοιούτης, 'a state similar to that in the Laws.'

8. 22. τῶν ὑστερον βρθησομένων.

Mixed constitutions are treated of in iv. cc. 7-9, but the promise seems hardly to be fulfilled in that place.

8. 22. ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἱρέσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῷ ἐξ ἀἱρετῶν ἀἱρετοῦς ἐπικαύδουν τί ἔγκριες συντόνει καὶ μέτρῳ τῷ πλῆθος, δὲ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱμαθήσονται βοιλησιων.

Cp. Mill's Representative Government, chap. ix (Should there be two stages of election?), 'The comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of parliament would reside, could not but afford additional facilities to intrigue.' The double election of representatives is thought to be a safeguard against democracy; it is really a source of danger and suspicion, and weakens the national interest in politics. It seems often to supersede itself. Thus the election of the President of the United States by Electoral Colleges has passed into a mere form of universal suffrage. The only case in which such elections succeed is where the electors have other important functions (like the American State Legislatures, to which the election of the Senate is entrusted), and therefore cannot be appointed under a pledge to vote for an individual.

For the indefinite use of ἐπικαύδουν cp. Thuc. i. 137, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμὸι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐν ἐπικαύδῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγένετο.

7. 1. αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ἰδιώτης is opposed both to philosophers and statesmen, as in Plato to δημοφυγός (Laws 921 B) and to ποιητής (Phaedr. 258 D), and in Thucydides (ii. 48) to ἱαρός. 'ἰδιώται' such as Phaleas
and Hippodamus; 'philosophers' such as Pittacus or perhaps Pythagoras; 'statesmen' such as Solon or Lycurgus (cp. infra, c. 12. § 1).

διώ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνως τοῦτ' εἰσήγηκε πρῶτος.
7. 2.

A sentence apparently inconsequential but really a condensation of two propositions. 'Therefore Phaleas the Chalcedonian introduced this, sc. the regulation of property, he being the first to do it.'

Nothing is known of Phaleas from other sources. The manner in which Aristotle speaks of him in this passage (§ 2 φησι γὰρ, § 8 εἰποὶ ἄν τὸ Φαλέας, διέστη γάρ) would lead us to the inference that he was not a legislator but the writer of a book; and this inference is further confirmed by c. 12. § 1, in which Aristotle (?) places first, and in a class by themselves, the private individuals who had treated of laws, apparently meaning Phaleas and Hippodamus. Whether Phaleas was earlier than Hippodamus is uncertain. It is true that Hippodamus is described as the first of those not statesmen who treated of 'the best state,' c. 8. § 1. But the stress may be laid on the words περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἄριστης, 'Hippodamus was the first, not of political writers, but the first who treated of the perfect state' which would be consistent with the claim of Phaleas to be an earlier writer on the subject of politics in general.

We cannot argue with Grote (Pt. II. c. 6, vol. ii. p. 523) that because Phaleas was the first who wrote or speculated about the equal division of land, therefore the legislation of Lycurgus or the ancient Dorian institutions may not have anticipated him in fact.

κατοικιζομένων, sc. τὰς πόλεις οὐ πολιτεύεις, an emphatic present, 7. 3. 'when in process of settlement.'

τῷ τὰς προῖκας τοῦ μὲν πλουσίου διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ. 7. 3.

Cp. the Babylonian 'marriage-market' in Hdt. i. 196.

ἐργαν γὰρ μὴ μετερποιοῦσα εἶναι τοὺς τοιχῶν. 7. 5.

With this passage compare v. 12. § 17 where Aristotle criticizes rather captiously the remark of Plato 'that loss of fortune is a source of revolutions,' to which he replies that 'it is only dangerous when it affects the leaders of the state.'
Mr. Grote (iii. pt. ii. chap. 11, p. 179) thinks that these words refer only to the annulment of mortgages. But they clearly imply that Solon restricted or attempted to restrict the amount of land which might be held by individuals. Although there is no other evidence of this fact, the silence of antiquity cannot be taken as decisive against the statement of Aristotle, and is certainly no reason for explaining away the plain meaning of his words, whether he was correctly informed or not.

Dependent on νόμος είσι, gathered from the preceding sentence. The preservation of the lot tended to maintain the equality of property; hence the transition from the one subject to the other.

The meaning is as follows:—Originally the Leucadian citizens had a lot which was their qualification for office. They were afterwards allowed to sell this lot, and still retained the right of holding office, when they had lost their qualification.

So in modern times reflections are often made on the evils of education unless based on moral and religious principles. Yet it was a noble thought of an early thinker like Phaleas that there should be equal education for all.

The opposition here intended is between the inequality of property by which the many are offended, and the equality of honour which offends the higher classes.
NOTES, BOOK II. 7.

οὐ τοῖνοι διὰ ταῦτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμοῖο, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνευ 7. 12.

The words καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμοῖο, though rather weak, are found in all MSS. and are therefore probably genuine. They are omitted however by Bernays, and have been variously corrected, καὶ ἀνευ ἐπιθυμίων (Bojesen), sc. ἀδικήσουσι, an ingenious conjecture; ἐν μὴ ἐπιθυμίωσι (Schneider), too great a departure from the MSS.; ἀνεπιθυμητοὶ (also Bojesen), too rare a word.

The general meaning is plain: ‘And therefore, i.e. not only to still pain, but also to gain pleasure, they will desire pleasures to which no pains are annexed.’ The three motives are, 1) necessity, 2) desire of things not necessary, 3) desire of painless pleasures.

οὐκ ὁμοιότερεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἀκοσ.

‘They will look for a cure from philosophy and go no further.’ 7. 12.

οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οἷος ἢν μὴ βιγώσιν. 7. 13.

Cp. the Story of Jason, who said πεινὴν ὅτε μὴ τυραννῖ, iii. 4. § 9 and note. So Daniel Manin (quoted by Stahr) used to say of himself that ‘he knew nothing except how to govern.’ ‘And as is the greatness of the crime, so is the honour given to the tyrannicide.’

δὲ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτονίας κ.τ.λ. 7. 14.


ἀλλ' οὕτως ὡς ἀν καὶ μὴ ἔχων τοιοῦτων οὐσίαν. 7. 16.

ὦ = ἀλλ' οὕτως πολεῖν ὡς ἀν ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ἔχων τοιοῦτων οὐσίαν, the more general word ποιεῖν being understood from πολεῖν.

‘That your enemies should act as they would do if you had not so great an amount of property,’ i.e. that your wealth should be no temptation. Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 422, where he argues that trained warriors will be always too much for wealthy citizens.

Eubulus, by birth a Bithynian, was the tyrant of Atarneus in 7. 17. Mysia, and was succeeded by Hermias his slave, whose niece or adopted daughter Aristotle is said to have married; Eubulus revolted from Persia, and was besieged by Autophradates, the Satrap of Lydia. See Strabo, xiii. 610, Suidas s. v. Ἀριστοτέλης.
7. 19. διοβελία.

The diobelia was the ordinary payment of two obols for attendance on the assembly and the courts, and also for theatrical entertainments. These payments seem in the later days of Athens, and even during the Peloponnesian war, to have amounted to three obols, and some of them to have been as high as a drachma. They were also made much more frequently than in 'the good old times.' Cp. Schol. in Aristoph. Vesp. 684, where it is said on the authority of Aristotle in [the] Politics that the sum given was originally three obols, but afterwards varied at different times: also cp. Lucian Dem. Encom. 36; Prooem. Dem. 1459, 27, a remarkable place; and other passages quoted by Boeckh, 'Public Economy,' Eng. Tr. vol. i. ed. 1, pp. 296 ff.

7. 20. τῶν οὖν τουοίτων ἀρχή κ.τ.λ.

If ἀρχή be retained, τῶν τουοίτων refers to some idea of reform vaguely implied in the previous sentences. ἀρχή conj. Scaliger, ἀρχεῖ Coraes.

7. 23. ἀλλ' εἶπεν δεὶ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοῖς τά κανένα ἐργαζομένους δεὶ καθάπερ ἐν Ἐπιείκμη τε, καὶ ὥς Διολφαντός ποτε κατεσκέυαζεν Ἀδηνησι, τούτον ἔχειν τῶν τρόπων.

Bernays places a comma after εἶπεν, and omits the second δε, placing a καὶ before καθάπερ. 'But if this is so (i.e. if artisans are to be public slaves), those who are to be engaged in public works should be slaves.' Nearly the same meaning may be got from the text, *if we place a comma after εἶναι and remove the comma after ἐργαζομένους: 'But if artisans are to be public slaves, those who are engaged in public works should form this class.'

tούτων ἔχειν τῶν τρόπων, sc. δημοσίους εἶναι. This Diophantus, or 'some one else of the same name, about whom nothing is known,' was Archon at Athens in the year 395.

8. 1. Stobaeus has preserved some fragments of a work περὶ πολιτείας, which bear the name of 'Hippodamus the Pythagorean' (Florileg. xliii. pp. 248-251, xcvi. p. 534, Mullach. Fragm. Philos. Graec. vol. ii. p. 11). But there can be little doubt that they are, as Schneider says, the pious fraud of some later writer. The
portions cited by Stobaeus will be enough to show the character of such performances. These fragments disagree in several points with the statements of Aristotle; such as the threefold division of the citizens into councillors, auxiliaries, and artisans (cp. the Republic of Plato), and the subdivision of each class into three other classes; the three principles of honesty, justice, utility, and the three instruments by which civil society is knit together, reason, habit, law. Of all this and of a good deal else, there is no trace in Aristotle, although the triplets are also found in Stobaeus. Considerable differences are not however inconsistent with the genuineness of the fragments. A more suspicious circumstance is the character of the philosophical distinctions, such as the opposition of καλίν, ἐθικον, and συμφέρον, which could hardly have existed before the time of Socrates, and a certain later tone of thought.

ΗΙΡΡΟΔΑΜΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΕΤΙΑΣ.

'In my opinion the whole state is divided into three parts: one the "Good"—that is, those who govern the commonwealth by mind; another, those who rule by force; a third part, those who supply and furnish necessaries. The first class I call councillors; the second, "allies" or warriors; the third, artisans. To the two former classes belong those who lead a freeman's life: to the latter those who work for their living. The councillors are the best, the artisans the worst, the warriors are in a mean. The councillors must rule, the artisans must be ruled, while the warriors must rule and be ruled in turn. For the councillors settle beforehand what is to be done: the warriors rule over the artisans, because they fight for the state, but in so far as they must be guided, they have to submit to rule.

'Each of these parts again has three divisions: of the councillors there are 1) the supreme council; 2) the magistrates; 3) the common councillors. The first has the presidency, and deliberates about all matters before they are carried to the assembly. The second comprises all those who are or have been magistrates. The third, the common councillors, are the mass of senators who receive the measures which the upper council have prepared, and vote upon and determine matters which come before
them for decision. In a word, the upper council refers matters to the common council, and the common council, through the general, to the assembly. In like manner there are three divisions of the warrior or military class: the officers, the fighters in the front ranks, and lastly the common herd of soldiers, who are the larger number. The officers are the class which furnishes generals and colonels and captains and the front rank of soldiers, and generally all those who have authority. The soldiers of the front rank are the whole class of the bravest, most spirited, and most courageous men; the common herd of soldiers are the remaining multitude. Again, of the class who work for their living, some are husbandmen and tillers of the ground; others mechanics, who supply tools and instruments for the needs of life; others traders and merchants, who export superfluous productions to foreign countries, and import necessaries into their own. The framework of the political community then is composed of such and so many parts; we will therefore proceed to speak of the harmony and unison of them.

'Now every political community exactly resembles a stringed instrument, in that it needs arrangement and harmony and touch and frequent practice. Of the character and number of the elements which form the arrangement of the state I have already spoken. The state is harmonized by these three things—reason (λογος), moral habit, law, and by these three man is educated and becomes better. Reason gives instruction and implants impulses towards virtue. The law partly deters men from crime by the restraint of fear, partly attracts and invites them by rewards and gifts. Habits and pursuits form and mould the soul, and produce a character by constant action. All these three must have regard to the honourable and the expedient and the just; and each of the three must aim at them all if possible, or, if this is not possible, at one or two. So will reason and habit and law all be honourable and just and expedient; but the honourable must always be first esteemed; secondly, the just; thirdly, the expedient. And generally our aim should be to render the city by these qualities as far as possible harmonious, and deliver it from the love of quarrelling
and strife, and make it at unity with itself. This will come to pass if the passions of the youthful soul are trained by endurance in pleasures and pains and conformed to moderation;—if the amount of wealth is small, and the revenue derived from the cultivation of the soil;—if the virtuous fill the offices in which virtue is needed, the skilful those in which skill is needed, the rich those in which lavish expenditure and profusion are needed; and to all these, when they have filled in due manner their proper offices, due honour be assigned. Now the causes of virtue are three: fear, desire, shame. The law creates fear, moral habits, shame (for those who have been trained in right habits are ashamed to do wrong); reason implants desire. For it is a motive power, at once giving the reason and attracting the soul, especially when it is combined with exhortation. Wherefore also we must prepare for the souls of the young guilds and common meals, and places of living and meeting together, military as well as civil, and the elders must be harmonized with them, since the young want prudence and training, the old, cheerfulness and quiet enjoyment.'

Aristotle’s account of the character and attainments of Hippodamus may be compared with the passage in the Lesser Hippias of Plato(?)(368 A foll.), in which Hippias is described as acquainted with every conceivable art and science. The personal description of Hippodamus also bears an odd resemblance to the statement of Diogenes Laertius about Aristotle himself—τραυλός τὴν φωτήν... ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑχανοσκέλής... ἦν, καὶ μικρόμματος, ἑσθήτι τε ἐπισήμωρ χρώμενος καὶ δακτυλίος καὶ κουφά (v. 1. § 2 init.).

The quantity of the name Hippodamus, though unimportant, is a somewhat difficult question. In Aristophanes (Knights 327) the α is long, yet if the name be a compound of δήμος, it is hard to give any meaning to it. It has been thought that Aristophanes has altered the quantity for the sake of the joke.

Mention occurs of the Ιπποδάμιος ὑγορᾶ at the Piraeus in Andoc. de Myst. § 45, p. 7, Xen. Hell. ii. 4. § 11, and Dem.(?) adv. Timoth. § 22, p. 1190. A tradition is preserved by Strabo (xiv. 653, ὃς ἀσαντίν), that the architect of the Piraeus was the architect of the
magnificent city of Rhodes. The scholiast on Knights 327 who supposes the Hippodamus of Aristophanes to be the person here mentioned, supposes him also to have designed the Piraeus at the time of the Persian War (κατὰ τὰ Μηδικά); but he had probably no special means of information and only ‘combined’ the two facts that Hippodamus was the architect of the Piraeus and that Themistocles was the original author of the proposal to improve the harbour. Hippodamus is also called ‘the Thurian’ in Hesychius. The city of Thurii was founded in 445 B.C. and Rhodes was built in 406 B.C. If therefore Hippodamus was a Thurian and also the builder of Rhodes he must have designed not the original works of the Piraeus, but the improvements made at a later date, such as was the middle wall in the age of Pericles, B.C. 444. This latter date is more in accordance with the half Sophist, half Pythagorean character which is attributed to Hippodamus. It is also more in accordance with the words of Aristotle in vii. 11. § 6, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἱδίων ὁικήσεων διάθεσις ἱδίων μὲν νομίζεται... ἄν εὔτομος ἡ καὶ κατὰ τῶν νεώτερων καὶ τῶν Ἱπποδάμεων τρόπον, where it is implied that the Hippodamean plan of arranging cities in straight streets was comparatively recent. Cp. for the whole subject C. F. Hermann de Hippodamo Milesio.

8. 1. καὶ κόσμῳ πολιτείᾳ, ήτις δὲ ἐσθήτως εὔπελοίς κ.τ.λ.

There is no reason for suspecting corruption. The eccentricity of Hippodamus consisted in combining expensiveness and simplicity: ἐσθήτως is dependent on some such word as χρόσει to be supplied from κόσμῳ.

8. 3. διήρει δ᾽ εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν, τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν, τὴν δ’ ἱδίαν.

The division of the land proposed in the Seventh Book (c. 10. § 11) is nearly similar to that of Hippodamus.

8. 4. δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ κύριῳ.

Plato in the Laws also establishes an appeal, vi. 767 C. ‘The final judgment shall rest with that court, which has been established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.'
NOTES, BOOK II. 8.

8. 5.

Vivis dē krisis in tois dikastēriois k. t. l.

See infra note on §§ 14, 15. Though the principle of Hippodamus is condemned by Aristotle as unsuited to the Athenian popular courts of law, it prevailed in the more advanced jurisprudence of the Romans in which the judges were allowed to give a sentence of "n. l. or non liquet, whence the Scotch verdict of 'not proven.' The ideas of Hippodamus certainly show great legislative ingenuity in an age when such a quality was extremely rare.

8. 6.

"os oistros tois por, Allios neomobetpēmenoȋ tos dē kai èn 'Athēnas. Aristotle intends to say that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty of which he claimed the credit, whereas it already existed at Athens and elsewhere. The meaning is clear, though the form of the sentence is not perfectly logical: 'But this law actually exists in Athens at the present day,' and this is considered as sufficient proof that it existed at the time of Hippodamus. Or 2) without any opposition but with less point: 'And this law now exists at Athens.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 46.

toȋs 6' aiperēvntas èpmelēsēthai kovōn kai éxnikωn kai òrfanikωn.

8. 7.

I. e. 'They were to watch over the public interests and over the interests of persons who had no legal status.'

Aristotle, after his rather onesided manner of attacking an 8. 10, 11. opponent, raises several òpoplias respecting the three classes of Hippodamus. 'How can the two inferior classes, who have no arms, maintain their independence? For many offices they are obviously unfitted: and if they have no share in the state how can they be loyal citizens? Granting that the artisans have a raiso̓n d'être, what place in the state can be claimed by the husbandmen and why should they have land of their own? If the soldiers cultivate their own lands, there will be no distinction between them and the husbandmen; this, however, is not the intention of the legislator: if there are separate cultivators of the public lands, then there are not three, but four classes. The husbandmen are practically slaves who will be at the mercy of the warriors; and if so, why should they elect the magistrates? They will have no attachment to the state and must be kept down by force.'
To these ἀπορίας he finds no answer. He adds one or two more: 'How can the husbandmen produce enough for themselves and the warriors? And why, if they can, should there be any distinction between their lots and those of the soldiers?'

8. 12. γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας.

Either οἰκία is here used like ὁικὸς in the sense of 'property' or 'inheritance'; or γεωργήσει must be taken to mean 'maintains by agriculture.' (Cp. for a similar use of οἰκία Dem. de Falsâ Leg. καρπομενή τὰς τῶν χρωμένων οἰκίας: and for another singular use of γεωργεῖο, i. 8. § 6, ὅσπερ γεωργίαν ζωσαν γεωργοῦσες.) If neither of these explanations is deemed satisfactory, we must suppose a corruption of the text, which may be corrected by reading εἰς δύο οἰκίας (Bernays), or δύοις οἰκίαις. The old Latin translation 'ministrabit' has suggested the emendation ὑπογρήσει. This is no better, or rather worse, Greek than γεωργήσεi in the sense given above.

8. 13. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ διάιτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται.

'This in an arbitration is possible, even although the judges are many.'

8. 14. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖσι μνᾶς, ὃ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς, ἢ ὃ μὲν πλέον, ὃ δὲ ἔλασσον, ἄλλος δὲ πίνε, ὃ δὲ τέταρας.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ clearly refers to the litigant, sc. ὅφελεσθαί οἴεται. But in what follows, the words ἢ ὃ μὲν πλέον ὃ δὲ ἔλασσον may refer either 1) to the difference between the judges and the litigant or 2*) to the differences of the judges among themselves. In the first case ἢ ὃ μὲν πλέον ὃ δὲ ἔλασσον is a generalised statement of the words which have preceded, ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖσι μνᾶς, ὃ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς. But in the second case the words are restricted to ὃ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς, ἄλλος δὲ πίνε, ὃ δὲ τέταρας. Anyhow there is a colloquial irregularity, the words ἄλλος δὲ πίνει κ.τ.λ. having crept in out of place, as an illustration of the general principle ὃ μὲν πλέον κ.τ.λ. already stated.

8. 16. εὐδοθαλμὸν ἂκοῦσαι μόνον.

A confusion of language: cp. εὐπρόσωπος (c. 5. § 11).

8. 16. ἢχει γὰρ συκοφαντίας.

That Hippodamus was speaking of political discoveries and not
of inventions in the arts, is clear from the context. Hippodamus' error was derived from the analogy of the arts, § 18. We can easily understand the danger of rewarding discoveries such as were made in the conspiracy of the Hermæ at Athens or in the days of the Popish Plot in England. Aristotle admits that there have been and will be changes in government, but he advocates caution and insists that law should be based on custom.

\textit{ai téchnei pásas kai ai dýnámeis.}  
\begin{footnotesize}8. 18.\end{footnotesize}

Every art and science is also a power to make or become; hence the word dýnamos being the more general term is constantly associated with both téchnē and épisthēmē.

\textit{ζητοῦσι δ’ ἀλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἄλλα τάγαθον πάντες.}  
\begin{footnotesize}8. 21.\end{footnotesize}

This statement goes beyond the truth. For the traditions of families or clans are very slow in giving way, as e.g. in the constitution of Lycurgus or Solon, to a sense of the common good. It is rarely and for a brief space that nations wake up to the feeling of their own nationality, or are touched by the enthusiasm of humanity.

\textit{όμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοίγτους, ἀσπερ καὶ λέγεται 8. 21. κατὰ τῶν γνηγκὼν.}\n
\textit{όμοίους has been altered by Bernays into ἀλίγους but without reason. It may be taken 1) as=όμοίους τοῖς γνηγκὼσι, or, 2) d’ ομοίους may be joined with καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας=‘no better than simple or common persons.’}  
\begin{footnotesize}Cp. Hdt. vii. 50, γνώμησι εἰχρέωτα ομοΐς καὶ σύ. Plat. Theaet. 154 A, ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ’ ομοῖοι καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὀτιοῦ.\end{footnotesize}

\textit{ἀσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἄδυνατον 8. 22. ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφήναι.}\n
\begin{footnotesize}1) If we take πάντα as subject, τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the remote object of γραφήναι, or the words may be governed by περὶ of which the force is continued from περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. Or 2) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the subject of γραφήναι, in which case πάντα is to be taken adverbially.\end{footnotesize}

\textit{οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὄφελησεται κινήσας, ὅσον ἔλαβῆσεται τοῖς ἀρχούσιν 8. 23. ἀπειθεῖν ἐδισθεῖς.}\n
\begin{footnotesize}Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα, ὅτι χείρος νόμος ἀκινήτου χρωμαίνη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύρως.\end{footnotesize}
In this chapter Aristotle tacitly assumes or perhaps acquiesces in the popular belief that Lycurgus is the author of all Spartan institutions. He was supposed to be the founder of the Spartan constitution, as Solon of the Athenian, or as King Alfred of the ancient English laws. The Ephoralty is apparently attributed to him; yet elsewhere (v. 11. §§ 2, 3) Theopompus, a later king of Sparta, is said to have introduced this new power into the state.

9. 1. εἰ τι πρῶς τὴν ἱστοθεσίν καὶ τῶν τρόπων ἱσταντίων τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείαις.

εἰ τι, sc. νεομοθέτηται: καὶ τῶν τρόπων following πρῶς τὴν ἱστοθεσίν, προκειμένης αὐτοῖς, i.e. 1)* 'which is proposed to the citizens,' πολιτείαις understood from πολιτείαιν supra; or 2)' which legislators set before themselves' referring to νομοθέται implied in νεομοθέτηται: cp. ἡ ἱστοθεσίς τοῦ νομοθέτου at the end of this chapter (§ 33).

9. 2. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν.

'Leisure or relief from the necessary cares of life.' The construction is singular and rare in prose, yet not really different from ἐν τῷ σχολῇ κακοῦ of Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1286. So Plat. Rep. ii. 370 C ὅταν εἰς ἐν, σχολήν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ.

9. 2. ἦ τε γὰρ Θεσσαλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέδεικε τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς, ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λακωνίων οἱ Εὐλωτες' ὅσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρέωντος τοῖς ἀνυξήμασι διατελοῦσιν.

Cp. Laws vi. 776 C, D: 'I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving
and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae.' Yet in this passage of Aristotle the Penestae are spoken of as constantly revolting from their masters.

The argument is that in Crete, where all the states had their Perioeci or subject class, no attempt was ever made to raise a servile insurrection when they went to war, because such a measure would have been contrary to the interests of both parties. The Cretans were the inhabitants of an island and there were no outsiders to encourage revolt among the slaves (cp. c. 10. § 15, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἦρηται σώζεται διὰ τῶν τόπων). Probably also a sort of international custom prevailed among them, arising from their common necessity, of not raising the slaves in their wars with one another. The Argives and the other Peloponnesian states, when at war, were always receiving the insurgent Helots. But the Argive subject population, like the Cretan, were not equally ready to rise, and indeed were at times admitted to the governing body (cp. v. 3. § 7, καὶ ἐν 'Ἀργεῖ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἱθέομη ἀπολομένων ἐπὶ Κλεομένου τοῦ Λάκωνος ἡναγκάσθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιόκων τινάς). We may also remark that in c. 5. § 19 supra, Aristotle incidentally observes that the Cretan slaves were comparatively well treated, although forbidden gymnastics and the use of arms.

The word 'perioeci' appears to have been used in Crete to denote generally an inferior class, who were not, as at Sparta, distinguished from Helots or slaves. This is confirmed by c. 10. § 5, γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν (sc. Δακεδαιμονίοι) Ἐξαστε, τοῖς δὲ Κρήτην οἱ περιόκως. But compare also Sosicrates [B.C. 200-128] preserved in Athenaeus (vi. c. 84. fin., p. 263), τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μνοία, τὴν δὲ ἱδίαν ἀφαρμιστα, τοὺς δὲ περιόκους ὑπηκόους. The use of the term μνοία in Sosicrates is confirmed by the celebrated
Scolium of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk 27), τούτῳ (sc. τῷ ξίφῳ) δεσπότας μνώνας κέκλημα. Cp. also Athen. vi. 267, where the term μνήμης is said by Hermon to be applied to ‘well-born’ serfs: εὐγενίς αἰκέτας.

καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκοις. ‘Since they too have perioeci.’

9. 4. With these criticisms we may compare Aristotle’s proposal (vii. 9. § 8 and 10. §§ 13, 14) in the description of his own state, that the husbandmen should be either slaves or foreign perioeci.

9. 5. ὅσπερ γὰρ οἰκίαις μέρος ἅνηρ καὶ γυνῆ.

The singular μέρος is used by attraction with the singular ἅνηρ.

For the general subject, cp. Laws vi. 780 E. ff.: ‘For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman’s nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together.

Cp. also Rhet. i. 5, 1361 a. 10, ὅσιος γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαίλα ὅσπερ Λακεδαιμονίους, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἡμισυ οἷκ εὐδαιμονίωσι: and supra i. 13. § 16; also Eur. Andr. 595,

οὐδ’ ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο τις,

σώφρων γίνοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη.

9. 8. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν.

Translated in the text, as by interpreters generally*, ‘in the days of their greatness,’ i.e. in the fourth century b.c. after the taking of Athens when Sparta had the hegemony of Hellas. But is not the passage rather to be explained ‘many things in their government were ordered by women’? (Schlosser). For why should
women be more powerful in the days of their greatness than in their degeneracy? To which it may be replied that the very greatness of the empire made the evil more conspicuous. According to the latter of the two explanations ἀρχὴς corresponds to ἀρχὴν in what follows.

This use of the genitive is not uncommon: cp. ἐπὶ στραταῖς Arist. Wasps 557; τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, sc. δυτικας, Dem. 309. 10.

For the conduct of the Spartan women in the invasion of 9. 10. Epaminondas: compare Xenophon, himself the eulogist of Sparta, Hell. vi. 5. § 28, τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οἶδὲ τῶν κατων ἀραγίην ἢνείχοντο, ὡς οἰδίποτε ἑδόσαν πολέμιος, and Plutarch, Ages. 31, who has preserved a similar tradition, οὐχ ἢττων δὲ τούτων ἐλπίς τῶν Ἀγασιδαν οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὔθωςοι καὶ κραγγαί καὶ διάδρομαι τῶν προσβυτέρων δυσανασχετούτων τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ τῶν γυνακῶν οἱ δυναμικῶν ἠσυχάζων, ἀλλὰ παντοπάσαι ἐκφρῶν οὐσῶν πρὸς τε τὴν κραγγὴν καὶ τὸ πόλι τῶν πολέμιων.

χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἤσαν, ὡσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν, ὕπωβοι δὲ 9. 10. παρέχον πλέον τῶν πολέμιων.

Either 1) 'For, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless'; or 2) 'For, like the women of other cities, they were utterly useless; and they caused more confusion than the enemy.'

The employment of the men on military service, which rendered 9. 11. it more easy for Lycurgus to bring them under his institutions, is supposed to have caused the disorder of the women which made it more difficult to control them. Yet we may fairly doubt whether this notion is anything more than a speculation of Aristotle or some of his predecessors (φασὶ μὲν), striving to account for a seemingly contradictory phenomenon. For there could have been no trustworthy tradition of the time before Lycurgus. It is observable that Aristotle, if his words are construed strictly, supposes Lycurgus to have lived after the time of the Messenian and Argive wars. Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, vol. i., p. 143 note w, considers the words καὶ Μεσσηνίους in § 11 to be an interpolation. But this assumption of interpolation is only due to the exigencies of chronology. The testimony of Aristotle may be summed up as follows: on the one
hand he favours the traditional date; for he connects the name of Charillus an ancient king with that of Lycurgus c. 10. § 2: and on the other hand it is very possible that he may not have known, or may not have remembered the date of the Messenian Wars.

Grote (p. 2. c. 6, p. 516, n. 3) defends the Spartan women against the charges of Aristotle and Plato (the φιλοδάκων) Laws vii. p. 806, reiterated by Plutarch (Ages. c. 31), and even supposes that 'their demonstration on that trying occasion (i.e. the invasion of Laconia) may have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honour as from fear.' Yet surely Aristotle writing not forty years afterwards, who is to a certain extent supported by the contemporary Xenophon (vi. 5, 28 see above), could hardly have been mistaken about a matter which was likely to have been notorious in Hellas.


Sc. the women:* or 'these are the causes' (ἀδώτα by attraction for τῶν). The first way of taking the words gives more point to the clause which follows.

9. 12. τίνι δέι συγγνώμην ἕχειν.

'We have not to consider whether we are to blame Lycurgus, or to blame the women; but whether such a state of things is right.'

9. 13. οὐ μόνον ἀπρεπεῖαν τινὰ ποιεῖν της πολιτείας αὔτὴν καθ' αὔτὴν.

αὔτὴν καθ' αὔτὴν must agree with πολιτείαν understood in ἀπρεπεῖαν τινὰ ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας; these words being equivalent to ἀπρεπὴν ποιεῖν τήν πολιτείαν: or αὔτής, which appears to have been the reading of the old translator (ipsius), may be adopted instead of αὔτὴν.

9. 13. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥήματα τοῖς περὶ τήν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτησεως ἐπιμήκειν ἐν τει.

1) The mention of avarice, or 2) the mention of women naturally leads Aristotle to speak of the inequality of property. The connexion is either 1) that avarice tends to inequality or 2) that inequality is produced by the great number of heiresses.

9. 14. Plutarch (Agis, c. 5) apparently ascribes to the Ephor Epitadeus the law which enabled a Spartan to give or bequeath his property as he pleased. Either Aristotle has followed a different tradition.
or the legislator is only a figure of speech for the institution (cp. supra, note at beginning of chapter).

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων.


ἡ καὶ μετρίαν.

Or even a moderate one.' καί is here qualifying. 'Better have no dowries or small ones, or you may even go so far as to have moderate ones.'

νῦν δὲ ἦτεροι δοῦναι τὴν ἐπικλήρων ὅτως δὲν βούληται.

νῦν, not 'now,' as opposed to some former time, but 'as the law stands.' See note on c. 5. § 23 supra. δοῦναι, sc. τινά.

'A man may give his heiress to any one whom he pleases': i.e. heiresses may be married by their relatives to rich men, and the evil of accumulating property in a few hands will thus be increased. Herodotus, vi. 57, says that the giving away of an heiress whom her father had not betrothed was a privilege of the kings of Sparta. There may have been a difference in the custom before and after the days of Epitadeus (cp. note on § 14), though this is not expressed by the particle νῦν.

οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὰ πλήθους ἦσαν, sc. ἐπὶ τῆς Θεσσαλίου ἐμβολῆς, §§ 10, 16. 9. 16.

γέγονεν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑργῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ 9. 16.

τὴν τάξιν ταύτην.

τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, sc. their arrangements respecting property described in the previous sentence. For the use of ταύτην with a vague antecedent, cp. below ταύτην τὴν διάρκειαν: also i. 2. § 2.

μίαν πληγήν.

The battle of Leuctra (b.c. 371) at which, according to Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4. § 15, one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished. The population of Sparta was gradually diminishing. In the time of Agis IV. reg. 240-248 b.c. according to Plutarch (Agis, c. 5), the Spartans were but 700, and only about 100 retained their lots.

ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας.

Yet Herodotus (ix. 35) affirms that Tisamenus of Elis, the
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prophet, and Hegias, were the only foreigners admitted to the rights of citizenship at Sparta. According to Plutarch, Dion was also made a Spartan citizen (Dio, c. 17).

9. 17. καὶ φασὶν εἶναι ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίους.

The ancient number of Spartan citizens is variously given: here at 10,000; in Herod. vii. 234, at 8,000; according to a tradition preserved by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 8), there were 9,000 lots which are said to have been distributed partly by Lycurgus, partly by Polydorus, the colleague of the king Theopompus.

9. 18. ὑπεναυτὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν.

At Sparta the accumulation of property in a few hands tended to disturb the equality of the lots. The encouragement of large families, though acting in an opposite way, had a similar effect. According to Aristotle, depopulation and overpopulation alike conspired to defeat the intention of Lycurgus. Yet it does not seem that the great inducements to have families were practically successful; perhaps because the Spartans intermarried too much.

Like Plato and Phales, the Spartan legislator is accused of neglecting population. (Cp. supra c. 6. §§ 12, 13, and c. 7. §§ 4–8.) It is clearly implied in the tone of the whole argument (against Mr. Grote, vol. ii. c. 6) that there was an original equality of property, but that it could not be maintained; cp. τὰς κτήσεις ισάζουσα, 6. § 10; τῆς χώρας οὖτω διήρημένη, 9. § 19; and so Plato, Laws 684 D.

9. 19. διὰ τὴν ἁπορίαν ἄνωτε ἦσαν.

Cp. Thuc. i. 131, etc. where we are told that Pausanias trusted to escape by bribery, πιστεύων χρήματι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Also Rhet. iii. 18. § 6, 1419 a. 31, Καὶ ὡς ὁ Λύκων εἰθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτόμενος ἐὰν δοκοῦν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολογεῖν ἄτερόν τε, ἔφη. 'Ο δὲ, 'Οὐκοῦν σὺ τούτως ταύτα ἔδου; ' Καὶ ὡς ἔφη. 'Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν, ἔφη 'καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο;' 'Οὐ δήτα,' ἔφη, 'οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταύτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γνώμη.'

9. 20. καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις.

'Ἀνδρίοι is a proper name, probably referring to some matter in
which the Andrians were concerned. It is unlikely that Aristotle would have used the archaic word ἀνδρία for φιδία or σωσίνα. For this use of the word ἀνδρία cp. c. 10. § 5, καὶ τὸ γε ἵρχαυν ἐκάλουν οἱ Δάκωνες οἱ φιδία άλλ' ἀνδρία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες, ί καὶ δήλον ότι ἐκέθεν ελήλυθεν.

The event to which Aristotle refers is wholly unknown to us, though the strange expression which he uses indicates the great importance of it (ἄσον ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖς ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἁπώλεσαν).

ἐστε καὶ ταύτη συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τῇ πολιτείᾳ. 9. 20.

'So that in this way, as well as by the venality of the Ephors, together with the royal office the whole constitution was injured.'

deῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μελλονταν σώζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι τὰ. 9. 22.

μέρη τῆς πόλεως είναι καὶ διαμένειν ταύτα.

The nominatives which occur in the next sentence, οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ, κ.π.λ. show that the corresponding words τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως are the subject of βούλεσθαι=δεῖ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τῇ πολιτείᾳ σώζεσθαι καὶ διαμένειν ταύτα.

tαύτα is to be taken adverbially with διαμένειν=κατὰ ταύτα.

ἄπλου γὰρ ἡ ἄρχῃ αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν. 9. 22.

Nearly the same words occur in Demosthenes, c. Lept. § 119, p. 489, where speaking of the γερουσία, he says, ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄπλου τῆς πολιτείας κυρίῳ γενέσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὀμοίων.

παθαριώθης γὰρ ἐστὶ λίαν. 9. 23.

It is not known how the Ephors were elected. Possibly in the same way as the γέροντες (vide note on § 27 infra), which Aristotle likewise calls παθαριώθης. Plato, Laws iii. 692 A, says that the Ephorality is ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως, by which he seems to mean that the election to the Ephorality was almost as indiscriminate as if it had been by lot.

As in the funeral oration of Pericles, the Spartan discipline is 9. 24. everywhere described as one of unnatural constraint. There was no public opinion about right and wrong which regulated the lives of men. Hence, when the constraint of law was removed and they were no longer ἄρχομενοι but ἄρχοντες, the citizens of Sparta seem
to have lost their character and to have fallen into every sort of corruption and immorality. The love of money and the propensity to secret luxury were kindred elements in the Spartan nature.

9. 25. τὸν τρόπον δὲ τούτων πεπαιδευμένων ὡστε καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην αὐτῶν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἄγαθοι ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ ἀσφαλές.

'But when men are so educated that the legislator himself cannot trust them, and implies that they are not good men, there is a danger.' The remark is resumed and justified in § 30 (ἐτι δ' ὑπὸ νομοθέτησις, κ.τ.λ.), by the general suspicion of their citizens which the Spartan government always showed, and also (§ 26) by the circumstance that the Gerontes were placed under the control of the Ephors.

οὐκ ἀσφαλές, sc. τὸ κυρίου αὐτοῖς εἶναι μεγάλων.


The discussion about the Ephors and Gerontes is a sort of dialogue, in which objections are stated and answers given, but the two sides of the argument are not distinctly opposed.

9. 27. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀφρασίαν ἦν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ τέ τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης κ.τ.λ.

For the mode of the election cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 26: 'The election took place after this fashion: When the assembly had met, certain persons selected for the purpose were shut up in a building near at hand, so that they could not see or be seen, but could only hear the shouting of the assembly. For, as with other matters (cp. Thuc. i. 87, κρίνουσι γὰρ βοή καὶ οὗ ψήφῳ), the Lacedaemonians decided by acclamation between the competitors. One by one the candidates were brought in, according to an order fixed by lot, and walked, without speaking, through the assembly. The persons who were shut up marked on tablets the greatness of the shout given in each case, not knowing for whom it was being given, but only that this was the first or the second or the third in order of the candidates. He was elected who was received with the loudest and longest acclamations.'

9. 27. δεὶ γὰρ καὶ θεωλόμενον καὶ μὴ θεωλόμενον ἀρχεῖν τῶν ἄξιων τῆς ἀρχῆς.

NOTES, BOOK II. 9.

9. According to the view of Aristotle and of Plato nobody should seek to rule, but everybody if he is wanted should be compelled to rule. Yet this is rather a counsel of perfection than a principle of practical politics. And it seems hardly fair to condemn the work of Lycurgus, because like every other Greek state, Sparta had elections and candidatures.

διόπερ εξεπεμπὼν συμπρεσβευτὰς τοὺς ἐκθρούς.

συμπρεσβευτὰς does not refer to the kings, but is an illustration of the same jealousy which made the Spartans consider the divisions of the kings to be the salvation of their state. διόπερ = 'by reason of a like suspicion.'

It has been argued that Aristotle in this section is criticising the kings only. And we might translate (with Bernays and others) 'they sent enemies as colleagues of the king,' e.g. in such cases as that of Agis (Thuc. v. 63). But these could hardly be described as συμπρεσβευταί, any more than the Ephors who, according to Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. c. 13. § 5), were the companions of the king—not his active counsellors, but spectators or controllers of his actions.

Ancient historians are apt to invent causes for the facts which tradition has handed down. Cp. note on c. 9. § 11 supra; also v. 11. § 2; Herod. v. 69; Thuc. i. 11, &c. It may be easily believed that there were frequent παραπρεσβεῖαι among Spartans, but that these were the result of a deeply-laid policy is the fancy of later writers. Still less can we suppose the double royalty which clearly originated in the ancient history of Sparta to be the work of the legislator. Compare the Laws (iii. 691 D) of Plato (who probably first suggested the notion of a special design), 'A god who watched over Sparta gave you two families of kings instead of one and thus brought you within the limits of moderation.'

9. 31.

Either 1) the gathering for meals; or 2) the contribution, as in Hdt. i. 64.
9.32. 

_Boi̊lētai μέν γὰρ δημοκρατικῶν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συστητῶν._

It may be admitted that the common meals had a sort of leveling or equalizing tendency; but this could hardly have been the original intention of them, whether they were first instituted at Sparta by Lycurgus or not (cp. vii. 10. § 2 ff.). They are more naturally connected with the life of a camp (§ 11) and the brotherhood of arms. They may also be the survival of a patriarchal life.

9.33. 

_The remark that the office of admiral was a second royalty appears to be justified chiefly by the personal greatness of Lyssander. Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus was also a distinguished man. It cannot be supposed that Eurybiades or Cnemus or Alcidas or Astyochus were formidable rivals to the king._

9.35. 

_τῶν τέκτων ἡ ἀδυνατίμη μὲν ἐκλαττον νομίζουσι μέν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τά γαθα τὰ περιμένητα δ’ ἀρετὴς μᾶλλον ἡ κακίας καὶ τούτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μᾶτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς._

_The Spartans were right in thinking that the goods of life are to be acquired by virtue, but not right in thinking that they are better than virtue’ (cp. vii. c. 2. and c. 14). The ‘not less error’ is that they degrade the end into a means; they not only prefer military virtue to every other, but the goods for which they are striving to the virtue by which they are obtained._

9.37. 

_τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἄχρηματον, τοῖς δ’ ἱδιώταις φιλοχρημάτωσι._

_It is quite true that many Spartans, Pausanias, Pleistoanax, Astyochus, Cleandridas, Gylippus and others were guilty of taking bribes. But it is hard to see how their crime is attributable to the legislator. Not the institutions of Lycurgus, but the failure of them was the real source of the evil._

_The love of money to whatever cause attributable was held to be characteristic of Sparta in antiquity. The saying χρήματα χρήματι ἀνήρ is placed by Alcaeus (Fr. 50) in the mouth of a Spartan, and the oracle ἄ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὅλει ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν is quoted in the Aristotelian Πολιτεία fr. Rei. Lac. 1559 b. 28._

10.1. 

_πάρεγγυσ μὲν ἐστὶ ταῖτης._

_Polyb. vi. 45 denies the resemblance between Crete and Lace-daeemon, Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν Κρητῶν μεταβάσεις (πολιτείαν) ἄξιον ἐπιστήσαι_
He contrasts the two states in several particulars; 1) the equal distribution of land in Sparta did not exist in Crete; 2) the greed of wealth which existed in Crete is said, strangely enough, to have been unknown at Sparta; 3) the hereditary monarchy of Sparta is contrasted with the life tenure of the γέραντες; 4) the harmony which prevailed at Sparta is contrasted with the rebellions and civil wars of Crete.

τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἡττῶν γλαφυρῶς.

Compare what is said of Charondas in c. 12, § 11, τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.

According to this view the Spartan institutions are not Dorian but Pre-Dorian, having been established originally by Minos; received from him by the Lacedaemonian colony of Lyctus in Crete, and borrowed from the Lyctians by Lycurgus.

διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τῶν αὐτῶν πρῶτων χρωνται αὐτοῖς, ὅν κατασκευάζοντος \[10. 3.\] σαντός Μίνω πρῶτου τὴν τάξει τῶν νόμων.

The connexion is as follows:—The Lacedaemonian Laws are borrowed from the Cretan. Among the Lyctians, a colony of the Lacedaemonians who settled in Crete and whom Lycurgus is said to have visited, these laws were already in existence, and he adopted them. And even at this day, the laws of Minos are still in force among the subject population or aborigines of Crete. διὸ is unemphatic; the logical form outruns the meaning.

Either the laws of Minos had ceased to be enforced among the freemen of Crete or the freemen of Crete had themselves changed (Bernays); and therefore any vestiges of the original law were only to be found among the ancient population. Thus communistic usages may be observed among the peasants of India and Russia, which have disappeared in the higher classes. Yet Aristotle also speaks of the common meals in Crete as still continuing. Does he refer only to the survival of them among the Perioeci? By Dosiades (B.C. ?) the Cretan Syssitia are described as still exist-
ing (see the passage quoted in note on § 6). Aristotle supposes that Lycurgus went to Crete before he gave laws to Sparta. According to other accounts his travels, like those of Solon, were subsequent to his legislation.

Ephorus, the contemporary of Aristotle [see fragment quoted in Strabo x. 486], argues at length that the Spartan Institutions originally existed in Crete but that they were perfected in Sparta, and that they deteriorated in Cnossus and other Cretan cities; both writers agree in the general view that the Cretan institutions are older than the Spartan and in several other particulars, e.g. that the Lyctians were a Lacedaemonian colony, that the common meals were called "Ἀνδρια or 'Ανδρεία, that the Cretan institutions had decayed in their great towns but survived among the Perioeci; and also in the similarity of offices at Lacedaemon and Crete. The great resemblance between this account and that of Aristotle seems to indicate a common unknown source.

The existence of the same institutions in Sparta and Crete and the greater antiquity of the Cretan Minos may have led to the belief in their Cretan origin. Others deemed such an opinion unworthy of Sparta and argued plausibly that the greater could not have been derived from the less; Strabo i. c.

10. 3. Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πενθέκεαι καὶ κείσθαι καλῶς.

Aristotle, like Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, is not indisposed to a geographical digression; cp. viii. 10. §§ 3-5.

It may be observed that the remark is not perfectly consistent with §§ 15. 16. The 'silver streak' and 'the empire of the sea' are the symbols of two different policies.

10. 4. Διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς βαλάντης ἀρχὴν κατέσχεν ὁ Μινως.

Cp. Herod. iii. 122, Thuc. i. 4.

10. 5. γεωργοὶς τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἰλοταῖς τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περιοίκοι.

But if Sosicrates, a writer of the second century B.C., quoted by Athenaeus vi. 84 is to be trusted, Aristotle is here at fault in his use of terms; τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρῆτες καλοῦσι μνοίαν, τὴν δὲ ίδιαν ἀφαμιώτας, τοὺς δὲ περιοίκους ὑπηκόους: see c. 9. § 3.
NOTES, BOOK II. 10.

10. 5.

These words may be compared with the passage in Book vii. 10.
§ 2. ἥ παρ ἄρχαϊ δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην
gνωμένα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλὰ παλαιό-
tέρα τούτων. In both passages Aristotle says that the common
meals came from Crete to Sparta.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλομίνοις 10. 6.
cόσμοι.

The office of the Cosmi is identified by Aristotle with that of the
Ephors. But the resemblance between them is very slight. The
fact that at Sparta there were kings, while in Crete the kingly
power, if it ever existed at all, had long been abolished, makes an
essential difference. The Ephors were democratic, the Cosmi
were oligarchical officers. And although both the Ephors and the
Cosmi were an executive body, yet the Ephors, unlike the Cosmi,
ever acquired the military command, which was retained by the
Spartan kings. Aristotle observes that the Cosmi were chosen
out of certain families, the Ephors out of all the Spartans, a circum-
stance to which he ascribes the popularity of the latter institution.

οῖς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες Βουλὴν.

Yet we are told that the term Βουλή was generally used to signify
'the council in a democracy.' Cp. iv. 15. § 11 and vi. 8. § 17,
also v. 1. § 10, [at Epidamus] ἀντὶ τῶν φυλάρχων Βουλὴν ἐποίησεν.
In the Cretan use of the term Βουλή there may be a survival of the
Homeric meaning of the word.

Βασιλεία δὲ πρῶτηρον μὲν ἴν.

Probably an inference from the legendary fame of Minos. No
other king of Crete is mentioned.

Dosiaides, quoted by Ath. iv. c. 22. p. 143, gives the following
account of the Cretan Syssitia: 'The Lyctians collect the materials
for their common meals in the following manner: Every one
brings a tenth of the produce of the soil into the guild (ετραπία) to
which he belongs, and to this [are added] the revenues of the city,
which the municipal authorities distribute to the several house-
holds. Further, each of the slaves contributes a poll-tax of an
Aeginetan stater. All the citizens are divided among these guilds which they call andrea. A woman takes care of the syssitia with three or four of the common people to help in waiting; and each of these has two attendants, called καλόφόροι, to carry wood for him. Everywhere in Crete there are two buildings for the syssitia, one called the andreon, the other, which is used for the reception of strangers, the dormitory (κοιμητήριον). And first of all they set out two tables in the room for the syssitia, called "strangers' tables," at which any strangers who are present take their place. Next to these come the tables for the rest. An equal portion is set before every man: the children receive a half portion of meat, but touch nothing else. On every table a large vessel is set full of diluted wine: from this all who sit at that table drink in common; and when the meal is finished another cup is put on. The children too drink in common from another bowl. The elders may, if they like, drink more. The best of the viands are taken by the woman who superintends the syssitia in the sight of all, and placed before those who have distinguished themselves in war or council. After dinner their habit is first of all to consult about state affairs, and then to recount their deeds in battle and tell the praise of their heroes. Thus they teach the youth to be valiant.

10. 8. ὅστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντως, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιδὰς καὶ ἄνδρας.
    ἐκ κοινοῦ, 'out of a common stock'; not necessarily at common tables. The syssitia or common meals of women are said by Aristotle in chap. 12 to be an invention of Plato in the Laws, and if so they could hardly have existed at Crete. Nor is there any allusion to them in the fragment of Dosiades (supra). The name ἄνδρα or ἄνδρεα also affords a presumption against the admission of women to the public tables. But if the words ἐκ κοινοῦ are interpreted as above, there is no reason that with Oncken (Staatslehre der Arist. ii. 386) we should suppose the words γυναῖκας καὶ παιδὰς on this ground to be spurious; nor is such a mode of textual criticism legitimate.

10. 9. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὅλυνσιάν.
    The connexion appears to be as follows: 'And as there were so many mouths to feed,' the legislator had many devices for
encouraging moderation in food, which he thought a good thing, as well as for keeping down population.

τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἢς εἰ φαῖλως ἢ μὴ φαῖλως 10. 9.

ἐτέρος ἔσται τοῦ διασκέψασα καιρὸς.

If these words refer to this work, the promise contained in them is unfulfilled. Nothing is said on the subject in Book vii. c. 16, when the question of population is discussed. The promise, however, is somewhat generally expressed; like the end of c. 8.

§ 25 supra, Διό τιν μὲν αὐτοὺς ταῦτα τὴν σκέψιν, ἄλλων γὰρ ἐστὶ καιρῶν.

ἐνταῦθα δ’ οὐκ εἴς ἀπάντων αἴρονται τοὺς κόσμους ἄλλ’ ἐκ τυπών γενόμεν, καὶ 10.10-12.

τοὺς γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἃν τις εἰπεῖν λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Δακεδαμών γυναῖκών. τὸ γὰρ ἀνπιστεύσον, καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μείζον ἐστὶ γέρας τῆς ἀδιάκολος αὐτοῖς... τὸ δ’ ἡσυχάζειν, κ.τ.λ.

περὶ δὲν. Do these words refer to* the γέροντες (Susemihl, Bernays) or to the κόσμος (Stahr)? The connexion would lead us to suppose the latter; for what precedes and what follows can only be explained on this supposition. Yet the Cosmi appear not to have held office for life (cp. γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων), perhaps only for a year (Polyb. vi. 46), though nothing short of a revolution could get rid of them; see infra, § 14. It is better to suppose that Aristotle has ‘gone off upon a word’ as at c. 9. § 30, and is here speaking of the γέροντες, but returns to his original subject at τὸ δ’ ἡσυχάζειν. περὶ δὲν and γυναῖκών have also been taken as neuters: ‘about which things,’ i.e. the mode of electing: but this explanation does not agree with the next words, which relate, not to the mode of election, but to the irresponsibility of the office.

καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν, ἄλλ’ αὐτογράφων ἐπισταλέτεις. 10. 11.

Cp. c. 9. § 23 where similar words are applied not, as here, to the Cosmi and elders, but to the Ephors. Another more general censure is passed on the γέροντες, § 25.

οὐδὲ γὰρ λήμματος τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὀσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πάρρω γ’ ἀποι- 10. 12.

κοινῶν ἐν ἄρει τῶν διαφθεροῦντων.

Yet to say that the Cosmi could not be bribed because they lived in an island appears to be rather far-fetched. Probably Aristotle is thinking of the bribery of Hellenes by foreign powers,
and for this there was little opportunity because the Cretans were isolated from the world.

10. 13. οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῆς οἱ κανών.

The expression is not quite accurate, for the caprice of an individual cannot be called a κανών. He means that to make the caprice of man a rule is unsafe.


The words ἂν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις which follow and the preceding ἐκβάλλοντες συννάντες τινὲς show that the expression τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν means not the insubordination of the notables, but the temporary abrogation of the office of Cosmi by their violence, or, possibly, their defiance of its authority.

10. 15. ἦσσυ δ’ ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις τῶν θυγαμίσκων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμίαν.

Translated in the English text: 'A city is in a dangerous condition, when those who are willing are also able to attack her.' More correctly, 'A city which may at any time fall into anarchy (οὕτως ἔχουσα) is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her.'

10. 16. Διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει.

'And this is also a reason why the condition of the Perioeci remains unchanged.'

10. 16. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικὴς ἀρχῆς κοινωνία.

Either 1*) have no foreign domains; or 2) have no relation to any foreign power. The language is not quite clear or accurate; for although a nation may possess foreign dominions it cannot 'share' in them. The Cretans were not members either of the Delian or of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

10. 16. νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβῆκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον.

The date of this event is said to be B.C. 343 when Phalaecus, the Phocian leader, accompanied by his mercenaries, crossed into Crete and took service with the inhabitants of Cnossus against those of Lyctus over whom he gained a victory, but shortly after-
NOTES, BOOK II. 11.

wards perished (Diod. xvi. 62, 63). This however is rather a civil than a ‘foreign war.’ Others refer the words to the war in the time of Agis II. (B.C. 330), or to the Cretan rising against Alexander. 

καὶ πολλὰ περιπτῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

‘And in many respects their government is remarkable when compared with those of other nations’ or ‘with the others of whom I have been speaking.’ For the use of περιπτῶς, cp. c. 6. § 6.

αὐτὰ γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς ἄλληλαι τε σύνεχος πώς εἰσιν.

Yet the differences are far more striking than the resemblances, which seem to be only ‘the common tables,’ the analogous office of kings at Sparta and Carthage, and the council of Elders. The real similarity to one another of any of these institutions may be doubted (see note on § 3 infra): while the entire difference in spirit is not noticed by Aristotle. The Semitic trading aristocracy has little in common with the Hellenic military aristocracy; the prosperity of Carthage with the poverty and backwardness of Crete. But in the beginnings of reflection mankind saw resemblances more readily than differences. Hence they were led to identify religions, philosophies, political institutions which were really unlike though they bore the impress of a common human nature.

αὐτὰ γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι συντεταγμένης.

‘And the proof that they were an organized state’ or ‘that they had a regular constitution.’ The insertion of εὖ before συντεταγμένης (Schneider) is unnecessary. Cp. supra ii. 9. § 22.

τὸν δὴν ἔχουσαν agrees with some word such as πόλιν understood from πολιτείαν—‘the city with its democracy.’ There is no need to change ἔχουσαν into ἐκάστα (Bernays) or ἐκουσίων (Spengel).

μὴ τε στάσω γεγενήσθαι.

For the inconsistency of these words with another statement of Aristotle (v. 12. § 12) that ‘the Carthaginians changed from a tyranny into an aristocracy,’ which is also irreconcilable with the further statement in v. 12. § 14, that they never had a revolution, see note in loco.
11. 3.  ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἑταίρων τοῖς φευδάρχοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐκατόν καὶ τετράδρων ἄρχην τοῖς ἐφόροις . . . τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς οἰκὶ βασιλείσι καὶ γέρουσιν.

Yet there could hardly have been much resemblance between the common tables of guilds or societies in the great commercial city of Carthage, and the 'camp life' of the Spartan syssitia; or between the five ephors of Sparta and the hundred and four councilors of Carthage; or between kings who were generals and elected for life at Sparta and the so called kings or suffetes who seem to have been elected annually and were not military officers at Carthage, but are distinguished from them, infra § 9.

11. 3.  οὖν χείρον.

Is to be taken as an adverb agreeing with the sentence, 'and this is an improvement.'

11. 4.  καὶ διαφέρον δὲ τοὺς βασιλείς μήτε κατὰ τὸ σύντομον, μηδὲ τὸτε τὸ τυχόν, εἰ τε διαφέρον ἐκ τούτων αἰρετοὶ μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν.

The true meaning of this rather perplexed passage is probably that given in the English text which may be gathered from the words as they stand. With διαφέρον supply τὸ γένος ἐστὶ. The correction of Bernays, τυχόν, εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίων αἰρετοὶ is too great a departure from the MSS. Lesser corrections, εἰ δὲ, ἄλλ' εἰ τι, εἴτε have some foundation in the Latin Version, but are unnecessary. εἰ τε is to be read as two words and answers to μήτε, as διαφέρον does to μηδὲ τούτο τὸ τυχόν. 'It is a great advantage that the kings are not all of the same family and that their family is no ordinary one, and if there be an extraordinary family, that the kings are elected out of it and not appointed by seniority.'

11. 4.  μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστῶτες, ἡν εὐτελεῖς δοσί, μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ ἐπιλαμψαν ἵδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακεδαμονίων.

He elsewhere speaks of the Spartan monarchy in a somewhat different spirit (iii. 14. § 3, 15. § 1 ff.). The praise here given to the elective Monarchy or Consulate of the Carthaginians at the expense of the Spartan kingship is considerably modified by the fact mentioned in § 10, that they not infrequently sold the highest offices for money.
NOTES, BOOK II. 11.

τὸν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας,
sc. ἐπιμηθέντων ἀν κ.τ.λ. Lit. 'But of the things which would be
censured when compared with the ideal of aristocracy and constitu-
tional government, etc.'

The constitution of Carthage was an aristocracy in the lower 11. 5.
sense, and like Aristotle's own πολιτεία, a combination of oligarchy
and democracy (iv. 8. § 9, v. 7. §§ 5-7). While acknowledging that
wealth should be an element in the constitution, because it is the
condition of leisure, Aristotle objects to the sale of places and the
other abuses which arose out of it at Carthage. The Carthaginian
constitution is expressly called an 'aristocracy' in iv. 7. § 4, because
it has regard to virtue as well as to wealth and numbers; and
once more (in v. 12. § 14) a democracy in which, as in other
democracies, trade was not prohibited. According to Aristotle the
people had the power 1) of debating questions laid before them;
2) of deciding between the kings and nobles when they disagreed
about the introduction of measures, but 3) they had not the power
of initiation.

ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις.

τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κ.τ.λ.

Of these pentarchies, or of the manner in which they held office
before and after the regular term of their magistracy had expired,
nothing is known. We may conjecture that they were divisions or
committees of the γεροντία. Their position may be illustrated by
that of the Cretan Cosmi, who became members of the γεροντία
when their term of office had expired (cp. c. 10. § 10).

τὴν τῶν ἑκατόν.
Possibly the same which he had previously (§ 3) called the
magistracy of 104. The magistracy here spoken of is termed
μεγίστη ἀρχή, the other is said to consist of great officers who
are compared with the Ephors. If the two institutions are
assumed to be the same, we might adduce for an example of a
like inaccuracy in number, a passage, c. 6. § 5, where the
citizens in Plato's Laws who number 5040 are called the 5000.

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But it is not certain that they can be identified. According to Livy and Justin the ordo judicum consisted of 100. ‘Centum ex numero senatorum judices deliguntur.’ Justin xix. 2. (Cp. Livy xxxiii. 46.) They were appointed about the year B.C. 450, to counteract the house of Mago, and are spoken of as a new institution. These facts rather lead to the inference that the 100 are not the same with the magistracy of 104, which was probably more ancient. But in our almost entire ignorance of early Carthaginian history the question becomes unimportant.

11. 7. Kai to tòs ðikas èpò tòv ðρχείων δικαζεθθαι πάσας [ἀριστοκρατικῶν], kai μὴ ðllas èpè ðllow, καθάπερ èn Lακεδαίμονι.

Either 1) katháper èn Lακεδαίμονι refers to the immediately preceding clause, μὴ ðllas èpè ðllow:—or 2), to the words ðikas èpò tòv ðρχείων δικαζεθθαι πάσας, in which case καὶ . . . ðllow must be taken as an explanatory parenthesis.

According to the first view, Aristotle is opposing Carthage and Lacedaemon. In Carthage all cases are tried by the same board or college of magistrates (or by the magistrates collectively), whereas in Lacedaemon some magistrates try one case and some another. The former is the more aristocratical, the second the more oligarchical mode of proceeding: the regular skilled tribunal at Carthage is contrasted with the casual judgments of individuals at Lacedaemon. The difficulty in this way of taking the passage is that we should expect èpò tòv aútvn ðρχείων, unless the words καὶ μὴ ðllas èpè ðllow be regarded as suggesting aútvn by antithesis.

According to the second view, Aristotle, as in iii. 1. § 10, is comparing the general points of resemblance in Carthage and Lacedaemon. ‘Both at Carthage and Lacedaemon cases are tried by regular boards of magistrates, and not by different persons, some by one and some by another.’ The difference between the professional judges of the Carthaginians and the casual magistrates of the Spartans is noted in iii. 1. § 10, but here passed over in silence. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian arrangements may thus be considered as both aristocratic and oligarchic,—aristocratic because limiting judicial functions to regular magistrates; oligarchic, because confining them to a few. They are
both contrasted with the judicial institutions of a democracy. The difficulty in this way of construing the passage is not the parenthesis, which is common in Aristotle, but the use of ἄλλων vaguely for 'different persons,' and not, as the preceding words ἐν τῶν ἀρχείων would lead us to expect, for 'different magistracies,' or 'boards of magistrates.'

In neither way of taking the passage is there any real contradiction to the statement of iii. 1. § 10. The words of the latter are as follows: 'For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly; but only extraordinary ones; suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates; at Lacedaemon, for instance, suits about contracts are decided, some by one Ephor and some by another; while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes probably fall to some other magistracy. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all causes.'

For the sale of great offices at Carthage, see Polyb. vi. 56. § 4, 11. 9. παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι δώρα φανερῶς διδόντες λαμβάνοντι τὰς ἀρχὰς παρὰ δὲ Ρωμαῖοις θάνατός ἐστι περὶ τοῦτο πρόστιμον.

dei δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρα- 11. 10. τίας ταῦτην κ.τ.λ.

The error consists in making wealth a qualification for office; the legislator should from the first have given a competency to the governing class, and then there would have been no need to appoint men magistrates who were qualified by wealth only. Even if the better classes generally are not to be protected against poverty, such a provision must be made for the rulers as will ensure them leisure. See infra § 12, βέλτιον δ' εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιτείκων ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.

eἰ δὲ δεῖ βέλτιον καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς, φαύλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας 11. 10. ὑμητὰς εἶπαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν.

Of this, as of many other passages in the Politics, the meaning can only be inferred from the context. In the Carthaginian constitution the element of wealth superseded merit. But whether there was a regular traffic in offices, as the words τὰς μεγίστας
would seem to imply, or merely a common practice of corruption, as in England in the last century, Aristotle does not clearly inform us. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 544 D, ἡ τεῦχα δήλων ἔχεις ἑδέαν πολιτείας, ἤτει καὶ ἐν ἐΐδει διαφανεῖ τιλ λέογος ἑν στείρε γὰρ μὲν ὁ ἦττι τοιαῦτα τινες πολιτείαι μεταξύ τινος τοῦ άτόμου τοῦ ἐστιν, εῦρος δὲ ἂν τις αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας.

11. 12. θέλεις δὲ καὶ προείπο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπικικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης.

The MSS. vary between ἀπορίαν and εὐπορίαν without much difference of meaning: 'Even if the legislator were to give up the question of the poverty' [or 'wealth'] of the better class.' A similar confusion of ἀπορος and εὐπορος occurs elsewhere: iii. 17. § 4, ἀπόροι and εὐπόροι; v. 1. § 14, ἀπόροι and εὐπόροι; v. 3. § 8, ἀπόροι and εὐπόροι: vi. 2. § 9, ἀπόροι and εὐπόροι.


κοντότερον, 'more popular,' because more persons hold office.

καθάπερ ἐπιστημων, cp. § 13.

ἐκαστόν τῶν αὐτῶν, i.e. because each thing remains the same.

The insertion of ἐνω before τῶν, suggested by the Old Translation ab eisdem, is unnecessary. τῶν αὐτῶν, 'where the duties are the same.'

κάλλιον ἀποτελεῖται, i.e. if many share in the government each individual can be confined to the same duties, a division of labour to which frequent reference is made in Aristotle. (Cp. ii. 2. §§ 5, 6; iv. 15. §§ 7, 8; vi. 2. § 8, and Plat. Rep. ii. 374 A, iii. 397 E.) And there is more political intelligence where everybody is both ruler and subject.

11. 15. ἐκφεύγουσι τῷ πλουτῶν. See note on text.

So England has been often said to have escaped a revolution during this century by the help of colonization: nor is there 'any more profitable affair of business in which an old country can be engaged' (Mill). That Aristotle was not averse to assisting the poor out of the revenues of the state when any political advantage could be gained, or any permanent good effected for them, we infer from vi. 5. §§ 8, 9.
Though the government of the Carthaginians is in good repute (§ 1), Aristotle regards this reputation as not wholly deserved, their stability being due to the power of sending out colonies which their wealth gave them; but this is only a happy accident. In a similar spirit he has remarked that the permanency of the Cretan government is due to their insular position (c. 10. § 15).

αὐν ἀναχλα γένηται τε.

The later reflection on the accidental character of the stability which he attributes to Carthage is not quite in harmony with the statement of § 2, in which he cites the lastingness of the government as a proof of the goodness of the constitution.

Grote in his eleventh chapter (vol. iii. p. 167, ed. 1847) says 12.2–6. that, according to Aristotle, Solon only gave the people the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability. What is said in §§ 2 and 3 he considers not to be the opinion of Aristotle himself, but of those upon whom he is commenting. This is true of § 2: but not of § 3, which contains Aristotle's criticism on the opinion expressed in § 2. Thus we have the authority of Aristotle (at least of the writer of this chapter) for attributing the institution of the δικαστήρια to Solon (cp. Schomann's Athenian Constitution, transl. by Bosanquet, pp. 36 ff.). The popular juries are said to be a democratic institution (τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστῆσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων); but it is obvious that, so long as the jurors were unpaid, the mass of the people could make no great use of their privileges. The character of the democracy was therefore far from being of an extreme kind; cp. iv. 6. §§ 5, 6 and 13. §§ 5, 6, vi. 2. §§ 6, 7.

The sum of Aristotle's (?) judgment upon Solon (§ 3) is that he did create the democracy by founding the dicasteries, but that he was not responsible for the extreme form of it which was afterwards established by Ephialtes, Pericles, and their followers.

ἐκαστὸς τῶν δημιουργῶν.

The writer of this passage clearly intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the Gorgias, pp. 515, 516.
12. 5. ἑπὶ Ἑλών γε δοκεῖ τὴν ἀναγκαιοτήτιν ἀποδίδαναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν.


12. 6. τὰς δ’ ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομελίμων καὶ ζευγατῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης ἰσπάδος τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικῶν, οἷς ὀυδεμίας ἀρχῆς μετῆν.

The arrangement of the classes here is somewhat disorderly, the second class or Knights being placed third in the series. That Aristotle should have supposed the Hippeis to have formed the third class is incredible; but it is difficult to say what amount of error is possible in a later writer. See an absurd mistake in Suidas and Photius about ἵππεις and ἰσπάδες (Boeckh, P. E. ii. 260) under ἰσπάδα, which in Photius s. v. is called a fifth class; while in the next entry four Athenian classes are cited in the usual order with a reference to Aristotle (§) de Rep. Atheniensium, and an addition 'that ἰσπάδες belong to ἵππεις' (§).

12. 6. νομοθέται δ’ ἐγένετον Ζάλευκας τε Δοκροίς τοῖς ἐπίζευφροῖς, καὶ Χαρώνιδας ὁ Καππανος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις.

Strabo (vi. 260), quoting Ephorus, says that Zaleucus made one great innovation, in taking away from the dicasts, and inserting in the law, the power of fixing the penalty after sentence was given.

Aristotle attributes greater precision to Charondas than to modern legislators. But early laws have a greater appearance of precision because society is simpler, and there are fewer of them.

12. 7. Θάλης.

Thales, called also Thaletas, probably the Cretan poet who is said by Ephorus apud Strabonem, x. p. 481, to have been the friend of Lycurgus; and also to have introduced the Cretan rhythm into vocal music. Mentioned in Plut. de Musica, pp. 1135, 1146. Clinton supposes him to have flourished from 690 to 660 B.C. But chronology cannot be framed out of disjointed statements of Plutarch and Pausanias.

12. 7. Διοκρόγον καὶ Ζάλευκον.

A greater anachronism respecting Lycurgus is found in the fragments of Ephorus (Strabo x. 482, ἐνυχώντα δ’, ὡς φασί τινες, καὶ
NOTES, BOOK II. 12.

"Ορήρω διαπρίσματε ἐν Χίῳ, quoted by Oncken, Staatslehre des Aristoteles, ii. p. 346).

12. 8.

The δὲ is not opposed to μὲν at the end of the last sentence, ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ., but is a resumption of the δὲ at the beginning of the previous sentence, πειράζεται δὲ. The story, if any reason is required for the introduction of it, may be intended to explain how Philolaus a Corinthian gave laws for Thebes.

Of Onomacritus, Philolaus, Androdamas, nothing more is known: 12. 11. of Zaleucus not much more. A good saying attributed to him has been preserved in Stobaeus xlv. p. 304, Ζάλευκος, ὁ τῶν Λοκρῶν νομοθέτης, τοὺς νόμους ἐφήσε τοῖς ἀρακνίοις ὅμοιοι εἶναι· ὀσπερ γὰρ εἰς ἑκεῖνα εἰν μὲν ἐμπέση μνία ἡ κόινα, κατέχεται, εἰν δὲ σφήξ ἢ μελίττα, διαρρήξασα ἀφάντασα, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους ἐὰν μὲν ἐμπέσῃ πένης, σωκέχεται· εἰν δὲ πλούσιοι ἡ δυνατὸς λέγειν, διαρρήξας ἀποτρέχει, an apophthegm which in Aristotle's phraseology (i. 11. § 10) may be truly said 'to be of general application.' Stobaeus has also preserved (xliv. p. 289) numerous laws which are attributed to Charondas and Zaleucus. They are full of excellent religious sentiments, but are evidently of a late Neo-Pythagorean origin. The same remark applies still more strongly to the citations in Diodorus xii. c. 12 ff.

12. 12.

Πλάτωνος δ' ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδών καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινής καὶ τα συνότια τῶν γυναικών, ἢ τε δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθρη νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποιαρχεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην, ὃς δέος μή τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῖς χερῶν τὴν δὲ ἀρχηγόταν.

The reference to Plato's communism in contrast with Phaleas' proposal of equality is not unnatural; but the allusion to three unconnected, two of them very trivial, points in the 'Laws,' is strange, and looks like the addition of a later hand. This whole chapter has been often suspected. It consists of miscellaneous jottings not worked up, some of them matters already discussed. But mere irregularity and feebleness are no sufficient ground for doubting the genuineness of any passage in the sense in which
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genuineness may be ascribed to the greater part of the Politics. The chapter may be regarded either as an imperfect recapitulation or as notes for the continuation of the subject. The story of Philolaus, and the discussion respecting Solon, are characteristic of Aristotle.

καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμικοῖς ἀσκησιν. The change of construction arises from the insertion of the clause ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμον. The accusative may be explained as the accusative of the remote object after ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται, or may be taken with περὶ.

It may be remarked that Aristotle looks on the ἀμφιδέξιος as an exception to nature (cp. Nic. Eth. v. 7. § 4, φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξία κρείττων καὶ τοι ἐνδείκται τινα ἀμφιδέξιους γενέσθαι), whereas in Plato (Laws 794 D, E) the ordinary use of the right hand only is regarded as a limitation of nature.

12. 13. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι.

BOOK III.

τὸ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι.

The particle δὲ after τὸ was probably omitted when the treatise was divided into books.

τὸ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου

are a resumption of the opening words τὸ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπι-ποῖντι. 'The legislator or statesman is wholly engaged in enquiries about the state. But the state is made up of citizens, and therefore he must begin by asking who is a citizen.' The clause τὸ δὲ πολιτικοῦ . . . περὶ πόλιν is a repetition and confirmation of the previous sentence, τὸ περὶ πολιτείας . . . ἡ πόλις, the enquirer being more definitely described as the legislator or statesman.

οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες σῷτως ὡστε καὶ δίκην ἐπέχειν καὶ δικαίοι—1. 4.

καί is closely connected with οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες. 'Nor those who share in legal rights, so that as a part of their legal rights they are sued and sue, as plaintiffs and defendants.'

καί γὰρ ταῦτα τούτους ἐπάρχει.

These words are omitted in the old translation and in several Greek MSS. and are bracketed by Susemihl (1st ed.). If retained, they either 1) refer to the remote antecedent μέτοικοι above, 'for the metics have these rights, and yet are not citizens,' whereupon follows the correction, 'although in many places metics do not possess even these rights in a perfect form.' Or 2* they are only a formal restatement of the words immediately preceding (for a similar restatement, which is bracketed by Bekker, see iv. 6. § 3), and are therefore omitted in the translation. Other instances of such pleonastic repetitions occur elsewhere, e.g. infra c. 6. § 4, where
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τοῦ δὴ ἄνεκου αὐτοῦ is repeated in κατὰ τὸ ἦν αὐτὸ μόνον: also iv. 1. § 1, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἐστίν, and v. 1. § 1.

Aristotle argues that the right of suing and being sued does not make a citizen, for a) such a right is conferred by treaty on citizens of other states: (cp. Thuc. i. 77, καὶ διαστούμενον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἔμπροσθεσιν πρὸς τοὺς ἐμμάχους δίκαιοι καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίως νόμοις ποιήσασθε τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν). 6) The metics have this right, which, as he proceeds to remark, in many places is only granted them at second-hand through the medium of a patron.

1. 5. οἷς ἄπλωσ δὲ λίαν.

λίαν qualifies and at the same time emphasises ἄπλωσ: 'But not quite absolutely.'

1. 5. ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων κ.τ.λ.

I. e. doubts may be raised about the rights to citizenship of exiles and deprived citizens, but they may also be solved by the expedient of adding some qualifying epithet.

1. 7. ἄνθυμων γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιάστου.

'This is a merely verbal dispute arising out of the want of a word; for had there been a common name comprehending both dicast and ecclesiast it would have implied an office.' Cp. Laws, vi. 767 A: 'Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates; for every magistrate must also be a judge of something, and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, is a very important magistrate when he is determining a suit.'

1. 8. δὲi δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστι πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινὸν, ἢ γλώσσαα.

τὰ ὑποκείμενα. 1*) 'the underlying notions' or 'the notions to which the things in question are referred,' i. e. in this passage, as the connexion shows, 'the forms of the constitution on which the idea of the citizen depends' (see Bonitz s. v.). 2) ὑποκείμενα is taken by Bernays to mean the individuals contained under a class, and he translates 'where things which fall under one conception are different in kind.' But it is hard to see how things which are
different in kind can fall under one class or conception, and the
meaning, even if possible, is at variance with the immediate
context which treats not of citizens but of constitutions.

τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὄρωμεν εἰδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας 1. 9.
τὰς δὲ προτέρας οὕτως.

The logical distinction of prior and posterior is applied by
Aristotle to states, and so leads to the erroneous inference that
the perfect form of the state has little or nothing in common with
the imperfect. So in Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, ‘there are no common
ideas of things prior and posterior.’ The logical conceptions of
prior and posterior have almost ceased to exist in modern meta-
physics; they are faintly represented to us by the expressions
‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori,’ or ‘prior in the order of thought,’
which are a feeble echo of them; from being differences in kind,
they are becoming differences of degree, owing to the increasing
sense of the continuity or development of all things.

διόπερ ὣ λεγεῖσι ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μᾶλιστ' ἐστὶν πολιτεία.

Yet not so truly as in Aristotle’s own polity hereafter to be
described, in which all the citizens are equal (cp. infra, c. 13. § 12).
Democracy is elsewhere called a perversion (infra, c. 7. § 5), but he
here uses the term carelessly, and in a better sense, for that sort of
democracy which is akin to the μέση πολιτεία.

κατὰ μέρος.

Generally ‘in turn,’ but the examples show that the phrase must
here mean ‘by sections’ or ‘by different bodies or magistracies.’

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα πᾶσας γὰρ ἄρχαι τινες κρίνουσι 1. 11.
τὰς δικας.

τὸν αὐτὸν, i.e. because in both these cases the administration of
justice is taken out of the hands of the people and entrusted to the
magistrates, either the same or different magistrates.
The oligarchies or aristocracies of Carthage and Sparta are here
 contrasted, not with each other, but with democracy. A minor
difference between them is also hinted at: at Carthage there were
regular magistrates to whom all causes were referred; at Lacedae-
mon causes were distributed among different magistrates. See note on ii. 11. § 7.

1. 11. ἀλλ’ ἔχει γὰρ διάφωσαν ὅ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός.
    The particle γὰρ implies an objection which is not expressed. 'But how, if our definition is correct, can the Lacedaemonians, Carthaginians, and others like them be citizens; for they have no judicial or deliberative assemblies.' To which Aristotle answers, 'But I will correct the definition so as to include them.' Finding ἀρχή to be a definition of citizenship inapplicable to any state but a democracy, he substitutes a new one, 'admissibility to office, either deliberative or judicial.'

1. 12. ταύτης τῆς πόλεως.
    Namely, of that state in which the assembly or law-court exists.

2. 1. πολιτικῶς.
    'Popularly' or 'enough for the purposes of politics.' Cp. Plat. Rep. 430 C. So νομικῶς (viii. 7. § 3), 'enough for the purposes of law.'

    For ταχέως Camerarius and Bernays needlessly read ταχέως.

2. 2. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὃ Δασυτίνος, τὰ μὲν ἵσος ἀπορῶν τὰ δ’ εἰρωνευόμενοις: ἔφη, καθάπερ ἤλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαῖοι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημοουργῶν πεποιημένους: εἶναι γὰρ τινας λαρισσαποιούς.
    ἀπορῶν. 'In doubt about the question who is a citizen?'
    δημοουργῶν. Properly the name of a magistrate in some Dorian states. The word is used here with a double pun, as meaning not only 'magistrates,' but 1) 'makers of the people,' 2) 'artisans.' The magistrates, like artisans, are said to make or manufacture the citizens because they admit them to the rights of citizenship.

    There is also a further pun upon the word Λαρισσαῖοι, which probably meant kettles, or was used as a characteristic epithet of kettles derived from their place of manufacture:—

    'Artisans make kettles.
    Magistrates make citizens.'

    The sentence may be translated as follows:—'Gorgias, very
likely because he was in a difficulty, but partly out of irony, said
that, as mortars are made by the mortar-makers, so are the Laris-
seans manufactured by their 'artisan-magistrates; for some of them
were makers of kettles' (Lάρισσας ον Λαρισσαίας).

For the term εἰρωνεύμενος, applied to Gorgias, compare Rhet. iii.
7, 1408 b. 20, ἡ μετὰ εἰρωνείας, διόπτρ Γοργίας ἑποίει: and for Λάρισσας compare Τάιναγρα Ταναγρίς, a kettle, (Hesych., Pollux); also an epi-
gram of Leonides of Tarentum (Anth. vi. 305):—

Λαζροσίνα τάδε δόμα, φιλευλείχω τε Λαφυγμῷ
θήκατο δεισόζου* Δωρίεως κεφαλά,
tῶς Λαρισσαίως βουγάστορας ἐφητήρας,
καὶ χύτρας καὶ τὰν εὐφυχαδή κύλικα,
καὶ τῶν εὐχάλκωτων εὖγναμπτῶν τε κρεάγραυ,
καὶ κυνήστιν, καὶ τῶν ἐτυνδών τορίων.

*δεισόζου = stinking; cp. Suidas, s. v. δεισαλέος: — δεισαλέος, κοπρώδης.

δέσια γὰρ ἡ κόπρος.

ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. (See note on text.)

2. 3.

Mr. Grote, c. 31. vol. iv. 170. n., would keep the words as they
stand, taking μετοίκους with both ξένους and δούλους. He quotes
Aristoph. Knights 347 (εἰ που δικίδων εἶπας εῦ καὶ ξένους μετοίκου),
and infers from the juxtaposition of the words δούλους μετοίκους, that they
mean, 'slaves who, like metics, were allowed to live by themselves,
though belonging to a master.' That is to say μέτοικοι are spoken
of in a general as well as in a technical sense. According to
Xen. de Vect. 2. § 3, all kinds of barbarians were metics.
Cp. for the general subject, Polit. vi. 4. § 18, where measures,
like those which Cleisthenes the Athenian passed when he
wanted to extend the power of the democracy, are said to have
been adopted at Cyrene. Such a reconstruction of classes also
took place at Sicyon under Cleisthenes the tyrant, who gave in-
sulting names to the old Dorian tribes (Herod. v. 68).

το δ' ἀμφιβόητημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστιν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον 2. 4.

Aristotle means to say that what is true in fact may be false in
principle. These two senses of the words 'true' and 'false' were confused by sophistical thinkers. See Plat. Euthyd. 284, ff.

2. 5. τῆς τοιῶσε ἄρχης refers to τωί, sc. ἀφόρισθι, supra 1. § 7, 'an office such as we spoke of.'

3. 1. δῆλον διτ πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τοῦτος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάστει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν.

A doubt is raised whether the ἀδίκος πολιτεύων is truly a πολίτης. The answer is that the ἀδίκος ἄρχων is truly an ἄρχων. But the πολίτης is by definition an ἄρχων, and therefore the ἀδίκος πολίτης may be rightly called a πολίτης.

καὶ τοῦτον, sc. τοῖς ἀμφισβητησμένοις (§ 4), 'these as well as the legitimate citizens.'

πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν is the question touched upon in c. 1. § 1, and resumed in the words which follow. The controversy concerning the de jure citizen runs up into the controversy respecting the de jure state, which is now to be discussed.

3. 1, 2. ὅταν εὖ διλιγαρχίας ἡ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ συμβάλλαι ἐνος βούλονται διαλέειν.

A question which has often arisen both in ancient and modern times, and in many forms. Shall the new government accept the debts and other liabilities of its predecessor, e.g. after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, or the English or French Revolution or Restoration? Shall the Northern States of America honour the paper of the Southern? Shall the offerings of the Cypselids at Delphi bear the name of Cypselus or of the Corinthian state? Or a street in Paris be called after Louis Philippe, Napoleon III, or the French nation?

3. 2. εἶπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τωσ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς διλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.

The mere fact that a government is based on violence does not necessarily render invalid the obligations contracted by it; at any rate the argument would apply to democracy as well as to any other form of government. Cp. Demosth. πρὸς Ἀπετίνην, p. 460, where it is mentioned that the thirty tyrants borrowed money of the Lacedaen-
monians, which, after a discussion, was repaid by the democracy out of the public funds, and not by confiscation of the property of the oligarchs. Cp. also Isocr. Areopag. vii. 153, where the same story is repeated.

ἔνδειξαν γὰρ διαζευγθήμα τῶν τόπων καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. 3. 3.

E.g. the case of the Athenian ἀληροῦχοι, who, while possessing land in other places, remained citizens of Athens; or of migrations in which a whole state was transferred; or possibly a dispersion like that of the Arcadian cities which were afterwards reunited by Epaminondas. Yet, ii. 1. § 2, ὁ τόπος εἰς ὅ τις μᾶς πόλεως.

πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστὶν πολέμεια τῆς τοιαύτης 3. 4.

ζητήσως.

'When difficulties are raised about the identity of the state, you may solve many of them quite easily by saying that the word "state" is used in different senses.'

ὅμως δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων κατοικούντων,

sc. ἡ ἀπορία ἐστὶν, supplied from τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης. 3. 4.

τοιαύτη δ’ ἵσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν.

'Such as Peloponnesus would be, if included within a wall,'—

further illustrated by ἢς γὰρ ἑακικοίνας κ.τ.λ. 3. 5.

ἡ γε φασίν ἑακικοίνας τρίτην ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέναι τῇ μέρος τῆς πόλεως. 3. 5.

Cp. Herod. i. 191: 'The Babylonians say that, when the further parts of the city had been taken by Cyrus, those in the centre knew nothing of the capture, but were holding a festival.' Also Jeremiah li. 31: 'One post shall run to meet another, and one messenger to meet another to show the king of Babylon that his city is taken at one end.'

ἄλλα περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εὶς ἄλλον καράδαν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέψις 3. 6.

περὶ γὰρ μεγίστος τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λαμβάνει τῶν πολιτικῶν.

The subject is resumed in Book vii. 4. § 4, ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτικῆς χρηγίας πρῶτον τὸ τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ πολίους τινὰς ἐπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὀσμάτως, διήν τε εἶναι καὶ ποιάν
3, 6, 7. Ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, πότερα ἐστιν ἢ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικοῦντων, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέων πόλιν, καίσερ δὲ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γενομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὶ εἰσάγονεν λέγειν τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτὰς, καίσερ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἐπιμυσμένον νάματος, τῶν ἑπεξεύσης, ἡ τῶν μὲν άνθρώπων φατέων εἶναι τῶν αὑτῶν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γάρ ἢ τοι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ.

From the digression into which he has fallen respecting the size of the state, Aristotle returns to the original question, What makes the identity of the state? He answers in an alternative: Shall we say that the identity of the state depends upon the race, although the individuals of the race die and are born—like a river which remains the same although the waters come and go? Or is not the truer view that the form or idea of the state makes the state the same or different, whether the race remain or not? This latter alternative he accepts, illustrating his meaning by the simile of a chorus (§ 7), which may be Tragic or Comic, although the members of it are the same; and of musical harmony (§ 8) in which the same notes are combined in different modes.

This is the conclusion which Aristotle intends to draw from the words εἴπερ γάρ ἢ τοι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ., and is clearly the general drift of the passage. But the alternatives Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἑτέραν create an obscurity, because Aristotle begins by opposing the continuance of the race to the transitoriness of the individuals who are always going and coming, when he is really intending to oppose the idea of the state to both of them, §§ 7, 9.

διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν. 'For the same reason as the rivers;' i.e. because there is an unbroken succession of citizens as of waters.

The argument is neither clearly expressed nor altogether satisfactory. For 1) the identity of a state consists in many things, such as race, religion, language, as well as government, and therefore cannot be precisely defined; 2) it is always changing for better or
for worse; 3) whether the identity is preserved or not is a question of degree; a state may be more or less the same, like the English constitution, and yet be continuous in the course of ages. Aristotle would have done better to have solved this question by having recourse once more to the different senses of the word πόλις (§ 4). Cp. iv. § 3; v. 1. § 8.

εἰπὲρ γὰρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἕστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, 8. 7. γνωρίσας ἐτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσῃ τῆς πολιτείας ἰσορροπίαν εἶναι διότι δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν.

For a state being a community, and a community of citizens being a community in a constitution, ἐστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν κοινωνία πολιτείας, when the form of this community changes, the state also changes': or, if this construction is deemed harsh πολιτείας, may be thought to have crept in from the next line, and may be omitted as in the English text.

The particle γὰρ implies assent to the second alternative (supra).

‘The sailor besides his special duties has a general duty, which 4. 1, 2. is the safety of the ship; the citizen has also a general duty, which is the salvation of the state—the nature of this duty will vary according to the character of the state. And besides the general duty citizens, like sailors, will have special duties and functions in the state, as in the ship.’

οὐ μήν ἄλλα καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον ἐστι διαφοροῦσα ἐπελθεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν 4. 4. λόγων περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

The last words are an explanation of κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον.

Two conceptions of the state are continually recurring in the Politics of Aristotle, first the ideal state, in which the best has a right to rule and all the citizens are good men: secondly, the constitutional state, which approaches more nearly to actual fact (ii. 2. § 6; vii. 14. §§ 2–5). In the first, the good man and the good citizen, or rather the good ruler, are said to coincide; in the second, they have a good deal in common, but still the virtue of the citizen is relative to the government under which he lives, and the occupation in which he is engaged.

These two points of view are apt to cross (ἐπιλάττεσθαι in Aristotle's own language), and they appear to be here confused.

Vol. II.
4. 5. ei yap adýnaton eî apantwv spoudaivov avtow einai polion, deî de ékastov
to kai ã tov on érignon eî poiheiv, toûto ò ap' ârteiâ; épetei ò adýnaton òmioâ
êina pántas toû politéas, ouk àn eî miâ ârtei poléton kai ãndros âgathoi,
tîn mîn yap toû spoudaiv poléton deî pássin iâpárxhein (outw yap ársteîn
âagkaioîn êinaî tîn poliân), tîn ò de toû ãndrîs toû âgathou adýnaton, ei mi
pántas âagkaioîn âgathous êinaî toûs en tî spoudaia polieí politéas.

The argument is that the perfect state is not composed only of
perfectly good men; for such absolute goodness is incompatible
with the different occupations or natural qualities of different
citizens, or their duties toward the government under which they
live. All the citizens are not the same, and therefore the one
perfect virtue of the good man cannot be attained equally by all of
them. But they may all have a common interest in the salvation
of society, which is the virtue of a good citizen. The Pythagorean
doctrine of the unity of virtue still lingers in the philosophy of
Aristotle. (Compare Ethics ii. 5. § 14, ésthoi mîn yap áploî, pante-
dapâs de kakoi.)

4. 6. kai óikeia eî ãndros kai ymnikov kai kêtísis ék ðeisptovn kai ðoulou.

kêtísis is here omitted by Bernays, because the slave is a part of
the óikeia: but it may be observed that in i. 4. § 1, kêtísis is a sub-
division of the óikeia under which the slave is included.

4. 7. ðamîn de tîn árkhon tîn spoudaivn ágathn einai kai froumoun, tîn
de politikov âagkaioîn einai froumoun.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5, where Pericles is spoken of as a type of
the froumous: and vi. 8. § 1, where politikh is described as a species
of froumis.

4. 7, 8. all' ðra ûstaî tumos ñ autâ ârtei poléton te spoudaivn kai ãndros
spoudaivn; ðamîn de tîn árkhon tîn spoudaivn ágathn einai kai froumoun,
tîn de politikov âagkaioîn einai froumoun. kai tîn pайдieian ò evthos étînan
êinaî legywî tînes tîn árkhonos, òwter kai fainontai oî tîn basilewv wîa
iâpîkhn kai pôleîkhn pайдieîmenôn.

Aristotle having determined that the good citizen is not always a
good man, now proceeds to ask the question whether some good
citizens are not good men? Yes, the ruler must be a good and
wise man; and the difference between him and other citizens is
partly proved by the fact that he has a different education.
Some persons say that, if we go no further than education, even this should be different. So in § 6 above, εἰθύς εκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. Cp. i. 5, § 2; Met. iii. 2, 1004 a. 5, ὑπάρχει γὰρ εἰθύς γένη ἠχοντα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ δι', μὴ μοι τὰ κόμψα.

The whole fragment, which appears to contain a piece of advice addressed to young princes, is given by Nauck, Eurip. Aeol. Fr. 16:—

λαμπροὶ δ' ἐν αἷμαῖς Ἀρεως ἐν τε συλλόγοις,
μὴ μοι τὰ κομψά ποικίλοι γενοίσαι,
ἀλλ' ἐν πολεῖ δεῖ, μεγάλα βουλεύωντ' ἀνεῖ.

Two points strike us about quotations from the poets which occur in Aristotle: 1) The familiarity with the words which they imply in the reader; for they are often cited in half lines only, which would be unintelligible unless the context was present to the mind. We are reminded that the Greek like some of our English youth were in the habit of committing to memory entire poets (Plat. Laws vii. 810 E). 2) The remoteness and ingenuity of the application. For a similar far fetched quotation, cp. infra c. 5. § 9.

ei δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀρχοντός τε ἁγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἁγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἔστι 4. 9. καὶ ὁ ἄρχωμενος, οἷς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἀν εἰ ἀπλώσει πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου.

'If the good man and the good ruler are to be identified, and the subject is also a citizen, then the virtue of the good man is not coextensive with the virtue of all good citizens, but only with that of a certain citizen,' i.e. the citizen of a perfect state who is also a ruler, and therefore has a sphere for the employment of his energies, cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 8. § 4.

οὗ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχοντός καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἵσως ἰάσων ἐφή πεινήν, 4. 9. ὑπὲ μῆ τυραννῆ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης ἐίναι.

Another illustration of the difference in the nature of the ruler and of the citizen is contained in the saying of Jason, 1) 'that he had no choice between starvation and tyranny, for he had never learned how to live in a private station'; or 2) '*that he felt a sensation like hunger when not a tyrant; for he was too proud to
live in a private station.' The two interpretations differ according to the shade of meaning given to πειρόμενος and ἐπιτρέπομενος.

The Jason here referred to is Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly.

Another saying of Jason is quoted in Rhet. i. 12, 1373 a. 26, 'δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἑνα, ὅπως δωνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν.'

4. 10. εἴ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἄνδρος τίθεμεν ἄρχων, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτην ἄμφω, οὐκ ἐν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπανετά ἄμφως.

1) Aristotle here lights upon a paradox, which he cannot resist mentioning, but does not pursue further. 'If the virtue of the good man is of a ruling character, but the virtue of the citizen includes ruling and being ruled, their virtues cannot [from this point of view] be equally praiseworthy, [for the good man has one virtue only, the citizen two].'

2) Or the meaning may be, 'that the virtue of the good man being the virtue of ruling is higher than that of the citizen who only rules at times, or who obeys as well as rules.'

The words οὐκ ἐν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπανετά ἄμφως according to the first way = 'the citizen is more to be praised than the good man': according to the second, 'the virtue of the two, i.e. of ruler and citizen, are not equally praiseworthy'; in other words, the virtue of the good man is the higher of the two.

The whole passage is perplexed, not from any corruption of the text, but from the love of casuistry and a want of clearness in distinguishing the two sides of the argument.

4. 11. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἄμφότερα, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μαθῶν καὶ τὸν ἄρχομενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἄμφῶτερ' ἐπιστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἄμφοις. τούτων οὖν ἐν καταίδοι τις.

Aristotle seems to mean that the citizen acquires a knowledge of the duties of both ruler and ruled, which are different. Since the ruler and the ruled must learn both, and the two things are distinct, and the citizen must know both and have a part in both, the inference is obvious. But what is this obvious inference we are uncertain:—either, 1)* that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler; or 2) that the citizen who knows both at once is to be preferred to the ἄρχον and ἄρχομενος, taken separately.
The sentence is awkwardly expressed and is perhaps corrupt. The change of ἄμφοτερα into ἄμφω ἐτερα (Bernays) would give much the same meaning with rather less difficulty, ('since the two must learn different things, and the ruler and the ruled are not required to learn the same things'), because τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ τὸν ἄρχόμενον have not then to be taken in two senses, collective and distributive. It might be argued in favour of Bernays' emendation that ἄμφοτερα may have crept in from the ἄμφωτερος in the next line; and against it that the two words ἄμφω ἐτερα, the one having a collective, the other a distributive sense, are not happily combined.

§ 11 seems to be intended as a summing up of §§ 8–10. The thread of the argument is resumed at the words ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν in § 14.

4. 11.

ἐστι γὰρ ἄρχη δεσποτικὴ κ.τ.λ.

is a digression introduced for the sake of distinguishing the ἄρχη δεσποτικὴ to which the preceding remarks do not apply, from the ἄρχη πολιτικὴ to which they do.

ἐστι γὰρ refers back to τὸν ἄρχοντα, 'We are speaking of the ruler who is also a subject; for we must remember that there is a rule of the master over his slave with which we are not here concerned.'

4. 12.

dιὸ παρ' ἐνιοίς οὐ μετέιχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἄρχων, πρὶν δὴ μονάδα γενέσθαι τὸν ἐσχατον.

διὸ, referring to ἄνθρωποι οἰκείαις and the various kinds of menial duties in which the artisan class were employed, 'Because of their servile and degraded character.'

4. 13.

τῶν ἄρχομένων οὖσας.

I. e. those who (like household servants) are subject to the rule of a master.

4. 13.

εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ.

εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ.

* 'For if men practise menial duties, not only for the supply of their own occasional wants, but habitually' (indicated by ποτὲ), 'there is no longer any difference between master and slave,' i. e. the natural distinction of classes is effaced. It has been proposed to read τότε μέν, τότε δὲ, instead of τὸν μέν, τὸν δὲ, 'for then the case no longer occurs of a man being at one time master and at
another time servant’—an arbitrary emendation (Riese, Susemihl) which gives a poor sense.


4. 16. καὶ ἀνθρώπω δὴ ἄγαθον ἄμφω.

At first Aristotle appeared to draw an artificial line between the good citizen and the good man; but he now shifts his point of view. The good man may be supposed to have all virtue; he must therefore have the virtues both of the ruler and subject, although the virtue of the ruler is of a peculiar character, and the virtue of the subject, if he be a freeman, takes many forms. So the virtue of a man and of a woman differ in degree and even in kind, yet both are included in the idea of virtue.

4. 17. καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμεῖ εἰπ ἄστερ ὁ ἄνὴρ ὁ ἄγαθος.

Compare for the ideal of womanly virtue, Thuc. ii. 45, τὴν τε γὰρ ἱππορκοῦσιν φύσεως μὴ κείροσι γενέσθαι ὡμίν μεγάλη ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἦς ἢ ἐν ἐν ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἡ ὕψον ἐν τοῖς ἀρετεῖ κλέος ὃ.

4. 18. ἄρχωμεν τι περὶ ἄρετῆς φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς ἄστερ αἰθανοῦσα γάρ ὁ ἄρχωμεν, ὁ δὲ ἄρχων αἰθητῆς ὁ χρώμενος.

Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 601 D, E, where the distinction is drawn between the ποιητὴς who has only πίστις ὁρθή and the χρώμενοι who has ἐπιστήμη, and where there is the same illustration from the difference between the αἰθανοῦσα and the αἰθητής, and Cratylus 388 b. also Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, ἢ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστιν . . . ἢ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον.

5. The discussion which follows is not unconnected with the preceding. For if, as has been assumed, a freeman or citizen is one who commands as well as obeys, then it would seem that the artisan or mean person, even though not a slave, must be excluded.

5. 1. οἶτος γὰρ πολιτὴς.

Sc. ὁ ἐξω τῆν τοιαύτην ἄρετήν. See note on English text.
But if the artisan is not included in the number of citizens where is he to be placed? He is not a metic, nor a stranger. Yet no real difficulty is involved in his exclusion any more than in that of slaves or freedmen.

But in respect to servile occupations; either an anacoluthon resumed in τὰ τουαίτα, or governed by the idea of ἐργαν contained in λειτουργοιντες.

The point is how to determine the position of the artisan or mean person. There is no difficulty in seeing that some who live in states are not citizens, but how is the mechanic to be distinguished from the slave? The answer is that the slave ministers to a single master, artisans and serfs belong to the state.

What has been said at once (φανέν) makes the matter clear. It has been said that the best form of state will not admit the artisan class to citizenship (§ 3), and that the citizen will vary with the state (supra c. 1. § 9), a remark which he repeats in what follows. For there are many forms of states; virtue is the characteristic of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy. Now although the mechanic or skilled artisan cannot have virtue, he may have wealth, and therefore he may be a citizen of some states, but not of others.

perὶ αὐτῶν, sc. about the lower class.

ἐν Θῆβαις δὲ νόμος ἢ τῶν δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀπειρημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ 5. 7. μετίκεις ἀρχῆς.

Cp. infra vi. 7. § 4, where the fact respecting Thebes is repeated. It is clearly for the common interest and for the security of the
state, that the passage from one class to another should be as easy as possible under all forms of government. Such a power of extending, and including other classes is necessary to the very existence of an oligarchy or of an aristocracy, or even of a constitutional government. And the avenue by which the lower naturally pass into the higher is personal merit or fitness which ought to overcome circumstances and not beat helplessly against the bars of a prison. The gold which the god has implanted in a person of an inferior class should be allowed to find its place (Plat. Rep. iii. 415), even if we cannot degrade the brass or lead in the higher. The higher class too have governing qualities which pass into the lower, and they themselves receive new life and new ideas from the association.

5. 7, 8. \προσεγέλκεται καὶ τῶν \ξένων ὁ νόμος . . . οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

\ξένων is partitive: 'The law goes so far as in addition to include some of the stranger class. Nevertheless, when there are citizens more than enough the law which extended, again contracts, the right.' For restrictions of population see Plat. Laws v. 740.

5. 8. \τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν.

I. e. whose mothers were free women and their fathers not slaves (for this case has been already provided for in the words \ικ ἀνὰλον), but strangers or resident aliens.

5. 8. \τίτοι δὲ μόνον τοὺς εἰς ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν.

The MSS. read αὐτῶν: Schneider, following Perizonius, has changed αὐτῶν into στάτων, and the emendation is adopted by Bekker in both editions: but 1) the word στάτως is of very rare occurrence in Aristotle; 2) it would be in awkward proximity to πολίτης: and 3) the change is unnecessary. Lit. 'they make only those of them (αὐτῶν) citizens, who are children of citizens both on the father's and mother's side.' αὐτῶν, though not exactly needed, is idiomatic.

5. 9. \ὡς εἰ τιν' ἀτύμητον μετανάστην.

Quoted also in Rhet. ii. 2, 1378 b. 33. Compare for a similar application of Homer bk. i. 2. § 9. Aristotle has given a new turn to the meaning of ἀτύμητος = τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. But there is nothing singular in this; for quotations are constantly cited in new senses.
NOTES, BOOK III. 6.

αλλ' ὀποτ' τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάθης χάριν τῶν συνών. 5. 9.

κούστων ἐστὶν.

τὸ τοιοῦτον = τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν, i.e. the exclusion from office of certain classes is concealed in order to deceive the excluded persons. The reference is not to such cases as that of the 5000 at Athens, whose names were concealed for a political purpose (Thuc. viii. 92); but more probably to such deceptions as those of which Aristotle speaks in iv. 12. § 6 and c. 13 whereby the poor, though nominally citizens, were really deprived of their privileges because they had no leisure to exercise them. The intention was to trick them, but they were not dissatisfied; for they did not find out the trick. The English translation is defective, and should have run, 'the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow-citizens.'

Another way of explaining the passage is to place an emphasis on τῶν συνοικίων, which is taken in the sense of 'fellow-colonists': 'the intention is to attract settlers by deceiving them into the belief that they will become citizens, when the rights of citizenship are really withheld from them.' (For examples of fraud practised by colonists on strangers or fellow settlers, see v. 3. §§ 11-13.) But the words refer to states generally and not merely to colonies.

κακείνως.

Sc. ὃ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθός καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος ἂν. In his later edition Bekker reads κακείνως, a correction of one MS. All the rest, and the old translator, read κακείνως. With either reading the meaning of the passage is much the same. 'Even where the virtues of the good man and the good citizen coincide (i.e. in the perfect state), it is not the virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only that of the statesman and ruler.' κακείνως = καὶ ὃ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθός κτλ.: κακείνης = ἐν ἦ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄγαθός κτλ.

ἐστι δὲ πολιτεία... πολιτείαν ἐτέρων εἶναι τούτων. 6. 1, 2.

Lit. 'The state [πολιτεία] is the ordering of the powers of a state, and especially of the supreme power. The government [πολιτεύμα] is this supreme power, and the state or constitution (ἡ πολιτεία subj.) is what the government is. In democracies, for example, the people are the ruling power, in oligarchies the few. Accordingly
we say that they differ in their constitutions.' The three words *politēma, politēia, pōles* have three primary gradations of meaning:

1) *politēma*—the government, i.e. the persons through whom the government acts; *politēia*—the government administering and being administered, i.e. the state or constitution; *pōles*—the whole state including the government. But these senses pass into one another.

6. 3. καθ' ὁσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκίστη τοῦ ἧν καλῶς.

μέρος is to be taken with καθ' ὁσον, the genitive τοῦ ἧν καλῶς is partitive. ἐπιβάλλει, sc. ἐκίστη τὸ ἧν καλῶς or impersonally. For the meaning of this word cp. note on ii. 3. § 4.

6. 4. συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἧν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ (ἴσος γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι τοῦ καλοῦ μέριον), καὶ συνέχοντι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἧν αὑτὸ μόνον, ἄν μὴ τοις χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιπάλλη λιαν.

Cp. Plat. Polit. 301 E, 302 A: 'And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would be utterly undermined,—there can be no doubt of that. Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths,—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.'


6. 8. ὅταν δὲ τούτων εἶς γενήται καὶ αὐτός.

αὐτός refers inaccurately either to the trainer or to the pilot.

6. 9. τὸ αὐτοῦ ἄγαθων.

The reflexive refers to the principal subject ἄξοιντες: but is
changed into the singular by the introduction of τιν. Translated into the first person the sentence would run, 'Some one should now look after my interest as I looked after his when in office.' For the 'disinterestedness' of traders cp. Plat. Rep. i. pp. 345, 346.

νῦν δὲ.

Answering to πρῶτον μὲν above. 'The natural principle that men should rule and be ruled in turn was once the practice; but now from corrupt motives, they insist on ruling perpetually.'

ἡ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέν ἑαυτὸς μετέχεται, ἢ δὲι κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμ. 

The meaning of γὰρ is as follows: 'Since there are perverted, as well as true states, there are states of which the members are not to be called citizens; or, if they were, they would partake of the common good.' For, as has been said at the beginning of the treatise, πάσαν πόλιν ὄρθον κοινωνιάν τινά οὖσαν καὶ πάσαν κοινωνίαν ἡγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐνεκεν συνεστηκαίν. And the true forms of government are those which regard the good of the governed.

ἀριστοκρατία, ἢ διὰ τὸ τούτο ἄριστος ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρῶς τὸ ἄριστον.

Of course in reality the first of the two etymologies is the true one, but Aristotle, like Plato in the Cratylus, regards the relation which the component parts of words bear to one another as variable. He is fond of etymological meanings and sometimes forces the etymology to suit the meaning, e.g. σωφροσύνη. ὡς σώζουσα τὴν φρόνησιν, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5; ἡθικὴ from θόν, Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 1; δίκαιον ὃτι δίκαια ἐστίν, Nic. Eth. v. 4. § 9; μακάρων ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, Nic. Eth. vii. 11. § 2; τιμοκρατία ἢ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 1.

The first of the two explanations of ἀριστοκρατία is more in accordance not only with the principles of etymology but with the facts of history, if we take ἄριστοι in the sense in which the word would have been understood by Alcaeus or Theognis: the second answers best to Aristotle's ideal state.

πολιτεία.

In Ethics viii. 10. § 1 this is identified with τιμοκρατία = ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, a government based upon a property qualification (ἡ τιμοκρατικὴ λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαι δ' αὐτὴν εἰώθεσιν οἱ πλείστοι
καλείν). No example of the word τιμοκρατία occurs in the Politics. It is used by Plato in another sense—the government of honour (ή φίλη-
timos politeia, Rep. viii. 545 B).

πολιτεία originally meaning, as in Thucydides, any form of
government, a sense which is continued in Aristotle, has also like
our own word 'constitution' a second and specific sense, apparently
coming into use in the age of Aristotle, though not invented by
him. Cp. iv. 7. § 1, πέμπτη δ' έστιν ή προσαγορεύεται τό κοινόν διόμα
πασῶν (πολιτείαν γάρ καλούσων), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λατινώ
τούς πειραμένους ἁριθμεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτείων εἶδη, καὶ χρώναι ταῖς τέταρτη
μάνων, ὅπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις: also ii. 6. § 16.

8. The subject of this chapter is again referred to in iv. c. 4. The
discussion which follows affords a curious example of the manner
in which Aristotle after passing through a maze of casuistry at
length arrives at the conclusions of common sense.

8. 6. διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διάφορας.

The MSS. have διάφορας ('That the already mentioned differ-
ences are the true causes,' a reading which gives a somewhat
unusual sense to αἰτίας). The old translator has 'differentiae' in
the genitive. Better to take διάφορας as a genitive, making αἰτίας
the predicate, and repeating the word with ῥηθείσας. 'And thus
the so-called causes of difference are not real causes.' Bernays
inserts πολιτείας after ῥηθείσας without authority, and appears to
translate the passage rather freely: 'And they cannot therefore
create any form of constitution which can be specifically named.'

The argument is intended to show that the essential differ-
ences between oligarchy and democracy are not made by the
governing body being few or many (τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας), but by
poverty and wealth. It is an accident that the rich are few, and
the poor many.

9. 1. καὶ ἢστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ τᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἵσσοις.

'And so it is; not however for all, but only for the equal.' Cp.
Cic. de Rep. i. c. 34, 'Cum par habetur honos summis et infimis . . .
ipsa aequitas iniquissima est.' Burke, French Revol. (vol. v. p. 106.
ed. 1815), 'Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently to
every man.'
NOTES, BOOK III. 9.

9. 2.

Men think themselves to be as good or better than others, and therefore claim equal or greater political rights; e.g. they claim to exercise the franchise without considering whether they are fit or not. They can never see that they are inferior, and that therefore it may be just for them to have less than others: cp. below § 3.

επει ἔδηρηται τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

9. 3.

Lit. ‘Since justice is distributed in the same manner (i.e. equally) over things and over persons.’ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων is to be taken not with δηρεται, but with the words which follow = ὑμοῖος.

9. 3.

Both δὲ ὁμοιοθετοῦσι.

9. 5.

οἷς as above τὸ ὁμοῖος, the technical word for persons, lit. ‘in relation to the whom.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 3. §§ 6, 7.

Either 1) τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς is in apposition with τῶν ἐκάτων μιᾶς or with some more general word, such as χρημάτων, understood; or 2) the words may = τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰσανεγκάντων τινά i.e. either any of those who originally contributed, or any subsequent generation of contributors. Cp. Burke; Ref. on F. R. (vol. v. p. 121, ed. 1815), ‘In these partnerships all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock.’

9. 6.

εἰ δὲ τῷ τοῦ ζῷου μόνων ἐνεκέν κ.τ.λ.

εἰ δὲ introduces the opposite side of the question. ‘If a good life is the object, then the oligarch is wrong’ (cp. above, § 5, ὅσθ’ ὁ τῶν ὀλιγορχικῶν λόγου δοξείς ἐν ἰσχύν), but the apodosis is lost in what follows. For a similar anacoluthon cp. infra c. 12. § 1.

9. 6.

καὶ γὰρ ἀν δοῦλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἦν πόλις.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 8, εὐθανασίας δ’ οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπωδες μεταδίδωσιν εἰ μή καὶ ἔνων.

9. 6.

οἷς ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλληλους.
Cp. above, c. 1. § 4, τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν.

9. 8. μὴ λόγον χάριν
is either 1) taken with peri ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖς εἶναι, or 2) is an explanation of ὁς ἄληθῶς, which it pleonastically emphasizes.

9. 8. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία.
‘For otherwise the state becomes’ or ‘would be.’

9. 8. συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπων διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων.
The construction is unsymmetrical, passing, as elsewhere, from the abstract to the concrete. ‘A city is an alliance differing from any other allies [= alliances], who are at a distance, in place only.’ Or τῶν ἄλλων may be taken with συμμαχίων, τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων, being epexegetic= other alliances of which the members live apart.

9. 8. Λυκάφρων ὁ σοφιστής.
An obscure rhetorician who is censured in the Rhetoric (iii. c. 3. §§ 1–3) for frigidity of style. It is also said that when set to make an encomium on the lyre he attacked some other thesis (Soph. Elench. c. 15, 174 b. 32), or, according to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, he began with the earthly lyre, and went on to speak of the constellation Lyra. Lycophron seems to have held the doctrine that ‘the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property.’ (Cp. Rhet. i. 15, 1376 b. 10, ἀυτὸς ὁ νῦμος συνήκη τις ἐστίν.

The opposite view is maintained in Burke, French Revolution (vol. v. ed. 1815, p. 184): ‘The state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the partners. It is to be looked upon with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.’

9. 11. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνελθονεν οὔτως κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος μὲντοι χρύτῳ τῇ ἰδιᾷ ὁικίᾳ ὑπὲρ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αἰτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὕτως βοηθούντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄδικους μόνον, οὐδὲ οὔτως ἄν εἶναι διέξειν τόλμη τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροίσιν, εἰπερ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῦν οὖσαν συνελθοντες καὶ χαρᾶς.
‘As a confederacy is not a city, so a number of individuals uniting in the same manner in which cities form a confederacy, would not be a city, unless they changed their manner of life after the union.’ The main distinction which Aristotle draws between the confederacy, in which many cities are united by a treaty, and the single city is that the object of the one is negative, of the other positive,—the one regards the citizens in some particular aspect, e.g. with a view to the prevention of piracy or the encouragement of commerce; the other takes in their whole life and education.

χιμωτο τῇ ἱδίᾳ αἰκίᾳ ὁσπερ πόλεις. I.e. ‘If every man were lord in his own house or castle, and only made a treaty with his neighbours like the cities in a federation,’ in other words, if the inhabitants of the common city had no social relations.

κοινωνικός is parallel with κοινωνικός, and in apposition with the nominative to συνελθονταν.

καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζήν. 9. 13.

Nearly = πράσιν τοῦ συζήν, ‘pleasant modes of common life,’ or more freely ‘enjoyments of society,’ not ‘relaxations for the sake of society,’ a construction not admissible in prose.

έχει δ’ ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. 10. 1.

The argument of this chapter consists of a series of ἀπορίαι which may be raised against the claims of any one person or class to have the supreme power. The ἀπορίαι are restated somewhat less sharply in the next chapter. They are indirectly, but not distinctly or completely, answered in the latter part of c. 13.

Εδχει γὰρ νὴ Διὰ τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίῳ. 10. 1.

It is difficult to account for this sudden outburst of vivacity. Compare infra c. 11. § 5, ἵσως δὲ νὴ Διὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον: cp. Xen. Mem. vi. 1. 4, ἵππα καὶ μὴ οὐ δὴ τὸ τέρε ἰδιῶν μόνοι δοκεῖ εἶναι: Dem. de Chersones. §§ 9, 17; Polyb. vi. 3. § 6, πότερον ός μόνος ταύτας ἡ καὶ νὴ Δὴ ὡς ἄριστας ἡμῖν οἰκείοινται πολιτείων; and the use of Hercule in Tacit. Ann. i. 3.

The whole passage is a kind of suppressed dialogue in which two opposite opinions are abruptly brought face to face. No conclusion is drawn; the only inference being really the impossible one that all forms of government are equally baseless, because they are not
based on justice, and therefore in all of them abuse of power is possible.

10. 2. πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων κ.τ.λ.

ληφθέντων has been explained, either 1) as neut. or 2) masc. Either 1) when everything, i.e. when all the property of the rich has been exhausted; for this meaning of the word cp. iv. 4. § 8; or 2) 'when all the citizens are taken together,' but this is a doubtful use of ληφθέντων and does not give a good sense.

The passage is a reductio ad absurdum of the previous argument: 'When the many poor have taken all the property of the few rich, and the majority go on subdividing among themselves, the property of the minority will become smaller and smaller, and the state will be ruined.'

Or, expressing the same idea in numbers, let us suppose a state of 1000 citizens. If a mere numerical majority constitutes rightful sovereignty, 600 citizens may resolve, and rightly, according to the hypothesis,—to confiscate the goods of the remaining 400, and divide them among themselves. Thus 400 will cease to be citizens. Of the remaining 600, 400 may go on to divide the property of the others, and thus the state becomes reduced to 400 and so on, till it disappears altogether.

It may be remarked that in all schemes for the division of property, the wealth which has been created under a system of accumulation is supposed to continue when the motives for accumulation have ceased. The poor are not fitted to govern the rich. But neither are the rich fitted to govern the poor. The truth is that no class in the state can be trusted with the interests of any other.

10. 2. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁδὶ ἵππων ἀνθρώπων ἀντὶ ἔχον αὐτὴν.

For the virtue of anything is that quality by which it fulfils its own proper ἔργον. Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 608 E.

10. 5. ἄν οὐκ ἦ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων ἔτη ἐπικρατικός, τί διόιει περὶ τῶν ἰππορμήματος;

'Even if we assume the law to rule and not the few or many, where is the difference? For the law may only represent the pre-
judges or interests of oligarchy or democracy.' Compare infra c. 11. §§ 20, 21.

This passage has been thought corrupt. Two conjectures have been proposed, 1) εἰπορίαν for ἀπορίαν (but the sense which would be given to εἰπορία is not natural or idiomatic), and 2) the omission of λύσθαι or λύσθαι καί, the latter words being thought to be suggested by the mention of ἀπορίαν, or to be a corruption of ἀλήθειαν. There is a want of order in the thought, but the same disorder occurs in a parallel expression (c. 12. § 2), ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. The text may therefore be accepted.

The combination of qualities in the multitude is compared to the combination of qualities in the individual: e. g. in a statue or picture of which the features taken separately may be far excelled by others, but when combined make a better portrait, because they are adapted to one another. .. (Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 420 C, D, ff.) Thus the multitude may be supposed to have a generalized excellence, and to be superior as a whole. This rather doubtful principle is not of universal application [§ 5]. We must presuppose the many to be good citizens and good men (infra c. 15. § 9).

Contrast the opposite view of Plato (Rep. vi. 493 A, B), in which he describes the multitude under the figure of a great beast, a view which is modified by his apology for them in Rep. vi. 498–500.

Compare the saying of Goethe: 'Nothing can be more certain than that this great Public, which is so honoured and so despised, is almost always in a state of self-delusion about details, but never or hardly ever about the broad truth (das Ganze).'</

Yet we may also make the opposite reflection, that a few wise men when they meet and act together are apt to fall short of the average intelligence of mankind: a Ministry of All the Talents may have less sense than any man in it—a coalition may never coalesce—
individuality may be too much for unity; or unity may only be enforced by the strong will of a single person.

11.5. ἵσως δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἄδικων. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἁριῶν ἀμφότεροι λόγοι. καὶ ἦν τί διαφέρουσιν ἐνοι τῶν ἁριῶν;

'Assuredly,' retorts the opponent, or Aristotle himself, struck by an objection which had not previously occurred to him, 'this principle cannot be true of all men. For it would be a reductio ad absurdum to say that it was true of beasts, and some men are no better than beasts.'

Admitting the objection Aristotle still maintains that his doctrine of 'collective wisdom' is true of some men, though not of all. He proceeds to argue that deliberative and judicial functions may be safely granted to the many, and cannot be safely denied to them; but that it would be dangerous to entrust them with high office.

11.7. διὰ τέ γὰρ ἄδικων καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνης τὰ μὲν ἄδικαν ἀν τὰ δὲ ἀμφότερα αὐτῶς.

The sentence is an anacoluthon; it has been forgotten that no words such as eἰκὸς εἰσὶ or ἀνάγκη have preceded, and that they cannot be easily gathered from the context.

11.9. ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἵκανη αἰσθήσιν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, where the distinction is drawn between σύνεσις (= αἰσθήσις in this passage), which is κριτικὴ μόνον, and φρονήσις, which is ἐπιστατική. And with both places, cp. Thuc. ii. 40, where Pericles, speaking in the name of the Athenian democracy, says, ἦτοι κριτικῶν γε ἣ ἐνθυμομέθα ὁρθῶς τὰ πράγματα.

11.10, 11. Aristotle is now stating the other side of the argument:—'The physician is a better judge than he who is not a physician. And it must be remarked that under the term "physician" is included 1) the higher sort of physician, 2) the apothecary, and 3) the intelligent amateur whether he practises medicine or not. In all of these there exists a knowledge which is not to be found in the many. Apply this principle to the art of politics. Even in the choice of magistrates the well-informed man, whether he be a statesman or
not, is better able to judge than the multitude.' This argument is then refuted in what follows, § 14.

The context is rendered difficult by the correction of the word 'artist,' for which Aristotle substitutes 'one who has knowledge' (§§ 11, 12). For the distinction between the δημιουργός and the ἀρχιτεκτονικός ἰατρός cp. Plat. Laws iv. 720, where the doctor, who attends the slaves, is humorously distinguished from the doctor who attends freemen. And for the notion of the ἰδιώτης ἰατρός (ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην) cp. Politicus 259 A, 'εἰ τῷ τις τῶν δημοσιευόντων ἰατρῶν ἱκανός ἔμπνευσεν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτός, ἄρ’ ὅπερ ἀναγκαίως αὐτῷ προσπαθεῖν εἰσθαί τοῦν τῆς τέχνης ταύτων ὀπέρ ὁ συμφωνεῖς;

Aristotle proceeds to argue that there is a judgment of common 11.14-17. sense equal, if not superior to that of the artist himself, which is possessed by the many.

Without pretending that the voice of the people is the voice of God, it may be truly said of them, 1) that they are free from the hypercriticism which besets the individual; 2) that they form conclusions on simple grounds; 3) that their moral principles are generally sound; 4) that they are often animated by noble impulses, and are capable of great sacrifices; 5) that they retain their human and national feeling. The intelligent populace at Athens, though changeable as the wind (Thuc. ii. 65; Demosth. 383, ὃ μὲν ἔδρας . . . . ὡσπερ ἐν βαλάντῃ πνεύμα ἀκαταστατον') and subject to fits of panic and fanatical fury (Thuc. vi. 27), were also capable of entertaining generous thoughts (Id. iii. 49), and of showing a wise moderation (Id. viii. 97), and in nearly every respect were superior to their oligarchical contemporaries, far less cunning and cruel (Id. iv. 80), and far more willing to make sacrifices (Id. i. 74) for the public interest.

The more general question which is here suggested by Aristotle, § 11, whether the amateur or the artist is the better judge of a work of art or literature is also worthy of attention. It is probable that either is a better judge than the other, but of different merits or excellences. The artist e.g. may be expected to be the best judge of points in which a minute knowledge of detail is required; the amateur has the truer sense of proportion because he compares
many works of art and is not under the dominion of a single style. He judges by a wider range and is therefore less likely to fall into eccentricity or exclusiveness. See infra at the beginning of c. 12.

11. 18. καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλεῖον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ ἐνα καὶ καὶ ὁλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχῶντων.

Aristotle seems here to have fallen into the error of confounding the collective wealth of the state with the wealth of individuals. The former is the wealth of a great number of persons which may be unequally distributed and in infinitesimally small portions among the masses, thus affording no presumption of respectability or education; whereas the wealth of the individual is the guarantee of some at least of the qualities which are required in the good citizen. Cp. infra c. 13. §§ 4, 10.

11. 19. ἡ δὲ πρῶτη λειχθέοσα ἀπορία κ.τ.λ.

That is to say the certainty that any single individual or class, if dominant, will infringe upon the rights of others renders it indispensable that the law should be above them all. Cp. c. 10. § 1.

12. According to Bernays (Transl. of Pol. I–III. p. 172) c. 12 and 13 are a second sketch of the same discussion which has been commenced in c. 9–11 and is continued in c. 16 and 17. But though in what follows there is some repetition of what has preceded, e.g. c. 12. §§ 1, 2 and c. 13. § 2 compared with c. 9. §§ 1, 2, c. 13. § 1 and c. 9. §§ 14, 15, and c. 13. § 10 with c. 11. § 2 ff., the resemblances are not sufficient to justify this statement. In c. 13 new elements are introduced, e.g. the discussion on ostracism; and the end of c. 11 in which the supremacy of law is asserted (§ 20) has no immediate connexion with c. 14 in which the forms of monarchy are considered; while the transition from the end of c. 13, in which the claim of the one best man to be a monarch is discussed, is not unnatural.

12. 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν πᾶσις κ.τ.λ.

Again, as in c. 9. § 6, the apodosis appears to be lost in the length of the sentence. It is also possible to gather it from the words πειεῖν δ' ἒστηκε κ.τ.λ. (§ 2). The process of reasoning will then
be as follows: 'Seeing that the end of the state is "justice" which is the common good, etc., and is also equality between equals, of whom or what is this equality or inequality?'

12. 1.

\[\text{dovei dê pása} \ldots \text{tois kata filosofian lógois.}\]

Compare Topics i. 14, 105 b. 30, prós mén oiv filosofian kat' allêsiav peri aitwv pragmatetéou, diallektikâs dê prós diásw.

\[\varepsiloni vàp màllon tò tì mégebos, kai olôs án tò mégebos epimêllon eîn kai 12. 6. prós ploteiôv kai prós èleveirian. dòst' eî plèion òdî diafìrei kata mégebos ò dî kàp' aretîn, kai plèion úperēxei olôs aretês mégebos, eîn án sujmìaìtâ pîsta, tosoûde vàp mégebos eî kriïtton tosoûde, tosoûde ìhîlon án ìson.}\]

That is to say, if different qualities can be compared in the concrete, they can be compared in the abstract, and degrees of difference can be compared even when two things differ in kind. If a tall man can be compared with a virtuous, then virtue can be compared with height, and all degrees of height and virtue can be compared. But this is impossible, for they have no common measure. Qualities can only be compared when they have a common relation, such as virtue and wealth have to the state.

\[\varepsiloni vàp màllon, 'for if we begin by saying that size in the concrete can be compared with wealth and freedom then we cannot avoid saying the same of size in the abstract: which is absurd.'\]

The bearing of this argument on the general discussion is as follows: Aristotle is explaining the nature of political equality which can only exist between similar or commensurable qualities and therefore between persons who possess such qualities: in the case of the state for example only between qualities or persons which are essential to the state, not between such as are indifferent, not between flute-playing and virtue, but between virtue and wealth.

\[\acute{\text{anw } tòv prògêrôv} \ldots \acute{\text{anw } dê tòytwv.}}\]

1) freedom and wealth . . 2) justice and valour.

\[\acute{\text{anágye pásas einai vàs touaîtás politiêias parékbasêis.}}\]

13. 1.

In a certain sense even the government of virtue is a perversion, if we could suppose the virtuous to govern for their own interests and to disregard those of others (cp. infra §§ 10, 20). At any rate virtue is not the only element required in a state.
13. 2. ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινῶν.

'The common or inclusive element of the state,' 'an element in which all are concerned'; or, if the phrase be modernized, 'the land is a great public interest.'

The word is here used nearly as in τὸ κοινὸν = 'public' or 'common': elsewhere in the sense of 'comprehensive,' 'general,' (Nic. Eth. ii. 2. § 2); applicable to the larger or more inclusive class, the more popular constitution (supra ii. 6. § 4), the more generally useful branch of knowledge (Rhet. i. 1, 1354 b. 29).

13. 5. καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν αὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβητητὸς ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχεις δεῖ· τότε γὰρ κύριος διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλας, ἄδικ' ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδάσων ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων. ἄλλ' δὲ ὅμως σκοπούμεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούθ' ὑπάρχῃ κρόνος, πῶς διοριστέον.

'There is no difficulty in determining who are to be the governing body in an oligarchy or aristocracy or democracy; for the nature of these is really implied in the name. The difficulty arises only when the few and the many and the virtuous are living together in the same city: how are their respective claims to be determined? For any of them, carried out consistently, involves an absurdity.'

13. 6. εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰν ὅλιγοι πάσης οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τῶν δὲ διελεῖν τῶν τρόπων;

'How are we to decide between them; or how are we to arrange the state having regard both to virtues and number?' For διελεῖν see ii. 2. § 1: also τίνα τρόπων νοέμεναι, iv. 1. § 10.

13. 6. ἢ τὸ ὅλιγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεὶ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διακεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὅσι' εἶναι πόλιν εἰς αὐτῶν;

'Must we consider their fewness relatively to their duties, and whether they are able to govern a state, or numerous enough to form a state of themselves?'

τὸ ὅλιγοι = 'the idea of the few,' like τὸ δὲ supra c. 9. § 2.

πρὸς τὸ ἔργον may be taken either with δεὶ σκοπεῖν, or with τὸ ὅλιγοι. 

tosoûtoi is dependent on εἰ, understood from εἰ δυνατοὶ = ἢ δεὶ σκοπεῖν εἰ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος εἰσί.
Aristotle here raises the question whether the laws shall be enacted for the good of all or of a privileged class when several classes exist together in a state. He answers that the laws must be equal, and this equal right, or law, means the principle which conduces to the good of the whole state.

1) ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεγένων refers immediately to § 10, which suggests the co-existence of classes in a state, and to § 4, which contains a more formal statement to the same effect.

2) Bernays alters the punctuation by enclosing ἀποροζθίον . . . πλείσθαι in a parenthesis explanatory of τὴν ἀπορίαν. This gives a sufficient sense; but a short clause at the end of a sentence following a long parenthesis is not in the manner of Aristotle. He also refers ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεγένων to the words τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βασίλευς κ.τ.λ., not 'when all the elements co-exist,' but 'when the whole people is better and richer than the few.'

The virtue here spoken of seems to be the virtue of the kind attributed by Thucydides viii. 68 to Antiphon, viz. political ability, and the characters who are 'out of all proportion to other men' are the master spirits of the world, who make events rather than are made by them, and win, whether with many or with few, such as Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander the great, Caesar, and in modern times a Marlborough, Mirabeau, Napoleon I, Bismarck.

The legend is preserved by Apollodorus (i. 9. § 19). According to him the ship Argo, speaking with a human voice, refused to take on board Hercules, φθηνω ουκ ἔγειν τὴν ἆργαν. This agrees with the text of the Politics if the word ἔγειν is taken to mean 'convey,' 'take on board,' as in Soph. Phil. 901,
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

\( \omega \sigma \tau e \mu \eta \mu \iota \gamma e \epsilon \nu o \iota \tau \eta \varepsilon \tau i \). Stahr translates wrongly: 'Hercules would not row with his comrades, because he was so far superior to them in strength.'

13. 16. \( t \eta \nu \; P e r i \alpha \nu \delta r o u \; \Theta r a s v \beta o i l o \; s u m b o u l i a n \; k.t.l. \)

Cp. Herod. v. 92, who reverses the characters, the advice being given not by Periander to Thrasybulus, but by Thrasybulus to Periander; and Livy i. 54; also Shakes. Rich. II. act iii. sc. 4:—

'Go thou, and, like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.'

13. 16. \( \delta \delta \; kai \; t o i o s \; \phi \gamma o n t a t e \; t \eta \nu \; \tau r a n v \eta \delta a \; kai \; t \eta \nu \; P e r i \alpha \nu \delta r o u \; \Theta r a s v \beta o i l o \; s u m b o u l i a n \; o i \chi \; \alpha p l \omega \; a i t i \tau o \; \varphi r b o s \; \epsilon p i t i m \alpha \nu \).

Because all governments rest on the principle of self-preservation, and at times extreme measures must be allowed.

13. 18. \( \delta \; \omega n t r a k i t i m \alpha s \; t \eta \nu \; a i t \eta \nu \; \dot{e} \chi e i \; \dot{d} \nu \alpha m i n \; . \; t \eta \gamma \; k o l o i t e i n \).

In this passage there is a doubt about the reading, and also about the construction. Several MSS. read \( t \eta \gamma \; k o l o i t e i n = ' ' h a v e \; t h e \; s a m e \; e f f e c t \; i n \; r e s p e c t \; o f \; p u t t i n g \; d o w n \; t h e \; c h i e f \; c i t i z e n s ' . \)

If we retain the reading of Bekker's text, it is doubtful whether \( t \phi \; k o l o i t e i n \; 1 \) is to be taken after \( t \eta \nu \; a i t \eta \nu \) (Bernays), or 2)\* is the dative of the instrument. To the first way of explaining the words it may be objected that \( t \phi \; k o l o i t e i n \) must then be referred to the particular instance of the counsel of Periander, whereas ostracism has been just asserted to be general, and to represent the policy of oligarchy and democracy as well as of tyranny. 'It has the same effect with the "lopping off" the chief citizens.'

13.18-23. It can hardly be supposed that the legislator who instituted ostracism had any definite idea of banishing the one 'best man' who was too much for the state. The practice seems to have arisen out of the necessities of party warfare, and may be regarded as an attempt to give stability to the ever-changing politics of a Greek state. It certainly existed as early as the time of Cleisthenes, and is said to have been employed against the adherents of Peisistratus. Every year on a fixed day the people were asked if
they would have recourse to it or not. If they approved, a day
was appointed on which the vote was taken. To ostracise any
citizen not less than 6000 citizens must vote against him. We may
readily believe, as Aristotle tells us (§ 23), that 'instead of looking
to the public good, they used ostracism for factional purposes.'
Aristides, according to the well-known legend, was banished be-
cause the people were tired of his virtues. Themistocles, the
saviour of Hellas, was also ostracised (Thuc. i. 137). The last
occasion on which the power was exercised at Athens was against
Hyperbolus, who was ostracised by the combined influence of
Nicias and Alcibiades. Other states in which the practice pre-
vailed were Argos (v. 3. § 3), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, Ephesus.

"οίον Ἀθηναίοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίου καὶ Χίου καὶ Λεσθίους.

For the Samians, cp. Thuc. i. 116; for the Chians, Thuc. iv. 51;
for the Lesbians, Thuc. iii. 10.

"ὁστι διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν καλλεί τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, 13. 22.
eὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὑπερήφανον ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν.
1)*, 'as far as the application of this principle of compulsion
is concerned, there is nothing to prevent agreement between kings
and their subjects, for all governments must have recourse to a
similar policy' (cp. note on § 16). τοῦτο δρῶσιν refers to the whole
passage: sc. if they use compulsion for the benefit of the whole
state.

Or 2), 'there is nothing to make the policy of kings differ from
that of free states.' It is an objection, though not a fatal one, to
this way of taking the passage that ταῖς πόλεσιν then occurs in two
successive lines in different senses.

κατὰ τὰς ὀμολογουμένας ἀπεροχὰς.

The meaning is that where the superiority of a king or govern-
ment is acknowledged, there is a political justification for getting a
rival out of the way.

"ἄλλα μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιοῦτον' παραπλῆσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Δίος 13. 25.
ἄρχειν διά οὖν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς.
See note on text. 'Nay, more; a man superior to others is like
a god, and to claim rule over him would be like claiming to rule over Zeus.' The words μερίζοντες τὰς ἄρχας may refer either 1)* to the Gods or 2) to men; either 1)* 'as if in making a division of the empire of the Gods' according to the old legend, they, i.e. the gods, should claim to rule over Zeus; or 2) more generally, 'as if when persons were distributing offices they should give Zeus an inferior place.' Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 607 C, ὁ τῶν Δίων συνφών δῆλος κατά, Nic. Eth. vi. 13. § 8, δύον καν ἐκ τῆς τῆς πολιτικῆς φαών ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, and Herod. v. 49, τῷ Διί πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε: also Plat. Polit. 301 D, 303 B.

Bernays translates μερίζοντες 'upon the principle of rotation of offices,' but no such use of μερίζειν occurs.

14. 4.  κτείναι γὰρ ὁ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρχακων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἑξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ.

ὁ κύριος, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς, supplied from ἡ βασιλεία. We have a choice of difficulties in the interpretation of the words which follow. Either 1) ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ must be explained 'in a certain exercise of the royal office,' i.e. when the king is in command of the army. This way of taking the passage gives a good sense and the fact is correct; but such a meaning cannot be extracted from the Greek. Or 2), 'for a king has no power to inflict death, unless under a certain form of monarchy'; Aristotle, writing in a fragmentary manner, has reverted from the kings of Sparta to monarchy in general. Or 3)*, possibly the words ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, bracketed by Bekker, are a clumsy gloss which has crept into the text, intended to show that the remark did not apply to every monarchy, but only to the Spartan. The conjecture of Mr. Bywater, who substitutes ἐνεκε δειλίας for ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, though supported by the citation from Homer, is too far removed from the letters of the MSS; and there is no proof that the Spartan kings had the power of putting a soldier to death for cowardice.

ἐν χειρῶς νόμῳ is often translated 'by martial law.' But the comparison of passages in Herodotus (e.g. ix. 48) and Polybius (iv. 58. § 9, etc.) shows that the word νόμος is only pleonastic, and that ἐν χειρῶς νόμῳ=ἐν χειρῖν, 'hand to hand,' or 'by a sudden blow.'
NOTES, BOOK III. 14.

δν δὲ κ’ ἐγὼν ἀπάνυευθε μάχη κ.τ.λ.

II. ii. 391–393. These lines which are rightly assigned here to Agamemnon are put into the mouth of Hector in Nic. Eth. iii. 8. § 4.

πάρ γὰρ ἐμοί βάνατος.

14. 5.

These words are not found either in this or any other passage of our Homer, though there is something like them in Iliad, xv. 348:—

ὅτι δ’ ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνυευθε νεών ἑτέρῳ νόησα,

αὐτοὶ οἱ βάνατοι μητίσομαι κ.τ.λ.

The error is probably due, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 9. § 3 and iii. 8. § 4, to a confused recollection of two or more verses. For a similar confusion of two lines of Homer cp. Plat. Rep. 389 E.

ἐξευθε δ’ αὐταὶ τὴν δύναμιν πάσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννικήν: εἰσί δ’ ὅμως 14. 6.

κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαλ.

The MSS. vary greatly: The Milan MS. reads τυραννίσαι καὶ κατά, instead of τυραννική: εἰσί δ’ ὅμως. So Paris I, 2, but omitting καί: other MSS. preserve traces of the same reading. Others read παραπλησίως τυραννικάν. Out of these Bekker has extracted the Text, in which however ὅμως seems to be unnecessary and to rest on insufficient authority. Susenohl reads τυραννίσαι εἰσί δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

For the distinguishing characteristics of nations, see Book vii. 14. 6.

καὶ η ἐθνικὴ δὲ βασιλικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικῇ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν οἱ 14. 7.

γὰρ πολίται φυλάττουσαι ὅπελος τοὺς βασιλέας, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικοῦν.

diὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ‘Because the form of government is legal.’

The omission of the article before ξενικῶν emphasizes the opposition between οἱ πολίται and ξενικῶν—‘their own citizens’ are contrasted with ‘any mercenary body.’

τῶν κακοπάτριδα.

Either on analogy of εὐπατρις,* ‘the base born,’ or possibly ‘the injurer of his country,’ like κακόδουλος, ‘the maltreater of his slaves.’

διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῖς πρῶτοι γενίσται τοῦ πλῆθους εἰρηγέται κατὰ τέχνας ἢ 14. 12.

πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγώντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόπτων

καὶ τοὺς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι.

Cp. v. 10. §§ 7–9, where royalty is said to be based on merit;
and i. 2. § 6, where it is assumed to have arisen from the Patriarchal relation: and for what follows vi. 8. § 20, where the ministers of Public Sacrifices are called Kings or Archons.

14. 13. ἐπον ὲ ἄριστον ἐπείν εἶναι βασιλείαν κ.τ.λ.

The kings who became priests retained only the shadow of royalty; but where they held military command beyond the borders, the name might be applied with greater propriety.

15. 2. ὥστε τὸ σκῆμα σχεδὸν περὶ νῦν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει τοῖς πόλεσι στρατηγῶν ἥδιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτον ἵ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ἢ ὡς συμφέρει· ἐν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντως, ἢ ὡς συμφέρει.
κατὰ μέρος, not ‘by rotation in a fixed order,’ (as in iv. 14. § 4) but more simply, ‘by a succession of one citizen to another.’ It is implied, though not expressed, that they are chosen by vote: cp. supra c. 14. § 5, ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτῳ ἐδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου τούτων ὧς οἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ αἴρεται.

Three MSS. read καθ' αἵρεσιν instead of κατὰ μέρος. It is more likely that καθ' αἵρεσιν is a gloss on κατὰ μέρος, than the reverse.

15. 2. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπίσκοπείν νόμων ἐχει μᾶλλον ἐδος ἤ πολιτείας.

‘Is a legal, rather than a constitutional question,’ ‘is to be regarded as a matter of administration.’ ἐδος νόμων μᾶλλον ἤ πολιτείας is an abridgment of ἐδος τοῦ ἐπίσκοπείν περὶ τῶν νόμων μᾶλλον ἤ πολιτείας.

ἐδος (like φύσις i. 8. § 10, νόμος iii. 14. § 4) is pleonastic as in i. 4. § 2, ὅ γαρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὄργανον ἐδει ἱστίν, ‘has the form or character of an instrument.’

15 2. ὥστ' ἀδεισθαν τὴν πρώτην.

After reducing the different forms of a monarchy to two, he now rejects one of them,—namely, the Lacedaemonian, because the Lacedaemonian kings were only generals for life, and such an office as this might equally exist under any form of government. This is a strange notion; for although the kings of Sparta were not generally distinguished, it can hardly be said with truth that Archidamus or Agesilaus were no more than military commanders.

ἀδεισθαν, sc. τούτο τὸ ἐδος.

τὴν πρώτην is to be taken adverbially in the sense of ‘to begin with’ or ‘at once’: so τὴν ταχίστην, (Dem.). The phrase also occurs
NOTES, BOOK III. 15.

in Xenophon Mem. iii. 6. § 10, περὶ πολέμου συμβουλευεῖν τὴν γε πρῶτην ἑπισκήπτομεν: and in Arist. Met. § 12, 1038 a. 35, τοσαύτα εἰρήσθω τὴν πρῶτην. Aristotle refers to the Lacedaemonian kings again in v. 11. § 2, and to the life generalship, c. 16. § 1, infra.

This passage is closely connected with a similar discussion in 15. 3 ff. Plato’s Politicus 293–295, where the comparative advantages of the wise man and the law are similarly discussed, and the illustration from the physician’s art is also introduced. Cp. also Rhet. i. 1354 a. 28, where Aristotle argues, besides other reasons, that the law is superior to the judge, because the judge decides on the spur of the moment.

metὰ τὴν τετρήμερον,
sc. ἡμέραν = metὰ τὴν τετάρτην ἡμέραν. The MSS. vary between τετρήμερον and τετρήμερον.

αλλ’ ἵσως ἐν φαίη τις ὡς ἀυτὶ τούτων βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ 15. 5, 6. καλλιον. διὶ μὲν τοῖνοι ἀνίγκη νομαθέτην αὐτῶν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ’ ἀλλων εἶναι δὲι κυρίους.

αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν βουλεύομενον, incorrectly translated in the text ‘a king:’ better, ‘whether you call him king or not’ there must be a legislator who will advise for the best about particulars.

ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν is a qualification of what has preceded:—‘although they have no authority when they err,’ i.e. there must be laws and there must be cases which the laws do not touch, or do not rightly determine. This is one of the many passages in Aristotle’s Politics in which two sides of a question are introduced without being distinguished. The argument would have been clearer if the words ἀλλὰ μὴ... δὲι κυρίους had been omitted. Aristotle concedes to the opponent that there must be a correction of the law by the judgment of individuals. In fact both parties agree 1) that there must be laws made by the legislator; 2) that there must be exceptional cases. But there arises a further question: Are these exceptional cases to be judged of by one or by all?

The supposition contained in the words ἀλλ’ ἵσως . . . καλλιον is repeated in a more qualified form in the sentence following, διὶ μὲν τοῖνοι . . . κυρίους.
15. 7. ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὀσπερ ἐστί σαμφορητὸς καλλίων μᾶς καὶ ὀπλῆς. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ κρίνει ἄμενον ὕχος πολλὰ ἢ ἐίς ὀστισθῶν.

Compare the saying ‘that the House of Commons has more good sense or good taste than any one man in it;’ and again, Burke, ‘Besides the characters of the individuals that compose it, this house has a collective character of its own.’

15. 8. ἐκι δ’ ἔργον ἀμα πάντας ὀργισθήναι καὶ ἀμαρτήν.

It is true no doubt that the passions of the multitude may sometimes balance one another. But it is also true that a whole multitude may be inflamed by sympathy with each other, and carried away by a groundless suspicion, as in the panic after the mutilation of the Hermae, or the trial of the generals after the battle of Ariginusae, or the English Popish Plot, or the witch hunting mania at Salem in Massachusetts, or the French reign of Terror; and commonly in religious persecutions.

15. 10. ἀριστοκράτερον ἄν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς δυνάμεως οὕσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἄν ἑλθέν πλείους ὁμοίους.

That is to say aristocracy, or the rule of several good men, is better than the rule of one—we may leave out the question of power, if only it be possible to find the many equals who will constitute this ‘aristocracy of virtue.’ In other words, the superiority of the aristocracy, who are many, to the king, who is one, does not simply consist in greater strength.

ὁμοίους, ‘equal in virtue to one another,’ an idea which is to be gathered from the mention of ἀριστοκρατία in the preceding clause, and explained in the words which follow, πολλῶν ὁμοίους πρὸς ἄρτης.

15. 12. ἐμπεδέν ποιεῖν εἰλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.

Yet in v. 12. § 14 he repudiates the notion of Plato that the state changes into oligarchy, because the ruling class are lovers of money. Royalty, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, democracy—the order of succession in this passage—may be compared with that of Plato (Rep. viii. and ix)—the perfect state, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The order in which constitutions succeed to one another is discussed in Nic. Eth. viii. 10.
15. 15. Compare what was said above c. 13. § 22, ὡστε διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. that ‘there need be no disagreement between a king and his subjects, because he is sometimes obliged to use force to them.’ Or, according to the other mode of interpreting the passage, ‘there is no difference between a king and a free state because’ &c.

15. 16. Either 1)* with emphasis ‘so many and no more’; or better 2) with reference to the previous words εἶναι δὲ τοσαῦτα τὴν ἵσχυν ὡστε έκαστον μὲν καὶ ἐνός καὶ συμπλεξών κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἤττω, ‘so many as would not make him dangerous.’

Nearly the whole of this chapter is a series of ἀπορίαι; as in c. 16. 15. Aristotle states, without clearly distinguishing, them.

Yet the στρατηγὸς ἄδιδος, who in time of peace is deprived of 16. 1. functions, and on the battle-field has arbitrary power, is not really the same with ὁ κατὰ νόμον βασιλεὺς.

16. 2. Either the construction may be an anacoluthon, or ὃ ἀνὰ μέρος τοῖνον may mark the apodosis.

Aristotle, taking the view of an opponent of the παρβασιλεία,
asserts that equals are entitled to an equal share in the government; there is justice in their ruling and justice in their being ruled: and therefore in their all equally ruling by turns. 'And here law steps in; for the order of their rule is determined by law.'

16. 4, 5. ἄλλα μὴν δὴ γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διαρίσειν ὁ νόμος, οὔτε ἀνθρώπου ἀν δυνάστω γνωρίζειν. ἄλλ' ἐπιτηδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησε τὰ λαοῦ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ γνώμη κρίνειν καὶ διακινεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἐτι δὲ ἐπαναρθοδότησε διδώσει, ὅ τι ἀν διάγι πειραμένων ἤμενον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.

ἄλλα μὴν κ.τ.λ. 'But surely if there are cases which the law cannot determine, then neither can an individual judge of them,' τὰ λαοῦ, what remains over and above law.

The connexion of the whole passage is as follows: Instead of one man ruling with absolute power, the law should rule, and there should be ministers and interpreters of the law. To this it is answered that the interpreter of the law is no more able to decide causes than the law itself. To this again the retort is made, that the law trains up persons who supply what is wanting in the law itself, to the best of their judgment.

16. 5. ὁ μὲν δὲν τῶν νόμων κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύων ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νοῦν μονος, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπων κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίων.

This is a reflection on the παραβασιλείας. The rule of law is the rule of God and Reason: in the rule of the absolute king an element of the beast is included.

The reading of τῶν νοῶν (instead of τῶν νόμων), which has the greater MS. authority, gives no satisfactory sense because it transposes the natural order of ideas. It has been therefore rejected. Schneider and Bekker, 2nd Edit., who are followed in the text, retain τῶν νόμων in the beginning of the clause and read τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νοῶν μονος, a very ingenious and probable emendation, partly derived from a correction νοῶν which is found in the margin of two or three MSS. instead of θεῶν.

16. 8. δοτε δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι τὸ δικαίων ἔποντες τῷ μέσον ἔποντειν ὁ γὰρ νόμος τῷ μέσῳ.

'And so, because men cannot judge in their own case, but are impelled this way and that, they have recourse to the mean, which is the law.'
The defects of written law are supplied not only by the judgments of individuals but by tradition and precedent. In any comparison of the judgments of law and of individuals, these have to be reckoned to the credit of law. And in early times this unwritten law is more sacred and important than written. Hence arises an additional argument against the superiority of the individual to the law. For the importance of unwritten law cp. Thuc. ii. 37, τῶν τε ἂν ἀρχών ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπὶ ὀφελία τῶν ἀδικουμένων κέιται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγγαφοι ὅσες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογούμενην φέρουσιν, and Rhet. i. 10, 1368 b. 7, λέγω δὲ ὅδε μὲν καθ' ὅν γεγραμμένων πολιτεύονται, κοινῶν δὲ ὅσα ἄγγαφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.

16. 9.

tούτοις τούς τράπον.

Referring to the words which have preceded—κατὰ τὸ πλεῖονοι εἶναι τούς ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἀρχοντας.

In the whole of this passage Aristotle is pleading the cause of 16. 9–13. the law against absolute monarchy. He shows that the law is not liable to corruption, that its deficiencies are supplied by individuals, that it trains up judges who decide not arbitrarily but according to a rule, that many good men are better than one. But the monarch too must have his ministers; he will surround himself by his friends, and they will have ideas like his own. Thus the two approximate to a certain extent. In either case the rulers must be many and not one. But if so it is better to have the trained subordinates of the law than the favorites of a despot.

ei τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν τούς ἰσούς καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δεῖν ὁμοίους. 16. 13.

Even in the παραβασιλεία there is an element of equality. ὁμοίους either 1) 'equally with himself'; or 2) with a slight play of words 'after the manner of equals.'

17. 2.

To be taken after ἀμείνων 'better in a certain manner, i.e. the imaginary and rather absurd case, to which he returns in § 5, of the vol. ii.
virtue of the individual being more than equal to the collective virtue of the community.

17. 4. \(\varepsilon\nu \ \varphi \ \pi\acute{e}\varphi\acute{u}ke \ [kai \ \varepsilon\nu] \ \acute{e}g\acute{g}\nu\acute{e}\sigma\theta\acute{a}i \ \pi\lambda\acute{e}\vartheta\acute{o}s \ \pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\omicron\mu\acute{k}\acute{a}n.\)

The reading of Bekker, \(kai \ \varepsilon\nu,\) which is wanting in the best MSS. and is omitted by Bernays, may have arisen out of the termination of \(\pi\acute{e}\varphi\acute{u}keu.\) If they are retained the meaning will be 'in which there is likewise a single' or 'compact body, defined by their all carrying arms' (ii. 6. § 16, etc.) as other forms of government by virtue, wealth, etc.

17. 4. \(kata\ \nu\acute{m}o\nu \ \tau\acute{o}n \ \kappa\acute{a}i \ \acute{e}\acute{d}i\acute{a}n \ \delta\acute{i}a\epsilon\acute{m}o\nu\sigma\tau\acute{a} \ \tau\omicron\iota\iota \ \epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\upsilon \ \tau\acute{a}s \ \acute{a}r\acute{x}\acute{a}s.\)

The citizens of a polity are here called \(\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron, \) 'respectable' or 'upper class,' though a comparatively low qualification is required of them (iv. 3. § 1; 9. § 3). They are 'the hoplites' (ii. 6. § 16) who are also elsewhere called \(\epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\) (vi. 7. § 1). \(\tau\omicron\iota\iota \ \epsilon\upsilon\pi\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\) is found in the better MSS.: \(a\lambda. \ \alpha\omicron\varphi\omicron\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron.\)

17. 6. \(o\iota \ \mu\acute{a}\nu\nu \ . \ . \ . \ \alpha\lambda\acute{l}a\ \kata\ \tau\acute{o} \ \pi\omicron\omicron\acute{t}e\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron \ \lambda\acute{e}x\theta\acute{e}n.\)

'He has a right to rule not only on the general ground which is put forward by all governments, but also upon the principle which we maintain, that he is superior in virtue.'

17. 7. \(\acute{a}r\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\acute{a}i \ \kata\ \mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\omicron; \ \iota\nu \ \gamma\acute{a}r \ \pi\acute{e}\varphi\acute{u}ke \ \tau\acute{o} \ \mu\epsilon\rho\omicron \ \iota\omicron\pi\omicron\acute{e}\chi\acute{e}n \ \tau\acute{o} \ \pi\omicron\upsilon\omicron\tau\acute{o} \ \tau\acute{a} \ \tau\acute{e} \ \tau\omicron\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\delta\omicron\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\nu\upsilon \ \acute{e}k\nu\acute{t}e \ \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\tau\omicron\sigma \ \sigma\mu\acute{m}b\acute{i}\acute{t}h\acute{e}nk\acute{e}n.\)

'This miraculous being cannot be asked to be a subject in turn or in part, for he is a whole, and the whole cannot be ruled by the part.' The double meaning of \(\mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\) is lost in English. The idealization of the whole or the identification of the perfect man with a whole of virtue is strange. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2. \(\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron \ = \ \tau\acute{o} \ \epsilon\acute{i}n\iota \ \pi\acute{a}n.\)

18. 1. \(\acute{a}r\chi\epsilon\theta\acute{a}i \ \delta\nu\nu\acute{a}m\acute{e}n\acute{a}n.\)

Bekker's insertion of \(kai \ \acute{a}r\chi\epsilon\theta\acute{a}i\) after \(\acute{a}r\chi\epsilon\theta\acute{a}i\) (ed. sec.) is unnecessary. The idea is already implied in the previous words. Under any of the three forms of government, the virtue of obedience is required in some, of command in others.

18. 1. \(\varepsilon\nu \ \delta\iota \ \tau\omicron\iota\iota \ \pi\omicron\omicron\acute{t}o\omicron\upsilon \ \iota\delta\acute{e}i\chi\theta\acute{h} \ \lambda\omicron\acute{g}o\omicron\nu\omicron\acute{o} \ \iota\tau\acute{i} \ \tau\iota\nu \ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{t}h\nu \ \alpha\nu\acute{r}a\gamma\kappa\acute{a}i\omicron\nu \ \alpha\nu\acute{d}r\omicron\omicron\upsilon \ \acute{a}r\acute{e}t\acute{h}n \ \epsilon\acute{i}n\iota \ \kai \ \pi\omicron\omicron\lambda\upsilon\upsilon \ \tau\omicron\iota\upsilon \ \pi\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\epsilon\omicron\upsilon \ \tau\iota\acute{s} \ \acute{a}r\acute{i}\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon\omicron.\)
The views of Aristotle respecting the relation of the good citizen to the good man may be drawn out as follows:—

1) The good citizen is not the same with the good man in an ordinary state, because his virtue is relative to the constitution (c. 4. § 3).

2) But in the perfect state he is the same: and this appears to be upon the whole the principal conclusion (c. 18. § 1, and iv. 7. § 2).

3) Yet even in the perfect state the citizens cannot all conform to a single type of perfection; for they have special duties to perform and special virtues by which they perform them (c. 4. §§ 5, 6).

4) It is therefore the good ruler who is really to be identified with the good man (§ 7; also i. 13. § 8, where the subject is introduced for the first time).

5) And still a 'grain of a scruple may be made'; for if the good ruler be merely a ruler, the private citizen who knows both how to rule and how to obey will have more complete virtue.

6) And therefore in the perfect state the citizens should rule and be ruled by turns (§ 11), cp. vii. c. 9.

This seems to be the result of many scattered and rather indistinct observations made from different points of view and not arranged in a clear logical order.

ἀνίγκη δὴ τῶν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκονσαν σκέψιν. 18. 2.

These words are removed from the end of this book by Bekker, who in his Second Edition adopts the altered arrangement of the books. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle’s Writings.
BOOK IV.

1. 2–6. The statesman has four problems to consider,
1) What is the best or ideal state?
2) What state is best suited to a particular people?
3) How any given state, even though inferior to what it might be, may be created or preserved?
4) What is the best state for average men?
1) is the best possible; 2) the best relatively to circumstances;
3) neither the best possible nor the best under the circumstances, but any constitution in which men are willing to acquiesce, even though ill-provided and ill-administered—such are to be found in the world and must therefore enter into the consideration of the statesman; 4) the best for mankind in general.

1. 2. ταύτην ἔστι τὴν δύναμιν.

The MSS. vary between ἔτι and ἐστὶ: ἔτι has rather the greater MSS. authority, but ἐστὶ is required for the construction, and the recurrence of ἔτι which was the first word of the sentence at the end of it is unpleasing.

1. 4. ἄξορήγητον τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων.

Explained in the text, with Susemihl, *not possessing the outward means necessary for the best state,* but the words *for the best state,* are not found in the Greek. Better *not possessing the common necessaries or simple requisites of life,* a hard but not impossible condition, e.g. in a remote colony. Cf. c. 11. § 21. πολλάκις οὕσης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετικάς ἐνίοις οὗθεν κωλύσει συμφέρων ἔτεραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν, which is similar but not the same with this passage. For ἄξορήγητον, cf. κεχορηγημένῳ in § 1, and δεομένῳ πολλῆς χορηγίας in § 6.
Although the language is inaccurate (for the Lacedaemonian is an 'existing' constitution), the meaning is plain. 'They put aside their own constitution and praise the Lacedaemonian or some other.'

The legislator should introduce an order of government into which the citizens will readily fall, and in which they will be able to co-operate; for the reformation of a state is as difficult as the original establishment of one and cannot be effected by the legislator alone, or without the assistance of the people.'

( sc. politieow) may be taken either with tαξιν or with κοινωνειν, either we ought to introduce 1) 'from among existing constitutions;' or 2) 'in passing out of existing constitutions that form,’ &c.; cp. in next sentence tais ὑπαρχούσας πολιτείας βοηθεῖν.

κοινωνειν is the reading of the majority of MSS. Some have κυνεῖν. The emendation κιχεῖν [Susemihl], taken from 'consequi' in the old Latin translation, is an unnecessary conjecture; nor does the word occur commonly, if at all, in Aristotle; καινοῦν is open to the objection of introducing a special when a general word is required. But no change is really needed.

The connexion of these words is difficult: Aristotle seems to mean that the legislator should select a constitution suited to the wants of the people: for however good in itself, if unsuited to them, they will not work it, and he will have as great or greater difficulty in adapting it than he would originally have had in making one for which they were fitted.

Διὸ πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεί δύνασθαι 1. 7. βοηθεῖν.

We may paraphrase as follows: Therefore, i.e. because it is difficult to introduce anything new in addition to what has been said [about the highest and other forms of government by the unsatisfactory political writers mentioned in § 5], we ought also to
be able to maintain existing constitutions, [which they would get rid of].

1.7. καθίστηρ ἔλεχθη καὶ πρῶτον.
There is nothing in what has preceded, which precisely answers to this formal reference. § 4 may perhaps be meant.

1.8. νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἰονται τινες είναι καὶ μίαν δυνασκίαν.
    | This is true of Plato, who is probably intended under this general form. For the anonymous reference to him cp. i. 1. § 2, ὅσα μίαν οἰονται κ.τ.λ., and c. 2. § 3 infra.

1.8. συντίθενται ποιμένες.
    | That is to say, either 1) the different ways in which the judicial and other elements of states are combined; or 2) the different ways in which the spirit of one constitution may be tempered by that of another: for the latter cp. infra c. 5. §§ 3, 4; c. 9. §§ 4–9.

1.10. καὶ το τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστὶν.
    | 'And what is the end of each individual form of society?' i.e. whether or not the good of the governed (cp. iii. c. 6).
    | ἐκάστης, with the article following, is emphatic.
    | κοινωνία is the state under a more general aspect.

1.10. νῦν δὲ κεχωρισμένα τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολιτείαν.
    | Either 1)* the words τῶν δηλούντων are governed by κεχωρισμένα, ‘are separated from those things which show the nature of the constitution’; i.e. they are rules of administration and may be the same under different constitutions; but see infra § 11. Or 2), the genitive is partitive: ‘Laws are distinct and belong to that class of things which show the nature of the constitution.’

1.11. τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαίας καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νῦμον θέσεις.
    | Either 1), ‘we must know the differences of states (sc. πολιτείων) and the number of differences in each state, with a view to legislation; or 2)*, referring τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης only to διαφοράς, and supplying πολιτεία with ἀριθμόν, ‘the difference of each state and the number of states;’ or 3), τὸν ἀριθμὸν means ‘the order of classification’ (Suseniihl; cp. iii. 1. § 9, where the defective (corrupt)
states are said to be 'posterior' to the good states). This gives a good sense, but is with difficulty elicited from the words.

2. i.

Cp. infra c. 8. § 1, where the words ἐν τοῖς καὶ ἀρχήν refer to iii. c. 7. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle's Writings.

He seems to mean that in discussing the ideal state he has already discussed Aristocracy and Royalty. But the discussion on the ideal state has either been lost, or was never written, unless, as some think, it is the account of the state preserved in Book vii.

Other allusions to the same discussion occur in what follows: c. 3. § 4, ἕτε πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλούσιον διαφορὰς ἐστιν ἢ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν, κἂν εἰ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπερήμην ὅρθως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, a passage which is supposed to refer to vii. i.e. iv. c. 8 and 9, by those who change the order of the books (Susemihl, &c.). But in this latter passage the allusion to the perfect state is very slight, and the point of view appears to be different; for no hint is given that it is to be identified with royalty or aristocracy. Whether the words of the text have a reference, as Schlosser supposes, to the end of Book iii. c. 14–18, where Aristotle discusses the relation of the one best man to the many good, is equally doubtful. A reference to the discussion of aristocracy in some former part of the work also occurs infra c. 7. § 2, ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλῶν περὶ τῆς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις.

2. i.

For royalty and aristocracy, like the best state, rest on a principle of virtue, provided with external means.'

pέτε δὲ βασιλείαν νομίζειν.

Not 'when we are to consider a constitution to be a royalty,' for there is no question about this, but νομίζειν is taken in the other sense of 'having,' 'using,' 'having as an institution,' like utor in Latin. For this use of the word cp. νομίζειν ἐκκλησίαν, iii. 1. § 10; and for the matter cp. iii. 17. §§ 4–8.
Royalty and tyranny both depend upon the individual will of the king or tyrant: hence it is argued that if royalty is the best, tyranny must be the worst of governments, because one is the pre-eminence of good, the other of evil. Aristotle, who is over-mastered by the idea of opposites, naturally infers that the very worst must be the opposite of the very best.

politeias. We might expect αὐτής, or τῆς ἀρίστης to be added; but Aristotle substitutes the more general μείζονες here, as elsewhere, used in a good sense. Compare infra c. 8. § 2, τεκνεταίος ἢ περὶ τυραννίδος εἰλογῶν ἐστὶ ποιήσασθαι μείζονα διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἡκοτα τάυτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἢμα δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας: also for the general meaning, Plat. Polit. 301 D, Rep. ix. 576 D, etc.

In the phrase ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας the word refers to ὀλεγαρχίαν.

2. 3. ἢδη μὲν οἷς ἀπεφήματο καὶ τῶν πρῶτον οὕτως.

The difference between Plato (Polit. 303) and Aristotle, which is dwelt upon so emphatically, is only verbal: the latter objecting to call that good in any sense, which may also be evil, a somewhat pedantic use of language, which is not uniformly maintained by Aristotle himself. Cp. vi. 4. § 1, δημοκρατίων οὐσῶν τεταρτῶν βελτίστη ἢ πρῶτη τάξει.

καὶ τῶν πρῶτον is a strange form of citation from Plato which would seem more appropriate to a later generation than to Aristotle. See Essay on the Criticism of Plato in Aristotle.

2. 4–6. The programme corresponds fairly, but not very accurately, with the subjects which follow. At chap. 14, before discussing the causes of ruin and preservation in states, having analysed in general outline the various types of oligarchy, democracy, polity, tyranny, Aristotle introduces a discussion respecting the powers and offices which exist in a single state: but of this new beginning which interrupts the sequence of his plan he says nothing here.

3. 1. The diversity of governments has been already discussed, but not in detail, in bk. iii. c. 6–8.
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

The parts of the state are spoken of in vii. 8. § 7. The opening sentence of book vii. itself also professes to speak of aristocracy. But the writer goes on to treat rather of the ὑποθέσεις or material conditions of the best state, than of the best state itself. These references are vague; if they were really the passages here cited, we should have to suppose that the seventh book preceded the fourth. But they are not precise enough to be adduced as an argument in favour of the changed order.

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εἰδεὶς διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. 3. 5.

'As the parts of states differ from one another (σφῶν αὐτῶν), so must states differ from one another.' Compare the curious comparison infra c. 4. §§ 8, 9.

πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἄρχων τάξει εὐτυχεὶς, ταύτην δὲ διανέμομεν πάσης ἡ 3. 5.
κατά τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἢ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱσότητα κοινῆν, λέγω ἃ οἶνον τῶν ἄπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἢ κοινῆν τιν' ἄμφοιν.

The last words, κοινῆν τιν' ἄμφοιν, which are obscure and do not cohere very well with δύναμιν, are bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. But there is no reason for doubting their genuineness. Aristotle means to say that governments subsist according to the powers of those who share in them; or according to equality, whether that equality be an equality of the rich among themselves, or of the poor among themselves, or an equality of proportion which embraces both rich and poor: cp. infra c. 4. § 2. The words οἶνον τῶν ἄπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων may be an explanation of κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων, which comes in out of place, and ἡ κοινῆν τιν' ἄμφοι, as in the English text, may be an explanation of ἱσότητα κοινῆν.

κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱσότητα κοινῆν, 'More power may be given to the poor as being the more numerous class, or to the rich as being the more wealthy; or power may be given upon some principle of compensation which includes both;' as e.g. in a constitutional government. In this way of explaining the passage the difficulty
in the words ἡ κοινὴ τῶν ἀμφοί, which has led Bekker to bracket them, is avoided.

3. 7. For the winds compare Meteorologica ii. 4, 361 a. 4 ff., a passage in which Aristotle argues that north and south are the chief winds because wind is produced by evaporation and the evaporation is caused by the movement of the sun to the north or south. Also for the two principal forms of government cp. Plato's Laws iii. 693 C: according to Plato they are democracy and monarchy.

3. 8. ἀληθιστέρον δὲ καὶ βελτιστὸν ὡς ἡμεῖς διεῖλομεν, δυοῖν ἡ μᾶς οὔσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκῆς τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκκλησίς, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὐ κεκραμένης ἀρμονίας, τὰς δὲ τῆς ἁρίστης πολιτείας.

Aristotle having compared the different forms of states with the different sorts of harmonies, now blends the two in one sentence and corrects the opinion previously expressed by him: 'There are not two opposite kinds of harmonies and states, but one or at the most two, δυοῖν ἡ μᾶς (the two states are royalty and aristocracy), which are not opposed but of which all the rest are perversions.' From this transcendental point of view polity or constitutional government itself becomes a perversion; but in c. 8. § 1 it is said not to be a perversion, though sometimes reckoned in that class.

4. 4. ἀστερ ἐν Ἀθηναίᾳ φασὶ τινες.

According to Herod. iii. 20, the Ethiopians are the tallest and most beautiful of mankind: and they elect the tallest and strongest of themselves to be their kings.

4. 5. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρα καὶ τῶν δήμων καὶ τῆς ἀληχρίας εἶσιν κ.τ.λ.

It is argued that neither freedom alone, nor numbers alone are a sufficient note of democracy, nor fewness of rulers, nor wealth of oligarchy: neither a few freemen, as at Apollonia, nor many rich men, as at Colophon, constitute a democracy. But there must be many poor in a democracy and few rich in an oligarchy. A slight obscurity in the passage arises from the illustrations referring only to democracy and not to oligarchy. Cp. iii. cc. 7, 8; infra c. 8. § 7.

Aristotle would not approve a classification of states such as that of Sir G. C. Lewis and the school of Austin, who define the sovereign power according to the number of persons who exercise
it (cp. G. C. Lewis’ ‘Political Terms,’ Edit. 1877, p. 50). An opposite view is held by Maine, who argues truly ‘that there is more in actual sovereignty than force’ (Early Institutions, p. 358 ff.). Aristotle insists that the character of a government depends more on the quality than on the quantity of the sovereign power.

Possibly the war with Gyges mentioned in Herod. i. 14. The Colophonians like the other Ionians (Herod. i. 142) appear to have been the subjects of Croesus at the time of his overthrow. A testimony to their wealth and luxury is furnished by Xenophanes apud Athenaeum xii. c. 31. 526 C, who says that a thousand citizens arrayed in purple robes would meet in the agora of Colophon.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ δὲ ἡν αἰτίαν, εἰρηται διότι δὲ πλείους 4. 7. τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τι, λέγομεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ὀμολογούμεν γιὰν ὕπερ οὐκ ἐν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλεῖο πάσαν ἔχειν πόλιν.

It is remarkable that Aristotle should revert to the parts of states which he professes to have already determined when speaking of aristocracy (cp. c. 3 § 4). His reason for returning to them is that he is going to make a new subdivision of states based upon the differences of their parts or members.

πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων. As he says, infra § 20, "Οτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτείαι πλείους καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας εἰρηται πρότερον ὡτι δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρατίας ἐσθ πλεῖο καὶ διαγραφάς λέγομεν. Compare Book vii. 8 § 9.

The illustration from animals may be worked out as follows. 4. 8. Suppose the different kinds of teeth were a, a', a'', a''', etc., the different kinds of claws, feet, etc. were b, b', b'', b''', c, c', c'', c''', and so on with the other organs which are important in determining the character of an animal. Then, according to Aristotle, the different combinations of these will give the different species. Thus:

\[ a', b, c'' \text{ will be one species,} \]
\[ a, b', c' \text{ another and so on.} \]

So with constitutions:

If we combine γεωργικόν, having some political power and coming occasionally to the assembly, with disfranchised βάνωσον, and a politically active wealthy class, the result will be an oligarchy or
very moderate democracy: or if we combine politically active γεωργία, βίουναυου, θηρίον with a feeble or declining oligarchy, the result will be an extreme democracy: and so on.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the illustration taken from the animals is the reverse of the fact. The differences in animals are not made by the combination of different types, but by the adaptation of one type to different circumstances. Nor is there in the constitution of states any such infinite variety of combinations as the illustration from the animals would lead us to suppose; (one kind of husbandmen with another of serfs and so on). Nor does Aristotle attempt to follow out in detail the idea which this image suggests.

4. 9-17. The eight or more classes cannot be clearly discriminated. The sixth class is wanting, but seems to be represented by the judicial and deliberative classes in § 14, yet both reappear as a ninth class in § 17. Aristotle is arguing that Plato’s enumeration of the elements of a state is imperfect—there must be soldiers to protect the citizens, there must be judges to decide their disputes, there must be statesmen to guide them (although it is possible that the same persons may belong to more than one class). ‘Then at any rate there must be soldiers’ (§ 15). This rather lame conclusion seems to be only a repetition of a part of the premisses. At this point the writer looses the thread of his discourse and, omitting the sixth, passes on from the fifth class τὸ προσόλευκησον in § 10 to a seventh class of rich men (§ 15), and to an eighth class of magistrates (§ 16). A somewhat different enumeration of the classes, consisting in all of six, is made in vii. 8. §§ 7–9.

4. 11–14. διώτι τῆς Πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.

The criticism of Aristotle on Plato (Rep. ii. 369) in this passage, to use an expression of his own, is παυδαρίωδης λύειν. Plato, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, in a fanciful manner builds up the state; Aristotle, taking the pleasant fiction literally and detaching a few words from their context, accuses Plato of making necessity, and not the good, the first principle of the state, as if the entire aim of the work were not the search after justice. There is also an ambiguity in the word ἀναγκαία of which Aristotle
here takes advantage. Plato means by the ἀναγκαιωτάτη πόλις, 'the barest idea of a state' or 'the state in its lowest terms.' But when Aristotle says judges are 'more necessary' than the providers of the means of life, he means 'contribute more to the end or highest realization of the state.' The remarks on Plato are worthless, yet they afford a curious example of the weakness of ancient criticism, arising, as in many other places, from want of imagination. But apart from the criticism the distinction here drawn between the higher and lower parts, the 'soul' and 'body' of the state, is important. Cp. vii. 9. § 10, where Aristotle introduces a similar distinction between the μέρη of the πόλις and the mere conditions (διὰ οἷς ἄνευ) of it. 'Husbandmen, craftsman, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and counsellors.'

ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ.
Here evidently the title of the book.

Ἰσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.
Equally with τὸ καλὸν.

διὸ πέρι συνόσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργων.
διὸ πέρι grammatically refers to τὸ βουλεύεσθαι, suggested by τὸ βουλεύομενον.

διὸ τι πέρι καὶ ταύτα καὶ ἐκείνα.
4. 15.
tαύτα = τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, gathered from τὰ τοιαῦτα in § 14.
ἐκείνα = τὸ εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν χρήσιν συνείναινα. If the higher and the lower elements of a state are both necessary parts of it, then the warriors (who may in some cases also be husbandmen) are necessary parts: Aristotle is answering Plato, § 13, who in the first enumeration of the citizens had omitted the warriors.

ταύτην τὴν λειτουργίαν,
sc. τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς.

πολλοῖς.
1) 'To many' or 'in many cases' opposed to πάντες in what follows; or 2*) πολλοῖς may be taken with δοκεῖ, the meaning being 'many (differing from Plato) think, etc.'; the appeal is to the common sense which Plato is supposed to contradict.
4. 18. ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἁρετῆς πάντες.

The connexion is as follows:—'Different qualifications often coexist or are thought to coexist in the same persons; and indeed virtue is a qualification for office to which all men lay claim. But no man can be rich and poor at the same time.'

4. 20. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἰρηνικὸς πρὸς τοὺς is a repetition with a slight verbal alteration (διὰ τίνας αἰτίας for διὰ ἂν αἰτίαν) of the first words of § 7.

4. 20. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

I. e. from what has been said respecting differences in the parts of states (supra §§ 7, 8). Yet the curious argument from the parts of animals is an illustration only; the actual differences of states have not been worked out in detail.

4. 21. καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐτέρων πλῆθους εἶδος.

Susemihl (note 1199) objects that there are no others and so the freedmen must be meant. But surely in this phrase Aristotle is merely adding a saving clause: 'and the like.' Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 7. § 21, τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν ἐπιγραμμὴ θεωροῦνται αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει αἱ δ' ἀθιμωφικές καὶ διὰ τὰ διάλλας, where the last words only generalize the preceding.

4. 22. τῶν δὲ γνωρίσμων.

Sc. εἰδὴ, here used inaccurately for differences or different kinds of εἰδὴ.

4. 22. τὰ τοιοῦτα λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν.

τοιοῦτα, dative after τὴν αὐτὴν, and refers to πλοῖοι, εὐγένεια, κ.τ.λ. Lit. 'the things which are spoken of according to the same principle of difference with these,' or 'similar differences having a relation to these,' e. g. the habits and occupations of the notables.

4. 22. τὸ μηθὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχων τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους.

If the reading ὑπάρχων is retained, the emphasis is on the words μηθὲν μᾶλλον which must be taken closely with it, 'that the poor shall be no more'—which is a feeble way of saying, shall have no more power—'than the rich'; or 'shall have no priority,' which gives a rather curious sense to ὑπάρχων. A doubt about the propriety of
the expression has led to two changes in the text. 1) ἵππερεχεῖν (Susemihl) for which there is slight MS. authority, P¹, P⁴; and Aretino's transl. 2) ἀρχεῖν an emendation of Victorius adopted by Coraes, Schneider, Stahr, and supposed to be confirmed by a parallel passage in vi. 2. § 9; see note on English Text. 3) The Old Translation 'nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus' seems to favour ἵππερεχεῖν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς εὐπόροις.

δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. 4. 23.
tαύτην is slightly inaccurate = 'the state in which this occurs.'

ἐν μὲν οὖν εἴδος κ.τ.λ. 4. 24.
Five forms of democracy are reckoned: but the first of these is really a description of democracy in general, not of any particular form. The words in § 24 ἀλλὰ δὲ seem to have been introduced by mistake. The five forms are thus reduced to four, as in c. 6 the five forms of oligarchy given in c. 5 appear as four.

ἐτερον εἴδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἀπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι ἄν-. 4. 24.

υπεύθυνοι, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τῶν νόμων. ἐτερον δὲ εἴδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πάσι μετείναι τῶν ἄρχον, ἐὰν μόνον ἢ πολίτης, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τῶν νόμων.

The words ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι agree with τοῖς ἀνυπεύθυνοι κατὰ τὸ γένος, as the ἐὰν ἢ πολίτης does with the ὅσοι ἐν ἔλειθεροι ὅσι in the recapitulation of the passage which follows (c. 6. § 4). In both cases all citizens are eligible and the law is supreme: but in the first of the two the rights of citizenship have been scrutinized; in the second, all reputed freemen are admitted to them without enquiry. The latter case may be illustrated by the state of Athenian citizenship before the investigation made by Pericles; the former by the stricter citizenship required after the change. The meaning of the word ἀνυπεύθυνοι is shown by the parallel passage (c. 6. § 3, ἀνυπεύθυνοι κατὰ τὸ γένος) to be, 'not proved to be disqualified by birth.'

"Ομορος δὲ ποιαν λέγει οὐκ ἄγαθων εἶναι πολυκρατίνην, πάτερον ταύτην ἢ 4. 27.

ὅταν πλείουσι δόσιν οἱ ἀρχοντες ὡς ἑκαστος, ἀδηλον.

It would be a poetical or historical anachronism to suppose that Homer in the words cited intended one of the senses which Aristotle seems to think possible. The collective action of states as distinguished from that of individuals is the conception, not of a
poet, but of a philosopher. No modern reader would imagine that Homer is seeking to enforce any other lesson than the necessity of having one and not many leaders, especially on the field of battle. This anti-popular text is adapted to the argument.

4. 31. τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστὰ τὰς δραχὰς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν κρίνειν.

For use of gen. after κρίνειν cp. Plat. Rep. 576 D, Laws 1. 646 D, τὴν πολιτείαν (πολιτεία here = πολίτευμα) is contrasted as 'the collective government' with αἱ δραχαί, 'the individual magistrates.' Yet in the context, both preceding and following, the word has the more general meaning of a 'form of government' or 'constitution.'

5. 1. ἄν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων.

τούτων, 'out of all the qualified persons,' all those referred to in the two previous sentences τῶν ἐχόντων τιμήματα τηλικαία ὅστε κ.τ.λ. or τῶν ἐχόντων μακρὰ τιμήματα.

In what follows the δυναστία is the exclusive hereditary oligarchy, ruling without law.

5. 2. For the forms of these hereditary oligarchies and the dangers to which they are exposed, cp. v. 6. § 3. We may remark that, though the most common, they are not included in Aristotle's definition of oligarchy (iii. c. 8).

5. 4. τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ' ἄλλῳν.

Not accurate, for the meaning is, not that the two encroach on one another, but that the dominant party encroaches on the other.

The form of a constitution is here supposed to be at variance with its spirit and practice. Thus England might be said to be a monarchy once aristocratically, now democratically administered; France a republic in which some of the methods of imperialism survive (cp. note on c. 1. § 8); while in Prussia the spirit of absolute monarchy carries on a not unequal contest with representative government.

6. 3. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτωμένοις ἔχεσθι μετέχειν.

Omitted by Π² (i.e. the MSS. of the second family except Π) and Aretino's translation, bracketed by Bekker in both editions, is a repetition or pleonasm of the previous thought, though not on that
NOTES, BOOK IV. 6.

account necessarily to be reckoned spurious. Cp. iii. 1. § 4 and note.

6. 3.

διὰ τὴν ἐξομένην αἰρέσιν.

· The principle of election which follows next in order’ (cp. c. 4. § 24, ἐτερον ἐλθο). This use of the word ἐξομένη is supported by iii. 11. § 15, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἐστὶν (ἀπορία) ἐξομένη ταύτης, and vi. 8. § 4, ἐτέρα δὲ ἐπιμελεία ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς, and several other passages. The other interpretation of ἐξομένη, given in a note to the English text, ‘proper to it’ is scarcely defensible by examples and is probably wrong. The first form of democracy required a small property qualification, the second admitted all citizens who could prove their birth. The third admitted reputed citizens without proof of birth; though in both the latter cases the exercise of the right was limited by the opportunities of leisure. For the laxity of states in this matter, cp. iii. 5. §§ 7, 8.

6. 4.

διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσοδον.

The public revenues could not be distributed, for there were none to distribute, cp. infra § 8. The want of pay prevented the people from attending the assembly.

6. 5.

διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλῆθους.

Either 1*) ‘on account of the preponderance of their numbers,’ or 2) more definitely ‘on account of the preponderance of the multitude’; (cp. c. 12. § 1 and iii. 15. § 13). The numbers of the people give the power and the revenues of the state provide pay.

καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχοῦσιν τοῦ πολιτείματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοῖς θ. 8.

ἀνθρώπους ἄλλα τῶν νόμων εἶναι κύριον.

The more numerous the members of the oligarchy, and the greater the difficulty of finding the means of living, the less possibility is there of the government of a few and therefore the greater need of law; cp. infra § 9.

8. 5.

μήδε οὕτως ὅλην ἄστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἀνάγκη τοῦ νόμον θ. 8.

αὖσοι αὖσοι ἄρχειν.

‘When numerous, and of a middle condition, neither living in careless leisure nor supported by the state, they are driven to maintain in their case (αὖσοι) the rule of law.’

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8. 9. πλείω δὲ,
sc. οὐσίαν ἔχοντες.

6. 9. τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιούτων.
Sc. they make the law oligarchical.

6. 10. ἡδὲ ἐπιτείνωσιν.
'But when they stretch (the oligarchical principle) further.'

7. 1. δαπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις.
Either 1)* in his works on Politics, meaning especially the
Republic (as in v. 12. § 7, ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ) and Politicus; or 2) in
his treatment of the various forms of government, i.e. in Books
viii. and ix. of the Republic. The latter explanation is less idio-
matic. Without referring to the Republic or the Politicus, the
statement is inaccurate; for if the perfect state be included, the
number of constitutions is in the Republic five, in the Politicus
(302) seven.

7. 2. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλὸς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ὧς διηλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώ-
tois λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἄπλως κατ' ἄρετὴν πολιτείαιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς
ὑπόθεσιν των ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων, μόνην δικαίων προσαγορεῖσθαι ἀριστοκρατίαν.
The discussion is apparently the same to which he has already
referred in iv. 2. § 1: the particle γὰρ seems to imply that he
had in that discussion spoken of aristocracy as the government of
the truly good. The passage most nearly corresponding to the
allusion is iii. 4. § 4 ff., in which Aristotle treats of the relation
of the good ruler to the good man.

7. καλοῦται ἀριστοκρατίαι.
According to a strict use of terms aristocracy is only the govern-
ment of the best; in popular language it is applied to the union of
wealth and merit, but is not the same either with oligarchy or with
constitutional government.

7. 4. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιομέναις κοινῆ ἐπιμέλειαι ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως ταῖς
οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπίκεισι.
Cp. Plat. Laws xii. 951: 'There are always in the world a few
inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring
up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities.'
Elsewhere (ii. 11. § 9) the constitution of Carthage is spoken of as a perversion of aristocracy because combining wealth and virtue; here it is called in a laxer sense an aristocracy because it combines wealth, virtue and numbers. That Sparta with all its secrecy (ἡ πολιτεία τὸ κρυπτὸν, Thuc. v. 68) might be termed a democracy and, with all its corruption and infamy, had a sort of virtue (τὸ πιστὸν τῆς πολιτείας, Id. i. 68) is the view, not wholly indefensible, of Aristotle, who regards the Spartan constitution under many aspects, cp. ii. 9. §§ 20, 22, and infra c. 9. § 5, but chiefly as consisting of two elements, numbers and virtue.

καὶ ἐὰν εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Δακεδαμονίων εἰς ἄρετὴν τε καὶ 7. 4. δήμον, καὶ ἐκτός μὲν τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἄρετῆς.

The want of symmetry in the expression εἰς ἄρετὴν τε καὶ δήμον, followed by δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἄρετῆς, instead of δήμου τε καὶ ἄρετῆς, probably arises out of a desire to avoid tautology.

ἄριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο 7. 5. ἔδω καὶ τρέτον ἐστι τῆς καλομενής πολιτείας ῥέσουσι πρὸς τὴν ὁλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον.

There are three imperfect kinds of aristocracy beside the perfect state (ἡ πρώτη, ἡ ἄριστη πολιτεία): 1) the governments, such as that of Carthage, in which regard is paid to virtue as well as to numbers and wealth; 2) those in which, as at Sparta, the constitution is based on virtue and numbers; 3) the forms of constitutional government (πολιτεία) which incline to oligarchy, i.e. in which the governing body is small.

ἐνδέχεται δ' οὕτως οἷον οὗτος οὕτως ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὕτε τὰς ἄρτι 8. 1. ῥήθειαν ἄριστοκρατίας, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄλλης πάσαι δημαρτήκασι τῆς ὁμοτάτης πολιτείας, ἐπειτα καταριθμοῦται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσὶ τ᾽ αὐτῶν αὐταὶ παρεκβάσεις, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπομεν.

αὐταί refers to τούτων, sc. τῶν παρεκβαθμικῶν οἵ δημαρτηκίων πολιτειῶν, and this to the singular παρέκβασιν.

ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπομεν. Sc. iii. 7. § 5.

8. 2.

Φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.

'Now that we understand what democracy and oligarchy are, it is easier to see what the combination of them will be.'
8. 3. 
dia τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις.

Men tend to identify nobility with wealth (cp. infra § 8), not unreasonably, for wealth gives leisure, and in the second generation commonly education. For εὐγένεια, see Rhet. i. 5, 1360 b. 31.

8. 5. 
dοκεῖ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ μὴ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν ἀριστοκρατομομένην πόλιν, ἀλλὰ ποιηκοκρατομενήν.

The words ἀλλὰ ποιηκοκρατομενήν (omitted in the translation) are read by all the MSS. (and supported by W. de Moerbeke), and therefore though pleonastic are unlikely to be a gloss. If retained we must
1) supply εὐνομεῖσθαι from τὸ μὴ εὐνομεῖσθαι, 'A state cannot be ill governed by good men, or well governed by evil men.'
2) We may alter the order of words by placing μὴ before ἀριστοκρατομενήν, instead of before εὐνομεῖσθαι (Thurot, Susem.). Or 3), with Bekker (2nd ed.), we may insert μὴ before ποιηκοκρατομενήν. Or 4) alter ποιηκοκρατομενήν into ποιηκοκρατεῖσθαι, answering to εὐνομεῖσθαι.

8. 6. 
dιὸ μὲν μὲν εὐνομίαν . . . τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, where Cleon says, πάντων δὲ δεινώτατον εἰ βιβλίων ἡμῶν μὴν καθεστῆσι τὸν διὰ διέξει πέρα, μὴν γραφόμεθα διὰ χείρας νόμοις ἀκινήτων χρωμενήν τόλμης κρείσσαν ἐς τίν ή καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύρως.

8. 6. 
tοῦτο δ' ἐνδεχεται διῆχος κ.τ.λ.

Refers back to the words τὸ καλῶς κείσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οἷς εἴμαι κατανυστηκότα, the clause ἐστι γὰρ . . . κειμένοις being a parenthesis.

8. 6. 
ἡ γὰρ τοῖς ἀριστοῖς κ.τ.λ.

Sc. ἐστι πείθεσθαι.

8. 8. 
ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται.

Sc. πολιτεία. Preserving the play of words and supplying πολιτεία with καλεῖται from τῆς πολιτείας, we may translate, 'in most cities the form of the constitution is called constitutional.' But are there 'many' such governments? Cp. supra c. 7. § 1; infra c. 11. § 19. For the answer to this question see Essay on the μίαν πολιτεία, &c.

8. 8. 
μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις.

'It is called by a neutral name, e.g. a constitution or commonwealth, for it is a mixture which aims only at uniting the freedom
of the poor and the wealth of the rich; ἀλεθερίας answering to ἀπόρων as πλούτου to εὐπόρων.

As in some other summaries of Aristotle the first division seems 9. 1–4. to be a general description of those which follow. (Cp. supra note on c. 4. § 24.) We cannot distinguish between 1 and 3, unless in one of them we suppose Aristotle to have in his mind a syncretism of two general principles of government (see § 6), in the other an eclectic union of elements taken from different governments.

σύμβαλλων.

Something cut in two and capable of being put together, so that the parts fitted into one another; a die or coin or ring thus divided, which friends used as a token when desirous of renewing hospitality on behalf of themselves or others, and which was also used in buying or selling. See Schol. on Eur. Med. 613, οἱ ἐπιζευγόμενοι, ἀστράγαλον κατατέμνοντες, βάτερον μὲν αὐτοὶ κατεῖχον μέρος, βάτερον δὲ καταλματάνοι τοῖς ὑποθεματίσαντι ἵνα εἰ δέοι πάλιν αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνους ἐπιζευγόνθαι πρὸς ἄλλους, ἐπαγόμενοι τὸ ἡμιον ἀστραγάλιον, ἀνευόυστο τὴν ξενίαν: and cp. Plat. Symp. 191 D, ἀνθρώπων ξύμβαλλον ἄτε τετραμένον... ἔξ ἐνὸς δύο.

ἡ γὰρ ἀμφότερα λαπτεῖν δὲν ἐκάτεροι νομοθετοῖς κ.τ.λ. 9. 2.

'For either they must take the legislation of both.' These words are resumed in εἰς μὲν οὖν ἄντος τοῦ συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος and followed by ἄνευς δὲ instead of repeating ἡ.

The first case is a union of extremes, the second a mean taken between them; the third seems to be only another example of the first.

ἐμφάνισται γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων. 9. 6.

From the democratical aspect a polity or timocracy has the appearance of an oligarchy or aristocracy; from the oligarchical aspect, of a democracy. Aristotle cites as an example of this many-sidedness the constitution of Lacedaemon, which he himself elsewhere (c. 7. § 4) calls an aristocracy, but which in this passage he acknowledges to have many features both of a democracy and of an oligarchy. Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 7. § 8, ἐπιδικαίωσαν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας.
10. 1. **περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διώρισμαν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιούμεθα τὴν σκέψιν.**

Either 'royalty' *commonly so called,* or 'the most truly called royalty,' which would seem to be the παμβασιλεία. Cp. iii. c. 16.

10. 1. **τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεὶ κυβιστάναι, καὶ πῶς.**

Two slightly different senses are here combined in δεί, 1) 'what we ought to establish,' and 2), incorrectly, 'how or by what means we may or must establish it.'

10. 2. **τυραννίδος δὲ εἰδὴ δύο μὲν διειλομέν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν.**

Sc. iii. 14. §§ 6–10. The two forms of tyranny there mentioned are the hereditary monarchy of barbarians, and the Aesymnetia of ancient Hellas. The barbarian monarchs are here called elected sovereigns, though before spoken of as hereditary (iii. 14. § 6), and contrasted with the elected Aesymnetes of ancient Hellas, with whom they are here compared.

10. 2. **διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἑπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν.**

Not 'because their powers in a manner change into one another, and pass into royalty;' for the words 'change into one another' would not be a reason why they should be spoken of in connexion with royalty, but 'because the power of either of these forms of tyranny easily passes likewise into royalty;' likewise i.e. besides being forms of tyranny. For the use of ἑπαλλάττειν, cp. vi. 1. § 3; and i. 6. § 3.

10. 4. **τοσοῦτοι διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.**

εἰρημένας, sc. in the previous sentences. 'There is more than
one kind of tyranny, because the tyrant may rule either with or without law, and over voluntary or involuntary subjects.'

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of the best average constitution 11. to which he alluded in c. 1. § 5.

τῶν μέσων ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστους ἐνθεομένης 11. 3. τοιχείν μεσοτήτος.

The gen. μεσότητος is a resumption of μέσων, and depends on βίον. Here, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 7, the mean is admitted to be relative.

ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα βλαβερὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν.

ἀμφότερα, sc. either 1) *their rogurities and their unwillingness to perform public duties, whether military or civil,' or 2) simply 'their dislike both of civil and military duties.' It is possible also that ταῦτα ἀμφότερα may refer to the μεγαλοπόνηροι and μικροπόνηροι, in which case the words ἕτε... ἄρχουσι are either inserted or misplaced.

The φιλαρχοὶ at Athens were the cavalry officers under the ἵππορχοῖ. See Liddell and Scott. The term is also sometimes used to denote civil magistrates, as in v. 1. § 11 to describe the oligarchical rulers of Epidamnus. θελαρχεῖν literally = 'to be a chief of the senate.' The word very rarely occurs, and can here only have a generalized meaning. William de Moerbeke, apparently finding in some Greek MS. φιλαρχοῖς, translates by an obvious mistake, 'minime amant principes et volunt esse principes.' For the association of political inactivity with the idea of crime, cp. Solon’s law forbidding neutrality in a sedition (Plut. Solon 20), τῶν δ' ἀλλῶν αὐτοῦ νόμον ἰδιοὺς μὲν μάλιστα καὶ παράδοξος ὁ κελεύων ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει μηθετέρας μερίδος γενόμενον: and Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40, μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηθέν τῶν ἑτέρων μετέχοντα τῷ δ' ἀρχεῖν νομίζομεν.

οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἑπεδρίᾳ τούτων ταπεινῶς λιαν.

tοῦτοι, sc. τῶν εὐπτυχιμάτων κ.τ.λ. supra.

ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ ἄρχῃ.

Dative of the manner; 'to be ruled in any fashion.'
11. 8. ὁστ' ἀναγκαῖον ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν φανεῖν φῶς τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

'So that a city having [like and equal] citizens, who in our view are the natural components of it, will of necessity be best administered.'

11. 9. πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα.

'Many things are best to those who are in the mean;' or as we might say in modern phraseology, 'The middle class have many advantages.'

(Quoted by Oncken, ii. 225, note 1.)

11. 15. Σύλων τε γὰρ ἦν τοῦτον (δηλοὶ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως).

The passage referred to may be that quoted by Plutarch v. Solonis, c. 3,

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλούσιοι κακοὶ, ἄγαθοι δὲ πένθουσι,

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς οὐ διαμεμβέρθη
tῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν πλούτων.

In classing Solon with the middle rank Aristotle appears to be thinking only of the tradition of his poverty and of the moderation inculcated in his poems. He has ignored or forgotten the tradition of his descent from Codrus.

11. 15. οὗ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεύς.

The feebleness of the argument is striking; because Lycurgus, who was the guardian and is said also to have been the uncle of the king, was not a king, he is here assumed to be of the middle class! Cp. Plut. Cleom. 10, perhaps following this passage, νῦν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἐχειν συγγνώμονα τῶν Δυσκόρων, δὲ οὐτὲ βασιλεύς οὐν, οὐκ ἄρχων, ἰδιώτης δὲ βασιλεύει ἐπιχειρών ἐν τοῖς ὕπαλλοις προῆλθεν εἰς ἁγοῦν ὅστε δεῖσαι τῶν βασιλέων ἰπτὶ βωμὸν καταφυγεῖν. Yet Plutarch
is inconsistent with himself; for he also says (Lyc. 3) that Lycurgus reigned for eight months, and resigned the royal office when the infant Charilaus was born.

"Ετι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς 'Ελλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρ' 11. 18, 19. οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἐκάτεροι πολιτείαν ἀποβλέπουσι οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεις καθίστασιν, οἱ δὲ ὀλιγαρχίας, οὗ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμφέρον σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. ὡστε διὰ ταῦτα τὰς αἰτίας ἡ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἢ ὀλιγάκια καὶ παρ' ὀλίγους.

Cp. Thuc. i. 19, 76, 99, 144, iii. 82 and elsewhere.

tῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων. Either of the leading states, opposed to in taïs pólesi the states of Hellas generally.


The variety of opinions entertained by commentators respecting the person here alluded to, who has been supposed to be Lycurgus (Zeller), Theopompus (Sepulveda), Solon (Schlosser), Pittacus (Goettling), Phaleas (St. Hilaire), Gelo (Camerarius), the king Pausanias II (Congreve), Epaminondas (Eaton), Alexander the Great (Zeller formerly), seems to prove that we know nothing for certain about him. Of the various claimants Solon is the most probable. He is regarded by Aristotle (ii. 12. §§ 1–6) as a sort of conservative democrat, the founder of a balanced polity, whom he contrasts with Pericles and the later Athenian demagogues (cp. Solon Frag. 5, ὅμω μὲν γὰρ ἐδωκα τόσον κράτος ὅσον ἐπαρκεῖ). The omission of the name, and the words τῶν πρότερον, tend to show that a well known and traditional legislator is meant. Yet it might be argued also that the phrase τῶν ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων seems to describe some one holding the position of Lysander or Philip of Macedon in Hellas, rather than the legislator of any single city.

If 'one man’ only gave this form of constitution to Hellas it must have been rare indeed or rather imaginary, cp. supra c. 7. § 1, διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλὰκις γίνεσθαι λαυθάτε. But how is this to be reconciled with c. 8. § 8?

ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων, 'the leading men.' For ἐτι cp. οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν. (Dem.) But are not the words a copyist’s repetition of τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων above?
11. 20. τις μέν οὖν δρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν.
Here, as limited in § 1, ἀρίστη ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι, διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν, i.e. the moderation and stability of the state. Cp. v. 1. § 16 where it is implied that the safety of democracy is due to its approximation to the μέση πολιτεία.

11. 21. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὖσας ἄλλης πολιτείας αἰρετικά καὶ κατακόρυφα ἐνίοις οὐθέν καλύτερον συμφέρειν ἐτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.
'It may often happen that some constitution may be preferable [in itself] and some other better suited to the peculiar circumstances of some state.'

πρὸς ἅπαθεσιν here (as in c. 1. § 4) means any supposed or given constitution, which may not be the best possible under the circumstances, but is the one to be preferred, in some states of society.

12. 2. εἰ δέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐτέραν μέρει τῆς πόλεως, εὗ δὲν συνε-στηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις.
'Namely to one of those parts which make up the state'; the clause εὗ δὲν κ.π.λ. is explanatory of ἐτέραν μέρει=ἐτέρα τῶν μερῶν.

12. 3. διὸν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος τήν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν.
'When the poor exceed in number the [due] proportion implied in the last words.'

12. 3. καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐκαστοῦ εἶδος κατὰ τήν ὑπερχαρίαν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους.
'And in like manner (not only oligarchy in general, but) each sort of oligarchy varies according to the predominance of each sort of oligarchical population (sc. δ ὑπαρχεῖ αὐτῇ).

12. 5. πανταχοῦ δὲ πιντότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητὴς δὲ ὁ μέσος.
The middle class are the arbiters between the extremes of oligarchy and democracy. When Aristotle calls the arbiter ὁ μέσος, this is probably meant in the same sense in which δικαιοσύνη is said to be a mean because it fixes a mean. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 17, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότητις ἔστιν οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ταῖς προτέρου ἀρεταις, ἀλλ' ὁτι μέσου ἔστιν, and v. 4. § 7, Διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἁμφισβητῶσιν.
NOTES, BOOK IV. 13.

...epi tois dikasthien katafeignousin to 8' epip tois dikasthien lenai lenai estin epip to dikaios. O yap dikasthite boileita einai oion dikaios empsiouchon kai istori dikasthine meson, kai kaloudin enoi mesidious, os, oiv tov mesou tyxwos, tov dikaiou teufimeno.

...anagkai yap xronon proti ek tois psevdo epais olochies sumbheia kakon' ai 12. 6. yap pleonexiai tois plousiwn apollinoun malloin tivn politeian ou ai tou dymou.

Aristotle gives no reason for this statement. He may have thought that the designs of an oligarchy are more deeply laid and corrupting, while the fickleness of the multitude is in some degree a corrective to itself. The oligarchies of Hellas were certainly worse than the democracies: the greatest dishonesty of which the Athenians were guilty in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 23) is far less hateful than the perfidy of the Spartans narrated Id. iv. 80. The cruelty of the four hundred or of the thirty tyrants strikingly contrasts on both occasions with the moderation of the democracy which overthrew them.

It is a curious question, which we have not the means of answering, whether all these artifices (sofis mata) are historical facts or only inventions of Aristotle, by which he imagines that the democracy or oligarchy might weaken the opposite party. Some of them, such as the pay to the people, we know to have been used at Athens: but there is no historical proof, except what may be gathered from this passage, that the richer members of an oligarchical community were ever compelled under a penalty to take part in the assembly, or in the law courts. Cp. infra p. 178 note: also c. 15. § 14–18.

...tois mewn megilhn, tois de mikran, oswper en tois Xarvndou nomois.

Yet the penalty must have been relatively as well as absolutely greater or smaller, or the rich would have had no more reason for going than the poor for abstaining. The meaning is not that Charondas inflicted a larger fine on the rich and a proportionally small one on the poor for absence from the assembly; but generally that he adapted his fines to the circumstances of offenders.

...exoun yap oi penutes kai mh metastoxes tov tewn tewon huvian exev, ean 13. 8. mh 6brizn tis avtonu mhpe efarmptai mhdein tis othis.

The connexion is as follows: The qualification must be such
as will place the government in the hands of a majority [and then there will be no danger]: for the poor, even though they are not admitted to office, will be quiet enough if they are not outraged.'

13. 9. ἐν Μαλιεῶσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτεία ἕν ἐκ τῶν ν κ.τ.λ.

'Among the Malians the governing or larger body was elected from those who were past service, the magistrates from those on actual service'; the past tense (ἡ) has been thought to imply that the government had changed possibly in consequence of Philip and Alexander's conquests: compare a similar use of the past, v. 1. § 11 respecting the government of Epidamnus, and note.

13. 10. ὁρτ' ἐν τοῖς ἵππεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἒσχύν.

Yet the tendency of some of the Greek states to the use of cavalry was as much due to the suitability of large regions, such as Thessaly, for the breeding and support of horses, as to the form of government. Nor can the remark be true of Greek oligarchies in general, considering how ill suited the greater part of Hellas was to the training or use of horses. Cp. supra c. 3. § 3, a passage in which Aristotle has made a similar observation.

13. 11. ἢ εὐν καλοῖμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρὸτερον ἐκάλουν δημοκρατία.

I.e. what appeared to the older Greeks to be a large governing class was to the later Greeks a small or moderate one.

13. 11. κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ἰπέμενον τὸ ἀρχεσθαί.

1*) Some word like ἀδερθεῖς has to be supplied from ἅλγοι οὕτε τὸ πλῆθος before κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν; or 2) κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν may be taken after ἰπέμενον, 'and also through a (want of) organization, they were more willing to endure the dominion of others.'

14. 1. Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινὴ καὶ χωρίς περὶ ἑκάστης λέγωμεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς λαβώστε ἀρχὴν τῆν προσέκουσαν αὐτῶν.

From a consideration of the differences between states, and the causes of them, Aristotle in his accustomed manner, proceeding from the whole to the parts, passes on to consider the mode in which different powers are constituted in states, cc. 14–16. He will hereafter show how the wholes are affected by the parts.
A somewhat similar discussion occurs in bk. vi. c. 8. See note on vi. 1. § 1.

ἔστι δὲ τῶν τρίων τούτων (SC. μορίων) ἐν μὲν τι τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ 14. 2. τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς (τούτοις δ' ἐστὶν ἃς δὲι καὶ τίνων ἐσται κυρίας, καὶ πολλὰ των δὲ γίνεσθαι τὴν ἁρκεσιν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τι τὸ δικαίων.

Aristotle divides the state, much as we should do, into three parts, 1) the legislative, (which has in certain cases power over individuals; see infra § 3) : 2) the administrative or executive : 3) the judicial. The words τούτοι δ' ἐστὶν seem to refer back to δεῖ θεωρεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην. But if so there is a verbal irregularity. For the duties and modes of appointment to offices are not a part of the state, but questions relating to a part of the state.

τι not interrogative, to be taken closely with ἐν and with τρίτον.

Nothing more is known about Telecles. From the manner in 14. 4. which he is spoken of he appears to have been an author rather than a legislator. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Τηλεκλεός is said like ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ii. 1. § 3, iv. 4. § 11.

ἔστι τινὰ διελθῇ.

Some word implying the right of succession to office has to be supplied, e.g. ἡ ἀρχὴ from τὰς ἀρχὰς. The same phrase occurs infra c. 15. § 17.

συνέναι δὲ μόνον

is governed by εἰς μὲν τρόπος above.

ἀλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.

A reduplication of the preceding, although there may also be a shade of distinction in the greater stress which is laid upon voting and scrutinies. Here, as in other places (c. 4. §§ 22–24 ; c. 6. §§ 3, 4), we have a difficulty in discriminating Aristotle's differences. There is only an incomplete order in the catalogue of democracies. First of all comes the most moderate, in which the assembly plays a very subordinate part, then two more which are almost indistinguishable, lastly the most extreme.
14. 6. τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἱρετὰς ὁδος, δοκας ἐνδέχεται τοιαύτα ἕνεκαν δοκας ἀρχεῖν ἀναγκαῖοι τοὺς ἐπισταμένους.

The words ὁδος ἐνδέχεται can only mean 'as many elective offices as can be allowed to exist in a democracy consistently with the democratic principle of electing the magistrates by lot.' The excepted magistracies will be those in which special skill or knowledge is required. Cp. vi. 2. § 5, τὸ κληρωτᾶς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ πάσας ἦ δοκεῖ μὴ ἔμπειρίας δεῖναι καὶ τέχνης. Susenmihl has introduced κληρωτᾶς οὐκ ἐνδεχεται εἶναι οὐκ ἐνδεχέται κληρωτάς εἶναι τοιαύτα ἕνεκαν ἐλευθερον referring to αἱρετὰς. But the change has no MS. authority, and though ingenious is unnecessary.

14. 8. fin. δοκας δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλευόσθαι μετέχωσιν ἄλλα αἱρετοί, κατὰ νῦν δὲ ἀρχομεν ἤσπερ καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀληθικοὶ.

Opposed to the milder πολιτική ἀληθεία in the previous sentence, and repeated with greater emphasis in the words which follow ἀληθικοὶ ἀναγκαίοι εἶναι τὴν τεῖν ταύταν (§ 9). μὴ πάντες, i.e. 'not all who possess the required qualification.' Yet these latter words, which are necessary to the sense, are wanting in the text.

14. 8–10. Compare for several verbal resemblances, supra c. 5.

14. 10. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀρχιτες, καὶ οὕτωι αἱρετοί ἢ κληρωτοί.

For in an aristocracy or oligarchy, as in a democracy, a magistrate might be elected by lot, but only out of a select class.

14. 10. ἀριστοκρατία μὲν ἢ πολιτεία.

Aristocracy is elsewhere said to include numbers, wealth, and virtue; here the aristocratical element seems to reside in the magistrates who have superior merit, and control the whole administration of the state except war, peace, and the taking of scrutinies.

Compare c. 7. § 3; c. 8. §§ 3, 9, in which the near connexion between aristocracy and polity is pointed out.

14. 11. διήρητα μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ ἑκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διαρισμόν.

κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διαρισμόν, i.e. each constitution will be variously administered according to some one of the principles on which
the governing body is elected, e.g. out of some, or out of all; and as acting either according to law, or without law, etc.

διοίκησις has been changed into διοίκησις and διακρίσει, for which later there is perhaps the authority of Moerbeke, who reads dispo


1. Aristotle remembering the short life of the extreme democracy which is above law, proposes various ways of strengthening or moderating it; he would have the notables take part in the assembly; and he would enforce their attendance by the imposition of penalties analogous to the fines which the oligarchy inflict on judges for neglect of their duties. (Cp. v. cc. 8, 9 on the preserving principles of state.)

Of the advantage of combining the few with the many there can be no question; but will the upper classes ever be induced to take an active part in a democracy? They have not done so in France or America; may we hope that they will in England?

ἀποκλήρων τῶν πλείονος.

I. e. he on whom the lot fell was not included, but excluded until the numbers were sufficiently reduced.

ὁροεῖται δὲ καὶ προεξεταί.

'Even ambassadors, whom we might be more inclined to call magistrates, and who are elected by lot, are ἄρετον τε παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς.'

οῖν στρατηγῶς στρατευομένων,

sc. ἐπιμελεῖται implied in ἐπιμελεῖτων.

"Verbal questions, such as the definition of an office, are of no practical importance, although some intellectual interest may attach to them." ἄλλῃν is redundant.

μᾶλλον ἐν τις ἀπορήσει.

I. e. rather than dispute about the name.
Aristotle's Politics.

15. 6. Βελτιών ἐκαστόν ἐργὸν τυγχάνει τῆς ἑπιμελείας μονοπραγµατούσης ἢ πολυπραγµατούσης.


15. 9. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πράγµα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄνθρωπους, λέγω δὲ οὖν ἐνα τῆς εὐκοσµίας, ἢ παῖδων ἄλλων καὶ γυναικῶν.

Two offices are mentioned in the latter part of the sentence: cp. infra § 13, παιδονόµος καὶ γυναικονόµος: and vi. 8. § 22, ἵδι δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐηµεροῦσίς πόλεσιν . . . γυναικονοµία . . . παιδονοµία κ.τ.λ.

15. 10. ἔτεραι ἐν ἑτέραις, οὖν ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαθεµένων.

'Differing,' i. e. in the character of those from whom the election is made. Though the word ἔτεραι is inaccurate, the meaning is the same as that of ἑτέρων, which Susemihl, on very slight authority, has introduced into the text.

15. 10. πότερον διαφέρει . . . ἡ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινες οὖσα καὶ κατ' αὐτάς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἄρχων, ἵτι δὲ ὑπὸν συµφέρονσιν αὐτάς.

The alternative πότερον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. is repeated and expanded. 'Are offices the same in different states, or not the same? Are they the same, but elected out of different classes in aristocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy? Or do the offices differ naturally according to the actual differences in forms of government, the same offices being sometimes found to agree and sometimes to disagree with different forms of government, and having a lesser power in some states and a greater in others? For example, has the president of the assembly, in whatever way appointed, the same functions at Sparta and at Athens? Are not probuli suited to an oligarchy, a censor of boys and women to an aristocracy, a council to a democracy? And will they be equally suited to other forms, or may not their powers require to be extended or narrowed?'

According to this explanation the natural order of the words is somewhat inverted, for τῶν ἄρχων is taken with τινες: and with κατ' αὐτάς τὰς διαφορὰς has to be supplied τῶν πολίτεων from κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας supra. We may also supply πολιτείας with τινες, and translate 'may not some states essentially derived their character from offices.' But the abrupt transition to a new subject (ἄρχων)
in the next clause shows this way of taking the passage to be inadmissible.

Bekker (2nd Edit.) after Victorius reads διαφορά for τὰς διαφορὰς.

\[\text{οὐν ἡ τῶν πράξεων} \quad \text{αὐτὴ γὰρ ὁ δημοκρατικὴ.} \]

prάξεως, as he says vi. 8. § 17, are oligarchical officers, because they alone have the initiative, and, therefore, the people cannot of themselves make any change in the constitution; supra c. 14. § 14.

\[\text{εἰς δὲ} \quad \text{αι διαφοράς κ.π.λ.} \]

The meaning of the text may be illustrated by the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i. tines o1 kathistantet tás arxás.</th>
<th>ii. e1 tinon.</th>
<th>iii. tina trōsou.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) h pante1.</td>
<td>a) h e1 panton.</td>
<td>a) h apresi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) h tinēs.</td>
<td>b) h e1 tinōn apomainon.</td>
<td>b) h klhph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) h tás μὲν pantes, tás de tinēs.</td>
<td>c) h tás μὲν e1 panton, tás de e1 tinōn.</td>
<td>c) h tás μὲ1 alresi, tás de klhph.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| al trecis diaforai. | al trecis diaforai. | al trecis diaforai. |

\[\text{oι τρεῖς ἄρα.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>o1 dō1eka trōsou.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. pantes e1 panton airesi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. pantes e1 panton klhph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. pantes e1 tinōn airesi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. pantes e1 tinōn klhph.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\text{o1 dò1o súnduxasmodi.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tά μὲν klhph.</th>
<th>tά de airesi.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tά μὲν e1 panton.</td>
<td>tά de e1 tinōn.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All, or some, or all and some, elect out of all, or some, or out of all and some, by vote or by lot; or by vote and by lot.
Aristotle's Politics.

The three modes give rise to twelve possible varieties:

- All elect by vote out of all,
  - by lot out of all,
  - by vote out of some,
  - by lot out of some;
- Some elect by vote out of all,
  - by lot out of all,
  - by vote out of some,
  - by lot out of some;
- All and some elect by vote out of all,
  - by lot out of all,
  - by vote out of some,
  - by lot out of some;

and to the two further combinations (οἱ δὲ συνδυασμοὶ): partly by vote and partly by lot, partly out of all and partly out of some.

It is not to be supposed that, even in such a 'bazaar of constitutions' (Plat. Rep. viii. 557 D) as Hellas furnished, all these different forms of government were really to be found. Aristotle derives them not from his experience of history, but out of the abundance of his logic.

15. ἦσπερ ἐν Μεγαραῖς.

Cp. v. 3. § 5 and 5. § 4, where the overthrow of the Megarian democracy is attributed to the corruption and oppression practised by demagogues; also Thuc. iv. 74 (though it is not certain whether Aristotle is speaking of the return of the exiles there mentioned or of some earlier or later one); and Arist. Poet. c. 3. § 5. 1448 a. 32, where he refers to an ancient democracy existing in Megara, of which the recent establishment is deplored by Theognis, line 53 ff., Bergk. There was an alliance between Athens and Megara in 458 (Thuc. i. 103, 114), which terminated at the battle of Coronea 447; probably during the alliance, but not afterwards, Megara was governed by a democracy. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War the oligarchs were in exile, but were restored by the influence of Brasidas. In the year B.C. 375 the democracy had been re-established: Diod. xv. 40.
The vote is considered less democratic than the lot: both are admissible in a democracy, but it is essential to its very nature that all should elect. If any limitation takes place the government becomes an aristocracy or a polity, which alike tend to oligarchy in so far as they reduce the number of electors or of persons who are eligible, though differing in other respects. When some only appoint, in whatever manner, out of all, or all out of some, and the elections do not take place all at once (ἄμοι, i.e. when the governing body retire by rotation), we have a constitutional government, which inclines to an aristocracy when the two opposite principles of ‘some out of some’ and ‘some out of all’ are combined. The high oligarchical doctrine is ‘some out of some, by vote or by lot or by both,’ the lot being employed in an oligarchy, as in a democracy, to exclude favour or merit. Cp. v. 3. § 9.

If genuine, is used in a pregnant sense =καθιστασθαί, the construction being changed from the active, which is resumed in the clause which follows, to the neuter or passive. Though the word appears to disturb the sentence, it is found in all the MSS.

There seems naturally to mean τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων, τὰς δὲ ἐκ τινῶν, cp. § 19 fin. But if so the same words which here describe the oligarchical government, are applied in the next sentence to the polity or constitutional government which inclines to aristocracy. Nor can any reason be given why the election ‘out of all and out of some’ should be ‘more oligarchical’ than the election out of some. Another way of taking the words is to explain ῥὡς ἀμφοῖν as a double election. But in this passage ῥὡς is always used to introduce the persons out of whom the election is made; and therefore ῥὡς ἀμφοῖν could not = ἀμφοῖν. Some corruption of the text is probable; the numerous repetitions are likely to have confused the eye of the copyist. τὸ ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν is the ingenious and probably true emendation of Mr. Evelyn Abbott. If the principle of ‘some out of some’ is maintained, the election in both ways, i.e. by vote out of persons elected by lot, or by lot out of persons
elected by vote, would clearly be more oligarchical than the simple election by vote or by lot.

15. 21. \( \mu \eta \) γενόμενον ὡς ὁμοῖος,
sc. ὀλιγαρχικῶν. These words which are translated in the text 'though not equally oligarchical if taken by lot' would be better rendered 'and equally oligarchical if not appointed by lot' (Stahr): that is to say, whether appointed by vote or by lot they would equally retain their oligarchical character, if some were chosen out of some. \( \mu \eta \) must be taken with γενόμενον.

15. 21. τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὄμφοιν.
'In both ways,' sc. κλήρῳ καὶ αἰρέσει.

15. 22. τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὸς καταστάσεως ὁμοί τινὸς δυνάμεις τῶν ἄρχων τίνες εἰσίν, ἐσται φανερῶν.
Neither the reading nor the meaning of this passage is quite certain. Some MSS. and the old translation omit \( \kappa \alpha i \) before Τῆς, thus referring τίνες εἰσίν to δυνάμεις. If with Bekker and several MSS. we retain \( \kappa \alpha i \) before τίνες εἰσίν, the words may receive different interpretations. Either 1), 'how to establish them and what their powers and their nature are will be manifest,' i.e. need no explanation; or 2), 'we shall know how to establish them and their nature when we know their powers.'

16. 3. τὸ ἐν Φρεαττῶι δικαστήριον.
Nothing certain is known about this court; it is here spoken of only as a matter of tradition. The cases of which it took cognizance were rare, and therefore it is not strange that the court which tried them should have become obsolete. According to Pausanias (i. 28. § 12) Phreattys was a spot in the Piraeus near the sea, whither banished persons, against whom some fresh accusation was brought after their banishment, went to defend themselves out of a ship before judges who were on the land. This explanation is repeated by several of the scholiasts; but Aristotle, with much greater probability, supposes the banished man to offer himself for trial of the original offence. So in Plat. Laws ix. 866 D, a law is proposed, probably founded on some ancient custom, that the banished homicide, if wrecked upon his
native shore, should sit with his feet in the sea, until he found an opportunity of sailing.

\[\text{ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν φοινικῶν καὶ τῶν ξεινῶν, περὶ δὲ 16. 5. τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ δὲν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτείων αἱ κινήσεις.}\]

This sentence appears to be out of place; for no special mention occurs of political causes in what follows; but the writer at once returns to his former subject, and treats the appointment of judges on the same principles which he has applied to the appointment of other magistrates. It is possible that they connect with the beginning of Book v, and that the rest of the chapter is only a repetition in an altered form of c. 15. §§ 17–22.

οἱ τρόποι τέταρτοι.

The scheme on which judges are appointed, though abridged, is the same as that on which magistrates are appointed; and the various modes correspond in like manner to different forms of government.

The judicial institutions of a country reflect the political, but with a difference. The legislature is active, the courts of law are passive; they do not move until they are set in motion, they deal with particular cases which are brought before them by others; and through these only do they rise to general principles. They do not make laws, but interpret them; nor can they set aside a law unless by appealing to a higher law. They are the conservative element of the state, rooted in habit and precedent and tradition.

But there is also a certain analogy between the political and judicial institutions of a country. In a free state the law must be supreme, and the courts of law must exercise an independent authority; they must be open and public, and they must include a popular element. They represent the better mind of the nation, speaking through certain fixed forms; and they exercise indirectly a considerable influence upon legislation. They have their place also in the education of the people: for they, above all other instructors, teach the lesson of justice and impartiality and truth. As good actions produce good habits in the individual, so the
laws of a state grow and strengthen and attain consistency by the decisions of courts.

That Aristotle was not ignorant of the connexion between the judicial and political institutions of a people is shown by his remark that 'Solon established the democracy when he constituted the dicasteries out of the whole people' (ii. 12. § 2).
BOOK V.

The first sentence implies that we are approaching the end of 1. i. the treatise; but see Essay on the Structure of the Aristotelian Writings.

ἐὰν δὲ σωτηρία τίνες καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χορίς ἑκάστης εἰσίν, ἐὰν δὲ διὰ τίνων 1. i. ἀν μᾶλλον σωζόντο τῶν πολιτείων ἑκάστη.

The latter of these two clauses is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition as being a mere repetition of the preceding. If spurious it is probably a duplicate incorporated from some other ancient form of the text, not a gloss. But Aristotle often draws over-subtle logical distinctions, and in striving after completeness he may easily have written σωτηρία τίνες and διὰ τίνων ἀν σωζόντο, with little or no difference of meaning between them.

δὲ δὲ πρῶτον ἵππολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν.

The last words may be either 1) taken adverbially; or 2)* may be the accusative after ἵππολαβεῖν, 1) 'We must in the first place begin by conceiving' or 2)* 'we must in the first place conceive our starting point to be.'

τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἔσον. 1. 2.

In Bekker's 2nd edition καὶ is altered to ἔσον without MSS. authority. The sense thus obtained would coincide with the conception of justice in the Nic. Eth. v. 3. § 8.

But the same thought is less accurately expressed by the text. The καὶ here, as elsewhere in Aristotle, may be taken in the sense of id est. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οἰκία πρώτον τῷ φόσει τοῦ πρός τι: Metaph. iv. 14, 1020 b. 3, τὰ ἄκιντα καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά where τὰ ἄκιντα = τὰ μαθηματικά. And it may be further argued that the more general form of words is better suited to this
passage. For Aristotle is here expressing not his own opinion but the consensus of mankind. And although the democrat in some sense acknowledges proportional equality, he would hardly go so far as to say that justice is identical with it. The reading of the MSS. is therefore preferable.

In Book iii. cc. 9 and 12 it has been assumed that justice and proportionate equality, not mere class interests, are the principles on which the state is based and which give a right to citizenship. Aristotle proceeds to show how the neglect or misconception of these principles leads to the overthrow of states.

1. 4. οἱ δὲ ἃνισοι ἄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ἐντούσῃ τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἄνισον.
   The last words are an explanation of πλεονεκτεῖν. Cp. Nic. Eth. v.

2. § 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἄπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πάν πλέον.

1. 5. ἡμαρτημέναι δὲ ἀπλῶς εἰσί.
   Spengel reads ἡμαρτημέναι δὲ τοῦ ἀπλῶς, though there is no trace of variation in the MSS. Nearly the same meaning may be elicited from the text as it stands: ‘They are perversions, when regarded simply,’ i.e. ‘by an absolute standard of justice’; that is to say, their justice is relative to aristocracy, oligarchy or democracy, and hence becomes a cause of revolution.

1. 8. Διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται δικόσ.
   The commentators are puzzled to find a connexion for these words, which the various reading δικαίως shows to have been an ancient difficulty. Either 1)* the particle διὸ is attributable to the superabundance of logical expression and therefore is not to be strictly construed; or to the condensation of two clauses into one, the word δικός referring to what follows: ‘Hence arise changes; and in two ways.’ Or 2) we must gather, however obscurely indicated, out of what has preceded some distinction corresponding to that between changes of forms of government and changes of persons and parties under the same form of government. Love of equality may perhaps be thought to lead to a change of the constitution; impatience of inequality to a change of persons and offices. But this connexion of ideas, if intended, is not clearly stated. It would be rash, after the manner of some editors (Con-
ring, Susemihl, etc.), in a book like Aristotle’s Politics to infer a
‘lacuna’ between the words ἐστὶ τῶν ἐστὶν and δὲν στασιάζουσιν from
the want of connexion.

ἀσπερ ἐν Δακεδαλίῳ φασι Λύσανθρος τινα ἐπιχειρήσαι καταλύσαι τὴν 1. 10.
bastilean.

Cp. Plut. Lys. 24–26 for an account (partly taken from Ephorus
and wearing rather an improbable appearance) of the manner in
which Lysander by the aid of oracles and religious imposture
conspired to overturn the monarchy of Sparta and to throw open
the office of king to the whole family of the Heraclidæ, of which
he was himself a member; or, according to another statement, to
all the Spartans.

Παυσανίαν τῶν βασιλέως.

He was not king, though of the royal family; cp. Thuc. i. 132.
καὶ ὁδε γένους τοῦ βασιλείου ὅτα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρώνι τιμὴν έχοντα (Πλει-
σταρχον γὰρ τὸν Λεωνίδου δύνα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἐν ἄνωθι δω ἐπετρόπευεν).
The same mistake is repeated in vii. 14. § 20.

καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μέροιν ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν 1. 10, 11.
φύλαρχοι βουλὴ ἐποίησαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἡλιαῖαν ἐπάφηγες ἐστιν ἐν τῶν
ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι βασιλεῖν τὰς ἱράς, δότων ἑπικυρίαν ἱρὴ τις.
διαγραφεῖν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ.

The revolution at Epidamnus was only partial. The change of
φύλαρχοι into a Βουλή made the state less oligarchical. Cp. vi. 8.
§ 17, καλεῖται δὲ [τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας] ἐνθα μὲν προβοῦσιν . . . ὅπου δὲ
πλῆθος ἐστὶ Βουλὴ μᾶλλον. But according to an ancient custom in
the governing body the magistrates (τὰς ἱράς τὰς ἱράς) were
required to go to the Heliaea at every election—this relic of
oligarchy survived in the democracy. A like oligarchical spirit
was indicated in the appointment of ‘the single magistrate’ (cp.
iii. 16. § 1).

It is also possible to take the words in another way, connecting
τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι with ἐστὶ τὴν Ἡλιαῖαν instead of with τὰς ἱράς.
‘It was compulsory that the magistrates should attend the assembly
of the ruling classes, when a certain magistracy took a vote re-
quiring it.’ Which of the two modes of translating the passage is correct, we can only guess, as we have no independent knowledge of the procedure mentioned. The latter is the mode of taking them adopted by Müller (Dorians, iii. 9. § 6); but the use of ‘Hlaiα simply in the sense of an assembly, and not as a proper name, and therefore its construction with τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείατι is doubtful.

τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείατι. Either 1) the ruling class; or better 2) the governing body. The two meanings cannot always be clearly distinguished. Cp. c. 6. § 11; iv. 6. § 9 and v. 4. § 2. Compare also iii. 7. § 2, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολιτεύμα σημαίνει ταύτων, πολιτεύμα δὲ ἑστι τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, and infra v. 8. § 5, τοῖς ἐξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτείατι, which show that the two meanings of πολιτεύμα, as of πολιτεία, like the two senses of the English word ‘government’ or ‘state,’ pass into one another. The genitive is partitive.

δ ἡρχών δ εἰς ἤν. ἤν is omitted in several MSS. and is not confirmed by iii. 16. § 1, ( . . . πολλαὶ ποιώσας ἐνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως τοιάτῳ γὰρ ἡρχῆς τίς ἑστι καὶ περὶ Επίδαμνον) where Aristotle speaks of the single Archon at Epidamus, not in the past, but in the present tense. Yet it is not impossible that he may have spoken of an office which had recently existed at Epidamus, first, in the present, and afterwards, more correctly, in the past tense.

1. i1. πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνυσον η στάσις· οὐ μὴν τοῖς ἄνισοις ὑπάρχει ἄνδυλον· ἀδίκως γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνυσος, ἐὰν γὰρ ἐν ἴσοις ἄλος γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ἐνιότεινε σταυράσειν,

οὐ μὴν . . . ἴσοις is a parenthetical explanation of the word ἄνυσον. 1) ‘Certainly to unequals there is no proportion.’ According to this way of taking the passage ἄνδυλον is the nom. to ὑπάρχει. 2) Others supply τὸ ἄνυσον from the preceding sentence (sc. ὑπάρχει ἄνδυλον). ‘I mean the inequality in which there is no proportion.’ This is illustrated by an example. 3) Others again connect ἄνδυλον with τοῖς ἄνισοις. ‘Not that real inequality exists among those who are only proportionately unequal.’ According to any explanation the connexion is harsh: and therefore there is some reason for suspecting that a marginal note has crept into the text.

1. 13. The punctuation of Bekker, who places a comma after τὸ καὶ.
NOTES, BOOK V. I.

17. In his 2nd Edition (see note on Text) accords with his correction of the text in § 2, ὁμολογοῦντον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ καὶ ἀναλογίαν ἵπτον instead of καὶ τὸ καὶ ἀναλογίαν.

εἰσεῖναι γὰρ καὶ ἄρετη ἐν ἀλίγους, ταῦτα δ' ἐν πλείονιν.


ἀποροι δὲ πολλοί πολλαχοῖ.

1. 14. 'But there are in many places a large class of poor.' Some MSS. read ἀποροι, some omit πολλοί, and it has been contended by Stahr that ἀποροι δὲ καὶ ἀποροι πολλαχοῖ is the true reading. But the text, which is the reading of several Greek MSS. and is confirmed by Moerbeke, is better.

tὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς πάντως καθ' ἑκάτεραν πετάχθαι τὴν ἱσότητα φαίλον,

1. 14. 'Either equality of number or equality of proportion, if the only principle of a state, is vicious': cp. infra c. 9. § 13; iv. 13. § 6; vi. 5. § 2.

ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου.

1. 15. ἡμαρτημένου is to be taken with τοῦ πρώτου as well as with τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

ἡ πρῶς τὴν ἄλλαρχίαν.

1. 16. ἄλλαρχία is here used for the oligarchical party, τοῖς ἀλίγοις, parallel to δῆμος in the previous clause, although in the preceding sentence the same word means a form of government—an example of Aristotle's transitional and uncertain use of language.

ἀὐτὲ δὲ πρὸς αὐτῶν, ὥς τι καὶ ἄρσον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται τῷ δῆμῳ στάσις. 1. 16.

This reflection is probably true of Greek democracies, but can hardly be justified by modern experience either of the Italian Republics, which swarmed with factions and conspiracies, or of France in the first French revolution, or of England under the Commonwealth, or of Switzerland in the war of the Sonderbund, or of N. America in the war of North and South, or of the S. American Republics. Differences of character, climate, religion, race, affect democracies as well as other forms of government.
1. 16. ἐτί δὲ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων, ἦπερ ἐστὶν ἄσφαλτότερη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτείων.

Aristotle is giving a further reason why democracy is safer than oligarchy, because it more nearly approximates to the μέση πολιτεία, which is the safest of all such forms of government, [i.e. of all except the perfect one]. Cp. iv. 11. § 14.

ἲπερ refers to ἢ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία. τοιούτων=the imperfect forms.

An obscurity arises from the inversion of the subject. The sentence=ὁμοίου ἐγγυτέρω τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας ἢ ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἦπερ τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας. The meaning would be improved if, as in some MSS., ἢ before τῶν ὀλίγων was omitted.

2. 1. The πῶς ἔχοντες, τίνων ἔνεκεν, τίνες ἀρχαὶ τῶν στάσεων are the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions.

2. 2. περὶ ἦς ἢδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες.

Sc. in what he has said about ἴσων and ἀνισῶν in the previous chapter.

2. 4. αἱ δὲ αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, ὅσον αὐτοί τε διατίθενται τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὕτως, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς πλείους.

The seven causes are κέρδος, τιμὴ, ὑβρις, φόβος, ἐπεροχή, καταφρόνησις, αἰθέριος παρὰ τὸ ἁλάσονι. Or, according to another way of reckoning (ὑπὸ τὸν τρόπον), other elements, partly the same, and partly different, are added, viz. ἐρυθεία, ὀλγορία, μικρότης, ἀνορμότης.

As often happens both in the Politics (cp. bk. iv. c. 1) and in the Ethics (cp. vii. cc. 1–10) of Aristotle, the order in which the cases are at first enumerated is not the order in which they are afterwards discussed; the latter is as follows: ὑβρις, κέρδος, τιμὴ, ἐπεροχὴ, φόβος, καταφρόνησις: the rest retain their original place.

περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων. To be taken closely with τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων, 'in the manner which I have described, and about the things which I have described,' sc. κέρδος and τιμὴ to which τοῖς εἰρημένως (§ 5) also refers.

2. 5. ἄλλ' οὖν ὁσαύτως,

sc. ὁσαύτως ταὐτά. They are the same and not the same, 'The
love of gain seeks gain for itself, the love of honour is jealous of honour bestowed upon others.'

2. 6.

2. 6.  

Notes, Book V. 3.

3. 4.

This and the revolution in Rhodes mentioned below (§ 5) appear to be the same with that of which a more minute but somewhat obscure account is given in c. 5. § 2—mentioned here as illustrating fear and contempt; in c. 5, as showing that revolutions arise from the evil behaviour of demagogues in democracies; two accounts of the same event taken from different points of view, but not inconsistent with each other. Rhodes was transferred from the alliance of Athens to Sparta in 412, and remained the ally of Sparta until after the battle of Cnidos in the year 394 B.C. when the people, assisted by the Athenians, drove out the notables who were afterwards restored by the help of Teleutias the Lacedaemonian B.C. 390. Diod. Sic. xiv. 97; Xen. Hell. iv. 8. Whether this latter revolution can be identified with the 

"παράκλησις" mentioned by Aristotle is uncertain.

3. 5.  

Cp. infra c. 5. § 2, where the suits against the rich at Rhodes appear to have been brought by private individuals; also Thuc. iii. 70.

3. 5.  

Yet the destruction of the democracy seems hardly consistent with the preponderance which the Athenians retained in Boeotia during the nine years following the battle of Oenophyta (456), at the end of which time, and not until after they had won the battle of Coronea (447), all the Boeotians regained their independence. (Thuc. i. 112.) Compare as bearing on Aristotle’s knowledge of Theban history, infra c. 6. § 15, and note.

3. 5.  

probably the same event mentioned infra c. 5. § 4, but apparently
not the same with the revolution in Megara, mentioned in Thuc. iv. 74, which occurred after, and in consequence of, the retirement of the Athenians (b.c. 424); possibly the same with the occasion mentioned in iv. 15. § 15, when the government was narrowed to the returned exiles and their supporters. See on iv. 15. § 15.

3. 5. εν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος,
sc. ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθαρ. According to the narrative of Herod. vii. 155, the γαμόροι were driven out by the Syracusan populace, and returned under the protection of Gelon, to whose superior force the Syracusans opened their gates. The destruction of the democracy may therefore be said to have been caused by the violent conduct of the people towards the landowners. But if so, the contradiction which Mr. Grote finds between the statements of Herodotus and Aristotle admits of a reconcilement. See note on c. 43, vol. v. 286, original edit. He thinks that for Gelon we should substitute Dionysius, and observes that the frequent confusion of the two names was noted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiq. Rom. vii. c. 1. p. 1314.

3. 7. εν Τάραντι ἡττηθέντων.
Called by Herodotus (vii. 170) ‘the greatest slaughter of Greeks within his knowledge.’ Diodorus, ‘the Sicilian,’ (xi. 52. § 5), apparently in ignorance of the geography of Italy, says that the Iapygian victors pursued the Rhegians into the town of Rhegium (a distance of about 200 miles), and entered with them!

3. 7. δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας.
Cp. vi. 5. §§ 10, 11, where the Tarentines are described in the present tense as being under a sort of πολιτεία or moderate democracy, to which they probably reverted at some time later than that referred to in the text. In the Syracusan expedition they were hostile to the Athenians (Thuc. vi. 44), and are therefore not likely at that time to have been a democracy.

3. 7. καὶ ἐν Ἀργείᾳ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἔβδομῇ ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένου τοῦ Δάκωνος ἱππαχώσθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινῶς.
The meaning of the name Hebdomê was unknown to the Greeks themselves. The victory of Cleomenes over the Argives is men-
tioned in Herodotus (vi. 76–83), Pausanias (iii. 4), and in Plutarch (De Mulierum Virtutibus, iv. 245 D). In the narrative of the latter various plays on the number seven occur, which probably originated in the word ἑβδομή. The number of the dead slain by Cleomenes is said to have been 7777: the battle is said to have been fought on the seventh day of the month ὑπεραποίον μῆνα, Ib.); or during a truce of seven days which Cleomenes violated by attacking the Argives during the night, he arguing that the seven days did not include the nights, or, perhaps with better reason, that vengeance on an enemy was deemed preferable to justice both by Gods and men (Apophth. Lacon. 223 B). The word may have been the name of the wood mentioned in the accounts of Herodotus and Pausanias (loc. cit.) or of some other place* called after the number seven; but more likely of a festival held on the seventh day, which gave its name to the battle.

ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένου κ.τ.λ. Read in the English text: 'the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces.'

καὶ ἐν Ἀθηναίων ἀνυχούντων πεζῶν οἱ γυναῖκες ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ 3. 7. κατάλογου στρατεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακωνικῶν πόλεων.

The κατάλογος ὀπλίτων mentioned in Thuc. vi. 43, καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιαι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ κατάλογον, and elsewhere, Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 1, in which the Θῆτες, or lowest of the four classes, were not included.

ἐκ κατάλογον. Every one was obliged to take his turn in the order of the roll, and no substitutes were allowed, because the number of soldiers willing to offer themselves was not sufficient.

ὑπὸ τῶν Λακωνικῶν πόλεων. As in the Syracusan expedition, to which the word ἀνυχούντων chiefly refers. Cp. Thuc. vii. 27.

πλειόνων γὰρ τῶν ἀπόρων γινομένων.

Most of the extant MSS. are in favour of εἰπόρων. But ἀπόρων, which is the reading of the old translator, is not wholly indefensible. The meaning may be that power falls into the hands of the few, either when the poor become more numerous, or when properties increase; the extremes of want and of wealth coexisting in the same state. The two cases are really opposite aspects of the same phenomenon, 'when the citizens become more and more
divided into rich and poor." The argument from the more difficult reading is in favour of ἀπόρρων.

3. 9. ἐν 'Αρείῳ.

A later name of Hestiaea in Euboea, or rather (Strabo x. p. 446) of an Athenian city established in the time of Pericles, on the same site, to maintain control over Euboea. After the fall of Athens it passed into the hands of Sparta and received an oligarchical constitution, reverting to Athens in the year 377. Probably at this time καταλίθη ὀλιγαρχία. For another reference to Hestiaea, which never entirely lost its old name (Pausan. vii. p. 592), see c. 4. § 4.

3. 10. τέλος δ' οὖθενδ' ἡρχον.

ουθενδ' is taken in the text as the genitive of value. If this way of explaining the word is rejected as unidiomatic, or rather, not likely to be employed when according to the more familiar idiom οὖθενδ' would be governed by ἡρχον, we may adopt the emendation of Bekker's 2nd Edition, ἀπ' οὖθενδ'.

3. 11. οὖν Τροιζνιώτες Ἀχαιοὶ συνήχεσαν Σύβαριν, εἶτα πλείονος οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ γενεῖναι εξίθαλοι τοῖς Τροιζνιώταις. διεν τὸ ἄγα συνέθη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.

The foundation of Sybaris (B.C. 720) is recorded in Strabo vi. p. 263, but nothing is said of the joint occupation of the place by the Troezenians: nor of the curse. The fall of Sybaris is attributed to a very different cause in a gossiping story told by Athenaeus xii. p. 520, of a Sybarite having beaten his slave at the altar to which he fled for refuge. A rather fabulous account of the war between Sybaris and Croton, in which Milo the athlete figures as a sort of Heracles, is given by Diod. Sic. xii. 9.

3. 12. καὶ ἐν Θουρίου Σύβαρίται τοῖς συνοικήσαντι.

Sc. ἐστασάσαν or some similar word gathered from the preceding sentence. For a more detailed though not very trustworthy narrative of the event referred to, see Diod. Sic. x. 90; xii. 10, 11. Thurii being founded on the site of Sybaris, the Sybarites who joined in the colony naturally looked upon the country as their own.

3. 12. Ζαγκλαίοι δ' Σαμίους ἐποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον καὶ αὐτοὶ.

This, which is one of the blackest stories in Greek history, is narrated at length by Herodotus vi. 23. The Zancleans had
invited Hippocrates tyrant of Gela to assist them against Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, but were betrayed by him and delivered over to the Samians.

Συμμορίαν μετὰ τὰ τυραννεῖα τοὺς ἔφοιτος καὶ τοὺς μυθοφόρους πολίτας Σ. 13.

Another instance of the danger of incorporating foreigners in a state. The foreigners in this case were the mercenaries of Hiero and Gelo. After the expulsion of Thrasybulus they were allowed to remain in the city, but deprived of political privileges. The narrative of their revolt, of their seizure of Acradina and Ortygia, and of the troubles which followed the attempt to drive them out in the ill-fated island of Sicily, is to be found in Diod. xi. 72 ff.

καὶ Ἀμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων ἀποίκους ἔξησαν ἐπὶ τοῦτον οἱ Σ. 13. πλείστοι αὐτῶν.

αὐτῶν is to be taken with οἱ πλείστοι, which is in partitive apposition with Ἀμφιπολίται. The event referred to cannot be shown to have any connexion with the revolt of Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 105). Nor do we know of any other event which corresponds with the account given either here or in c. 6. § 8 where the revolution is spoken of 'as an insurrection against an oligarchy, made by the aid of Chalcidians' who had settled in the place. But an oligarchy could not have existed under the control of Athens; nor would a democracy be likely to have joined the Peloponnesian confederacy.

στασιάζουσι θ' ἐν μὲν τῶν διλαγχίας κ.τ.λ. Σ. 14.
‘There are other differences besides those of race which divide cities. There may be two cities in one (c. 12. § 15), both in oligarchies and democracies.’ This general reflection is introduced awkwardly amid the special causes of revolutions in states. But a similar confusion of general and particular occurs in several other passages; e. g. iv. 4. § 22 ff.

καθάπερ ἐξηταὶ πρώτερον. Σ. 14.
Probably c. 1. §§ 3, 4.
3. 15. Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιέσ.

That the Colophonians and Notians were torn by dissensions may be gathered from Thucydides iii. 34.

3. 15. μᾶλλον δηματικοὶ οἱ τῶν Πειραιά οἰκονυτες τῶν τὸ δαστυ.

The great power of the democracy at Athens dated from the battle of Salamis; and as the sailors were the lowest class of citizens, naturally the Piraeus was its head-quarters. Liberty was saved by the fleet in the days of the Four Hundred; and when driven out of Athens by the thirty took refuge at the Piraeus, from which it returned victorious.

4. 1. γίνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλὰ ἐκ μικρῶν.

Do not wars or revolutions always or almost always arise from a combination of large public and political causes with small personal and private reasons? Some spark sets fire to materials previously prepared. If Herodotus overestimates the personal and private causes of great events, does not Thucydides underestimate them, explaining everything on great principles and ignoring the trifles of politics to which Aristotle here directs attention? The course of ancient or of modern history taken as a whole appears to be the onward movement of some majestic though unseen power; when regarded in detail, it seems to depend on a series of accidents. The Greek was a lover of anecdotes; and for him this gossip about trifles had a far greater interest than the reflections of Thucydides upon the course of human events. (See Introduction, vol. i. p. xcii.)

4. 1. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.

The same story is told with additions and embellishments by Plutarch 'Praecepta gerendae reipublicae' p. 825 C.

4. 2. ὅθεν προσλαμβάνοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι διεστασῖας πάντας.

Here as infra c. 6. § 8 the word διεστασίασαν may be causal and active, ‘they took the members of the government to their respective sides and so split all the people into factions.’ (Cp. καταστασίασθαι v. 6. § 14). Or as in the English text (taking διαστασίμως, like στασίμως, as a neuter) ‘they then drew all the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and made a revolution.’
The argument is that the beginning is half the whole, according to the old proverb, and therefore that an error at the beginning is equivalent to half the whole amount of error. The proverb is again cited, Nic. Ethics i. 7. § 20.

This narrative, like the story of the Syracusan affair, is told, but in a more romantic manner, in the passage of Plutarch quoted above (Praec. geren. rep. p. 825 B) and also by Aelian, Var. Hist. xi. 5. The narrative of Plutarch contains the names of the persons concerned, Crates and Orgiliaus, and is therefore probably taken not from Aristotle but from some other source. τῶν στάσεων κ.τ.λ., the sacred war to which another origin is assigned infra in § 7. See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.

No mention of Doxander occurs nor is there any hint of this story in Thucydides (iii. 2 ff.). The revolt of Mitylene is ascribed in his narrative entirely to political causes, and was long premeditated. The only point of coincidence between the two accounts is the mention of the proxenus, who is said in Thucydides to have given information to the Athenians. They are not, however, necessarily inconsistent: for Aristotle may be speaking of the slight occasion, Thucydides of the deeper cause. Nor can any argument be drawn from the silence of the latter. He may have known the tale, but may not have thought fit to mention it, any more than he has recorded the singular episode of the suicide of Paches in the public court on his return home, recorded by Plutarch iv. 8 (Nicias 6). There is also an omission in the account of Aristotle which is supplied by Thucydides. For the proxenos who gave information to the Athenians is afterwards said to have
repented, and to have gone on an embassy to Athens petitioning for peace (Thucyd. iii. 4). Such stories as this about Doxander have been common in modern as well as in ancient history; they are very likely to be invented, but may sometimes be true.

4. 7. Mnason, according to Timaeus, was the friend of Aristotle (Athenaeus vi. p. 264).

4. 8.  ἥ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάχῳ βουλῇ εἰδοκιμήσας εἰς τοῖς Μηδικοῖς.

According to Plut. Themistocles c. 10 Aristotle narrated that 'at the time [of the battle of Salamis] when the Athenians had no public resources the council of the Areopagus gave to each sailor a sum of eight drachmas and thus enabled the triremes to be manned.' Whether such a statement was really to be found in Aristotelian writings, perhaps in the Politics to which it is commonly ascribed, or whether Plutarch is confusing the more general statement of Aristotle contained in this passage with information which he had derived from some other source, is uncertain.

4. 8. συντονωτέραν ποιήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Cp. iv. 3. § 8, διαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ διεποιηκτέμες, τὰς δὲ ανεμένας καὶ μάλακὸς δημοτικὰς, sc. πολιτείας. σύντονος means the more highly pitched note given by the greater tension of the string, and hence the stricter and more rigid form of government.

4. 8. ὁ ναυτικὸς δὴχὸς γενόμενος αὐτὸς τὴν περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θαλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημαρχίαν ἐσχάρτησαν ἐποίησε.

διὰ ταύτης, sc. τῆς νίκης, 'by means of this victory.'

τῆς ἡγεμονίας, sc. αὐτοῦ γενόμενος, διὰ τὴν κατὰ θαλατταν δύναμιν follows τῆς ἡγεμονίας.

Plut. Arist. 22 says that after the battle of Salamis Aristides extended the right of voting to the fourth class. He had already mentioned in c. 13 that many of the higher classes had fallen into poverty; they would therefore have been degraded but for this extension. The merits and sufferings of all classes in the war were a natural justification of such a measure. The nobility and the common people vied with one another in their defence of
Hellas against the invader. No element lay deeper in the Hellenic character than the sense of superiority which all Hellenes acquired in the struggle with Persia.

περὶ τὴν ἐν Μαντείᾳ μάχην.

I.e. the first battle of Mantinea (419 B.C. described by Thuc. v. 70-74) in which, though the Argive army was defeated, the 1000 chosen Argives (doubtless belonging to the noble families) remained unconquered, and cut their way through the enemy. There is nothing in the account of Thucydides inconsistent with this statement, though he naturally dwells more on the influence of Lacedaemon in effecting the change of government (Ib. 81).

ἐπὶ Συρακοσίοις ὁ δῆμος αὐτος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς 4. 9.

Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν.

These words are not in perfect accord with the statement of Thucydides that the Athenians were unable to cope with the Syracusans because they had a form of government like their own, Thuc. vii. 55; but they agree with Diod. xiii. 34 fin., who says that the extreme form of democracy was introduced at Syracuse by Diocles after the overthrow of the Athenians. Nor is Thucydides quite consistent with himself; for the overthrow of the Athenian expedition was effected by the aristocratic leader Hermocrates and by the aid of Corinthians and Lacedaemonians. (See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.)

καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ.

See note on English text. Ambracia is said to have been founded by Gorgus, who is described by Antonin. Liberalis (i. 4. 19 ed. Westermann) as the brother of Cypselus (cp. Neanthes apud Diog. Laert. i. 98, who says that the two Perianders were ἄνευ τοῦ ἀδήλητου): by Scymnus (454) he is called his son. Periander is supposed by Müller (i. 8. § 3) to have been the son of Gorgus; but this is conjecture. Whether there was any real connexion, or whether the stories of relationship arise only out of an accidental similarity of names, it is impossible to determine.

ὁ δυνάμεως αὐτος.

‘Who are the causes of the power of a state:’ cp. supra,
§ 9. ὁ δήμος αἰτων γενόμενος τῆς νίκης. The elements of strength are also the elements of danger.

4. 13. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἱσπαστήσατε ... ἄρχοντιν αἰτῶν κ.τ.λ.
I. e. when fraud is succeeded by force or the old fraud by a new one. To take an example from Modern History, as the presidency of Louis Napoleon was succeeded by the coup d'etat, and ended in the plebiscite by which he was made Emperor of the French; or as in ancient history the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero was acquiesced in after a time by their Syracusan subjects.

4. 13. οἶνον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δήμον ἱσπαστήσαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλεῖα χρήματα παρέξεων.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 53, where Peisander demonstrates to the Athenian assembly that their only hope lay in the alliance of the Persian king.

4. 13. ψευδάμενοι.
‘Having once told the lie’ which, it is inferred, was detected.

5. 2. καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ μισθοφοράν τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπώριζον, καὶ ἐκάλλον ἀποδίδοντα τὰ διευλόμενα τοῖς τριπαλίχων· οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸς ἐπισφερομένας δικάς ἴνα γερανόθησαν συστάντες κατάλυσα τὸν δήμον.
‘The demagogues gained influence over the assembly by procuring pay for them: [probably they obtained the money for this purpose by not paying the trierarchs]. These were sued by their sailors or other creditors, and, not having been paid themselves, were unable to pay others; so in self-defence they overthrew the government.’ Such appears to be the meaning of this passage, a little amplified, on which no light is thrown from other sources.

The revolution here mentioned would seem to be the same as that which has been already referred to, supra, c. 3. § 4. The words διὰ τὰς ἐπισφερομένας δικάς occur in both passages.

5. 3. κατελίθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ δήμος.
Probably the Heraclea of Pontus founded by the Megarians in b.c. 559. The poems of Theognis imply that already in the sixth century b.c. a democratical party existed in the mother-city.
places bear the name of Heraclea. The Heraclea in Pontus is the most important of them and may be presumed to be meant when there is no further description as here or in c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

\[ \eta \text{ in Megárosis kateléthi dēmokratía.} \] 5. 4.
Cp. supra c. 3. § 5.

\[ \eta \text{ tais prosódois tais leitourgyais.} \] 5. 5.
Some word containing the idea of diminishing has to be supplied from ἀναδιάστοις ποιοίτες.

Demagogues like Cleon, Lysicles, Eucrates, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, were of a different type from Peisistratus or Periander, and equally different from Hiero and Gelo or Dionysius the First.

Three reasons are given for the frequent attempts to establish tyrannies in early Greek history—1) there were great magistracies in ancient states; 2) the people were scattered and therefore incapable of resistance; 3) the demagogues were trusted by them, because they were supposed to be the enemies of the rich.

\[ \text{Πεισιστράτους στασιάς πρὸς τοὺς πεδικοῖς.} \] 5. 8.

According to the narrative of Herodotus, i. 59 ff., Attica was at this time divided into factions, that of the inhabitants of the plain led by Lycurgus, and of the sea coast by Megacles, to which was added a third faction of the inhabitants of the highlands whom Peisistratus used as his instruments. He was restored to the tyranny by a combination of his own adherents and those of Megacles against the inhabitants of the plain.

\[ \text{Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις.} \] 5. 9.
Theagenes is mentioned in Thuc. i. 126 as the father-in-law of Cylon the conspirator; and in Arist. Rhet. i. 2, 1357 b. 33, as an example of a tyrant who like Peisistratus had asked for a guard.

\[ \text{Διονύσιος κατγορῶν Δαφναίου.} \] 5. 10.
Cp. Diod. Sic. (xiii. 86, 91, 92) who narrates how Daphnaeus, having been elected general by the Syracusans, failed to relieve Agrigentum and on the motion of Dionysius was deposed from his command.
5. 10. ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας.

The same phrase is used in ii. 12. § 2 where Solon is said to have established ἡ πατρίας δημοκρατία, the ancient or traditional democracy, 'the good old democracy,' as opposed to the later and extreme form.

5. 11. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἡττον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς ἄρχουσας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τῶν δήμων.

τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι, sc. κύριον τῶν δήμων τῶν νόμων = 'a remedy against the people becoming master.' That is to say, when the magistrates were elected by the tribal divisions the power of the people was not so great as when they voted all together.

When the larger units of government or representation are broken up into very small ones, local interests are likely to be preferred to the general good, and local candidates for office take the place of better men—a nation ceases to be inspired by great political ideas, and cannot effectually act against other nations. On the other hand, if England, or France, or the United States were represented in the national council only as a whole, what would be the result? Aristotle might have replied that a state is not a state in which 30,000,000 of people are united under a single government, or are represented in a single assembly, having no other connecting links; nor yet when they are subdivided into parishes; cp. vii. 4. § 11.

These are extremes by which a principle may be illustrated, but no one would think of accepting either alternative. The question which Aristotle here touches has a modern and recent interest to us, and may be put in another form: 'What should be the area of a constituency?' Some considerations which have to be kept in view are the following: 1) The facilities of locomotion and communication; 2) The habit or tradition of acting together among the natives of a country or district; 3) The question of minorities—should the aim of a constitution be to strengthen the government, or to give a perfectly fair representation of all parties, opinions, places? 4) The greater opportunity of a political career afforded by more numerous elections and smaller bodies of electors; and, on the other hand, 5) The greater independence of the representatives of large constituencies; and 6) The advantages or disadvan-
tages of local knowledge and of local interests have to be placed in the scale. We may conclude that in so far as the political life of a country is affected by the area of representation, it should not be so extended as to interfere with the power of common action; nor so localized that the members of the national assembly cease any longer to think in the first place of great national interests.

According to C. 1. § 16, ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίζονται δύο, ἢ τὰ πρὸς ὀλλόν τοῖς στάσεως καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον there are two modes of revolutions in oligarchies,—1) That arising from dissensions among the oligarchs themselves; 2) that arising from dissensions between the oligarchs and the people. The order of the two is reversed in this passage. The first which is here the second is generalized into ‘that arising from those outside the governing body’ (ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων, § 2), under which four cases are included (see Introduction). Το ἐνα μὲν (§ 1) corresponds grammatically μᾶλλον δὲ, which introduces one of the cases of στάσεως arising ἐξ ἄλλων although the leader comes ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. The other mode of revolution from within is discussed at the end of § 5 καὶ ἵνα δὲ κτλ., with which the second main division begins.

For a silly story about a bargain over some fish which is said to have been the origin of the revolt led by Lygdamis at Naxos, see Athenaeus viii. 348 who derives it from the Νάξιων πολιτεία in the so-called ‘Politics’ of Aristotle.

Goetting would interpret ἄλλων as ἄλλων ἡ τοῦ πλῆθους which is harsh. The conjectures αὐτῶν and ἄλληλων seem, at first sight, to simplify the passage, as everything from μᾶλλον δὲ in § 1 onwards would then apply to the same mode of στάσεως (ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν): but Aristotle in § 2 expressly distinguishes the ἐποροι who are not in the government from the oligarchs, and therefore a revolution begun by them could not be described as arising ἐξ ἄλληλων or ἐξ αὐτῶν.
6. 2. ὁ ἴν ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ.

In vi. 7. § 4 Massalia is described by Aristotle, speaking probably of a later period, as having enlarged the narrow oligarchy by the admission of new citizens. The oligarchy thus became more like a πολιτεία (πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλυγραχία).

6. 3. The difference was settled, not by throwing open the government to a lower class, but by the admission in greater numbers of members of the same families.

6. 5. τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

Here the members of the governing body, see note on c. 1. § 10.

6. 6. ἐν τοῖς τριάκονται Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἱσχύον τοὺς τριάκοντα δημογαγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετράκοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον.

From Xenophon's Hellenics ii. 3 we might be led to infer that Critias was the leading spirit of the thirty, but in Lysias contra Eratosthenem § 56, p. 125, we find that the name of Charicles precedes that of Critias among the leaders of the more extreme party. Charicles and Critias are also named together among the νομοθεταί whom the thirty appointed in Xen. Mem. i. 2. § 31.

It is singular that the leadership of a party in the 400 should be ascribed to Phrynichus who was late in joining the attempt (Thuc. viii. 68) and was soon assassinated (c. 92). He was however a man of great ability and is said by Thucydides to have shown extraordinary energy when he once took part.

6. 6. καὶ ἐν διασὶ ὀλυγραχίαις οἷς ὀντὶς αἱρεύνται τὰς ἅρχας ἐξ δῶν οἱ ἄρχοντες εἶναι.

The people will always be able to elect those members of the oligarchy who favour their interests. The representative depends upon his constituents, and must do their bidding. The remark of Aristotle is true, and admits of several applications. Yet the opposite reflection is almost equally true, that the popular representative easily catches the 'esprit de corps' of the society in which he mingles, and of the order or assembly to which he is admitted.

6. 6. ὅπερ ἐν Ἀθήνῃ συνέβαινεν.

We cannot be certain whether these words illustrate οἱ ὀπλιταὶ ἡ ὁ δῆμος or ὁ δῆμος only. That the membership of a club should
have been the qualification for an office of which the election was
in the hands of the people is remarkable (see note on § 13 infra).

καὶ ὅπως τὰ δικαστήμια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἔστων· δημαγωγοῦντες γὰρ θ. 7.
pρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Compare ii. 12. § 3, where Solon is said to have established the
democracy by appointing the courts of law from the whole people.

γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἵδια ζωτες θ. 8.
ἀσέλγεις.

So Plat. Rep. viii. 555 D. Compare also infra c. 12. § 17.

Hipparchinus, the father of Dion, was the chief supporter of θ. 8.
Dionysius (Plut. Dio c. 3), who married his daughter.

Καὶ ἐν Ἀιγλῆ ὁ τήν πράξει τήν πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μετα—θ. 9.
βολεῖ τὴν πολιτείαν.

Probably the well-known general Chares who flourished between
367–333 is here intended. He was a man who, in spite of his
disreputable character, contrived by corruption to maintain a great
influence over the Athenian people in the decline of their glory.
Of the transaction here referred to nothing more is known.

ὅποι τοιαῦται αὐτῶι, θ. 9.
sc. διὰ τὸ ἀναλώσαι τὰ ἱδια τοὺς εὐπόρους ζωτες ἀσέλγεις.

ὅτε μὲν οὖν ἑπιχειροῦσι τι κινεῖν, ὅτε δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά· ὅθεν πρὸς θ. 9.
ἀντοὺς στασιάζουσιν ἢ ὁδὸι ἢ οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτωσιν.

ἀντοὺς = 'the government, or the other oligarchs, from whom the
theft is made.'

ὁδοὶ = 'the thieves or peculators.' The revolution arises in two
ways, from the attack either of the thieves upon the government,
or of the government upon the thieves.

ὅμως τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερῆστιν.
θ. 11.

I. e. the election of the Elean elders, besides being an election
out of certain families (δοκαστευτικὴν), resembled that of the Lace-
daemonian elders who were chosen but 'in a ridiculous fashion' by
the whole people. See ii. 9. § 27.
6. 12. Timophanes was a Corinthian general, who was about to become, or for a short time became, tyrant of Corinth. He was slain either by the hand (Diod. xvi. 65), or at the instigation, of his brother Timoleon (Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4).

6. 13. τῶν περὶ Σιμών.

σίμων is found in all the Greek MSS, and in the old Latin translator. It shews at any rate the faithfulness with which they copied an unmeaning reading. Σιμων which is adopted by Bekker in both editions is an ingenious conjecture of Schlosser. Simus, if he be the person mentioned in Demosthenes (de Cor. p. 241), was a Larissaean who betrayed Thessaly to king Philip.

6. 13. ἐν Ἀβύδῳ εἰπὶ τῶν ἐταριῶν ὅπω ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου.

The name of Iphiades occurs in Demosthenes (in Aristocratem, p. 679), where it is said that his son was, or ought to have been, given up as a hostage to the Athenians by the town, not of Abydos but of Sestos. It will be remembered that at Abydos (supra c. 6. § 6) some of the magistrates were elected by the people from a political club. The manner in which he is spoken of would lead us to suppose that Iphiades was tyrant of Abydos, and that by the help of his club he had overthrown the oligarchy.

6. 14. Of the great Euboean cities Chalcis and Eretria, as of so many other Hellenic states which were famous in the days before the Persian War, little is known. We are told in bk. iv. 3. § 3 that the Chalcidians used cavalry against their opponents, and there is an allusion in Thuc. i. 15 to the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria which 'divided all Hellas,' again mentioned by Herod. v. 99.

6. 15. τῶν δ' ἐν Ἐβεροὺς καὶ Ἀρραῖον.

The only Archias of Thebes known to us was an oligarch, who betrayed the citadel of Thebes to the Spartans, and was afterwards himself slain by Pelopidas and his fellow conspirators. An oligarchical revolution could not therefore be said to have arisen out of his punishment. Yet the uncertainty of the details of Greek history in the age of Aristotle should make us hesitate in assuming a second person of the name. The mention of Heraclea in juxtaposition
with Thebes may suggest that this is the Heraclea not in Pontus, but in Trachis. Cp. note on c. 5. § 3.

6. 15.

Const. preg. = φιλονεκούντες είδωκον. The infinitive δεθημι helps the construction of αὐτούς, 'They carried their party spirit against them so far.'

6. 16.

διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικός εἶναι τὰς διλιγαρχίας ... ἡ ἐν Χλω διλιγαρχία.

The Chians in the later years of the Peloponnesian War were governed by an oligarchy: cp. Thuc. viii. 14. The island was recovered by Athens under the Second Empire, but again revolted in the year 458. The population is said to have been largely composed of merchant-seamen, supra, iv. 4. § 21.

6. 17.

πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρώτον τίμημα ... τοῦς μέσους is an accusativus pendens; 'Often when there has been a certain qualification fixed at first ... the same property increases to many times the original value,' etc.

6. 18.

οὐ μέντοι διὰ παλτῶν διλιγαρχία.

The exclusiveness of aristocracy and oligarchy is equally the ruin of both, though arising in the one case from the fewness of men of virtue and good manners, in the other from the fewness of men of wealth and birth.

7. 1.

Παρθενιά (έκ τῶν όμοιῶν γὰρ ἴσαν).

According to the legend the Partheniae were the progeny of Spartan women and of certain slaves or citizens of Sparta called ἰπέναιαι. They had in some way incurred the reproach of illegitimacy or inferiority. The fertile imagination of ancient writers, who were clearly as ignorant as ourselves, has devised several explanations of the name: they were the children of Spartans who remained at home during the Messenian war and were made Helots (Antiochus of Syracuse, fr. 14 Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. i. p. 184); or of Helots who married the widows of those who had fallen in the war (Theop. fr. 190 Müller i. p. 310); or of the youngest of the army who had not taken the oath to remain until the
the war was finished (Ephor. fr. 33 Müller i. p. 247), and were sent home to beget children.

7. 2. Λύσανδρος.
For the narrative of the later life of Lysander and of his attempt to open the Spartan monarchy to all the Heraclidae of whom he himself was one, and of his overthrow by Agesilaus whose claim to the kingdom he had previously supported, see Plutarch's Life of Lysander, 24–26.

7. 3. Κυάδων ο τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγρισιλάφω συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.
For a very curious account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, to which he was instigated by a desire to become one of the Spartan peers, see Xen. Hell. iii. 3. §§ 4–11.

ἐπ' Ἀγρισιλάφω if genuine must mean 'against Agesilaus' and (less directly) against the Spartans.

7. 4. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλομένης Εὐνομίας.
See Bergk Frag. 2–7, p. 316.

7. 4. Hanno is mentioned by Justin, xxi. 4. He is said to have lived in the time of Dionysius the younger about the year 346 and to have attempted to poison the senate and raise an insurrection among the slaves. Being detected and taken he was crucified with his family.

7. 5. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τε πειρῶνται μεγαλόν καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλομένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν.

ταῦτα refers to τὰ δύο, democracy and oligarchy. The great difficulty is the combination of the many and the few; not of virtue with either, except from the circumstance that it so rarely exists: cp. iv. 7. §§ 3, 4, and c. 8. § 8.

7. 6. διαφέρονται γὰρ τῶν ὑπομαζομένων πολιτείων αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τοῦτο, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἡττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν. τὰς γὰρ ἄποκλιμαχίας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ἀληθείαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας.

τοῦτο and διὰ τοῦτο have been taken as follows: 1)* 'Aristocracies differ from what are termed polities in the number of elements
which they combine (supra § 5), and the nature of the combination makes some of them more and some less stable.' The words which follow return to διαφέρουσι: 'there are such differences; for those of them which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, those which incline to democracy, polities.'

2) τότε and διὰ τοῦτο may be thought to refer rather to what follows than to what precedes. 'Aristocracies differ from polities in that polities include numbers, and because of this difference some of them are less and some of them more stable, some inclining more to oligarchy or the government of a few, others to polity, which is the government of a larger number.'

Susemihl takes the whole passage nearly in the same manner:

3) 'Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect (i.e. in having the three elements of δήμος, πλοῦτος, ἀρετή instead of the first two only), and for this reason, the former of these two kinds of governments (αἱτῶν) are less stable and the latter more so. For those which incline rather to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy are called polities; and for this reason they are safer than the others: for the greater number have more influence, and because they have equality they are more content.' Polity has only two elements, while aristocracy has three. The δήμος being one-half of the polity but only one-third of the aristocracy are better pleased with the existing government and therefore less disposed to revolution.

This way of explaining the passage gives an excellent sense. But the words αἱ μὲν ἡπτῶν, αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον, are partitive of αἱτῶν, which refers to αἱ ἀρετοκρατίαι and cannot therefore be applied αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον μόνιμοι to aristocracies αἱ δὲ ἡπτῶν μόνιμοι to polities. The passage is ill written and inaccurately worded, though the general meaning is tolerably clear, namely, that there is often an ill mingling of constitutions, which in various degrees seek to unite numbers and wealth, and that of the two, numbers are the safer basis.

συνέξη δὲ τὸ ἐξομένων ἐν Θουρίως.

7. 9.

Sc. the tendency of the constitution towards the prevailing element spoken of in § 7, as at Thurii from aristocracy towards oligarchy, followed by a reaction to democracy.
Thurii was founded in the year 443 under the protection of Athens, and had nearly ceased to exist in 390. Yet in this short time it was subjected to at least two serious revolutions. 1) that which is mentioned here from an oligarchical aristocracy into a democracy; 2) another revolution, noted infra § 12, by which it passed from a polity into an oligarchy of a few families, whether earlier or later than the preceding, is unknown. It may be conjectured, but it is only a conjecture, that the narrowing of the aristocracy briefly alluded to in this passage is the same change with that which is afterwards mentioned more fully in § 12, and their overthrow which ensued may be further identified with the expulsion of the Sybarites soon after the foundation of the city. It may also be conjectured with considerable probability that the government of Thurii became an oligarchy at the time when the Athenian citizens were driven out, after the failure of the Syracusan expedition.

7. 9. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμῆσατο εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἔλασσον μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἄρχεια πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τῶν γυρίμοισι συγκίσασθαι παρὰ τῶν νόμων.

Lit. 'For because the qualification for office was high and also because the whole country was monopolized by the notables contrary to law, the qualification was reduced and the number of offices increased.' Either the apodosis which is attached to the first member of the sentence belongs also to the second; or a clause answering to the second has been forgotten. The revolution at Thurii was a change from aristocracy or polity to democracy. The government had grown narrow and oligarchical, and the governing class had contrived to get the land into their own hands. But the people rose against the oligarchy, lowered the qualification, increased the number of offices, and got back the land. Two reasons are given for the rising of the people, 1) the increase of the qualification for office, and 2) the monopoly of land which had passed into the hands of the notables.

For εἰς ἄρχεια πλείω, cp. ii. 11. § 14, ὥσπερ ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πῦλις, πολιτικῶτερον πλείονος μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικῶτερον κοινῶτερον τι γὰρ, καθάπερ εἰπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἐκαστον ἀποτελείται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ δαντων.
Aristocracies are in fact more oligarchical than aristocratical, and 'the few' are always grasping at wealth. Cp. infra, c. 8. § 16.

The mother of Dionysius the younger was Doris a Locrian woman, and when expelled from Syracuse he was received by the citizens of Locri in a most friendly manner, but he afterwards availed himself of their good will to impose a garrison on the town. They ultimately drove out his garrison [Diodorus xiv. 44, Justin xxii. 2 and 3].

But why not? Aristotle seems to mean that no well-governed city would have allowed one of its citizens to marry into the family of a tyrant or would have entered into relation with him in consequence: or perhaps that in a democracy or well ordered aristocracy the marriage of a single citizen could not have become a great political event.

We may paraphrase this rather singular expression, 'In the days when the Greek world was divided between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.'
sibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant? At conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit, and the real speech of Claudius (given by Orelli and Nipperdey in their editions).

8. 6. έστι γάρ ὅσπερ δήμος ἡδη οἱ δῆμοι, διό καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγνονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὅσπερ είρηται πρότερον.

ἡδη, sc. διὰν πλείους δῆμοι.

ὁσπερ είρηται πρότερον refers only to the clause, διό καὶ . . . πολλάκις as will be seen from the comparison of c. 6. § 6 (demagogues in an oligarchy) where nothing is said about equals in an aristocracy becoming a democracy.

8. 9. πρῶν παρειληφέναι και αὐτοῖς.

The construction is πρῶ τῶν φιλονεκίας παρειληφέναι και αὐτοῖς (sc. τῶν ἔξω), ὅσπερ τοὺς ἀλλούς.

αὐτοῖς may be either the subject or the object of παρειληφέναι, with a slightly different meaning. Either "ʻbefore the spirit of contention has also carried away or absorbed them,' or, 'before they too have caught the spirit of contention.'

8. 10. τοῦ τιμήματος τοῦ κοινοῦ τῷ πλήθος.

i.e. the amount of the whole rateable property. The object is to preserve the same number of qualified persons, when the wealth of a city has increased or diminished.

8. 10. συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τῷ πλήθος πρὸς τὸ παμφθέον κατὰ τούτον τὸν χρόνον, ἐν ὅσαι μὲν πόλεις τιμῶνται κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, κ.τ.λ.

The words κατὰ τούτον τὸν χρόνον, though somewhat pleonastic, have a sufficiently good sense. The government is to compare the present with the past value of property at that time, i.e. with the property serving as a qualification at the time when the change is occurring (εἰσπορείας νομίσματος γιγαντομένης). The words are placed after κατ' ἐνιαυτόν by Susmihl following the authority of William of Moerbeke, but the meaning is thus over emphasized.

With κατ' ἐνιαυτόν repeat κατ' ἐνιαυτόν ἐπισκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.
\textbf{NOTES, BOOK V. 8.}

8. 12. 
\textit{ėn δήμῳ καὶ δῆλοιρχία καὶ μοναρχία καὶ πάση πολιτείᾳ.}

\textit{καὶ μοναρχία is omitted by Bekker in his second edition, but is found in the best MSS.} The advice given is at least as applicable to kings as to other rulers of states. \textit{πάση πολιτείᾳ=not \textit{every constitutional government} but in a more general sense \textit{every form of government}.} (See note on text.)

8. 12. 
\textit{tās παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.}

\textit{=tōs παραστάτας, \textquoteleft their followers\textquoteright or \textquoteleft followings.\textquoteright}

8. 13. 
\textit{tōs ζώντας ἀνυμφόροσ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν.}

As an example of a life unsuited to the state of which they are citizens may be cited the case of the Spartan Ephors, ii. 9. § 24.

8. 13. 
\textit{τοῦτον δ` ἄκος τὸ ἀτι τῶν ἀντικειμένων μορίων ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ 8. 14. τὰς ἀρχὰς.}

\textit{In this favourite remedy of \textquoteleft conservation by antagonism,\textquoteright which is really only an \textquoteleft unstable equilibrium,\textquoteright Aristotle does not seem to see} how much of the force of the state is lost.

8. 17. 
\textit{καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἄμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ 8. 17. τοῦτο κατασκευάσσει τις.}

8. 17. 
\textit{τοῦτο, sc. τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν κερδαίνειν, to be gathered from the previous sentence.}

8. 18. 
\textit{ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιμῆσθωσαν.}

8. 19. 
\textit{λόχοι are military divisions to which in some states civil divisions appear to have corresponded.} Cρ. \textit{Xen. Hier. c. 9. § 5, δηρηνται μὲν γὰρ ἀπασαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ μὲν κατὰ φυλὰς αἱ δὲ κατὰ μοίρας αἱ δὲ κατὰ λόχους· καὶ ἄρχουσι ἐφ’ ἕκάστῳ μέρει ἐφεστήκασιν.} The accounts apparently are to be deposited at the bureaus or centres of such divisions.

8. 20. 
\textit{μὴ μόνον τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρποὺς, 8. 20. ἐν ἐνίας τῶν πολιτείων λαμβάνει γεγρόμενον.}

8. 20. 
\textit{As might be done by taxes or state services exclusively imposed on the rich,} or \textit{by a tax of which the rate increased in proportion to the amount assessed.} \textit{Infra c. 11. § 10, Aristotle tells us how}
Dionysius contrived in five years to bring the whole property of his subjects into his treasury. Cp. also vi. 5. § 5.

8. 20. κἀν τις ὑβρίσθη τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπίτιμα εἶναι ἡ ἐν σφῶν αὑτῶν.

The construction is ἀν τις ὑβρίσθη τιμᾶ σφῶν αὑτῶν; but whether σφῶν αὑτῶν refers 1) to οἱ εὐπόροι or 2) to τούτους, i.e. τοὺς ἀπόρους, is not clear.

8. 20. μηδὲ πλειόνων ἢ μιᾶς τῶν αὐτῶν κληρονομεῖν.

Cp. Mill, Pol. Econ. Bk. v. c. 9, where he urges, much in the spirit of Aristotle and Plato, 'that no one person should be permitted to acquire by inheritance more than the amount of a moderate independence.'

9. 1. τρία δὲ των χρή ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.

In this passage, which has the appearance of a digression, Aristotle is still speaking of the preservatives of the state.

See the summing up, § 5.

Cp. Rhet. ii. 1, 1378 a. 6, τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι πιστοῖς τοῖς λέγονται τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἷμα· τοσαῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιπλοῦμεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτα φρόνησι καὶ ἀρετή καὶ εὔνοια: also Thuc. ii. 60, where Pericles claims εὔνοια, φρόνησις, ἀρετή as the proper qualities of a statesman: καὶ τοῖς ἐμόι τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὑγίεισθε ὡς σεβαστὸν εἰσόμαι ἕσων εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δεόντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταύτα φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων.

9. 1. δύναμιν τῶν ἐργῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς.

≡ 'administrative capacity,' 'power to do the duties of the office.'

9. 2. πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τῆς διαίρεσιν.

In this passage (cp. infra πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῆν αἵρεσιν) the words αἵρεσις and διαίρεσις are used almost indifferently, the latter adding to the idea of choice or selection another shade of meaning 'discrimination or separation from others,'—'how we are to discriminate in the choice.'

9. 4. ἢ δὲι ένδέχεται κ.τ.λ.

Dependent on some more general idea to be supplied from
\textit{OTES, BOOK V. 9.}

\textit{9. 5.}

We need not suppose any allusion to a lost part of the Politics, or to a special treatise called \textquote{oi νόμοι.} The meaning is that \textquote{enactments in the laws of states which are supposed to be for their good are preservative of states.}' \textit{tòs νόμοις = \textquote{their laws,' the article referring to \textit{πολιτείαις} which follows.}

\textit{9. 7.}

Those who consider that rigid adherence to the principles of the existing constitution, whether democracy or oligarchy, is the only object worthy of a statesman, carry their theory to an extreme. They forget that \textquote{happy inconsistencies' may be better than extremes.} The \textit{Opportunist} may do greater service to the Republic than the \textit{Intransigeant.}

\textit{9. 7.}

\textit{καθάπερ ρίς.}

Cp. Rhet. i. 4, 1360 a. 23, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι \textit{ζῶ τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πάσαι καὶ ἀνείμεναι καὶ ἐπιτευνόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνείμενη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὡστε τίλος ήξε τὰ ὀλγαρχεῖα, ἄλλα καὶ ἐπιτευνομένη σφόδρα, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ γνώμη, καὶ ἡ σημαίνεται ὃ ἐν μόνον ἄνειμενα ἥρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἄλλα καὶ σφόδρα γραφή γνώμενα ὑπὸ παρὰ ἑωτὸ διαστίθεται ὡστε μηδὲ μικτῆρα δοκεῖ εἰναι.

\textit{9. 7.}

\textit{διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων.}

\textit{On account of the excess (cp. above \textit{ἐὰν ἐπιτεύη}) and of the defect of the opposite qualities.'}

\textit{συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὸς ἄλλος πολιτείας.}

\textit{9. 8.}

\textit{ἄλλος} is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of \textquote{likewise.'} Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 4. § 3, \textit{πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν, where ἄλλος = \textquote{which we are comparing with the virtues,'} and Pol. vii. 10. § 10, δεικνύει τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν.

\textit{9. 8.}

\textit{ὥστε} is bracketed by Bekker (2nd edition) without reason; it is
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

found in all the MSS. and in point of Greek is unobjectionable; cp. Peri Phugis ii. 1, 412 b. 25. § 11, ἕστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀπόβεβλητός τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει οὐ διετεῖν ζηρ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχων.

9.9. φθείροντες τοὺς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις.

Sc. τοὺς εὐπόρους ἤ τὸ πλήθος. 'So that when they destroy either party by laws †carried to excess [or possibly 'by laws based on superior power'] they destroy the state.'

9.11. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων . . . τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας.


9.11. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἑνίαις ὑμνίοισι 'καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακῶνος ἰδώματι καὶ βουλεύοντας δ' τι ἀν ἔχων κακὸν.'

The habit of taking a formal oath of hostility may be illustrated by an Inscription containing an agreement between certain Cretan cities:—

ὁμών. . . θεούς πάντας καὶ πίστας, μὴ μὲν ἐγώ ποια τοῖς Λυττίοις καλῶς φρονησέων μήτε τέχνα μήτε μαχαιρά μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ μήτε πεδίν μέρεαν καὶ σπείρων δ' τι καὶ δύναμιν κακῶν τὰ πόλει τὰ τῶν Λυττίων.

The inscription is given in Vischer's Kleine Schriften, vol. ii. p. 106.

9.11. χΡῇ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τοιναντίον.

'To have the notion and act the part of one who does no wrong,' not necessarily implying a mere profession or simulation, as c. 11. § 19 infra, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν ὀσπερ ὑπόδεικνυος δὲ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν ὑποκρίνομενον τῶν βασιλικῶν καλῶς.

9.13. νῦν δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀλγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχαύτων ὕποι τροφῶσιν κ.τ.λ.


9.15. 'εἰς δ' χρήσιν.'

Probably ἔστι is to be supplied. The words do not agree with any known passage of Euripides.
πρὸς βοηθείαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δῆμου.  
10.3.

'The assistance which arises from i.e. is necessitated by the people.' Such we must infer to be the meaning from the parallel clause ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους which follows.

τῶν ἐπικείμενων.  
10.3.

'The good' in the party sense, i.e. the higher classes like the ἄγαθοι of Theognis 32 Bergk and elsewhere.

Besides the three accounts of the origin of monarchy given in 10.3, i. 2. § 6 (the patriarchal); and iii. 14. § 12 and infra §§ 7, 8 (election for merit), and iv. 13. § 11 (the weakness of the middle and lower classes), we have here a fourth in which the royal authority is said to have been introduced for the protection of the aristocracy against the people.

Supra, c. 5. § 8, Aristotle speaks of tyrannies arising out of the need which democracies felt of a protector of the people against the rich before they became great (διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τὰς πόλεις); here, when they were already 'increased in power,' (ἡθη τὰν πόλεων ἑξημένων). But the discrepancy is verbal. For the terms greatness and littleness might be used of the same states at different periods of Greek history.

οἱ δῆμοι.  
10.5.

Not 'the democracies,' but 'the peoples in different states.'

Pheidon, a legitimate king of Argos, tenth or sixth in descent 10.6. from Temenus, called by Herodotus (vi. 127) a tyrant, who gave the Peloponnesians weights and measures. He is said to have driven out the Elean judges, and to have usurped authority over the Olympic games. According to Ephorus fr. 15, Müller i. p. 236, he recovered the whole lot of Temenus and attempted to reduce all the cities once subject to Heracles. He was at length overthrown by the Eleans and Lacedaemonians.

Phalaris, according to Arist. Rhet. ii. 20. § 5, 1393 b. 8 ff., was 10.6. elected by his Himerian fellow citizens general and dictator of Himera. It was on this occasion that Stesichorus told the story
of the Horse and his Rider. Phalaris has been generally called tyrant of Agrigentum, and it is possible that his power having begun in the one city may have extended to the other.

Panaetius is mentioned in c. 12. § 18 as having changed the government of Leontini from an oligarchy into a tyranny.

For Cypselus, who came into power as the representative of the people against the oligarchy of the Bacchiadæ from which he was himself sprung, see Herod. v. 92.

10. 8. ὀστερ Κόρος.
In the common tradition Codrus is supposed to have saved his country in a war with the Dorians by the voluntary sacrifice of his own life; here Aristotle implies that he delivered Athens from slavery by his military services.

10. 8. ἐλευθερώσαντες ὀστερ Κόρος,
who delivered the Persians from the Medes. See infra, § 24.

10. 8. κτίσαντες χώραν.
'Who have settled a country.'
kτίσειν χώραν is said like κτίσειν πόλιν, with a slight enlargement of the meaning of the word.

10. 8. ὀστερ οἱ Λακεδαμωνίων βασιλεῖς.
Referring, probably, not to the Lacedaemonian kings generally, who cannot be said to have added, except in the Messenian Wars, to the territory of Sparta, but to the original founders of the monarchy.

10. 8. Μακεδόνων.
Such as Perdiccas I., Alexander I. (Herod. viii. 137 ff.), Archelaus (Thuc. ii. 100), Philip the father of Alexander the Great and others.

10. 8. Μολοστών.
Cp. infra, c. 11. § 2, where the moderation of the Molossian monarchy is eulogized.

NOTES, BOOK V. 10.

βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτόρκης καὶ πάσι τοῖς ἄγαθοις ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οἰκεῖος προσδέται· τὰ ὁφέλειμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποὶ τοῖς δὲ ἄρχομένοις·—in which the ideal conception of royalty maintained in the Politics also appears.

τὸ Περιανδρὸν πρὸς Θρασυβουλον συμβουλεύεια.

See note on iii. 13. § 16.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμάδιος.

Sect. ἐπίθετο, to be supplied from τῶν ἐπιθετόντων, or from ἐπιθετοῦνται (supra, § 14). Cp. Thuc. i. 20, vi. 54–58. The account of Aristotle agrees in the main with that of Thucydides, but there is no mention of the critical question raised by the latter, viz. whether Hippias or Hipparchus was the elder son of Peisistratus. The Peisistratidae are loosely spoken of as the authors of the insult, and the punishment inflicted is assumed to be the punishment of a tyrant. But the language of Aristotle is not sufficiently precise to be adduced on either side of the question.

ἐπιθετόντων δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀρμάδιαι τυμάνσῃ.

Mentioned above, c. 4. § 9, where, not inconsistently with the account here given, he is said to have been attacked by conspirators, although the conspirators failed in attaining their object, for the people took the government.

ἡ Ἀμύντος τοῦ μεροῦς.

Probably Amynas the Second who flourished in the generation which followed the Peloponnesian War and succeeded after a struggle to the Macedonian throne B.C. 394, from which however he was deposed but afterwards restored by the help of the Spartans.

Derdas the prince of Elymia his kinsman, and at one time his ally, is probably the conspirator here mentioned.

ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου ἐπὶ Παυσανίου.

The only direct allusion to Philip which is found in Aristotle except Rhet. ii. 23, 1397 b. 31, καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Ἐθελῶν δεῖναι Φιλίππου εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ὅτι εἶ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκείς ἡξίου, ὑπέσχοντο
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ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

The murder of Philip by Pausanias occurred at the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus B.C. 336. The mention of the circumstance shows that this passage, if not the whole of the Politics, must have been composed later than the date of this event.

The story here referred to is narrated more fully by Diodorus (xvi. 98). According to his rather incredible narrative Attalus was the uncle of Cleopatra whom Philip married in 337 B.C., and he had a friend also named Pausanias of whom the assassin Pausanias was jealous. Pausanias the friend of Attalus being abused and insulted by his namesake, sought death in battle, and Attalus, to revenge the supposed insult to his friend, invited the other Pausanias to a banquet and outraged him. When Philip could not or would not punish Attalus, Pausanias turned his anger against the king. Nearly the same story is told by Justin ix. 6. and Plutarch Alex. c. 10.

10.16. καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐνοῦχου Ἐὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ.

Sc. ἡ ἐπίθεσις. Ἐὐαγόρα is governed by the ἐπὶ in ἐπίθεσις. The story is differently told by Theopompos (Fragm. III, Muller i. p. 295). According to his account the eunuch Thrasydaeus got Evagoras and his sons into his power by inducing them to make assignations with a young maiden, who was the daughter of Nicocreon, a revolted subject of Evagoras. According to Diodorus (xv. 47) the name of the eunuch who conspired was Nicocles; but the name is probably a confusion with the son of Evagoras who succeeded him. Isocrates in his ‘Evagoras’ throws a veil over the whole story. Thus our four authorities all disagree with one another.

10.17. Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, reigned in Macedonia 413-399, and had two wives,—the name of the second was Cleopatra, the name of the first is not mentioned. He seems to have thought that he would prevent quarrels in his two families if he married a son and daughter out of each of them to one another. For Archelaus see Thuc. ii. 100 and Plat. Gorg. 470, 471; for Arrhabaeus (or
Arribaeus) the enemy of Perdiccas, as he was afterwards the enemy of Archelaus, see Thuc. iv. 79. Of Sirra, which appears to be the name of a woman, nothing more is known. The occurrence of the name in this passage has suggested a very ingenious emendation in the words of Strabo, bk. viii. c. 7. p. 327, ἦς Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ 'Αμώτου Ἐφρέϊκης Ἰρρά δὲ θυγάτηρ where read Ἐφρέϊκη Σιβία δὲ θυγάτηρ. (Dindorf.)

10. 18.

Cotys was assassinated in 358 B.C. by the brothers Heraclides and Parrhon called also Python, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 659. According to Plut. Adv. Coloten 32 and Diog. Laert. iii. 31 they had been disciples of Plato.

10. 19.

Πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ σῶμα αἰκασθέναι πληγαῖς ὀργυσθέντες οἱ μὲν δισφέλειαν οἱ δὲ ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς οἰδεριθέσει, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἅρχας καὶ ἀσαλικές δυναστείας.

The first καὶ means that attempts were also made in consequence of personal ill-treatment of another sort, and the second καὶ that they were made not only upon tyrants, but upon magistrates and royal personages. See also note on Text.

In this passage, though speaking primarily of tyrannies, Aristotle digresses into monarchies generally and oligarchies.

ἐνεχείρησαν, sc. δισφεῖρειν.

10. 19.

Πενθαλίδαια.

It was Penthilus, the son of Orestes, who according to Strabo, bk. ix. p. 403, xiii. p. 582, and Pausanias iii. 2. p. 207 recolonized Lesbos. The Penthalidae derived their name from him.

10. 20.

ὁ δὲ Ἐυριπίδης ἐκαλέσατεν εἰπόντος τι αὐτῶ οἷς δισφείλιν τοῦ στόματος,

This story, which casts a rather unfavourable light on the character of Euripides, is alluded to in Stobaeus, Serm. 39. p. 237, Ἐυριπίδης ὀνειδίζων αὐτῷ τινὸς ὅτι τὸ στόμα δυσώδες ὅι, πολλὰ γὰρ, ἐπει στόμῳ, ἀπήρητα ἐγκατεστάπη i.e. Some one said to Euripides, 'Your breath smells.' 'Yes,' he replied, 'for many things which might not be spoken have been decomposed in my mouth.'

10. 21.

ὡςπέρ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας.

We must supply περὶ in thought before μοναρχίας. It is inserted
in the margin of P5. ‘As well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government.’

10. 21. ὁ Ζέρχης Ἀρταπάνης φοβοῦμενος τὴν διαθήλην τὴν περὶ Δαρειῶν ὁτι ἐκριμάσεν οὐ κελεύσαυτος Ζέρχην, ἀλλ’ οἴμενος συγγνώσεθαι ὡς ὑμηρονύντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν.

The Xerxes here referred to is Xerxes the First, cp. Ctesias Fragmenta, Περσικά § 29 (edit. Didot p. 51), Ἀρταπάνος (sic) δὲ μία παρὰ Ζέρχη δυνάμενος, μετ’ Ἀσπαμίτρου τοῦ εὐνοίχου καὶ αὐτοῦ μέγα δυνάμενον βουλεύονται ἀνελεῖν Ζέρχην, καὶ ἀναιροῦσι, καὶ πείθουσιν Ἀρταπάνος (sic) τὸν ύδην ὡς Δαρειῶς (sic) αὐτὸν ὁ ἔτερος πάσα ἄνηλε. Καὶ παραγίνεται Δαρειῶς ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ Ἀρταπάνου εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν Ἀρταπάνου τοῦ βασιλέως δυνάμενος καὶ ἀπαιροῦμενος οὐκ εἰς φανείς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἀποθνήσκει. Αccording to Diod. xi. 69, Artabanus an Hyrcanian, having by a false accusation got rid of one of the sons of Xerxes, shortly afterwards attacked the other son Artaxerxes who succeeded him, but he was discovered and put to death. Both these stories, which are substantially the same, are so different from the narrative of Aristotle that it is better not to try and reconcile them by such expedients as the placing οὐ before ἐκριμάσε. The purport of Aristotle’s rather obscure words seems to be as follows: Artapanes had hanged Darius the son of Xerxes who was supposed to have conspired against his father; he had not been told to hang him or he had been told not to hang him (for οὐ κελεύσαυτος may mean either); but he had hoped that Xerxes in his cups would forget what precisely happened.

Ctesias is several times quoted by Aristotle in the Historia Animalium but always with expressions of distrust, ii. 1. 501 a. 25, iii. 22. 523 a. 26, viii. 28. 606 a. 8; also De Gen. An. ii. 2. 736 a. 2.

10. 22. Σαρδανάπαλος.

A rather mythical person apparently the same with the Assurbanipal of the Assyrian inscriptions, a mighty hunter and great conqueror, who became to the Greeks and through them to the civilized world the type of oriental luxury. The story of his effeminacy is taken by Diodorus (ii. 23–27) from Ctesias and is again referred to by Aristotle in Nic. Eth. i. 5. § 3.
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10. 22.

For another example of a similar manner of treating old legends, see i. 11. § 8.

10. 23.

See infra §§ 28 and 32.

10. 24.

Aristotle in this passage follows a legend, differing from that of Herodotus who selected the tradition about Cyrus' life (i. 95 ff.) and death (i. 214) which seemed to him the most probable. In Aristotle's version Cyrus, not Harpagus, was represented as the general of Astyages. Of a misconception entertained by Herodotus, Aristotle speaks with some severity in his Historia Animalium, iii. 22, 523 a. 17.

10. 24.

A friend and acquaintance of Xenophon who recovered his small kingdom by the help of some of the ten thousand. He is mentioned in Anab. vii. 3, Hell. iii. 2. § 2, iv. 8. § 26.

10. 25.

According to Corn. Nepos Datames, c. 11, Mithridates the son of Ariobarzanes, a revolted satrap of Pontus, attacked not Ariobarzanes but Datames the celebrated satrap of Caria. It does not therefore become less probable that he may also have attacked his own father; and the latter fact is confirmed by the allusion of Xenophon, Cyrop. viii. 8. 4, ὅσπερ Μιθριδάτης τὸν πατέρα Ἀριωβαρζάνη προδοὺς.

10. 28.

There should be ever present with them the resolution of Dion.'

10. 28.

Sc. ἄντι.

10. 30.

Ἀδ 'because one form of government naturally hates another.' Cp. Thuc. i. 18, ἐπειδῆ δὲ αἱ τὰ Ἀθηναίων τύρανναι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης
This period of liberty and prosperity lasted for sixty years, 466-406, from the overthrow of Thrasybulus to the usurpation of Dionysius. But more is known of Sicily in the days of the tyrants than of the time when the island was comparatively free.

The final expulsion of Dionysius the younger by Timoleon occurred B.C. 343; but it is the first expulsion by Dion to which Aristotle is here referring, B.C. 356, as the Politics were written not earlier than 336 (see supra note on ii. 9. § 20, καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις.

Either 1) the same persons who are called αὐτῶν, or some part of them, αὐτῶν being taken substantively = αὐτο-σωτικοῖ. Or 2) αὐτῶν may be understood of the whole people as if πολίται had preceded; αὐτῶν would then refer to another band of conspirators who were not of the family. Bekker in his second edition has inserted καὶ before αὐτῶν without MS. authority. Susemihl suggests μετά. Neither emendation is satisfactory.

The reign of Thrasybulus, if indeed he reigned at all except in the name of his nephew, as seems to be implied in this passage, lasted only eleven months; see infra c. 12. § 6. According to Diodorus (xi. 67, 68), who says nothing of a son of Gelo, he immediately succeeded Hiero, but soon provoked the Syracusans by his cruelty and rapacity to expel him.

This is a reminiscence of § 28. The emphasis is on ἐκβαλὼν. Aristotle is speaking of cases in which tyrants were destroyed by
members of their own family. He means to say that Dion drove out Dionysius who was his kinsman, although he himself perished more than twelve months afterwards when the revolution was completed. Or, 'Dion did indeed perish (as I have already implied), but not until he had driven out his kinsman Dionysius.'

10. 35.

\[\text{άλλα} \ \text{μάλλον} \ \text{τὸ} \ \text{μίσος}, \]

sc. \[\text{χρίται} \ \text{τὸ} \ \text{λογισμό} \] which is supplied from the preceding sentence.

10. 35.

\[\text{ὅσα} \ \text{αλλίας} \ \text{εἰρήκαμεν} \ \text{τής} \ \text{τε} \ \text{διοικησίας}, \]

sc. \[\text{τῆς} \ \text{φθορᾶς} \ \text{τῆς} \ \text{διοικησίας}, \] understood from the general meaning of the preceding passage.

10. 37.

\[\text{oύ} \ \text{γέγρωσα} \ \text{δὴ} \ \text{ἐπὶ} \ \text{βασιλείαν} \ \text{νῦν}. \]

Cp. iii. 14. § 13, a passage in which the gradual decline of royalty is described.

10. 37.

\[\text{ἄλλῳ} \ \text{ἄν} \ \text{περ} \ \text{γέγρωσα}, \ \text{μοναρχίαι} \ [\text{καὶ}] \ \text{τυραννίδες} \ \text{μᾶλλον}. \]

The objection to the καὶ (which is found in all the MSS.) is that μοναρχία is elsewhere the generic word (cp. supra §§ 1, 2), including βασιλεία and τυραννίς. If we accept the reading of the MSS., some general idea, 'wherever there are such forms of government' must be supplied with γέγρωσα from βασιλεία. 'There are no royalties nowadays: but if there are any,' or rather 'instead of them mere monarchies and tyrannies.' Here 'monarchies' is taken in some specific bad or neutral sense opposed to βασιλείαι. But a variation in a technical use of language which he was endeavouring to fix, but was not always capable of himself observing, is not a serious objection to a reading found in Aristotle's Politics.

10. 38.

\[\text{μηδία} \ \text{γὰρ} \ \text{ἐγίνετο} \ \text{ἡ} \ \text{κατάλυσις}. \]

'For their overthrow was easily effected.' The imperfect graphically represents the historical fact.

11. 2.

\[\text{ἡ} \ \text{περὶ} \ \text{Μαλαρτοῦς} \ \text{βασιλεία}. \]

Cp. supra, c. 10. § 8.
11.2. Theopompus is said by Tyrtaeus to have terminated the first Messenian War, Fr. 3 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graeci:—

\[\text{"H} \text{m} \text{et} \text{é} \text{r} \text{o} \text{ β} \text{a} \text{s} \text{i} \text{l} \text{h} \text{i} \text{ θ} \text{e} \text{ò} \text{i} \text{s} \text{ φ} \text{i} \text{l} \text{o} \text{ Θ} \text{e} \text{o} \text{p} \text{ób} \text{m} \text{p} \text{ò} \text{φ},
\text{ δ} \text{n} \text{ δ} \text{i} \text{ά} \text{ M} \text{e} \text{s} \text{s} \text{ó} \text{n} \text{h} \text{η} \text{n} \text{ ε} \text{l} \text{o} \text{m} \text{e} \text{n} \text{ ε} \text{υ} \text{r} \text{ú} \text{k} \text{o} \text{r} \text{o} \text{n},
\text{ M} \text{e} \text{s} \text{s} \text{ó} \text{n} \text{h} \text{η} \text{n} \text{ ἀ} \text{γ} \text{α} \text{θ} \text{ή} \text{n} \text{ μ} \text{έ} \text{n} \text{ ἀ} \text{ρ} \text{o} \text{υ} \text{n}, \text{ ἀ} \text{γ} \text{α} \text{θ} \text{ή} \text{ν} \text{ ἐ} \text{τ} \text{e} \text{ς} \text{ φ} \text{υ} \text{τ} \text{e} \text{n} \text{e} \text{n}.\]

\[\text{ά} \text{μ} \text{φ} \text{í} \text{ α} \text{υ} \text{τ} \text{h} \text{í} \text{ δ} \text{é} \text{ ἐ} \text{μ} \text{ά} \text{χ} \text{o} \text{n} \text{τ} \text{í} \text{ ἐ} \text{n} \text{ν} \text{e} \text{k} \text{a} \text{i} \text{d} \text{e} \text{í} \text{ δ} \text{ή} \text{τ} \text{í} \text{n} \text{w} \text{a} \text{l} \text{e} \text{m} \text{e} \text{w} \text{o}, \text{ a} \text{i} \text{e} \text{i} \text{ τ} \text{a} \text{l} \text{a} \text{s} \text{í} \text{fr} \text{o} \text{n} \text{a} \text{ δ} \text{ύ} \text{m} \text{í} \text{ν} \text{ έ} \text{x} \text{o} \text{ν} \text{t} \text{e} \text{s},
\text{ α} \text{i} \text{χ} \text{μ} \text{t} \text{a} \text{i} \text{ p} \text{a} \text{t} \text{é} \text{r} \text{o} \text{n} \text{ ἦ} \text{m} \text{et} \text{é} \text{r} \text{o} \text{ν} \text{ p} \text{a} \text{t} \text{é} \text{r} \text{e}s.\]

\[\text{ε} \text{i} \text{k} \text{o} \text{s} \text{t} \text{ȳ} \text{ δ} \text{é} \text{o} \text{ μ} \text{έ} \text{n} \text{ k} \text{at} \text{à} \text{ π} \text{ó} \text{n} \text{a} \text{ ἔ} \text{ρ} \text{γ} \text{a} \text{ λ} \text{i} \text{p} \text{ó} \text{v} \text{t} \text{e} \text{s}, \text{ f} \text{e} \text{í} \text{γ} \text{o} \text{n} \text{ ἦ} \text{θ} \text{w} \text{m} \text{a} \text{i} \text{ω} \text{i} \text{o} \text{n} \text{ ἐ} \κ \text{ μ} \text{e} \text{g} \text{ά} \text{l} \text{α} \nu \text{ν} \text{ ὁ} \text{δ} \text{é} \text{o} \nu \text{o} \text{n}.\]

According to Plutarch, Lyce. 7, he increased the power of the Ephors, but he also made the ὁμήρια more stringent which forbade the people to amend or modify proposals submitted to them.

In this passage the institution of the Ephors is attributed to Theopompus, but in ii. c. 9 it seems to be assumed that Lycurgus is the author of all the Spartan institutions: see note in loc.

11.5. ἡ γὰρ γνώσις πιστῶν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἄλληλους.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 66 where the difficulty of overthrowing the 400 is attributed to the uncertainty of the citizens as to who were or were not included in the conspiracy.

11.6. καὶ τὸ τοῦς ἐπιθημοῦντας ἀεὶ φανεροὶ εἶναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θόρας.

ἐπιθημοῦντας is translated by William de Moerbeek without any authority ‘praefectos populi,’ apparently an etymological guess.

περὶ θόρας. Either *‘at his gate’ or ‘at their own gates.’ In whichever way the words are taken, the general meaning is the same, viz. that the people are not to hide but to show themselves.

11.8. καὶ τὸ πέντας ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, τυραννικόν, ὅπως ἡ τε φιλακή τρέφηται.

1) * Reading ἡ τε with Bekker’s second edition after Victorius: ‘Also he should impoverish his subjects that he may find money for the support of his guards.’ Yet the mode of expression is indirect and awkward. If 2) we retain μῆτε with the MSS. we must translate either ‘that he may not have to keep soldiers,’ for his subjects will keep them for him; or, ‘so that a guard need not
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be kept,' because he will be in no danger on account of the depressed state of his subjects. Neither explanation is satisfactory; there is a balance of difficulties.

\[\text{ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελίδων κ.τ.λ.}\]

See Herod. i. 14.

Florence in the fifteenth century, and Paris in the nineteenth, witness to a similar policy.

\[\text{τὰν περὶ Σάμου ἔργα Πολύκρατεια.}\]

Lit. and 'among' or 'of the buildings of Samos the works of Polycrates.' Among these splendid works an artificial mountain containing a tunnel forming an aqueduct, a mole in front of the harbour, and the greatest temple known, are commemorated in Herod. iii. 60, but he does not expressly attribute them to Polycrates.

\[\text{καὶ ἡ ἐσφαρὰ τῶν τελῶν, οἷον ἐν Συρακοσίᾳ εἰς πέντε γὰρ ἔτεα τὸν εἰπὲν ἱκανόν.}\]

Διονυσίου τῆς οὐσίας ἐπασαν εἰσενεχρέως συνεβαίνειν.

Compare a story equally incredible told of Cypselus in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomics ii. 1346 a. 32: 'Cypselus the Corinthian made a vow that if he ever became lord of the city he would consecrate to Zeus the whole wealth of the citizens, so he bade them register themselves, and when they were registered he took from them a tithe of their property and told them to go on working with the remainder. Each year he did the like; the result was that at the end of ten years he got into his possession all which he had consecrated; the Corinthians meanwhile had gained other property.'

There are several similar legends respecting Dionysius himself recorded in the Oeconomics, such as the story of his collecting the women's ornaments, and after consecrating them to Demeter lending them to himself, 1349 a. 14; or of his taking the money of the orphans and using it while they were under age, ib. b. 15; or of his imposition of a new cattle-tax, after he had induced his subjects to purchase cattle by the abolition of the tax, ib. b. 6.

The fertile imagination of the Greeks was a good deal occupied with inventions about the tyrants; the examples given throw a light upon the character of such narratives.

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11. 10. ἔναυλομένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων.
Cp. note on text.

11. 11. καὶ γὰρ ὁ δήμος εἶναι βούλεται μάναρχος.
i.e. 'for they are both alike.'

11. 13. ἡλίω γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος, ὀσπερ ἡ παρομία.
Sc. ἐκκροιέται, 'one nail is knocked out by another' = one rogue is got rid of by another. That is to say; 'The tyrant finds in rogues handy and useful instruments.' Such appears to be the application of the proverb in this passage. Yet the common meaning of it given in collections of proverbs is that 'one evil is mended by another.' Cp. Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, § 7; μωρία δὲ καὶ ἄλλα έκ τε ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων καταδείξας συν έχεις, προσιδόντων τό ἕγινειν, τούτο μὲν παρατίθεσαι, ὅτι μὴ εἰς ἀπειροκαλλίαν την μετακαίδη ἐκπέφη μοι τό σύγγραμμα καὶ κυδυνεύωμεν ἄλλα χῆρ εκροίνυ τόν ἥλιω.

11. 13. αὐτῶν γὰρ εἶναι μόνων ἄξων τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος.
Compare the saying attributed to the Russian Emperor Paul, 'Il n'y a pas de considérable ici que la personne à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle.' Wallace's Russia, p. 280, ed. 8.

Sc. τό τύραννος; or oūthēn may be the nominative to ἐλλείπει.

11. 16. εἰς οἷς μὲν ὁν ὤνοι . . . φρονῶσιν.
The end of § 16 is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd Edition (after Schneider). It is only a repetition of what goes before, the three aims of the tyrant being stated in a different order.

The 1st in § 15 = 3rd in § 16.
" 2nd " = 1st "
" 3rd " = 2nd "

The parallel words are either a summary or a duplicate.

But there is no reason for excluding either of the two passages any more than for excluding the repetitions in Homer. Both versions can hardly be supposed to have come from the hand of Aristotle, but they belong to a text which we cannot go behind.
Liturally, 'the other manner of preserving a tyranny takes pains,' i.e. works, 'from an opposite direction.'

Compare Machiavelli, who in his 'Prince' goes much farther than Aristotle in preaching the doctrine of 'doing evil that good may come' and of 'keeping up appearances' and of 'fear to be preferred to love.' 'Let it be the Prince's chief care to maintain his authority; the means he employs, be they what they may, will for this purpose always appear honourable and meet applause; for the vulgar are ever caught by appearances and judge only by the event.' (c. 18, Bohn's Translation, p. 461.) Again 'A prince ought to be very sparing of his own or of his subjects' property.' . . . 'To support the reputation of liberality, he will often be reduced to the necessity of levying taxes on his subjects and adopting every species of fiscal resource, which cannot fail to make him odious.' (c. 16, pp. 454, 455.) And for much of what follows, infra §§ 20, 25: 'He should make it a rule above all things never to utter anything which does not breathe of kindness, justice, good faith and piety; this last quality it is most important for him to appear to possess, for men judge more from appearances than from reality.' (ib.) Again, cp. §§ 22, 23 with Machiavelli c. 19, p. 462: 'Nothing in my opinion renders a prince so odious as the violation of the rights of property and disregard to the honour of married women. Subjects will live contentedly enough under a prince who neither invades their property nor their honour, and then he will only have to contend against the pretensions of a few ambitious persons whom he can easily find means to restrain. A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute and effeminate is sure to be despised—these defects he ought to shun as he would so many rocks and endeavour to display a character for courage, gravity, energy and magnificence in all his actions.' Like Aristotle he advises that princes should practise economy and not overcharge the people with taxes; they should give festivals and shows at
certain periods of the year and 'should remember to support their station with becoming dignity,' p. 476. Cp. Hallam, Mid. Ages i. 66, 'The sting of taxation is wastefulness. What high-spirited man could see without indignation the earnings of his labour yielded ungrudgingly to the public defence become the spoil of parasites and speculators?' (quoted by Congreve).


11. 22. The moderation here described in everything but ambition was shown by the elder Dionysius as he is pictured by Cornelius Nepos De Regibus c. 2: 'Dionysius prior . . et manu fortis et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxurosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuique imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum il studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitae, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.'

The second Dionysius would furnish a tyrant of the opposite type (§ 23), if we may believe the writer of the Aristotelian Polity of Syracuse, 'Ἀριστοτέλης δε ἐν τῇ Συρακοσίᾳ πολιτείᾳ καὶ συνεχῶς φησὶν αὐτῶν [Διονύσιον τῶν νεώτερων] ἔσθ' δ' ὅτε ἐπὶ ἡμέρας ἐνενήκοτα μεθ' ἑαυτός διὸ καὶ ὑμβηκοπότερον γενίσθαι τὰς ὄψεις. (Arist. Berl. Ed. 1568, b. 19.)

11. 23. φαινοθαὶ τοῖς δᾶλοις βούλονται τούτῳ ποιοῦντες.

These words curiously illustrate the love of ostentation inherent in the Greek character.

11. 24. κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεὶ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Like Polycrates at Samos, Gelo at Syracuse, Cypselus and Periander at Corinth, Theron at Agrigentum, Peisistratus at Athens.

11. 28. κολάσεως.

Bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition after Schneider. Certainly the word is not appropriate if taken with ἡλικίαν, but ἑβραοὶ may be supplied with τῆς eis τὴν ἡλικίαν from the preceding.

11. 30. διαφθείραντες.

Sc. τῶν τίραννων.
Quoted in Nic. Eth. ii. 3. § 10, ἕτερον ὁμοιότερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἕν ἄρμῳ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος.

For the arts of the tyrant cp. Machiavelli's 'Prince' quoted above, especially chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23.

μάλιστα μέν ἄμφοτέρον ἐπουλαμβάνειν δεῖ σώζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν.

The consciousness that no other government could hold the balance between irreconcilable parties seems to have been the main support of recent French Imperialism.

ἐτι δ' αὐτῶν διακείσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἱδίον ὕστοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀριστήν ἡ ἡμίχρηστον

The consciousness that no other government could hold the balance between irreconcilable parties seems to have been the main support of recent French Imperialism.

Cp. Machiavelli, Prince, c. 15. p. 453, in a still more subtle style of reflection: 'It would doubtless be happy for a prince to unite in himself every species of good quality, but as our nature does not allow of so great a perfection a prince should have prudence enough to avoid those defects and vices which may occasion his ruin.' And again: 'He should not shrink from encountering some blame on account of vices which are important to the support of his states; for there are some things having the appearance of virtues which would prove the ruin of a prince, should he put them in practice, and others upon which, though seemingly bad and vicious, his actual welfare and security entirely depend.'

Hdt. vi. 126 gives the Sicyonian tyrants as 1) Andreas, 2) Myron, 3) Aristonymus, 4) Cleisthenes. According to Pausanias x. 7. § 3. p. 814 Cleisthenes is said to have won a victory in the Pythian games B.C. 582. Grote (vol. iii. c. 9. p. 43) says 'there is some confusion about the names of Orthogoras and Andreas. It has been supposed with some probability that the same person is designated under both names: for the two names do not seem to occur in the same author.' Orthogoras, 'speaker for the right,' may have been a surname or second name of Andreas. Infrac § 12, Aristotle supposes the tyranny to have passed directly from Myron to Cleisthenes.

Πεισστρατον ἵππομείναι ποτε προσκήνην εἰς Ἀρειῶν πάγον.

According to Plutarch in the life of Solon c. 31 he is said to
have gone to the Court of the Areopagus intending to defend himself against a charge of homicide, but his accuser did not appear.

12.3. Cypselidae.
The addition in this passage appears to be incorrect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cypselus</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periander</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psammetichus</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these numbers how does Aristotle get a total 734 years?

Sylburg would change τρία καὶ ἐβδομᾶκοντα into ἑπτὰ καὶ ἐβδομᾶκοντα. Giphanius would omit καὶ τέταρτα after τεττάρακοντα. Susemihl would change τέταρτα into ἦμασιν, which would give exactly the sum wanted. Goettling has a very farfetched and groundless supposition that the reign of Psammetichus was omitted by Aristotle in the addition, because he was only a commander of mercenaries and not of Cypselid blood. It might also be suggested that some of the reigns overlap in consequence of a tyrant adopting his successor as colleague. But a mistake either of Aristotle or his copyists is more likely.

All the MSS. read τέταρτα or τέσσαρα.

12.5. τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε.
Hdt. v. 65 makes the Peisistratidae rule Athens 36 years.

Peisistratus seized the sovereignty in 560 B.C. and died in 527; he reigned 17 years out of the 33. Hippias reigned 14 years before the death of Hipparchus (514), and in the year 510, four years afterwards, he was expelled. \(17 + 14 + 4 = 35\).

The whole period 560-510 is 50 years, 35 of actual rule. In the calculation of Herodotus there is a year more. From Thuc. vi. 54 we learn that even at Athens not 100 years after the event, there were erroneous ideas about the expulsion of the Peisistratidae.

12.6. Here the addition is correct. \(7 + 10 + 1 = 18\), although the time assigned to Hiero's reign does not agree with the statement of Diodorus (xi. 66) that he reigned 11 years. But why does
Aristotle omit Dionysius, whose tyranny lasted longer, and therefore afforded a better example? Dionysius I b.c. 405–367, Dionysius II 367–356, and again 346–344, besides the shorter reigns of Dion and others, in all about 60 years.

12. 7.

i.e. in any way specially applicable to that form of government.

We may observe that Aristotle criticises the Platonic number as if it had a serious meaning: yet he omits τρις αὐτῆς, words which are an essential part of the calculation, after δύο ἁρμονιῶν παρέχεται. (See Rep. viii. 546 C.)

12. 8.

διὰ τέσσερις χρόνων.

Sc. τί ἂν ἰδίος εἴη μεταβολή to be supplied from the preceding sentence. ‘And in what is any special change made by time?’ i.e. What has time alone to do with the changes of states?

With τὰ μὴ ἀρχόμενα supply τί or διὰ τί from τί ἂν εἴη above; cp. 12. 9.

διὰ τῶν αἰτίων (infra § 10). ‘And why should things which do not begin together change together?’

12. 9.

Aristotle unfairly criticizes Plato's order as if it were meant to be an order in time. The same objection might be taken to his own use of the phrases μεταβάλλειν and μεταβαίνειν in Nic. Eth. viii. 10, where he talks as if states always 'passed over' into their opposites:—the 'passing over' is logical, a natural connexion of ideas, not always historical.

12. 10.

1) *He never says whether tyranny is or is not liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them and into what form it changes'—a condensed sentence in which καὶ is omitted before διὰ τῶν αἰτίων. εἰς ποιαν πολιτείαν, sc. ἐσται μεταβολή.

2) It is also possible and perhaps better, with Bekker in his second edition, to place a comma after the second οὔτε: οὔτε, εἰ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τῶν αἰτίων. (It will be remembered that tyranny is the last
development of the Platonic cycle, and it is natural to ask 'Why
does not the cycle continue or return into itself?') The meaning
may then be paraphrased as follows: 'He never says whether (as
might be expected) tyranny, like other forms of government,
experiences a change, or if not, what is the explanation of this
inconsistency?'

12.12. ἡ Χαριλάου.

According to Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 2 Müller) Charillus, as
the name is also spelt in ii. 10. § 2, or Charilaus, as here,
made himself tyrant during the absence of Lycurgus, who on his
return to Sparta restored or introduced good order. The change
which he then effected in the constitution of Sparta is called by
Aristotle, who appears to follow the same tradition, a change
from tyranny to aristocracy.

12.12. ἐν Καρχηδών.

Sc. τυρανίς μετέβαλεν εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν. Yet he says in Book ii.
c. 11. § 2—'that Carthage has never had a sedition worth
speaking of, nor been under a tyrant,' and a similar statement
occurs in this chapter (§ 14). Cp. also vi. § 9, τιμῶταν δὲ τῶν
τριτῶν Καρχηδώνοι πολιτεύμενοι φίλον κέκτησαι τὸν δήμου δὲ γὰρ τοὺς
ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίας ποιοῦσι εὐπόρους κ.τ.λ. To
avoid this apparent contradiction St. Hilaire conjectures Χαλκηθῶν,
a useless emendation of which there can be neither proof nor
disproof; for we know nothing of the history of Chalcedon and
not much of the history of Carthage.

It might be argued that the text as it stands may refer to a
time in the history of Carthage before the establishment of the
aristocratical constitution described in Bk. ii. c. 11, as he says in
this very passage of Lacedaemon, § 12, that it passed from tyranny
into aristocracy. But such a violent supposition is hardly to be
assumed in order to save Aristotle's consistency. In § 14 infra, he
calls Carthage a democracy. In ii. 11. § 5, he talks of it as
having a democratic element.

12.15. ἅπτον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, πλουσίων καὶ
πενήτων.
Here as elsewhere Aristotle is really objecting to a figure of speech, Plat. Rep. iv. 422 E; viii. 551 D. It may be certainly said of a state which is governed by an oligarchy, with much more truth than of a timocracy or democracy, that it consists of two cities.

Bekker inserts καί in his 2nd Edition—ἀδεσποτεύομενοι (καί) κατατοκίς—12. 17. ζωμενοι. The addition makes no change in the sense.

μεταξάλλοστιν οὐδέν μᾶλλον οὐδέποτε εἰς δῆμον ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. 12. 18.

Yet in iii. 15. § 12, Aristotle says that oligarchies passed into tyrannies and these into democracies.
BOOK VI.

The greater part of Book vi. has been already anticipated in iv. There are also several repetitions of Book v. A few sentences may be paralleled out of ii. and iii. (See English Text.) The whole is only a different redaction of the same or nearly the same materials which have been already used; not much is added. The varieties of democracy and oligarchy and the causes of their preservation or destruction are treated over again, but in a shorter form. The management of the poor is worked out in greater detail: the comparison of the military and civil constitution of a state is also more precise and exact. The magistrates required in states are regarded from a different point of view; in iv. they are considered chiefly with reference to the mode of electing them and their effect on the constitution; in vi. they are enumerated and described, and the officers necessary to all states are distinguished from those which are only needed in certain states. There are several passages in which a previous treatment of the same subjects is recognized (1. § 1, § 5, § 8, § 10; 4. § 1, § 15; 5. § 2; 8. § 1). The references seem to have been inserted with a view of combining the two treatments in a single work.

1.2. ἀμα τε περὶ ἐκεῖνων εἰ τι λοιπὸν

seems to indicate the supplementary character of this part of the work. 1) As well as any omission of those matters (ἐκεῖνων) which have just been mentioned,' i.e. the offices, law-courts, etc.; or 2*) ἐκεῖνοι may refer to the forms of constitutions [πολιτείων].

1. 4–6. Bekker in his 2nd edition inserts περὶ τὸ before θολενόμενον in § 4, and ἐπεὶ before δεῖ in § 6 without any authority, both apparently in order to make the language smoother and more regular. But this is not a good reason for altering the text of Aristotle.
NOTES, BOOK VI. 2. 235

ἀὑτῷ δ' ἐστὶν ὡς καλοῦσθαι τινὲς ὀλιγαρχίαν,

1. 6.

'which they call oligarchy,' is perhaps only an example of unmeaning pleonasm like the expression ὁ καλούμενος ἀδρ, Meteor. i. 3, 339 b. 3 ; τὴν τοῦ καλούμενον γάλακτος φύσιν, Pol. i. 8. § 10. But it is also possible that Aristotle here uses the term in the wider sense in which he has previously spoken of oligarchy and democracy as the two principal forms of government under which the rest are included (iv. 3. § 6). Cp. note on iv. 8. § 1.

τῷ δ' ἀπαντᾷ ταύτα.

1. 9.

'All the democratic elements of which he has spoken generally and is going to speak more particularly,' i.e. election by lot, elections of all out of all, no property qualification, payment of the citizens (etc., see infra c. 2. § 5), 'may exist in the same state.'

ἀς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας εὐερείας. 2. 1.

μετέχοντας, accusative absolute, or a second accusative after λέγων εἴλωθασιν, the subject and object being nearly the same.

τούτ' εἰναι καὶ τέλος, καὶ τούτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. 2. 2.

'That is also the end, and that is the just principle.'

ἐπερ τοῦ δούλου ὄντος τὸ ἔργον. 2. 3.

The MSS. vary between δοῦλον ὄντος and δοῦλον ὄντος. Supply ἔτσι or some weaker word than ἔργον.

συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν εὐερείαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἔσον. 2. 4.

'The impatience of control passes into the love of equality; mankind are unwilling to be ruled and therefore they rule and are ruled in turn. Thus the two characteristics of freedom meet or coincide.'

τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων. 2. 5.

The old translator takes this as if he read ἡ ἐκ. But we may retain καὶ, regarding ἐκ πάντων as explanatory of the manner in which the whole people exercised their judicial functions by the election of smaller bodies out of their own number.
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

2. 5. τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυριὰν εἶναι πάντων, ἄρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηθενὼς ἢ ὁτι ὀλιγύστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυριάν.

The passage as it stands in the MSS. [ὅ ὁτι ὀλιγύστων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων κυριάν] gives no suitable meaning. It is possible to correct it 1*) by placing the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων after πάντων, or 2) by inserting μὴ before τῶν μεγίστων [Lambinus].

2. 6. ἄρχων

is used in the generic sense to include the ἀδύστος ἄρχη of iii.

1. § 7.

2. 6. μεθέδω τῇ πρὸ ταύτης.

Sc. iv. 6. § 5 and c. 15. § 13.

2. 7. τῶν ἄρχον ἢ ἐνάγκη συναπτεῖν μετ' ἄλληλον.

i. e. the chief magistrates whom the law required to take their meals together. This, which is a regulation prescribed by Aristotle in vii. 12. § 2, may be inferred to have been the general custom.

2. 7. ἐτι ἑπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλοῦτω καὶ παιδείᾳ ὀρίζεται κ.τ.λ.

The term oligarchy is here used nearly in the sense of aristocracy. Education cannot be said to be characteristic of oligarchy in the strict sense of the word. Cp. iv. 8. § 3. 'The term aristocracy is applied to those forms of government which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.'

2. 8. ἐτι δὲ τῶν ἄρχον τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀδιδιν εἶναι.

Sc. δημοτικῶν δοκεῖ εἶναι. For the general power of the ancient magistrates cp. iii. 16. § 1; v. 1. §§ 10, 11; c. 10. § 5.

2. 8. ἐὰς ἄρχονικας μεταβολής.

These words are translated in the text *'has survived some ancient change'; they may also mean, though the expression is somewhat inaccurate, 'have survived from the old state before the change.' For an example of such a 'survival' compare the custom at Epidamnus of the magistrates going into the assembly at elections, v. 1. § 10.
ta μὲν οὖν κακαὶ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτα έστίν.  

ταῦτα, i.e. ‘election out of all, all over each, each over all, some payment for services, poverty, mean birth are in various degrees characteristic of all democracies.’

τὸ μηθέν μᾶλλον ἀρχέων τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους

is the reading of all the MSS. except one, and is supported by Moerbeek. The phrase is peculiar: ‘that the poor should no more have power than the rich’—we might expect rather ‘that the rich should no more have power than the poor.’ But Aristotle is speaking of democracy in the previous passage. It has been suggested that we should transpose the words; for the confusion of εὐπόρου and ἀπόρου (ii. 11. § 12, iii. 17. § 4, and v. 3. § 8) is common, and renders such a transposition not improbable. But a sufficiently good meaning is elicited from the text as it stands.

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τούτῳ ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἐξοικονομηται τὸ ἰσου, πότερον δει τὰ τιμήματα 3. 1.

dieleiv χιλίους τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἰσου δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἡ δὲ ὡς δει τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοίτο λειτουργίαν, ἄλλα διελειν μεῖν οὕτως, ἐπείτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἰσους λαβῶντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τότε τούς κυρίους ἐνδείκνυ τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων.

The meaning of the first case (πότερον δει τὰ τιμήματα κ.τ.λ.) is that the five hundred men of property should have as many votes as the thousand; of the second case that the proportion between the rich and the poor being maintained (500 = 1000), the electors instead of voting directly should choose representatives in equal numbers and transfer to them all the electoral and judicial power.

χιλίους is the dative after dieleiv: ‘to distribute to or among the thousand the qualification of the 500.’ The clause which follows (καὶ . . . πεντακοσίους) is explanatory and illustrates the meaning. The qualification of the 500 is to be distributed among the 1000, and so the 1000 are equal to the 500. Others take the words with ἰσου δύνασθαι, placing a comma at dieleiv, ‘and arrange the qualifications so that the votes of the 500 should be equal to those of the 1000, and the 1000 equal to the 500.’ According to this
way of taking the passage, τὰ τιμῆματα τῶν πεντακοσίων is not parallel
with χρήσεις, sc. πολίταις, for which we should have expected τοῖς
tῶν χρήσεων. The irregularity is not continued in the next clause.

dieleiv μὲν οὕτως. 'We ought to distribute the qualification in
this proportion, i.e. so that 1000 shall have together as much as
500 have together; and carry out the principle by electing an
equal number of representatives from both.' In the previous case
Aristotle supposes a direct election, in this an election through
representatives.

The word διαιρέσεων in this passage is doubtful. If genuine, it
probably means the distribution of the citizens in classes or courts,
like dieleir in the previous sentence (ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως κτλ.).

3. 4. λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς ὅτι δὲν δοξῆ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τούτῳ εἶναι δὲ
κύριον κτλ.

'It is commonly said that the majority must prevail, but in the
majority the elements both of wealth and numbers have to be
included. Suppose for example there are ten rich and twenty
poor, six rich are of one opinion, fifteen poor of another. Five
poor vote with the six rich, and four rich with the fifteen poor.
When both are added up, then of whichever side the qualification
exceeds, that is supreme.'

In the instance given, assuming the qualification of the poor to
be half that of the rich then the votes of the side on which
the poor have a majority = 4 x 2 + 15 = 23,
the rich have a majority = 6 x 2 + 5 = 17,
Majority of poor . . . 23

The precise arithmetical expression which is given to an
imaginary problem is rather curious. It is also remarkable that
the formula which is used seems applicable to timocracy rather
than to democracy, which is now being discussed. But here as
elsewhere Aristotle is always trying to escape from democracy
pure and simple.

3. 5. ὑποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμομένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέρως,
tοῦτο κύριον.

ἑκατέρως is the dative after ὑπερτείνει and a pleonastic explanation
of ὑποτέρων.
NOTES, BOOK VI. 4.

λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὡσπερ ἀν τις διέλα τοὺς δήμους βέλτιστος γὰρ δήμος 4. 1. ἡ γεωργικός ἐστιν, ὡστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ἐς τὸ πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἦ νομῆς.

ὡσπερ ἀν τις κτ.λ. is the explanation of πρώτην, 'I call it the first, meaning that which comes first in the classification of democracies,' because it is the best and most natural, implied in βέλτιστος γὰρ δήμος.

ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν. The commentators require the addition of βέλτιστην which may be supplied from βέλτιστος. Or Aristotle may mean, that you can have a democracy (though not commonly found to exist) among a rustic population, for that is the very best material of a democracy.

ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἦ νομῆς. Aristotle is here speaking not of nomadic tribes 'cultivating their living farm' (i. 8. § 6), who are far from being the most peaceable of mortals, not of an exclusively pastoral life at all (cp. § 11 infra), but of the tending of cattle as one of the ordinary pursuits of an agricultural population.

διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν ὁδότιν ἔχειν ἀσχολεῖσθαι, ὡστε μὴ πολλάκις 4. 2. ἐκλεξομένην διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τάναγκα αἰτίησι πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβομαι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπέθυμος οὖν.

It may appear strange that their being poor should be a reason why people do not desire the property of others. But though a little paradoxical the meaning is clear. Aristotle is describing a population which having little or no independent means, is absorbed in labour, and can only obtain through their labour the necessaries of life; they are patient as well as industrious, and too busy to covet the property of others.

κἂν μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλὰ τινες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος 4. 4. ἐκ πάντων, ὡσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ.

These words probably mean that a body of representatives elected the magistrates, this body consisting of persons elected in turn, or by sections out of all the citizens. A similar principle was adopted in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian (iv. 14. § 4), in which the citizens were to deliberate by turns, as here they elect by turns.
Mantinea is to be counted as a democracy 'after a fashion,' at a certain period of her history, because the electors to offices, although themselves a small body only, were elected by all, and because the whole people had the right of deliberating. Schneider thinks that the names of the magistrates mentioned in the treaty made between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis, B.C. 420 (Thuc. v. 47), likewise indicate a democratic form of government. But this is fanciful. That Mantinea was at that time a democracy may be more safely inferred from the alliance which she formed with Athens and Argos. Aristotle's cautious language would lead us to suppose that the government of Mantinea, though not strictly speaking a democracy, wore the appearance of one, and was a form of government which he himself greatly admired, being in name a democracy but in reality administered by its chief citizens.

The chief magistrates are to be a select class possessing a high qualification, but they will be controlled by the whole people. Thus the democratical constitution is supposed to be happily balanced. But it may be questioned whether a democracy which has a supreme power in the assembly would be willing to elect its magistrates from a privileged class. It may equally be doubted, whether a great people like the Athenians would have submitted to the checks and artifices by which democracy is bridled. Such theories of government look well in books, but they are 'paper-constitutions' only. They may sometimes be realized in fact when events have prepared the way for them; but cannot be imposed as the behests of political philosophy on a reluctant people merely with a view to their good.

διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρῶτῃ ῥήθεισι δημοκρατίᾳ.

dió refers to what has preceded. 'And because of the general contentment which is thereby secured, it is advantageous to this rural form of democracy to be allowed to elect officers and review and judge': a thought which is illustrated in what follows, § 6.
NOTES, BOOK VI. 4.

4. 7.

...tois ἐπιεικεῖσιν ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας.

Lit. 'and they are blameless,' 'do no wrong,' or taken in connexion with the preceding words, as in the translation, *‘are prevented from doing wrong.' An example of a condensed sentence in which two thoughts are compressed into one.

πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δήμον τῶν τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν 4. 8. παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κειμένοιν τὸ ἁρχαῖον χρήσιμοι πάντες, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἔχειναι κεκτηθῶσιν πλείον γῆν μέτρου τινός ἢ ἀπὸ τινὸς τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἀστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν,

ἀπὸ τινὸς τόπου, 'beginning from a certain place,' reckoned in relation to the town. *If reckoning inwards, we must supply μὴ from μὴ ἔχειναι; if outwards, the force of μὴ is not continued.

'The law provided that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land; or, if he did, it was not to be within a certain distance of the city; or, regarded from another point of view, it was to be beyond a certain distance from the city.' In other words he was not to monopolize the valuable portions of the land (cp. Plato's Laws, v. 739 foll.), which were to be distributed among as many of the citizens as possible.

Ἀστυ the city is more precisely defined by πόλις, the Acropolis, as at Athens, cp. Thuc. ii. 15.

4. 9.

ζητεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁν λέγουσιν ὧν ζήλουν νόμου εἶναι τοιοῦτοι τι δινάμενοι, τὸ μὴ 4. 9. ἐναργείαν εἰς τὸ μέρος τῆς ἑπαρχοῦσην ἐκάστῳ γῆς.

That is to say, a certain portion of the land could not be pledged, and was therefore always clear of incumbrances. In ancient as well as in modern times there were agricultural troubles; and many plans were devised for securing the peasant proprietor against the money-lender.

νῦν δὲ διεὶς διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ 'Αφυταίων νόμῳ πρὸς γὰρ ὁ λέγομεν ἕστι 4. 9, 10. χρήσιμος. ἕκενοι γὰρ, καίτερ δυνεῖ πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὄλην, ὅμως πάντες γεωργοῦσιν τιμῶνται γάρ οὐκ ἔλαις τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τηλικαια μόρια διαμοινὰτ ὡστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμῆσει καὶ τοὺς πίνακας.

διορθοῦν. 'Now, when through the want of an enactment such as
that which is ascribed to Oxylus the evil has already sprung up, we should correct it by the law of the Aphytaeans.'

The object aimed at was to maintain or to preserve a large number of small proprietors who were freemen. This was effected at Aphytis by dividing the lots into small portions, each of which gave a qualification for citizenship, so that every one, however poor, was included: e.g. suppose a citizen of Aphytis to have possessed fifty acres, and that forty of these were seized by the usurer, still the remaining ten were sufficient to preserve his rights of citizenship. Or, more generally, 'though the properties were often larger, the portion of land required for a qualification was small.'

The meaning of ἐπερβάλλειν is doubtful. It has been thought to mean that 'even the small proprietors exceeded in number some other class, i.e. the rich or the inhabitants of the town,' or* better 'they exceeded the amount required.'

Aphytis was a city in Pallene, which, according to Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 39, Müller, vol. ii. p. 223, bore an excellent character for honesty among Hellenic cities. Δικαιος καὶ σωφρόνος βιούμενος καὶ ἀλλοτριῶν οὐθεγώνουσιν ἄνεφαμένων τῶν βυρῶν. Then follows the story of the stranger who bought wine and entrusted it to no one, but on returning after a voyage found it in the same place.

4. 11. τὰ πρὸς τὸς πολεμικὸς πράξεις.

Not to be taken after γεγυμνασμένοι; nor is it necessary with some editors to bracket τὰ. Translate, 'and as regards military actions, their mode of life is an excellent training for them.' Compare Alexander's speech to his army, made a few months before his death, 323 B.C., recorded by Arrian, Exped. Alexandri, vii. 9, in which he contrasts the Oriental luxury of his Macedonian soldiers with their former life as mountain shepherds.

The pastoral democracies of the Swiss mountains have been among the most lasting democracies in the world, and they have also furnished some of the best soldiers.

4. 15. ἐπομένως δεῖ παρεκβαίνειν, sc. τὰς ἄλλας. 'The other sorts must deviate in a corresponding order.'
ἐπομένως, i.e. ‘in an order corresponding to their goodness or badness,’ gathered from βελτίστην καὶ πρῶτην.

χείρων δὲ πλῆθος χωρίζειν.

‘At each stage we shall exclude a population worse in kind than at the preceding stage.’ Thus the first and best kind of democracy excludes the class of teχιταὶ (and αὐτοῖς of course all below them). The second excludes the βήτες, and so on till at last nobody remains to be excluded. For the analogous process in oligarchy, cp. infra c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

ἀ δὲ φθείρεις συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τάς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρώ- 4. 15. τερον τὰ πλείστα σχεδόν.

Either the stress is to be laid upon καὶ ταύτην, to which the words καὶ τάς ἄλλας are subordinated, for other states have not been spoken of, ‘Most of the causes which are wont to destroy this like other states, have been already mentioned.’ Or, if the emphasis on καὶ τάς ἄλλας πολιτείας is retained, the reference is to the causes of the destruction of states in bk. v.

ἀ δὲ . . . εἴρηται. The connexion is, ‘But I need not speak of the causes which destroy states; for they have been already spoken of.’ For the absolute use of μᾶλλον cp. Plat. Phaedo 63 D, φησὶ γὰρ δεμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγμένους.

ὅταν γὰρ οἰκεῖον τούτο τῷ ταυτῷ δῆμῳ μᾶλλον. 4. 16.

The last word qualifies οἰκεῖοι: ‘For all this admission of citizens is rather natural than alien to a democracy of this kind.’

διπέρ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αὑτῶν γενέσθαι περὶ Κυρήνης. 4. 17.

διπέρ = the violence of the democracy which was established after the overthrow of the royal power (Herod. iv. 161), about 460 or 450 B.C., and was extended at a somewhat later period in the history of Cyrene.

Κλεισθένης.

Cp. Hdt. v. 69, ὃς γὰρ δὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον πρῶτερον ἀπωσμένον τότε πάντα (al. lect. πάντων) πρὸς τὴν ἐωτοῦ μοίραν προσθήκεια, τὰς Φυλὰς μετεκώμασε καὶ ἐποίησε πλείνας ἐξ ἑλαστῶν. δέκα τε δὴ φυλάρ-
The breaking up of old divisions in an army and a state is not a mere change of names, but of traditions, customs, personal relations—to the ancients even of gods. The division of France into departments, the reorganisation of Italy and Germany, or, to take a minor instance, the recent redistribution of the English regiments, are modern examples of the manner in which such changes affect the habits of men or offend their prejudices.

5. 1. έστι δ' ἵπποιν . . . μέγαστον ἵπποιν.

The repetition of ἵπποιν is awkward; but the general style of the Politics is not sufficiently accurate to justify us in omitting the word in either place.

5. 2. διὸ δέ, περὶ δὲν τεθεώρηται πρῶτον, τίνες σωτηρίαν καὶ φθοράς τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τοῦτων πειράσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν.

διὸ because of the instability of states; the words περὶ δὲν τεθεώ-ρηται πρῶτον are either omitted or altered by those who change the order of the books.

The clause τίνες σωτηρίαν is the explanation of περὶ δὲν, and is resumed in ἐκ τοῦτων.

5. 3. καὶ φερόντων πρῶς τὸ καινόν.

These words are an explanation of τῶν καταδικαζόμενων, 'of those who are condemned, and so bring money into the public treasury,' not voluntarily, but by the penalties which they incur.


δίωσχες ἐμοὶ καλὴν δίκην,

ἐποίμενος ταῖς ἐσφοραίς.

ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐσ τοὺς πλουσίους

σπεύδω σ' ὅπως ἂν ἐγγραφῆς.

5. 5. δεὶ ποιεῖν δλίγας ἐκκλησίας.


5. 8. ἄθροια χρή διανύειν τοῖς ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μέν, εἴ τις δύναται τοσοῦτον ἄθροιζων ὅσον εἰς γηδίον κτῆσιν.


dēpōta, 'in lump sums,' opposed to the piecemeal method of doling out money which he had been describing above.

ei tis, indefinite 'if we can only collect.'

δύναται, sc. dēpōta diaphèrēn. The MSS. vary between dēpōtēn and "να dēpōtēn. Bekker's emendation dēpōtēn is unnecessary.

ἐν δὲ τοὺτο.

'In the meantime,' i.e. until the poor have all received their share they should be assisted by the rich, who should pay them for attending the assembly.

ἀφεμένους τῶν ματαιῶν λειτουργίων.

They being excused from those services which are useless.

Cp. v. 8. § 20.

For Tarentum, see Müller's Dorians (iii. 9. § 14), who sug-5. 10.
gests without any proof that the words κοινὰ ποιηταὶ τὰ κτήματα refer only to the ager publicus. Compare ii. 5. § 8, where Aristotle describes the Lacedaemonians as using one another's horses and dogs in common.

ése δὲ τότε ποιηταὶ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας, τοὺς μὲν κληρω-5. 11.
toûs toûs δ' αἰρεταῖς.

See note on text.

ἀρχῆς is a genitive of respect, assisted by μερίζειν. 'Either there may be two sets of offices, filled up the one by lot and the other by vote, or the same office may be filled up sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote.'

toûs μὲν κληρωτοὺς, sc. ἀρχοντας. Either the accusative immediately follows ποιηταὶ, or is in apposition with τότε; or some word like καθιστάντας is to be supplied from μερίζοντας.

The people of Tarentum elected to some of their offices by vote and to some by lot; the same result might have been attained if they had divided each office, and filled up the vacancies alternately by vote and by lot.

πῶς δὲι φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων.

6. 1.

With δὲι, κατασκευάζειν from the previous sentence, or some similar word suitable to the construction, has to be supplied.
6. 1. τῷ μέν εὐκρατον μᾶλλον τῶν ὀλγαρχῶν καὶ πρώτην.
   With these words have to be supplied, though not therefore to be inserted in the text (Lambinus), πρὸς τῷ βελτίστην δημοκρατίαν καὶ πρώτην from the beginning of chap. 4.

6. 2. ὀ δὲι.
   ὀ = εἰν ὀ. 'And in this.'

6. 2. μετέχειν ἑξεῖναι,
   sc. δὲι.

6. 2. τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένου τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος,
   'The people being introduced in such numbers.' An accusative of measure. (Matth. G. G. 421. § 5.)

6. 4. ὀσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν σώματα εἰ διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτίλιαν καλῶς ἔχοντα τοῖς πλωτήριοι ἐπιδέχεται πλέον ἀμαρτίας.
   καλῶς ἔχοντα is taken in a double construction with τὰ πρὸς ναυτίλιαν and with πλωτήριοι. Either (1)* 'well furnished with sailors for navigation,' or (2) 'well furnished in respect of naval equipments for their sailors.' τοῖς πλωτήριοι may also be construed with ἐπιδέχεται, 'allow of more errors in their sailors.' (1) is confirmed by the words which follow πλωτήριον τετυχηκότα φαίλων.

7. 1. ὑπεὶ δὲ τίτταρά μὲν ἑστὶ κ.τ.λ.
   Interpreters correctly remark that the four kinds of military force have no connexion with the four classes of the people.

7. 1. ἐναῖδα μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.
   'There nature favours the establishment of an oligarchy which will be strong,' or 'we may naturally expect to establish an oligarchy.'

7. 1. ὅποιον δ'/ ὀπλίτην.
   Sc. εἶναι συμβίβασκε understood from the previous words though with a slight change of meaning in the word εἶναι. It is not necessary to read 1) ὀπλίτων with Bekker (in his second edition), or 2) ὀπλίτικην with Susemihl (on the authority of one MS. which reads ὀπλίτικων and the old translator who gives 'armativam').
The oligarchy find themselves outnumbered and overmatched 7. 2, 3. by the light-armed troops. The remedy for this evil is to combine a light-armed force of their own with their cavalry and heavy-armed.

νῦν μὲν οὖν ὅποιν τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἔστιν, ὅταν διαστῶσι, πολλάκις 7. 2. ἄγωνιζονται χείρῳ.

The change in the nominatives is observable, 'When the two parties (πλῆθος καὶ εὔποροι) fall out, the rich (εὔποροι) are often worsted in the struggle.'

φύσιμακον . . . στρατηγῶν. 7. 2.

'A remedy such as military commanders employ.'

ταύτῃ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν. 7. 3.

The antecedent of ταύτῃ, 'in this way,' is not clear. It appears to mean (as we gather from the context) 'by their superior flexibility'—sc. διὰ τὸ ψιλὴν τὴν δύναμιν εἶναι.

ἐκεκριμένοις δὲ εἰκ παῖδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοῖς τῶν ἔργων. 7. 3.

Lit. 'and that persons selected out of boys [thus trained] should themselves become actual light-armed warriors.' The opposition of ἐκεκριμένοις δὲ to ἄτι μὲν ὄντας νέους implies that the persons selected had passed the stage of youth. For ἀθλητὰς τῶν ἔργων cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 543 B, ἀθλητὰς πολέμου.

ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ. 7. 4.

See note on v. 6. § 2.

κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν 7. 6.

should be taken generally of some permanent work, to erect some public building or monument.

tὰ λήμματα γὰρ ξητοῦσαι οὐχ ἔτην ἡ τῆς τιμῆς. 7. 7.

Cp. Eth. viii. 16. § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι.

The plan of this book, which is for the most part a repetition 8. of Book iv., here abruptly breaks down. For though democracy
and oligarchy are fully discussed, nothing is said of other forms of government, notwithstanding the intention expressed at the beginning of the book, c. 1. § 2, of considering 'the modes of organisation proper to each form of government.'

8. 3. πρώτον μὲν ὁδ' ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ περὶ τὴν ἁγιάν, ἐφ' ἣ δὲ τινὰ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορώσαν περὶ τὰ συμβαίνα, καὶ τὴν εἰκοσμίαν.

τῶν ἀναγκαίων, sc. 1) ἐπιμελείαν; or *2) ἀρχῶν, cp. supra § 1, τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν.

8. 8. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐγχώρησθαι μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδόν καὶ χαλεπότατη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄτικν ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιμώμενων κατὰ τὰς ἑγγραφάς.

πράξεις is here used generally to include execution of sentences passed on criminals, and exaction of debts from public debtors.

τῶν προτιμώμενων appears to mean those whose names, having been first entered on the register as defaulters or criminals (κατὰ τὰς ἑγγραφάς), are publicly posted up. Cp. infra § 10. περὶ τὰς προβάσεις τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων: and Plato Laws 784 D where the incorrigible are to be written up (ἀναγεγραμμένοι) and deprived of citizenship.

8. 9. καὶ πράξεων μὴ γεγονόμενων,
sc. κοινωνίων ἀδύνιστον ἀλλήλως.

8. 10. ήτο δ' ἔνια πρώτεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων μίλλων τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων ἐτέρας καταδικασθέντως ἐτέραν εἰς τὴν πραττόμενην, οἷον ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἁγιανμέων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἐτέρους.

'Moreover, in some cases, the magistrates too should execute the sentence; and there should be fresh magistrates to execute the sentences on fresh offences; but in the case of old or existing offences (τῶν ἐνεστῶτων opposed to τῶν νέων) one magistrate should condemn, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora.'

With τὰς τῶν νέων and τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων supply δίκας.
8. 11.

τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν.

Sc. ποιεῖ understood from ἀπέκθει καὶ διπλῆν.

8. 12.

διὸ βελτίων καὶ ταύτῃς χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ἔστείν καὶ περὶ ταύτης.

8. 13.

τὸ σόφισμα, 'the suitable or appropriate device.' The correction of τὸ σόφισμα, which is supported by the expression εἰκὸν μὴ το σοφίζωνται (ii. 5. § 19), is unnecessary and feeble. Such an idiomatic use of the article is not unknown in English: e. g. 'to find out the way' or 'the proper way of making the office less unpopular.'

καὶ περὶ ταύτης, sc. τὴν φυλάττουσαν. 'About this as well as the last case,' i. e. the case of the jailor and the executioner, as well as of the judge and the executioner.


τοιάνται δ' εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὧσατα μᾶς τείνεται.

πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας.

The optative here would seem to require ἄν, which is inserted by Bekker in his second edition, or εἰκὸν may be altered into ἀκοί.

8. 15.

τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐν τοῖς τούτων ἐστὶν εἰκὸς ἐπιμελείας πολεμικών.

The order of the words is τὸ δὲ πᾶν εἰκὸν τούτων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ εἰκόνι ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. Bekker, in his 2nd edition (after Lambinus), reads ἐπιμελεία, a change which is unnecessary.

καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν.

8. 16.

'And which in addition audits them.'

ἡ γὰρ αὕτη πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφορὰν.

8. 17.

The connexion proves that the latter words can only mean the final ratification and the introduction of measures.'

8. 20.

Either 1) the words ἐκεῖνος ὅσοι, or 2) αἱ θυσίαι must be supplied before ἔρχουσι.

Aristotle is opposing the priests, who perform the ordinary sacrifices assigned to them by law, to the great officers of state, who offer sacrifice at the public hearth of the city.
8. 20. καλοὶ δ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχονται κ.τ.λ.

8. 21. ἐπιλογισμοῦ.
   Audits by the officers called λογισταί (cp. § 15). But it is hard to distinguish them from ἐξετάσεις since Aristotle (supra § 16) says that λογισταί and ἐξετασταί are only different names for the same officers.
BOOK VII.

Bernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 ff.) has drawn attention to the peculiar style of the opening chapters (1, 2, 3) of this book, which he supposes to be taken from some Aristotelian dialogue. (See Essay on Structure of Aristotelian Writings.) The passage is certainly remarkable for a flow and eloquence which are not common in Aristotle. But though rare, there are other traces of grace and elevation of style to be discovered in the Politics: e.g. in the discussion about education (viii. c. 3–5), where the writer seems to derive inspiration from his subject; in the introduction to the criticism on the forms of government ii. c. 1; parts of ii. c. 5, especially § 11, are easy and flowing; the descriptions of the middle class citizen iv. c. 11; of the tyrant v. c. 11; and of the city vii. cc. 11, 12, are graphic and striking. There are also several passages in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as many fine expressions in which beauty of style shines through the logical analysis, e.g. Eth. i. 10. § 14; c. 10. § 12, διός δέ καὶ . . . μεγαλόψυχος; ix. 4. §§ 3–6: x. 8. §§ 7, 8. If we could suppose these passages to be a fair sample of any complete writing of Aristotle, we could better understand why his style was so highly praised by Cicero (Acad. ii. 38), and other writers.

ἀδύνατον γὰρ δυνατὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀριστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδικον εἶναι 1. 1. πολιτείαν.

'For the best life may be expected to show us the best state.'

ἀριστεὰ γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοῖς ἀριστα πολιτευμένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ- 1. 1. ἁντιῶν αὐτῶν, εἶτα μὴ τι γίγνεται παράλογον.

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων is to be taken closely with πολιτευμένους. Not 'they lead the best life, as far as their conditions of life admit, who are governed in the best manner:' but 'they lead the best
life who have the best form of government possible under their conditions of life.

The qualification ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, though not mentioned in the first sentence, naturally occurs to the mind of Aristotle, who thinks of life under the conditions of life. Cp. infra § 13, υἱὲ δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοιοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστός, καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετὰ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε μετέχειν τῶν καὶ ἀρετὴν πρῶτον.

Aristotle adds a further qualification ἐὰν μὴ τε γίγνηται παράλογον: as we might say without much meaning and almost as a fauson de parler, 'under ordinary circumstances.'

1. 2, 3. νομίσαντας οὖν ἰκανὸς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀριστῆς ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστεύων αὐτοῖς. ὡς ἄλλον γάρ πρὸς γε μίαν διάσκεψιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβήτησεν ἂν ὁς οὐ τρίων οὐσιῶν μεριδῶν, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις δέι.

καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. 'Popular writings in general,' whether those of Aristotle or of others, containing opinions or distinctions which were generally accepted. The threefold division of goods, into goods of the body, goods of the soul, and external goods, here said to be found in the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, is again mentioned in Rhet. i. 5. § 4, 1360α. 25, and would seem to have been a received notion not peculiar to Aristotle. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 2, νενεμημένων δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῆ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματι, τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς κυρίωτα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὸς τὰς δὲ πράξεως καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχῆς τίθεμεν. ὡστε καλῶς ἐν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτῃ τῇ δόξῃ παλαιῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ ὀμολογημένην ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων. The λόγοι ἔξωτερικοί are alluded to in the same manner and nearly in the same words by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. i. 13. § 9. They are opposed to λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν Eud. Eth. 1217 b. 22.

τριῶν οὐσιῶν μερίδων, sc. τῶν ἄγαθῶν, which is somewhat strangely omitted. The clause which follows τῶν τε ἐκτὸς κ.τ.λ., is either dependent on these words, or in apposition with them.
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ινθρίας κ.τ.λ.

The virtues here mentioned are the four cardinal virtues of Plato (Rep. iv. 428), who calls φρόνησις by the term σοφία, making no such distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις as Aristotle afterwards introduced (Nic. Eth. vi.).

tois philatous filous.

φίλος is bracketed by Bekker in his second edition. But why object to the pleonasm in a rhetorical passage?

ἀλλά ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὅσπερ πάντες ἀν συγχωρήσεις, διαφέρονται δ’ 1. 5. εν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

ὁσπερ is bracketed* by Bekker in his second edition, but without reason. If retained it may either be construed with ἀν συγχωρήσεις, 'as all would agree in these things the moment they are uttered, so on the other hand they differ' etc.; or ὅσπερ may be a qualification of πάντες, 'in a manner every one' (Schlosser, Bonitz s.v.).

diapherontai δ’ εν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

Cp. infra § 8, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν ἤπιοπε ἐξηθεὶ διάστασιν.

'Virtue can never be in excess, and he who has the most virtue 1. 5-13. is the best of men and the happiest; for happiness consists in virtue provided with sufficient means or instruments of good action; and this principle applies equally to individuals and to states, and is the foundation both of ethics and of politics.'

The proof that external goods are inferior to the goods of the 1. 6, 7. soul is twofold:

1) διὰ τῶν ἐργῶν, from the fact that the former are acquired by the latter and not vice versa.

2) κατὰ τῶν λόγων σκοπουμένως, from reason, i.e. the nature of things, because external goods, being an instrument, have a limit; of the goods of the soul there is no limit.

On the antithesis of facts and reason and the connexion between them in Aristotle, cp. note on i. 5. § 1.

τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὁσπερ ἀν ὑπερβάλλη, τοσοῦτο 1. 7. μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι.
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

Yet this is only true of the goods of the soul in their most general sense; a man cannot have too much justice, or wisdom, or intelligence, but he may have too much memory or too much imagination, and perhaps even too much courage or liberality. He cannot have too much of the highest, but he may have too much of the lower intellectual and moral qualities. Cp. Ethics ii. 6. § 17 where Aristotle, after defining virtue as a μεσότης, is careful to explain that it is also an ἀκρότης.

1. 8. Ἑλῶς τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φύσεις τῆς διάδεσιν τῆς ἀρίστης ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἢπερ εἰληφε διάστασιν δὲ ὁμών αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσις ταύτας.

The general meaning of this passage is simple enough. ‘If one thing is superior to another, the best state of that thing is superior to the best state of the other.’ But an awkwardness is caused by the insertion of διάστασιν, after the relative ἢπερ in apposition with ὑπεροχήν. ‘According to the excess or interval which exists between the different states of things.’ The subject of εἰληφε is the antecedent of δὲ, i.e. πράγματα, supplied from ἑκάστου πράγματος.

Bekker, following the old translation ‘sortita est,’ reads εἰληφε for εἰληφε in his second edition. The change makes no real difference in the sense.

1. 9. Ἐτε δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν τούτα πέρυκεν αἰρετὰ καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἰμέθθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἑκέιων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν.

Cp. Matth. xvi. 26, τί γὰρ ὡφθηκενταί ἀνθρώπος εἰν τῶν κόσμων δῶν κερδήσῃ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θεομοβῆ.

1. 10. μάρτυρι τοῦ θεοὶ χρωμένοις.


1. 11. ἐχθένου δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πολίν εὐδαιμόνα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πρᾶττοσαν καλῶς.
The words πρᾶττονσαν καλῶς may be taken either with εἰδαίμων or with τὴν δρίστην. Either 1) *the happy state is that which is (morally) best, and which does rightly*: or 2) *the happy state and that which does rightly is the best*: or 3) (and this though not the only allowable rendering of the passage probably has the most point) *the best state and that which acts rightly is happy,* as God has been said to be happy in the previous sentence. The last words πρᾶττονσαν καλῶς are ambiguous, including both our own *‘doing well,’ and ‘faring well.’ The argument is that as God is happy in his own nature so the state can be happy only so far as it partakes of virtue or wisdom.

ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὖθιν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ 1. 12. μορφήν, δὶν μετασχῶν ἐκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.

τὴν αὖθιν δύναμιν, sc. ἐκεῖνος, to be supplied before δὶν μετασχῶν, ‘with that power or force which each man partakes of when he is called just and temperate and wise.’ Cp. for construction supra § 8.

Bekker, in his second edition (after Coraes), inserts καὶ σώφρωσις after φρόνησις, and ἀνδρείας καὶ before δίκαιος to make the passage symmetrical; but there is no reason to expect this exact symmetry.

ἐτέρας γὰρ ἑστὶν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα. 1. 13.
Lit. *‘For this is the business of another time of leisure,’ or ‘of another time when we shall be at leisure,’ or*, ‘of another discussion.’ Yet he returns to the subject at the beginning of the next chapter. The word σχολῆ is translated ‘discussion’ in this passage by Stahr, and so explained in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon. It is found in this sense in the Laws of Plato, 820 C, and perhaps in Arist. Polit. v. 11. § 5.

ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου. 1. 14.
*‘Enquiry,’ rather than *‘treatise.’ No reference is made in the Politics to the whole work as a book.

It has been already said, c. 1. § 11, not exactly that the happiness 2. 1. of the state is the same as that of the individual, but that they can
be shown to be the same by the same kind of arguments; and again, § 13, the best life for both is declared to be the life of virtue, furnished sufficiently with the means of performing virtuous actions; and in § 14 he proposes to defer matters of controversy for the present. But at the beginning of the second chapter, as if he were dissatisfied with his conclusion, he resumes the question, which has been already in a manner briefly determined, and as if he had forgotten the intention to defer it. There appears to be a latent incongruity even in this rhetorical passage.

It has been thought by Susemihl that c. 1. § 11, ἐχόμενον ὦ ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον κ.τ.λ. is another form of what follows, and that if c. 1. §§ 11, 12 be omitted the connexion of c. 1 and c. 2 would be restored. But the similarity of §§ 11, 12 in c. 1 with c. 2 is not very close; and the difference of style in the two chapters remains as striking as ever.

The analogy of the individual and the state is drawn out at length in the Republic of Plato, iv. 435 ff.

2. 3. ἐστι πάσιν ὄντως αἴρετον κοινωνεῖν πόλεως ἐστι καὶ τοῖς μὲν μή τοῖς δὲ πλείστως.

'Whether it be a democracy or a timocracy.' The remark is parenthetical, and is not further expanded.

2. 4. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστίν ἐργαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον αἴρετον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προήρημα ἄν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκείνο μὲν πάρεμαν ἢ ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐργαν τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ταυτήν, sc. σκέψιν πολιτικῆς supplied from πολιτικῆς.

ἐκείνω, sc. the question, 'which is the more eligible life?'

τούτῳ, sc. the question, 'which is the best state?' Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 2. § 8.

2. 5. ἀνθρωπον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἴρετος ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων ἔκτος ἄπολευμενός, οἰον θεωρητικὸς τις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7, where the relative value of the two kinds of life is fully discussed.

2. 6. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν τε εὐ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τῶν βελτίων σκοπῶν συντάπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῆ τὴν πολιτείαν.

Yet Aristotle does not show how the two lives of action and
contemplation are to be transferred to the sphere of politics, the parallel which he sets over against them in this passage being only the life of the tyrant and the life of the private individual. At § 16 he opposes the state in activity to the state in isolation; and this is perhaps the half-expressed contrast which is floating before his mind.

νομίζοντι δ’ οί μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γεγούμενον μέτ’ 2. 7. 

ἀδίκως τῶν εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἦχεν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἦχεν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ.

ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἦχεν, ‘to contain an impediment.’ The article may be supplied, if necessary from τὸ μὲν ἄδικον.

ὡσπέρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέκται σχεδὸν 2. 9. εἰ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.

Cp. Plato’s Laws, bk. i. 630 ff., where the principle that the laws of nations should have some higher object than success in war is energetically maintained, and for the approval of these sentiments by Aristotle, supra, ii. 9. § 34.

καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τόν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν. 2. 10.

It may be instructive and is certainly amusing to remark that William de Moerbek either reading κρίνων from κρίνου, ‘a lily,’ or confusing κρίνου and κρίκων, translated ‘lilia.’

ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἦχεν πίνειν ἐν ἐορτῇ τοῦ σκύφους περιπερώμενον τῷ 2. 11.

μπένα ἀπεκταγότοι πολέμων.

Cp. Hdt. iv. 66, where it is said that once in every year the governor of each district mixes a bowl of wine from which those only may drink who have captured enemies.

The accusative σκύφους περιπερώμενον may be regarded as an accusative absolute, assisted by the verb of cognate signification, ‘when the cup was brought round.’

Here is a beginning of national and international morality. The 2. 12–18. question whether the contemplative or the practical life is the superior was discussed in Nic. Eth. x. c. 7, but entirely with reference to the individual. In this passage an analogous question is raised con-
cerning the state. May not an individual find within himself the
best kind of action?—May not the state, though isolated and self-
centred, lead a true political life? These two questions to us
appear distinct; but they are very closely connected in the mind
of Aristotle, to whom the individual is the image of the state.

The isolated life of the state is suggested as a possibility by
Aristotle. But he is quite aware that all states have relations to
their neighbours which they cannot afford to neglect. Cp. ii. 6.
§ 7; c. 7. § 14.

2. 15. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν.
Cp. in i. 7. § 5, οἷον ἡ δικαία, and infra c. 14. § 21.

3. 3, 4. καὶ τοῖς ἰν ὑπολάβοι τις τοῦτων οὕτω διαφημισμένων ὑπὸ τὸ κύριον εἶναι
πάνων ἀριστῶν οὕτω γὰρ ἐν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριοι εἰς πράξεως.
οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀρχείν παρεῖναι τῷ πλησίον, ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖται,
καὶ μήτε πατέρα παῖδων μήτε παῖδας πατρῶς μήθ᾽ ὅλως φίλου φίλων
μηδένα ὑπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν τὸ γὰρ ἀριστῶν αἰρετάτατον.

'It is argued by some that power gives the opportunity for virtue,
and if so, the attainment of power will be the attainment of virtue.
But power in the higher sense implies the qualities which enable a
man to make the true use of it, and these he will not gain but
lose by violating the equality which nature prescribes.' Compare
the notion of Thrasymachus (Plat. Rep. i.) that justice is the interest
of the superior and supra, note on i. 6. § 3; also the thesis main-
tained by Callicles (Gorgias 484 ff.) that the tyrant is wisest and
best and the refutation of this notion by Socrates.

πρὸς τοῦτο, sc. πρὸς τὸ ὑπολογεῖν παιδῶν, κ.τ.λ.

3. 5. μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἁνὴρ γυναῖκος ἢ πατὴρ τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης
δούλων.

These family relations are chosen as types of government an-
swering to various kinds of rule, aristocratical, royal, tyrannical

Aristotle means to say that a man is harmed by ruling over
others unless he have a right to rule; but this right can be given
only by a natural superiority.
Either 1) ‘For equals to share in the honourable is just,’ or 2)*

‘For to equals the honourable and the just consists in all having a turn.’

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τούτο συμβαίνειν.

καὶ τούτο = οὐκ ἀπρακτεῖν; or rather some positive idea which is to be elicited from these words. ‘There may be in a state internal as well as external activity.’

ὁμολογεῖ δὲ τούτο ἐπάρχει καὶ καθ’ ἐνὸς ὀσοιοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

‘Like the state the individual may be isolated, yet he may have many thoughts and powers energizing within him.’

σχολὴ γὰρ ἃν ὁ θεὸς ἔχει καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος οἷς οὐκ εἰσίν ἐξωτερικά 3. 10.

πράξεις παρὰ τὰς ὀλίγας τὰς αὐτῶν.

i.e. ‘were happiness not possible in isolation.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. ix.

3. § 4, ἐχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τάγαθων ἄλλ’ ἀν ὅτι ποι’ ἐστίν; ib. Χ. 8.

§ 7, quoted supra, c. 1. § 10.

καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

There is no reason for bracketing these words as Bekker has done in his second edition; = ‘mankind generally.’ Cp. supra c. 2. § 17, where πόλεις are joined with γένος ἀνθρώπων.

περὶ αὐτῶν.

‘About these general questions.’

περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.

‘Other than the best.’ These words seem most naturally to refer to Books iv, v, and vi, and are therefore inconsistent with the altered order of the books. It is impossible to believe with Hildenbrand and Teichmüller that Book ii., in which Aristotle treats not of different forms of government, but of certain theoretical or historical constitutions, furnishes a sufficient antecedent for these words. (See Sussemlh’s note, 749, vol. ii. p. 180.)

περὶ τῆς μελλοντικῆς κατ’ εὐχήν συνεστάναι πόλεως.

Compare iv. 1. § 3, ὅστε δὴ λογία καὶ πολιτεία τῆς αὐτῆς ἕστιν ἐπιστήμης τῆν ὀρίστην θεωρήσαι τὸς ἑστὶ, καὶ ποία τις ἀν οὖσα μᾶλιστ’ εὖ κατ’ εὐχήν,
Aristotle appears to start with a consideration of the perfect state; but in attempting to describe the conditions of it he seems to forget his higher purpose. Unless it may be supposed that the Politics is an unfinished work.

4. 3. την οικείαν ὑλήν.

= τὰς ἰσοθεσίας, the conditions mentioned in § 1.

4. 5. ἢστι γὰρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἐργον, ὡστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰκτέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οὖν Ἰπποκράτην οὐκ ἀνθρωπον ὄλλ' ἱερῶν εἶναι μείζω φύσεων ἀν τις τοῦ διαφέρων κατά τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος.

'That city is the greatest, not which is numerically largest, but which is best adapted to its end; just as Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a physician, than somebody else who is taller.'

The great city must have the qualities suited to a city, just as the great Hippocrates must have the qualities, not of a tall man, but of a physician. It is the accident of a city that it is populous, just as it is the accident of Hippocrates that he is tall.

4. 8. 9. οἱ δὲ λιών ὑπερβαλλόν ἄριστος οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως: θείας γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἐργον, ἢτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλῶν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσὶν γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλις ἢτις μετὰ μεγέθους οὐκ ἔπαρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαίων.

The connexion is as follows: 'The divine power which holds together the universe can alone give order to infinity. For beauty consists in number and magnitude; wherefore that city in which magnitude is combined with the principle of order is to be deemed the fairest.'

In this and similar passages we may note mingling with Pythagorean fancies, a true sense that proportion is the first principle of beauty. Cp. Metaph. xii. 8. § 26, 1074 b. 1, parađidōsai δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μῦδον σχῆματι καταθελεμένη τὰς ἔστηρον δι' ἦθελ τέ ἐσων οὕτω καὶ περίχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὑλήν φύσιν τὰ δὲ λοιπά μεθυκός ήδη προσηκταί πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν σῶλων καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν.

τοῦτο refers to τάξεως, but is neuter because it is attracted by ἐργον.

ὁ λεγέται ὅρος, 'the above-mentioned principle,' sc. εἰσαξιόν.
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дио ἐπὶ τὸς πολιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τούτου πλήθους ἐπὶ πρῶτον 4. 11.

πλήθος αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ εὖ εἶναι ἐστί κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν.

διὸ refers not to the clause immediately preceding but to the principal idea of the sentence, contained in the words ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις, ὡς μὲν εἰς ὅλην καὶ αὐτάρκης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 10. § 3, ὡστε γὰρ ἐκ δικαὶ ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, ὡτ' ἐκ δικαὶ μυριάδων ἐτὶ πόλις ἐστίν.

ἐπὶ τὸν κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. 'We then first have a state when we first have a sufficient number.' πρῶτον may be either adjective or adverb.

κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. 'A good life according to the requirements of the political community,' i.e. the life of a freeman and citizen.

ἐναι μεῖζων πόλιν.

μεῖζω is unnecessarily bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. The point is as follows: 'There may be also a greater city than is required by the limit of self sufficiency, but this increase is not unlimited.' He has said above (§ 4) 'that the more numerous city is not necessarily the greater,' but in this case it is or may be.

eἰς γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχῶτων, τῶν δὲ ἀρχομένων. 4. 12.

The πράξεις, or actions of a state, are the actions of two classes which act upon each other, the governors and the governed. Cp. i. 5, § 3, ὡστε δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεῖ τὸ δὲ ἀρχεται ἐστὶ τοῦτων ἐργαν.

ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἄλληλους. 4. 13.

Cp. Plat. Laws v. 738 D, E, εἴ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἄγαθων ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτῶν (sc. τοῖς πολίσις) αὐτῶς εἶναι. Ὡστε γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἄλληλοι ἐστίν ἄλληλοι ἐν τοῖς πρόσε σώματος ἄλλα σκότος, οὔτ' ἂν τιμής τῆς ἄξιας οὔτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἂν τῆς προσηκούσης ἀρθός τυχόναι.

ὅλων τοῖν πολέως ὡς οὖσις ἐστὶ πολέως ὄρος ἀριστος, ἡ μεγάλη τοῦ πλήθους 4. 14.

ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν καὶ ἐντονεῖσα εὐσώφορος.

This is a condensed sentence, meaning 'the largest number which can be seen at once, and at the same time suffices for the purposes of life.' Aristotle wishes to combine μεγεθὸς τι with εὔνομα. Cp. Poet. 7, I451 a. 3, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐδέασαν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἐχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τούτο δὲ εὐσώφορον εἶναι.
5.2. Ἔλκοντας,
like the English word 'draw,' is used neutrally, 'those who
draw or pull to either extreme.'

5.3.4. The paragraph—τὸ δ’ ἑίδος . . . ἐὑπαρακόμιστον—is ill arranged:
it may be analysed as follows: 'The city should be difficult of
access to enemies, and easy of egress to the citizens; the whole
territory should be seen at a glance (for a country which is easily
seen is easily protected): it should be well situated both in regard
to sea and land. Herein are contained two principles: 1) the one
already mentioned, about inaccessibility to enemies and convenience
to friends: to which may be added 2) a second principle, that the
situation should be adapted to commerce.'

The words ἰεὶ γὰρ . . . ἀπάντων are a repetition of the words τὸ
δ’ ἑίδοντον τὸ ἐὑπαρόκόμετον ἐναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν.

5.4. ἐἰς μὲν ὁ λεγθεῖς ὄρος,
sc. περὶ τοῦ ἑίδους τῆς χώρας.

5.4. ἐτὶ δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὑλῆς, κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυχαία
κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, ἐὑπαρακόμετον.

τῆς ὑλῆς dependent on ἐὑπαρακόμετον—ἐὰν ἔχοσαν πρὸς τὴν κομιδὴν:
tῆς περὶ ξύλα ὑλῆς either 1) wood (ὑλή) which is used as timber,
or 2) timber which is used as material (ὑλή).

6. The echo of these antimaritime prejudices is heard in Cicero,
who discusses the subject at length in his De Republica, Book
ii. cc. 3 and 4.

6.1. καὶ τὴν πολιονθρωπίαν,
sc. ἀσύμφορον εἶναι φασιν.

6.2. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, κ.τ.λ.
'That however, if we could get rid of these evils, there would be
an advantage in a city being connected with the sea is obvious.'

6.4. οὕτω γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.
'Like the individual (i. 9. § 14) the city may receive what she
absolutely needs, but is not to import and export without limit.'
Aristotle would restrain foreign trade as much as possible, not because he aims at exclusiveness, but because he dislikes the moneymaking and commercial spirit.

In this passage ἄπαρχων the reading of the MSS. has been altered into 1) ἄπαρχεων by Schneider and by Bekker in his 2nd Edition; and also 2) into ἄπαρχουσα, in the latter case with the omission of καί. The alteration, though probable, is not necessary; for ἐμπόρουν may be supplied with ἄπαρχον from the preceding sentence, the plural words ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμήνας being taken in apposition as an epexegesis. ‘But now-a-days there are many cities and places in which such a mart exists, [containing] docks and harbours conveniently situated in relation to the city; and as is obvious, whatever evil there may be is avoided and the good secured, when they are placed at a moderate distance, but commanded by walls and similar fortifications.’

The inland position of the ancient Greek cities, as Thucydides (i. 7) remarks, was due to the prevalence of piracy. Their ports were added later, as the Piraeus at Athens, Nisaea at Megara, Cenchreae and Lechaeum at Corinth, Cyllene at Elis, Gythium at Sparta, Nauplia at Argos, Siphae at Thespiae, Notium at Colophon, etc.

κρατεῖοθαι = to be controlled or held in check by.

ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικόν καὶ πολιτικόν ζῆσται βίον. 6. 7.

ἡγεμονικόν, like Athens or Sparta in the days of their greatness, v. 7. § 14. The alteration of πολιτικόν into πολεμικόν in Bekker’s 2nd edition is quite unnecessary. For πολιτικὸς βίος, applied to a city, cp. ii. 6. § 7, εἰ δὲ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν.

πολλάς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τρίηρες [οἱ ᾿Ηρακλεῖται]. 6. 8.

6. 9. καὶ πόλεων.

πόλεων, if genuine, is a difficult word. It may be taken in the sense of 'ports like the Piraeus' *; or closely connected with λιμένων of 'cities in relation to their harbours,' cp. supra, c. 5. § 3. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The word has been bracketed by Bekker in his second edition and is probably corrupt. The conjectural emendations ἐπινεῖων (Coraes), ἐμπορίων (Schmidt), περιπολίων (Broughton) are not fortunate; πλοίων might also be suggested (cp. supra, § 6). But it is more probable that some words have been accidentally transposed and that we should read περι μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεων [οί πόλεως] καὶ λιμένων κ.τ.λ. οί, περι μὲν οὖν πόλεων [οί πόλεως] καὶ χώρας κ.τ.λ.

7. 2. τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην.

According to Aristotle it would seem that Europe includes the colder, that is, the Northern parts of Europe and excludes Hellas. The words καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην an explanatory of τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη. Compare the Hymn to Apollo l. 250:

ἡμέν ὅσοι Πελοπόννησον πείρας ἔχονσιν,

ἡδ' ὅσοι Εὐρώπην τε καὶ ἀμφιρύπτας κατὰ νήσους,

in which a similar notion of Europe is implied.


7. 3. µᾶς τυχαύνον πολιτείας.

Could Hellas have been united in a federation, she might have governed the world. But the individuality of Greek cities was too
strong to allow of such a union, and the country was too much divided by natural barriers. The cities on the coast might be coerced into an Athenian Empire, but could not be fused into a political whole. Cp. Herod. ix. 2, where the Thebans say to Mardonius that the Greeks if united would be a match for the whole world,—κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἱσχυρὸν Ἑλλήνας ὁμοφρονείτας, οὖτε καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπασὶ ἀνθρώποις.

φιλεῖν δὲν εἰσίν ἰπάρχειν τοῖς φίλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸς μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. 7.5.

This, like some of Aristotle's other criticisms on Plato, is chiefly interesting as shewing the difficulty which he found in understanding the play of language which is characteristic of Plato. [See Essay on Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato.] The passage referred to is Rep. ii. 375 E, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γυνώμοις ὅσ' οὖν τε πρασάτον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τοίνυντιον, where we may observe that the word φιλητικὸς is not used by Plato.

ο ἰθυμός. 7.5.

'Passion' = the depth or force of character which makes a good lover or a good hater. Compare Theognis, l. 1091 Bergk—

ἀργιλέως μοι θυμός ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος,
οὔτε γὰρ ἐξεδώρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναιμαι.

But in the Topics ii. 7, 113 b. 1 Aristotle raises the question whether φίλα resides in τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν and not in τὸ θυμοειδές. Like our word passion, θυμός has both a wider and narrower use, and is employed by Aristotle here in a more philosophical, but in the Topics in a more popular sense.

Aristotle truly remarks that anger is felt, not against strangers, 7.5–8. but against friends who have wronged or slighted us. Cp. Rhet. ii. c. 2, 1379 b. 2, καὶ ἑργαζόνται] μᾶλλον τοῖς φίλοις ἢ τοῖς μη φίλοις: and Psalm xli. 9, 'Yea, even mine own familiar friend, whom I trusted, who did also eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.'

οῦ γὰρ δὴ περὶ φίλων ἀπάνχησι. 7.6.

The reading of the MSS. which is repudiated in the translation is not indefensible, though, in the absence of context, it is im-
possible to interpret it with certainty: 'For were they not friends about whom thou wast plagued or grieved?' cp. again from Psalm lv. 12: 'It is not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour, for then I could have borne it.' A mot attributed to a well-known statesman who had been anonymously attacked in a newspaper is to the point, 'It must have been by a friend,' he said, 'an enemy would not have been so bitter.' The verse is very probably taken from the well-known poem of Archilochus in Trochaic verse beginning θυμε θυμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμεν, of which a fragment is preserved (Bergk 60): the metre might be restored either by omitting δη, which may have been added by Aristotle, or by inserting ὤν before δη.

The translators William de Moerbek and Aretino render ἄσπιχεο 'a lanceis,' as if they had read or imagined they read ὄπτ' ἐγχέων.

7. 7. οὐδ' εἶσαι οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τῷ φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄδικοντας.

Yet the μεγαλόψυχοι described in Nic. Eth. iv. 3. is rather unapproachable by his neighbours.

7. 9. οὐ γὰρ τῷν αὐτήν ἀκριβεῖαν δεὶ ζητεῖν διὰ τέ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γιρομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

Cp. below c. 12. § 9. Aristotle is opposing political theories to facts, as in the Ethics he contrasts the moral certainty of Ethics (Nic. Eth. i. 3. § 4) with the absolute certainty of mathematics, though the ἀκριβεία in the two cases is different, meaning in the one the necessity and α' πρι' θεία of mathematics, in the other exactness of detail.

8. 1. ἐπεὶ δ' ὅσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατά φύσιν συνεστῶτων οὗ ταύτα ἐστὶ μόρα τῆς ὀλης συντάσεως, δὲν ἀνευ τὸ διον οὐκ ἀν εἶν, ἀδιον οὐδὲ πόλεος μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαίον ἐπάρχειν, οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας ὀδηγεῖας, εἰς ἤς ἦν τι τὸ γένος.

In this rather complex sentence Aristotle is distinguishing between the conditions and the parts of the whole. The words δὲν ἀνευ τὸ διον οὐκ ἀν εἶν answer to ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαίον ἐπάρχειν in the application to the state.

The editions vary between ταύτα and ταύτα. ταύτα is confirmed by the words of § 6, πόσα ταύτ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἀνευ πόλεις οὐκ ἀν εἶν. If we
NOTES, BOOK VII. 8.

read ταῦτα it will be convenient to supply ἤκεινος with ὅν ἄνευ, if ταῦτα, ἤκεινον.

ἐξ ὡς ἐν τῷ γένος, i.e. ‘out of which is formed,’ or ‘which forms a lower class having a unity;’ ‘which in its nature is a whole, and not a mere aggregate,’ ἐν τῷ γένος ἐν τῷ ἐστι τῷ γένος.

‘The end has nothing in common with the means; the final 8.3. cause with the conditions.’ Just as in iii. 1. § 9 things prior and posterior are said to have no quality in common with each other. Of course the modern philosopher makes the opposite reflection, ‘that the end is inseparable from the means,’ or, ‘is only the sum of the means’; that causes are indistinguishable from condition; and equally indistinguishable from effects; ‘that no line can be drawn between à priori and à posteriori truth.’ The common understanding, like ancient philosophy, rebels against this higher view, because it can point to numberless visible instances in which the end is separable from the means, the effect from the causes. Both lines of reflection are constantly returning upon us, and the opposition between them gives rise to many metaphysical problems. It is the old difficulty, as old as the opposition of ideas to phenomena, of finding the similarity where there is difference or contrast.

δρόμῳ τε πάντι πρὸς τὸ γεγένεμον ἐργον καὶ τῶν δημιουργίων. 8. 3.

 Governed by oiedades κοινὸν ἐστι. ‘The builder and his tools have nothing in common with the work; so property has nothing in common with the State.’

The connexion of this passage in which means and ends, parts 8.5–6. and conditions are curiously combined appears to be as follows: ‘Now happiness is imparted in various degrees to states, making them to be what they are according to the degree of happiness which they attain. But we must also ascertain what are the conditions of states, for in these we shall find their parts.’ He seems to mean that through what is outward only we can arrive at the true elements of the state; and that happiness, which is the end of the state, is not to be confounded with the conditions of it. The argument is interrupted by the seemingly irrelevant remark that the
character of states is given to them by the degrees of happiness which they attain. Here as in other passages (cp. c. 9. § 2 infra), when speaking of the perfect state, he occasionally goes back to the imperfect forms.

8. 5. ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις.

Cp. the more complete statement of the Nic. Eth. i. 7. §§ 14–16, ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀρετὴν ἅρυστην ἐν βίῳ τελείο.

8. 6. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ τῶν ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἄν ἄνεν πόλις οὐκ ἄν εἶν.

'Besides considering the highest good of the state or the idea of the state in its highest terms (gathered from the previous section) we must also consider the indispensable conditions of it, and among them we shall find its parts.' All the parts are conditions of a state, not all the conditions are parts; e.g. the ὑπὸς are a condition but not a part; τὸ βουλευόμενον both a condition and a part.

8. 7. πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον.

'First,' i.e. in honour, not in necessity, for that place he assigns to the sixth class.

Spengel would omit καὶ πρῶτον. But how could the insertion of such a clause ever be explained, unless it had been put in by the piety of a Greek monk?

ἡν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, 'which they call ritual.' The formula ἡν καλοῦσιν seems to imply some technical or uncommon use of the word, which occurs nowhere else in classical Greek, cp. ἡν καλοῦσιν τινες ἀλγαρχίαν, vi. 1. § 6.

8. 7. ἔστων δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

The last words are pleonastic, 'sixth in numerical succession.'

8. 9. The conjecture of Lambinus τῶν δικαίων taken from τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων above, § 7, has been adopted in the text. But the reading of the MSS. τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'of necessary matters of life,' is really defensible and is confirmed by the word ἀναγκαίαται in § 7. ἀναγκαίων may also refer to punishments: see infra c. 13. § 6.

9. 1, 2. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τούτῳ πολιτείᾳ.

'This question, however, does not arise in every state, for it is
already decided. In democracies all share in all, while in oligarchies only some share in some employments or functions. But we are speaking of the ideal state in which the question remains to be considered.

καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν.  9.2.

This passage can hardly refer to ii. 1. § 2, for there Aristotle is speaking of the distribution of property: here of the distribution of functions in the state. The reference is rather to iv. c. 4 and c. 14; see supra c. 4. § 1.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦστε περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας . . . εἰρηταὶ.  9.3.

The connexion is as follows: 'But in the best state, with which we are now concerned, all cannot participate in all, for the trader, the artisan and the husbandman have no leisure for education, neither are they capable of political functions.'

εἰρηταὶ πρῶτερον in c. 8. § 5 supra. It is noticeable that Aristotle in describing the perfect state no longer, as in a democracy (cp. vi. c. 4.), regards the husbandmen as the best material out of which to form citizens.

tοῖς ἀνδροποιοῖς ἐσεβὴς.  9.4.

sc. πολίτας, (ἐν τῇ καλλιστα πολιτευμένῃ πόλει § 3), 'citizens of the best state.'

πρῶτερον ἐτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέων.  9.4.

Bekker in his second edition inserts ἐτερος after ἐτερα unneces-

arily. Without it we may translate: 'Are these also to be distinct, or are both to be given to the same persons?'

Compare Book ii. 5. § 26.  9.5.

ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τούτων.  9.7.

The use of περὶ is singular: the force of the preposition may be paraphrased as follows: 'they too should have a near interest in property,' an indirect way of expressing what is more distinctly said infra § 8 τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων.
9. 8. εἰπέρ ὑπαγκαίων εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δοῦλους ἢ βαρβάρους.

The necessity seems to arise from the impossibility of the husbandman having the leisure which a citizen requires for mental cultivation and the fulfilment of political duties, cp. § 4.

9. 10. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἐκαστῶν, τὸ μὲν ἄει, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

tούτων, i.e. not merely the ὀπλιτικῶν καὶ βουλευτικῶν; to these must be added the γεωργοί, τεχνίται, and τὸ βηθικόν, in all five. The two first interchange with each other, but never with the three last.

The division between the mere conditions of the state (viz. the γεωργοί, τεχνίται and τὸ βηθικόν) and the parts of it (τὸ οπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν) is permanent. The division between τὸ οπλιτικὸν, τὸ τῶν ἱερίων γένος and τὸ βουλευτικὸν is transitory or κατὰ μέρος, i.e. the same persons may belong in turn, or at different stages of life, to all three classes.

10. 1. ἦοκε δ’ οὗ νῦν ολιθε νεωτε τοῦτ’ εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας

philosophos, ότι δεί διηρησθαί χωρίς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν.

This chapter has been regarded, and perhaps with reason, as a criticism of Plato, Aristotle being desirous of disproving by historical facts the claim of Plato to originality in instituting the system of caste and of common meals.

10. 2. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα κ.τ.λ.

In apposition with τῶν συναστίων ἤ τάξει, ‘the custom in Crete going back to the reign of Minos.’

10. 3–5. ‘The name Italy was originally confined to the district between the Lametic and Scylletic Gulfs’ (Golfo di Eufemia and Golfo di Squillace), ‘and was derived from Italus, an ancient king of the Oenotrians’ (called by Thucydides vi. 2 a Sicel king) ‘who inhabited these regions. The people to the north-west towards Tyrrhenia were called Ausones and those to the north-east in the district called Siritis’ (on the shore of the Tarentine gulf) ‘Chones.’

The mention of Italy (taken in this narrower sense) leads the writer to particularise its different regions; but nothing is said about how far the custom of common meals may have extended.
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...that part of Italy which is bounded or enclosed at its narrowest point by the two gulfs. The reason (ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα) is imperfectly expressed: 'You may call this the boundary because the distance is so small between the two gulfs.' It is in fact about 20 miles.

It has been asked, 'What does Aristotle purpose in this digression?' There is a fallacy in requiring that every part of an ancient work should have a distinct purpose. Aristotle, like Aeschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, 'breaks out' into the favourite subject of geography, and his conceptions of it, as might be expected in the beginning of such studies, are not perfectly accurate or distinct.

It is evident that common meals played a great part in the political organisation of Hellas and the south of Italy. But, according to Susemihl, no other writer mentions their existence in Italy.

Σίρης is the reading of most MSS., σύρης of two only. The 10. 5. MSS. of the old translator appear all to give sytem. Σίρης is conjectured by Heyne, who compares Arist. Fragm. Πολιτεία 542, καὶ οἱ τὴν Σίρην δὲ κατακούντες . . . ὡς φησι Τίμαιος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, εἰς τρυφὴν ἐξωκελαὶ οἷς ἤσσον Συβαρίτων, Athen. xii. 523 C. Hence Goëtting's conjecture Σφίτις the district of Siris. Of any district of Italy called Syrtes or Syrtis there is no mention elsewhere.

...that part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostiris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos.'

It is also possible to supply the ellipse differently: 'The separation into castes came [not from Italy or Crete, but] from Egypt.'

The sentence is then parallel with the other statements. Common tables existed in Crete and in Italy: the latter were the older, and therefore are called 'the origin of the institution' (§§ 2, 4); similarly, caste existed in Crete and in Egypt; in the latter
country its origin dates further back than in the former, for Sesostris is older than Minos, and therefore it is said to have originated there.

10. 7. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρήσασθαι πολλάκις εἰ τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ.

A favourite reflection of Aristotle's. See note on text for parallel passages.

10. 8. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαία.

'All political institutions are ancient; for they are found in Egypt which is the most ancient of all countries.' Cp. Plat. Laws ii. 657. 'Their (i.e. the Egyptian) works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago; this is literally true, and no exaggeration.' For further references see note on text. That this sameness was the weakness of Egypt, and that the life of Hellas was progress, seems not to have occurred either to Aristotle or Plato.

10. 8. τοῖς μὲν ἑιρημένοις

is the reading of the MSS., altered in the text after Lambinus into ἑιρημένοις, a change which seems to be required by the want of a suitable antecedent and by the parallelism of παράλειψεμένα. Cp. supra, σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρήσασθαι πολλάκις, and ii. 5. § 16.

10. 10. ἦστερον ἐροῦμεν.

This promise is not fulfilled. In c. 12. § 1 the common meals are only mentioned in passing; no reason is given in support of the institution.

10. 11. τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυνεῖτους πολέμους ὑμοσυνηκτώτερον.

A lesson learned from the experience of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. The Acharnians whose lands lay on the borders, seeing them ravaged, wished to attack the invaders rashly (Thuc. ii. 21), and afterwards when they had lost their possessions as Archidamus thought likely (Thuc. ii. 20 ἐστερημένοι τῶν σφετέρων οἷς ὁμοίως προθύμους ἔστασθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων καυδυνεύουν,
For reference to Plato and criticism on him see note on text. 10. 11.

δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους.

Compare above c. 9. § 8, ἀνυγκαίον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δοῦλους ἡ βαρβάρους ἡ περιοίκους, a comparison which has led to the insertion of ἡ before περιοίκους in this passage, or to the omission of it in c. 9. The text of the MSS. is probably right in both passages. ‘If we could have the very best thing, the husbandmen should be slaves; or if slaves cannot be had, then perioeci of alien stock.’

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν βέσιν εἰχεσθαι δεὶ καταυγχάνειν πρὸς 11. 1.

πέταρα βλέποντας.

The order of the words is as follows—δεὶ εἰχεσθαι καταυγχάνειν [τοῦ] τὴν βέσιν εἶναι.

The four points to be attended to appear to be as follows: 1) healthy and airy situation, open to the winds (cp. § 4, infra); 2) good water; 3) convenience for administration (πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις); 4) adaptation to military requirements (πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις).


Vitruvius i. 6 tells us how the inhabitants of Mitylene suffered from the situation of their town: ‘Oppidum magnificenter est aedificatum et eleganter; sed positum non prudenter. In quâ civitate auster cum flat homines aegrotant, cum eurus, tussiunt, cum septentrio, restituuntur in sanitatem, sed in angiportis et plateis non possunt consistere propter vehementiam frigoris.’ (Quoted by Eaton.)

δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν.

κατὰ βορέαν—'facing the same way that the North wind does,' (cp. κατὰ μῶν) i.e. sheltered from the North wind. Cp. Plat. Crit. i 18 A, Β, ὁ δὲ τόπος οὗτος ὅλης τῆς χήσου πρὸς νότου ἐπέτραπτο, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων κατάβοθος.
δεύτερον may either be taken as *an alternative, or as introducing a second condition of healthfulness, so that a South Eastern aspect is what is recommended; i.e. a situation which is open to the healthy East winds and affords shelter from the North wind.

11.3. τούτο γ' εὖρηται
is the reading of all the MSS. The conjecture of Lambinus, εὐφησθαι, adopted by Bekker in his second edition, is unnecessary.

τούτο γ’ εὖρηται=‘a remedy has been found for this,’ i.e. ‘a remedy may be found.’ The language is not quite symmetrical, but this is no reason for altering it.

11.3. ὑποδοχῆς ὁμβρίων ἔδασιν.
Five MSS. read ὁμβρίων, a possible reading, ‘rain cisterns for water’ instead of ‘cisterns for rain water.’

11.4. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ.
‘In the situation described, and looking to the quarter described.’

11.5. τοιούτων ναμάτων.
The reading of the best MSS. and the old translator, ‘such streams as I have spoken of above,’ that is to say, ‘good streams’ (ἐγείρετον § 4).

11.5. ἀκρόπολις ἀθηναρχικῶν καὶ μοναρχικῶν, ἀριστοκρατικῶν . . . ἰσχυρῶν τόπων πλείους.
It may be asked: ‘Why should a single fortress be adapted to a monarchy, or oligarchy, several strongholds to an aristocracy?’ Probably because in the former case the government is more concentrated. A small governing class, if they are to maintain their power against the people, must draw together. An aristocracy has only to defend itself against foreign enemies, and is therefore better dispersed.

11.7. ἐν τῷ σωτῷ κατασκευάζῃ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς ὅσο καλοῦσι τινες τῶν ἀμέλεων συστάδος.
The last word is explained by Hesychius (under ἔσταδες) as αἱ πυκναὶ ἀμέλεις ἀμέλειας ἐὰν τὰς εἰκόνις καὶ μὴ κατὰ στοιχεῖα πεφυτευμέναι
1) *vines planted thickly or in clumps, or 2) vines planted irregularly. If we adopt the first of these interpretations and take the image literally, Aristotle is suggesting that the city should be built partly in regular streets, but here and there in blocks which would have the character of strong places. If we take the second, he would seem to mean that the city should be built in part irregularly, with a view to confusing or perplexing an enemy after he had entered it.

Cp. Laws vi. 778 D ff, peri δε τειχών, & Mεγάλλε, ἐγών ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἔμφερομην τὸ καθεδευν ἐὰν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη.

The absence of walls in Sparta suggested to Plato the poetical fancy that the walls of cities should be left to slumber in the ground: it may reasonably be conjectured that the position of Sparta and the military character of her citizens rendered artificial defences unnecessary.

The disasters of Leuctra (B.c. 371) and of Mantinea (B.c. 362) had done a great deal to diminish the admiration for Sparta. (Cp. ii. 9. § 10 and infra c. 14. § 16). Yet the allusion is hardly to the point, for Sparta was never taken by an enemy: Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra refrained from attacking it, Xen. Hell. vi. 5.

Either 'the most truly warlike in character' or 'the best defence of the warrior.' Both meanings may be included.
Aristotle's Politics.

11. 10. ὁμοιὸς δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσει ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβάλλειν τοῖχους.

Private houses as well as cities, especially in the country, might in many cases need the protection of walls.

ὁμοιὸς δὲ, sc. ἔχει.

12. 1. αὐτά,

sc. τὰ τεῖχη, i.e. the position of the walls; or more generally, 'the consideration of these circumstances.'

12. 2. ἀρχεῖων.

The MSS. vary between ἀρχῶν, ἀρχαιῶν, ἀρχεῖων.

12. 3. εἶ δ' ἐν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὄστις ἐπιφάνεια τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἁρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανός καὶ πρὸς τὰ γενειώντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμηνεύει.

Lit. 'This place should be of a sort which has conspicuousness, suitable to the position of virtue, and towering aloft over the neighbouring parts of the city.'

Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a Commentary on the Politics, if we may judge from his Latin 'bene se habentem ad apparentiam virtutis,' seems to have read θέσιν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἁρετῆς ἐπιφάνειαν. (Susemihl.) But the words are better as they are found in the Greek MSS.

The habitation of virtue is to be like that of the Gods who have their temples in the Acropolis. Cp. Vitruv. i. 7 'Aedibus vero sacris quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, unde moenium maxima pars conspiciatur areae distribuantur' (quoted by Schneider); and Burke, French Revolution, p. 107, 'The temple of honour ought to be seated on an eminence.'

12. 4. 5. εἰς δ' ἀν εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γεννάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχαι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γὰρ διηοχθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἁρχονταῖς· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ἀρχώτων παρουσία παλαια ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν αἰδώ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἔλευθερων φόβου.

The opposition of μὲν and δὲ before νεωτέροις and πρεσβυτέρους seems to imply that the youth are to perform under the eye of certain magistrates, and the elders under the eye of the magistrates
as a body. The distinction appears to be in the one case, that some of the magistrates are to go to the gymnasium, in the other the exercises are to take place in or near the public buildings appropriated to the magistrates. Everywhere the presence of the authorities is required. *'Some of the rulers are to be present (διατρίβεται) at the exercises of the younger men, but the elders are to perform their exercises with the rulers.' Here either another verb has to be supplied with παρά τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς or the word διατρίβεται is to be taken in a slightly different sense. Or 2) we may translate, 'and the elders shall be placed at the side of the magistrates.' This, however, disregards μὲν and δὲ and seems not to cohere with the words διατρίβεται κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας: for thus no mention is made of the gymnastics of the elders. 3) The most natural way of taking the Greek words (τοῖς δὲ ... ἀρχηγοῖς) that 'the magistrates shall perform their gymnastic exercises before the elders;' (St. Hilaire) gives a very poor sense. The clause ἤ γάρ ἐν διθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ., shows clearly that the principal point is the requirement of the presence of the magistrates at all gymnastic exercises.

The word κόσμον is difficult. It may be taken in the sense of 'institution,' which is in some degree supported by the use of κόσμος τῆς πολιτείας for 'the order or constitution of the state,' (Περὶ Κόσμου 6. 399 b. 18). Or* τοῖτον τῶν κόσμων may be the accusative after διατρήσθαι and may be taken with Adolph Stahr in the sense of 'this embellishment of the state:' [dieser Schmuck der Stadt]. In this case it is better to make διατρήσθαι impersonal, κόσμων being the indirect accusative following it. καὶ τοῖτον, this institution too, i. e. as well as the offices of state which in c. 9 are divided between old and young.

Cp. supra, c. 5. § 4.

The enumeration is incomplete, because Aristotle has only occasion to speak of priests and magistrates. The places assigned to their common tables, like those of the soldiers and the guardians of the country, are to be situated conveniently for their employ-
ments. The baldness of the expression suggests the possibility that something may have dropped out. The first words ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος appear to be a repetition of ἐπεὶ δὲ δὲ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν at the beginning of the Chapter. πλῆθος is used for the citizens generally, not as opposed to the upper classes.

12. 6. περὶ τὴν τῶν λεπτῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν.
'To have their proper place.' Cp. § 8, τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν, τὴν . . . οἰκοδομημάτων, sc. τάξιν, is to be supplied.

12. 7. τὴν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν.
The qualifying καλουμένην, if not a mere pleonasm, seems to indicate the more uncommon or technical expression. Cp. note on c. 8. § 7 supra, and on vi. 1. § 6.

12. 8. The MSS. vary between νενεμήσθαι and μεμιμήσθαι. P4 has compounded them into νενεμμήσθαι. Bekker in his second edition has adopted μεμιμήσθαι. Cp. vi. 2. § 7, where certain magistrates are required by law to take their meals together.

13. 1. περὶ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.
Hitherto Aristotle has been speaking only of the conditions of the best state, which are its ἔλη (supra c. 4. §§ 1–3). Now he is going on to speak of the πολιτεία itself, which is the εἶδος of a πόλις (cp. iii. 3. §§ 7–9).

Chapters 13, 14, 15 form a transition to the subject of education, which is begun in c. 16, and is continued in Book viii. But it cannot be said that Aristotle fulfils the promise of discussing the 'constitution' of the best state. He describes the life of his citizens from birth to boyhood, but says nothing about their judicial or political duties.

13. 2. ἔκκειται καλῶς.
'Stands out well,' or 'distinctly.' For the thought, cp. Eud. Eth. ii. 11, 1227 b. 20, ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὁρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν.

13. 3. In this passage, of which the connexion is obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the good man is superior to the ordinary con-
ditions of existence, and so to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only (ἐλάττωνος τοῖς ἐμενον διακειμένοις), the legislator may make his citizens superior to external conditions. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. cc. 9-12.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' 13. 4. ἢν ἀριστῇ ἀν πολιτείαν τόλμει, ἀριστα δ' ἀν πολιτείαν καθ' ἢν εἰδαμονεῖν μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δήλων ὅτι τὴν εἰδαμονεῖν δει, τι ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν.

The connexion is as follows: 'In various ways men mistake the nature of happiness, but we recognise it to be the great object of a state, and therefore we should ascertain its nature.'

φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, εἰ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὀφελός. 13. 5.

It is difficult to say why Aristotle should speak thus doubtfully or depreciatingly of a principle which lies at the basis both of his ethical and political philosophy. Is the expression to be attributed only to the Greek love of qualifying language?

καὶ τά仿真 ὅποι ἐς ὑποθέσεως ἄλλα ὑπόλοι. 13. 5.

These words are not found in the Nicomachean Ethics (see references in note on text), and therefore may be supposed to be added by Aristotle as an explanation.

λέγω δ' ἐς ὑποθέσεως. 13. 5, 6.

'Happiness is an absolute good, whereas punishments are only good under certain conditions;' they are evils which prevent greater evils. The negative and the positive senses of the word 'just,'—just punishments, just actions,—needed to be distinguished in the beginning of philosophy.

οἴποι τὰ πέρι τὰς δικαίας πράξεις αἱ δικαία τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' 13. 6. ἀρετῆς μὲν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐχουσιν (ἀερετο- τερον μὲν γὰρ μηθεύοι δείσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εἰσπορὰς ἄπλος εἰςι καλλιεργεῖται πράξεις.

'They have their righteousness, not as ends, but as means or conditions of something else which is an end.' For the use of ἀναγκαίον, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 2, τῶν δ' ἐνεργεῖνοικ αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δὲ ἐτέρα αἱρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς.
Under the common notion of ἀναγκαῖα and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, by a
play of words, Aristotle appears to comprehend not only the
external goods which are the conditions of individual life, but
the penalties imposed by law, which are the conditions of the
existence of states.

αι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς πράξεις, sc. φέρονσαί, τεῖνονσαί οἵ γιγνόμεναι.

13. 7. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτερον κακὸν αἰρεσις ἐστίν.
‘The one is a voluntary choice of an evil,’ i.e. for the sake of
removing some other evil. For example, punishment puts an end
to crime.

The conjecture ἀναρεσις, which is adopted by Schneider, Coraes,
Bekker (2nd edition), and Susemihl, is unnecessary.

13. 7. χρήσατο δ' ἐν ὧν σπουδαίας ἀνήρ καὶ πεινὰ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις
ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναρτίοις ἐστίν.

Compare Nic. Eth. i. 10, especially the noble words in § 12.
ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλύμετε τὸ καλὸν, ἐπειδὴ ψέρῃ τις εὐκάλεος πολλὰς
καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας μὴ δὲ ἀναγγέλσαι ἄλλα γεννάδας ὧν καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι.

13. 8. δήλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίοι σπουδαίᾳ καὶ καλᾶς εἶναι ταῖς ἀπλῶς.
διό καὶ νομίζοντε φιλοσοφοὶ τῆς εὐθυμονίας αὕτια τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν
ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κυαρίζειν λαμπρῶν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῶτον τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον
τῆς τέχνης.

‘The good man will make a use of external goods which is
absolutely good. And because (ὅ) this use of external goods is
good in him, men think that external goods are the causes of
happiness, which is just as if we were to attribute the melody to
the lyre and not to the player.’

ἀιτιῶτο, sc. τις, gathered from ἄνθρωποι. τις occurs in one MS. (P′)
and is inserted by Bekker in his 2nd edition.

13. 9. διὸ κατ' εἰκῆν εἰκόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὑπ' ἑκτῇ κυρίᾳ.
1) ‘Since therefore some things must be presupposed (ὅ), our
prayer and desire is that our city may be so constituted as to have
the goods of fortune,’ sc. εἶναι ἐκ ἐκεῖνων ὑπ', etc.; or 2) ‘we desire
that her constitution in respect of the goods of fortune may answer
to our prayer,’ making κατ' εἰκὴν, sc. εἶναι, the predicate, ὑπ', sc. ἐν
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νόμοις ὑπὲρ; or 3) ‘we ask if we could only have our prayer,’ or ‘though it be only an ideal,’ as above, ἀπ’ ἑαυτῶν, τὴν κατ’ ἐνεργήν γυμνόμενην.

καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχετοι σπουδαίους ἔσωμ, μὴ καθ’ ἑκατὸν δι’ τῶν 13. 10. πολιτῶν, ὡσοῦ οἰκετώτερον, ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ’ ἑκατὸν καὶ τὸ πάντας.

He seems to mean that although there might be some common idea of virtue which the citizens attained collectively, such as patriotism, yet it would be better that each individual should be virtuous, for each implies all. Compare, ii. 3. § 2, τὸ γὰρ πάντες διὰ τῶν, κ.τ.λ., where he distinguishes ‘each’ from ‘all.’

ἐνά τε οἴκου ὑφὲ γίνεται τὰ γὰρ ἑδα μεταθηλίων ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ. 18. 11.

Lit. ‘Some qualities there is no use in having by nature; for habit alters them; and through nature,’ or ‘such is their nature that, they are swayed by habit both towards good and towards evil.’ To us the reasoning of this passage appears singular. Yet probably what Aristotle means to say is, that moral qualities, if given by nature, would cease to be moral, and in so far as they are moral would cease to be natural. Nature in this passage is used for ‘instinct,’ or ‘natural impulse.’ From another point of view (Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 2) he shows, using the term φύσις in a somewhat different sense, that things which are purely natural cannot be altered by habit; but that nature supplies the conditions under which habits may be cultivated. Cp. also infra, c. 15. § 7.

ἔπερον τε ... ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ βίου. 14. 1.

‘Are rulers and subjects to differ at different times, or to be the same always?’

tοῖς ἄρχομενοι.

1) *Dative of reference: ‘In relation to their subjects,’ or, 2) with a more obvious construction, but with a feeble sense, τοῖς ἄρχομενοι may be taken after φανερῶν, ‘so that the superiority of the governors is manifest to their subjects.’

Σκίλαξ.

The same who is mentioned in Herodotus (iv. 44) as sailing down the Indus by order of Darius Hystaspes. Whether the
writings passing under his name with which Aristotle was acquainted were genuine or not we cannot say. The short summary of the geography of the habitable world which has come down to us under the name of Scylax contains allusions to events later than the time of Herodotus, and is therefore certainly either spurious or interpolated.

14. 4. πάντες οί κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

Not country as opposed to town—'the country people combine with the malcontents of the town;' but, 'all the inhabitants minuis the rulers,' i.e. the perioeci, metics, or any others, who, though personally free, had no political rights, make common cause with the subject classes and desire revolution.

14. 5. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν ἀρετὴν, ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦταν τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, διὸ τοῖς μὲν ἀρχεσθαι πρίτει, τοῖς δὲ ἄρχειν.

Lit. 'For nature herself has given the principle of choice when she created in the very race the same element, i.e. the same human beings, partly young and partly old, of whom the one are fitted to obey, the others to command.'

αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταῦταν. The word αὐτῷ has less MS. authority than αὐτό, and is omitted altogether in one MS. and in Aretino's translation. Αὐτὸ may be translated: 'In the human race nature has created the very same thing, making a distinction of old and young, corresponding to that of rulers and subjects.' The correction τῶν αὐτῶν for αὐτῷ is unnecessary.

14. 8. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἀρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός.

i. e. in the best state which he is here discussing.

14. 11. ὁσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι καὶ ταῦτα τὸ μέρος δῆλον ὅτι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις δὲ ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἐχεῖν, καὶ δει τὸς τοῦ φύσει βελτίων αὑριοτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμεῖσιν τυχόνων ἢ παῖσιν ἢ τοῖν δυσὶν.

ὁσαύτως . . ἐσεῖν. 'And as there must be a division of the soul, in like manner there must be a division of the actions of the soul;' ὁσαύτως answers to ἀνάλογον ἐσεῖν, and is to be taken closely with καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

τούτῳ τὸ μέρος, sc. τὸ λόγον ἑχειν.
The simple action of the highest principle is better than the mixed action of all or of two, that is the union of the higher with the lower, or the practical and speculative reason combined (τοιν δυοιν). Aristotle is here speaking of that life of mind which in the Ethics he conceives to have a separate existence (ἡ δὲ τοιν νοο [sc. εὐθαμοιον] κεχωρισμενη Nic. Eth. x. 8. § 3). But we are unable to understand how this pure mind condescends to take a part in human things—the analogous difficulty in Aristotle to the relation of τα νοούμενα and τα φανόμενα in Plato. We know that within the sphere of practice thought and reflection must always be reappearing if the legislator is endowed with them. But Aristotle nowhere explains how the speculative, either in private or public life, is related to the practical, or what is the higher training which fits the citizen for either.

ἐπαναλύσεις γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν πολιτείαν ἐγκατα τοῦ νομοθέτου τῶν 14. 16. οἰκοποιών, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πάλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν ἃ καὶ κατὰ τῶν λόγων ἄστιν εὐδελεγετα καὶ τῶν ἐργοις ἐξελελεγκται νῦν.

Cp. Thuc. ii. 39, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παθείσαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιστῶν ἀσκήσει (sc. οἱ Λακεδαίμονιοι) εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνεμίσως διαιτῶμεν οὐδὲν ἥσουν ἐπὶ τῶν ἰσοπαλίας κυνικούς χαρακτηρίζομεν.

καὶ τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἐξελελεγκται νῦν. Alluding to Leuctra and Mantinea. Cp. c. i. § 8, about walls, and ii. 9. § 10, about the women.

οὕτω καὶ Θιβρών.

Who Thibron was is unknown. But we have an example of a treatise such as he might have written in the ‘de Republica Lacedemoniorum,’ attributed to Xenophon. Was he more likely to have been a Spartan, or only an admirer of Sparta, like the Philolacon in other states of Hellas? The name is Lacedaemonian. The words τῶν Ἀλαν ἔκαστος τῶν γραφῶν πέρι πολιτείας αὐτῶν remind us how large a literature of political philosophy must have existed in the time of Aristotle, although we are apt to imagine him the first writer on such subjects. Cp. ii. 1. § 1; c. 7. § 1; c. 12. § 1.

ἐτὶ δὲ τοῦτο γελοίον, εἰ μένοντες εν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτῶν, καὶ μηδενὸς ἔμπαθε. 14. 18.

ζουσκα πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποδεδικησε τὸ εἶνα καλὸς.
'If their greatness depended on their laws, it is ridiculous to suppose that they can have retained their laws and lost their happiness.'

14. 19. ὁτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πείλαις ἀρχεῖν.

'If states are trained in virtue only that they may rule over their neighbours, the same principle will impel individuals to usurp the government in their own states.'

14. 20. Παυσανίας τῷ βασιλεί.

See note on v. 1. § 10.

14. 21. ταῦτα γὰρ ἁρμονα καὶ ἱδία καὶ κοινὴ τῶν νομοβέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεὶ ταῦτα ταῖς...ψυχαῖς τῶν ἄνθρωπων.

There is a slight flaw in the text, which may be corrected (with Susemihl) by adding τέ after τῶν.

14. 22. τὴν γὰρ θαφήν ἀφιάσειν, ὡσπερ ἄ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες.

Cp. Soph. Aj. 650 (Dindorf):—

καὶ ὁ γὰρ, ὥς τὰ δεῖν ἐκαρτέρουν τότε,

βαφὴν σίδηρος ὡς, ἐδηλίνθην στόμα

πρὸς τῆς χήσει τῆς γυναικὸς.

15. In the Nic. Eth. x. 7, Aristotle dwells at length on the thesis that the true happiness of man is to be sought in leisure and contemplation. But we have a difficulty in realizing his meaning. For we naturally ask how is the leisure to be employed? and on what is contemplation to feed? To these questions his writings supply no answer. We have no difficulty in understanding that by a philosopher the mind and the use of the mind is deemed higher than the body and its functions, or that the intellectual is to be preferred to the moral, or that the life of a gentleman is to be passed in liberal occupations, not in trade or servile toil. But when we attempt to go further we can only discern a negative idealism; we are put off with words such as θεωρία, οὐσία, and the like, which absorbed the minds of that generation, but which to us appear to have no context or meaning.

But if in the sphere of the individual the idea of contemplative leisure is feeble and uncertain, much more shadowy is the meaning
of the word when applied to the state. We can see that peace is to be preferred to war; that the Athenians ‘provided for their weary spirits many relaxations from toil’ (Thuc. ii. 38); that ‘they could fix their minds upon the greatness of Athens until they became filled with the love of her’ (ib. 43); that into education an element of philosophy should enter; that sleep is sweet to weary mortals; that to the Greek leisure was a necessity of the higher life. But we fail to perceive how the leisure of a state, the interest of a spectacle, the tranquillity of wealth is better than some great struggle for freedom; or how the sons of those who fought at Thermopylae and Salamis were more fortunate than their fathers. Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that greater virtues of some kind would be required in ‘the islands of the blest’ than in the ordinary life of man. The contemplative end which he imagines is not suited to the human character and is nearly unmeaning. To us there appears to be more truth in the sentiment, which has been repeated in many forms, that ‘the search after knowledge is a greater blessing to man than the attainment of it.’

δεί γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ὑπάρχει, ὅπως ἔξω σχολάζειν. 15. 2.

‘The virtues of leisure imply the virtues of business, for business supplies the means of leisure.’

ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν. 15. 3.

Cp. Tennyson’s Maud I. vi.–xiii. —
‘Why do they prate of the blessings of peace?

Peace in her vineyard—yes!—but a company forges the wine.’

Yet there is corruption in war as well as in peace, now as of old, in furnishing the commissariat of an army, in making appointments, in conferring distinctions, sometimes followed by a fearful retribution.

ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτη διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταῦτα τοῖς 15. 6.

ἄλλοις μέγαστα τῶν ἄγαθῶν, ἄλλα τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διά τῶν ἀφετῆς.

‘The Lacedaemonians agree with the rest of mankind that the good life is the end, but they differ in supposing the end to be obtained by military virtue alone.’
Cp. (though a different point of view from that which is here taken) ii. 9. §§ 34, 35: ‘Although the Lacedaemonians truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.’

15. 6. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔστι, τούτο δὴ θεωρητέων.

The construction of the sentence is as follows: ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων μείζω [εἴναι] τὰ ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν [sc. ἡθικῶν ἢ πολεμικῶν χρήσιν understood from ἀπόλαυσιν] καὶ ὅτι [αἱ ἀρεταί] εἴοι δὲ αὐτὴν [sc. τὴν τούτων ἀπόλαυσιν].

πῶς δὲ introduces the apodosis which is resumed in τούτο δὴ θεωρητέων.

ἀρετῶν goes back to διὰ τῶν ἀρετῆς in the previous sentence.

15. 7. εὐνέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τῶν λόγων τῆς θελήσεως ὑποθέσως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑλθὼν ὁμοίως ἥχθαι.

The meaning of ἥχθαι is simply ‘trained;’ whether for good or evil depends on the sense given to ὁμολογ. Either 1)* ‘in the same i.e. a mistaken way;’ or 2) ‘all the same’ = ‘nevertheless.’ The first is most in accordance with the context διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τῶν λόγων. The καὶ is needlessly bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. ‘For even reason (which we might least expect to err) is not infallible.’

15. 8. φανερῶν δὴ τοῦτο γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς ἐστι καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους: ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ νῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος.

1) *The connexion is as follows: ‘We have to consider whether men are to be trained by reason or by habit: Thus much is clear—that there is a succession of means and ends: every birth having a beginning and every end having a beginning in some other end; and the end of nature being reason and intelligence.’ That is to say: ‘In every birth there are previous elements and in like manner in the end or intellectual perfection of human nature other antecedents, such as education, are implied, which from other points of view are themselves ends.'
2) According to Susemihl the words are to be taken as follows:

'It is clear that generation implies some antecedent principle and the end which springs from an antecedent principle is in turn relative to a further end.' According to this way of taking the passage γένεσις in the 1st clause is equivalent to τέλος in the 2nd. Generation has an antecedent principle of which it is the end. The end which thus springs from an antecedent principle has a further end, namely, intelligence and reason. But two objections may be offered to this way of translating the words. a) τινὸς has no meaning. b) The less natural construction is adopted instead of the more natural. For ἄλλον τέλος would naturally depend upon the words which immediately precede, ἀπὸ τινὸς ἄρχής.

3) Once more, Mr. Postgate proposes to take the passage as follows: 'So much then is evident—first here, as in other cases, coming into existence is the beginning of all, and what is the end, viewed from a certain beginning, is itself directed towards a further end.' To this interpretation it may be objected that ἄν' ἄρχης is taken in a different sense from ἀπὸ τινὸς ἄρχής and that τοῦ τέλους, as in the preceding explanation, is construed unnaturally.

See infra note on § 9.

τὸν χρησμὸν.

The oracle 'μὴ τέμνε νεᾶν ἄλοκα' which is found in the margin of two MSS. is probably made up from the context. Out of these words Gottling has constructed a hexameter ἄλλα νεᾶς, Τροίκην, ἄλοκας μὴ τέμνε βαδείας. The equivocation may either consist in the double meaning of νεᾶς 'fallow ground' (in Attic used for νεᾶς) and νέας 'the young maiden:' or the disputed point may have been only whether the oracle was to be taken literally or metaphorically.

διὸ τὰς μὲν ἄρμάτες περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀκτωκαδέκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγώναι, 16. 9.

τοῦ δὲ ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα, ἢ μικρὸν.

The words ἢ μικρὸν probably mean 'thereabouts' or 'nearly,' like μικρῶν; or some word such as πλεῖων may have dropped out.

The disparity of age between the man and woman appears to be great; but as Aristotle extends the term for the women from 18 to 50, and for the men from 35 to 70 years, the time allowed
for cohabitation in either would nearly coincide, i.e. 35 and 32 years. There is therefore no reason for doubting the reading.

The relative ages to us appear singular. Malthus, On Population vol. i. p. 237, remarks that this regulation 'must of course condemn a great number of women to celibacy, as there never can be so many men of thirty-seven as there are women of eighteen.' But the real and great disparity is between the total number of women after eighteen and the total number of men after thirty-five.

Plato in the Republic (v. 460) makes the interval less. He assigns twenty to forty as the marriageable age for women: for men, from the time 'when they have passed the greatest speed of life' (twenty-five?) to fifty-five. In the Laws (iv. 721) the citizens are required to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; but in another passage (772 D, E) between twenty-five and thirty-five.

In the History of Animals (Aristotle?) the age proper for marriage in men is limited to sixty, or at the utmost seventy; in women to forty, or at the utmost fifty.

16. 10. ἐν δὲ ἡ διαδοχή τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχαίης ἦσσται τὴς ἀκμῆς, ἔνας γίγνεται κατά λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡδή καταλελαιμημένης τῆς ἁλικιας πρὸς τῶν τῶν ἐξοδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἄριστων.

According to this way of reckoning Aristotle seems to consider the prime of life to be thirty-five. The father having begun to keep house at thirty-five years of age would at seventy give up the son, who might be expected to begin family life over again at thirty-five.

In speaking of the succession of children to their parents Aristotle takes account only of the fathers.

16. 10. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄραν χρόνοις, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ἀρίστων τες κειμῶν τὰ τυπή ποιεῖται ποιεῖται ταύτην.

Sc. δὲ οὕτως ποιεῖται, taking δὲ from the previous sentence. The better MSS. read δὲ χρῆσθαι after χρόνοις, but this is unnecessary, and the repetition of χρῶνται after χρῆσθαι is unpleasant.

συναὐλίαν, 'cohabitation' probably from αἴλη not from αὐλός.
like αὐτοῖς ἑδή.
i.e. 'themselves when they come to be parents as well as the
writers on these subjects.'

Like Plato, Aristotle prescribes gymnastics for women as well as 16. νε.

διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, ἓν ἔν τὰς τῶν ἔθων καλόν, μηδέν ἀποτίθεσθαι 16. 15.
τῶν γεννομένων ὄρισται γὰρ δὴ τῆς τεκνοποίας τὸ πλῆθος. ἐὰν δὲ ταῖς
γέννησι παρὰ τοῖς συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αὐθηκαὶ ἐγγενεῖσθαι καὶ ζωῆς,
ἐμποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀμβλυσιν.

'But when there are too many children (for we have settled that
there is to be a limit of population), they must not be exposed
merely for this reason. If, however, it should happen that a
couple exceed the number allowed by law, then abortion must be
practised before sense and life have begun.'

ὁρισται γὰρ δὴ . . . τὸ πλῆθος gives the reason for introducing
the previous remark. ‘I speak of this because population has
been limited.’ Cp. ii. 7. § 5, where Aristotle says that the legis-
lator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the limit
of population; and ii. 6. § 10, where he censures Plato for sup-
posing that population will be kept down even if nothing is
done to secure this object: and Rep. v. 461, where abortion and
exposure are allowed, or in certain cases enforced; also a curious
and interesting passage quoted from Musonius a Stoic philosopher
(about 60 a.d.), by Stobaeus § 15. p. 450, in which he denounces
abortion and similar practices as offences against Zeus the god of
kindred.

Respecting the seven ages, see infra, note on c. 17. § 15; and 16. 17.
for the regulations of Aristotle respecting marriage, the time after
marriage, procreation and nursing of children and their early

ὀνεσθαι.
sc. δεί. To be gathered from the previous paragraph.

τῶν δὲ διασάσει τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμῶν ὁκ ὅρθως ἀπαγορεύωσιν οἱ 17. 6.
καλύπτεις εἰ τῶν νόμων συμπέρονται γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν.
This is another misrepresentation of Plato, who only says that when children are silent they are pleased, and that they ought to have as little pain as possible in early childhood lest they grow up morose in character. ('When anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate.' Laws vii. 792 A). Yet the words ἐν τοῖς νόμοις sufficiently show that Plato is the writer to whom Aristotle is referring.

τὰς διαπάσεις, 'the passions or struggles,' a neutral word to be interpreted by κλαυεμαι which follows.

17. 7. εἰδογυν ὁνὶ ἀπελάυνει ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσματῶν καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικοίτους ὅντας.

A thought enlarged upon by Plato Rep. ii. 377 ff.

Bekker in his 1st edition has unnecessarily altered ἀνελευθερίαν, the reading of the majority of the MSS., into ἀνελεύθερων. In his 2nd edition he has substituted ἀνελευθερίαν, which has some MS. authority. Neither alteration is necessary; τηλικοίτους ὅντας may be taken as an accusative of the remotest object. ἀπελάυνειν has been altered by Susenmihl into ἀπολαβεῖν, a change which is partly grounded on a various reading ἀπολαύειν, and partly on the 'absurder' of the old translator.

καὶ τηλικοίτους ὅντας. 1)* 'Even when they are at this early age,' i.e. although they are so young, care must be taken about what they see and hear; or 2) καὶ may be emphatic, 'especially at this early age when they cannot take care of themselves.'

17. 10. ἐπεμελέσ μὲν οὖν ἑστω τοῖς ἄρχοσι μηθὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιοῦτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τὴν θεῖαν τοιοῦτος ὁδὲ καὶ τῶν τωβασμῶν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἀφήσῃ ὁ νόμος τοῖς ἑκώσις ἥλικιαν πλέον προήκουσαν καὶ ἐπίρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμλφεῖν τοῖς θεοῖς.

ὅς καὶ τῶν τωβασμῶν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. Such as the Phallic improvisation at the Dionysiac festival of which Aristophanes furnishes an imitation in the Acharnians 263 ff.

The words πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι introduce a second exception: 'in-
decency may be allowed in the temples of certain Gods;’ πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ‘and also to persons of full age whom the law allows to worship in such temples.’ Cp. once more Plat. Rep. ii. 378: ‘The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which his son in turn inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and in order to reduce the number of hearers they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim.’

17. 13.

A great Athenian actor and performer of Sophocles who took the part of Antigone: Aeschines was his triagonist who played Creon. Dem. Fal. Leg. 418. He is mentioned in the Rhetoric of Aristotle ii. 23. 1400 b. 16, iii. 13. 1414 b. 13.

οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐξθαμμασις διαιροῦστε τὰς ἁλκίας ὅσι ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ 17. 15. καλῶς, δεὶ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν.

It is uncertain whether we should read *οὐ καλῶς or οὐ κακῶς in this passage. The authority of the MSS. and the immediate context confirm the former. On the other hand οὐ κακῶς is the more idiomatic expression, and is not irreconcilable with the context:— ‘Those who divide the ages of men by seven are not far wrong, and yet we should rather observe the divisions made by nature;’ or, ‘and we should observe the divisions made by nature, i.e. the divisions into sevens’ (Bergk 25). This is also confirmed by the passage in c. 16. § 17, αὕτη [sc. ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀκμή] δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἡπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐξθαμμασις τὴν ἁλκίαν, περὶ τῶν χράων τῶν τῶν πενῆ-κοιτα ἔτον.

It may be observed too that Aristotle himself in this passage divides ages by sevens—seven, fourteen (puberty), twenty-one.

The ‘sevens’ of Aristotle agree with the ‘sevens’ of Solon (?) in the years which he assigns to marriage (35) and to the highest development of the mind (49 or 50):—

Παῖς μὲν ἄμφος ἐδών ἐτη νήπιως ἔρχος ἐδῶτων
φύσας ἐκβάλλει πρώτον ἐν ἐπὶ ἐτεσιον'
toûs δ' ἐπέρως ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θείος ἔτπ' ἐναυοῦς,
ηῆθες ἐκφαίνει σήματα γενομένης'...
τῇ τριτάτη δὲ γένειον ἀδεσμένων ἢτί γιγάντω
λαχνοῦται, χροῆς ἄνδρος ἀμεσομένης'...
τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἐβδομάδι μέγ' ἀριστος
ισχύων, ἢν τ' ἄνδρες σήματ' ἐχουσ' ἀρετής'...
πέμπτῃ δ' ὄρλου, ἄθροα γάμου μερισμένον εἶναι
καὶ παιδῶν ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενεῆς'...
τῇ δ' ἑκτῇ περὶ πάντα καταρτίσεται νόσο ἄνδρός,
οὐδ' ἐρείδει ἔθ' ὅμως ἐρυ' ἀπαλαμμα θέλει'...
ἐπτά δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν ἐν ἐβδομάδιν μέγ' ἀριστος
οἰκῶ τ' ἀμφιτέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκ'. ἑτη'
τῇ δ' ἐνάτῃ ἦτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακότερα δ' αὐτοῦ
πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετήν γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφία'...
τῇ δεκάτῃ δ' ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θεοῦ ἐπὶ' ἐναυοῦς,
οὐκ δὲ ἄροσ ένω μοίραν ἐχοι βασιλέων.'


1 al. lect. σάμα τε καὶ δύναμι.
BOOK VIII.

1. 2.
Here Susemihl has adopted παιδεύεσθαι after Aretino’s translation. But παιδεύεσθαι the reading of the Greek MSS. is also confirmed by William de Moerbeke, ‘politizare,’ and is more in accordance with the context: ‘For the life of the citizen should conform to the state, because the state is of one character, and this unity in the end of the state necessitates unity in the education of the citizens.’

1. 3.

ϕανερῶν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἁναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων πολλῶν καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἑαυτοῦ.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 14, κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ ὁρθῆς, where he goes on to show that public education can be best enforced, but that, since it is generally neglected, we must have recourse to private education, which moreover will take into account the peculiarities of the individual case; also that the education of individuals must be based upon general principles, and these are to be gathered from the science or art of legislation.

1. 4.

ἐπαινεῖτε δ’ ἀν τις καὶ τούτω Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῖται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παιδας καὶ κοινῆς ταύτης.

Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the quality of their education (cp. infra c. 4), but for the circumstance that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters, τοσοῦτον ἀπολελειμμένοι τῆς κοινῆς παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰς ὧν ὦτ' οὐδὲ γράμματα μαθάνουσιν: and according to Plato, or rather according to the author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), ‘not many of them could count.’
καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ is found in all the MSS., and was the reading of Moerbeek. There is no difficulty in explaining it: 'One may praise the Lacedaemonians for this also,' as he has already praised their common use of property in ii. 5. § 7. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 13, ἐν μονῇ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ πάλιν μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοβείτις ἐπιμελεῖαν δοκεῖ πεποίηται τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

2. 1. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων.

'We are agreed about the necessity of a state education, but we differ about the subjects of education' or 'about the things to be done in education;' cp. infra § 3, τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων.

2. 2. ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας.

'The customary education' or 'the education which meets us in life'—without any idea of obstruction.

2. 2. παραχώδης ἡ σκέψις.

'It is impossible to consider the theory of education apart from the prevalent custom; and it would be equally impossible even if we could frame a perfect theory to carry it out in practice.'

2. 2. τὰ περιττά.

Lit. 'things in excess,' i.e. not included in the ordinary training either for life or virtue, in modern language 'the higher knowledge.' For the use of the word cp. ii. 6. § 6; Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 4.

2. 2. κρυτάς τινας.

Cp. for the use of the word De Anima i. 405 b. 8. πάντα τὰ σταυχεῖα κρυτὴν ἐλήφε πλὴρ τῆς γῆς, 'All these views have found approvers.'

2. 6. καταβεβλημέναι.

'laid down and so established:' cp. c. 3. § 11, καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα. Cp. supra, ἡ ἐμποδῶν παιδεία.

2. 6. ἐπαρμοφορέων,

'are of a double character,' partly liberal, partly illiberal.

3. 1. ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα κ.τ.λ.

μοναική is here separated from γράμματα, which in Plato's Republic are included under it.
We may remark the form of sentence: 'There are four;' but the fourth is introduced with a qualification, τέταρτον ἐνοι.

3. 2.

ὁμιλός γὰρ ἄρχη πάντων.

Not φῶς but ἡ σχολή, as is shown by the clause which follows, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς referring to vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and perhaps to Nic. Eth. x. 6.

3. 3.

Either, 1) 'the general question must be asked;' or 2) *taking ὁμιλός in an emphatic sense, 'the question must be surely' or 'absolutely asked.' In what follows §§ 3–6, Aristotle passes on to discuss the more general subjects of refreshments or relaxations, and returns to music in § 7.

But ὁμιλός is only a conjecture of Victorius. All the MSS. read τέλος, except one (P'), which reads τελευτάοι. (Cp. the old trans. 'finaliter.') The reading τέλος gives a sufficient but not a very good sense ('lastly'), nor can any objection be made to it on the ground that the word occurs in the following line with a different meaning. For such false echoes are not uncommon. Cp. συνηγεία, used in two senses, iv. 15. § 8, note.

3. 6.

τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν.

Cp. infra § 8, τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆν. The two expressions are nearly equivalent: 1) 'the leisure occupied in διαγωγή:' 2) 'the διαγωγή of leisure.' It is hard to find any satisfactory phrase in English to express what Aristotle throughout this book terms διαγωγή. The first sense of the word is that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman (cp. πάροικον παιδείαν ἡ παιδιάν ἡ διαγωγήν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδία χάριν ἀναπάλευπος ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδείαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ιατρεία τῆς ἐστιν) καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογομένως δεὶ μη μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἥδωρν infræ c. 5. §§ 9, 10). Further it is joined with φρόνησις (c. 5. § 4. init. πρὸς διαγωγήν συμβάλλεται τι καὶ φρόνησιν) and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from παιδία and ἀνάπαυσις 'amusement' and 'relaxation,' which are properly, not ends, but only means to renewed exertion (cp.
Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6); and so means to means, whereas διαγωγή and σχολή are ends in themselves. The idea of ‘culture,’ implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to διαγωγή.

3. 8. ἢν γὰρ οἶονται διαγωγὴ εἶναι τῶν ἔλευθερων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάπτοσιν.
   ἐν ταύτῃ, sc. τῇ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ.
   τάπτοσιν, sc. ἀλήθ. or music. ‘They reckon music in that class of intellectual enjoyments which they suppose to be peculiar to freemen.’

3. 8. ἀλλ' οἶον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλείην.
   The line is not found in our Homer. There is no doubt that in the original θαλείην is to be taken with δαίτα; but it is probably quoted by Aristotle in reference to the Muse Thalia: and καλεῖν θαλιην is said in the same way as καλένοισιν ἀοίδοιν in the following quotation.

3. 11. ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον.
   i. e. ‘the fact that the ancients included music in education proves thus much, that they considered it a noble part of education’;—they would not have included what was purely utilitarian.

4. 1. οἱ δὲ Λάκκωνες ταύτῃ μὲν οἷς ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δὲ ἀπεργύζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μᾶλλον συμφέρον.
   ‘The Lacedaemonians do not run into the error of spoiling the frames of their children, but they spoil their characters.’

4. 2. εἶ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτῃ, οὔτε τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκοντον οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἔθνων ὄρμην τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἐγχριστάσιοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμεροτήροις καὶ λεοντάδεις ἤθεσιν.
   ‘And even if they train with a view to courage they do not attain to it; for courage is not to be found in brutal but in mild and lionlike natures, whether (the comparison is made) of animals or of barbarians.’ Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 375 and Aristotle’s Criticism on this passage in the Politics vii. 7. §§ 5–8.

4. 3. τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἔθνων.
   Not ‘of Epirus,’ which would be wholly disconnected from the
Pontus and could hardly have been described as in this state of savagery, nor as in the translation ‘there are other inland tribes,’ for the Achaeans are not inland tribes (unless indeed the tribes ‘about the Pontus’ are called continental with reference to the Mediterranean), but more accurately ‘other tribes on the mainland.’ For another mention of these cannibals in Aristotle, cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 5. § 2.

\[ \mu \Hat{h} \; \pi \Hat{r} \Hat{o} \; \acute{a} \sigma \kappa \omega \acute{u} \acute{t} \acute{a} \; \]

Said for \( \pi \Hat{r} \Hat{o} \; \mu \Hat{h} \; \acute{a} \sigma \kappa \omega \acute{u} \acute{t} \acute{a} \). But the fall of Sparta was not really due to the improvements of the other Hellenes in gymnastics; though the equal or superior military discipline of Macedon at last overpowered them.

The fall and decay of Sparta is a political lesson which greatly impresses Aristotle, cp. notes on vii. 11. § 8 and c. 14. § 16 ff.

So in modern times the superiority of nations has often been due to their superior organization. Those who organize first will be first victorious until others become in their turn better trained and prepared. By organization Frederick the Great crushed Austria, as she was afterwards crushed once more in 1866; again the military organization both of Prussia and Austria crumbled before Napoleon at Jena, as the French organization was in turn overpowered by the new military development of Germany in 1870. The Germans have still to prove, \( \acute{e} \acute{t} \acute{e} \; \tau \acute{o} \; \tau \acute{o} \; \nu \acute{e} \acute{o} \; \gamma \acute{u} \mu \acute{a} \acute{e} \acute{e} \nu \; \tau \acute{o} \; \tau \acute{r} \acute{o} \acute{p} \acute{o} \; \tau \acute{o} \acute{i} \acute{t} \acute{o} \nu \; \vartheta \acute{i} \acute{f} \acute{i} \acute{e} \acute{r} \acute{e} \acute{r} \acute{o} \nu \), \( \acute{e} \acute{t} \acute{e} \; \tau \acute{f} \; \mu \acute{o} \acute{n} \mu \Hat{h} \; \pi \Hat{r} \Hat{o} \; \acute{a} \sigma \kappa \omega \acute{u} \acute{t} \acute{a} \; \acute{a} \acute{s} \kappa \acute{e} \acute{i} \acute{n} \).

\[ \acute{o} \; \phi \acute{e} \acute{t} \acute{i} \acute{n} \; \acute{d} \; \acute{l} \acute{o} \acute{g} \acute{o} \acute{s} \; \]

Cp. Plato (e.g. Phaedo 87 A, Soph. 238 B) for a similar personification of the argument.

A warning against overstraining of the faculties in youth which may be applied to the young student of modern times as well as to the young Olympic victor.

\[ \kappa \acute{a} \alpha \lambda \alpha \mu \beta \acute{a} \acute{a} \acute{e} \nu \; \tau \acute{n} \; \acute{h} \acute{l} \acute{i} \acute{k} \acute{i} \acute{a} \acute{n} \; \]

‘To occupy,’ ‘engage,’ ‘employ.’

\[ \acute{i} \acute{n} \; \acute{O} \acute{S} \acute{P} \acute{e} \; \acute{E} \acute{n} \dot{d} \acute{o} \acute{s} \acute{i} \acute{m} \acute{o} \nu \; \acute{g} \acute{e} \acute{n} \acute{t} \acute{a} \; \tau \acute{o} \acute{i} \acute{e} \; \acute{l} \acute{o} \acute{g} \acute{o} \acute{s} \; \]

A musical term and therefore appropriately used in speaking of
music = 'the keynote,' 'that what we have to say may be a sort of keynote to any future discussion of the subject.' Cp. Arist. Rhet. iii. 14. § 1, 1414 b. 22, καὶ γὰρ οἱ αἰσθαναί, ὅτι ἐὰν ἔσῃαν αἰσθάνατο προσνιάσαντες συνήψαν τῷ ἐνυδατίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπίθετοιοι λόγοις δεί οὕτω γράφειν.

5. 2-4. Aristotle suggests three reasons which might be given for the cultivation of music:

1) παιδεία καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα, like sleep, wine, dancing (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6), amusement and relaxation being the means to renewed exertion.

2) Because of its influence on character. Hence its value in education (παιδεία).

3) πρὸς διαγωγήν καὶ φρόνησιν, as an end.

In c. 7. § 3 he speaks of music as being used for a) παιδεία, b) κάθαρσις, c) διαγωγή; a) corresponds to 2) of c. 5 (πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν), c) to 3).

This leaves b) κάθαρσις to correspond to the use of music as a relaxation, and would seem to show that Aristotle gave the lower meaning to κάθαρσις (i.e. 'purification' rather than 'purification'). Cp. c. 3. § 4, φαρμακείας χάρων, and c. 7. § 4, ἀσπέρ ιατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. See note on c. 7. § 3.

5. 2. καὶ ἄμα παίει μέριμναν, ὡς φησίν Βιρρύνδης.

Goettling and Bekker (in his second edition), against the authority of the MSS. of the Politics, have altered ἄμα παίει into ἀναπαύει, an unnecessary change, and unsupported by the MSS. of Euripides, which cannot be quoted on either side; for the citation, like many others in Aristotle, is inaccurate. The words referred to occur in Eur. Bacch. 380:—

δεὶ [Βρόμοις] τὰδ' ἔχει,

θιαστεῖν τε χορὸς

μετὰ τ' αἰλοῦ γελάσαι,

ἀποπαύσαι τε μερίμνας.

5. 3. τάσπωνον αὐτὴν.

Sc. εἰς παιδίων καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν understood from the words preceding.

5. 3. Reading ὑπνόρ for ὠψ, gathered from ὑπνῶν καὶ μέθης supra, with
Bekker’s 2nd edition, but against the authority of all the MSS. and of William de Moerbeek.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παυσίν ἀφρότετε καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι 5. 4. ταῖς τοιαύταις.

The particle τε is not easily explained. It may be suggested either that 1) it should be omitted, or 2) should be changed into τι or τοῖς, or 3) that καὶ φράσεως should be added after it from the corresponding words in § 4. ἡ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ φράσεως.

οὔτε γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος. 5. 4.

A singular and almost verbal fancy. ‘The imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and therefore the immature youth is not intended for reason and contemplation.’ Yet the meaning of τέλος is obscure, cp. infra §§ 12, 13, ἐπεί δ’ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλεγάκις γίγνεσθαι.

§§ 5–8 are a series of ἀπορίας which take the form of a sup-pressed dialogue. 1) But a child may learn music with a view to a time when he will be grown up; 2) But why should he learn himself? 3) He will not appreciate unless he does; 4) Then why should he not learn cookery? 5) And how will his morals be improved by playing himself rather than by hearing others perform? Yet infra c. 6 these cobwebs are dashed aside; and it is acknowledged that the truer and deeper effect of music can only be produced on the mind by actual practice.

ὁσπερ οἱ Δάκωνες ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν 5. 7. ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν.


οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτός ἂν ἦν καὶ κιβαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ θανατούς 5. 8. καλούμεν τοὺς τοιούτους.

In II. i. 603 it is Apollo, not Zeus, who plays to the assembly of the gods.

ἐξεῖ γὰρ ἅσως ἡδονὴ τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν τυχούσαν ξητοῦσε 5. 13.
There is a finality about pleasure, which leads to a confusion with happiness. Like the greater end of life it comes after toil; it is sensible to the eye or feeling; it is the anticipation of what we know not what: no account can be given of it.  

5. 14.  δι' ἂν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ.  

Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 13. § 6, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὖχ ἡ αἰτίη οὔτε φύσις οὔθ ἐξίς ἢ ἀριστή οὔτ' ἐστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὖθ' ἡδονή διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονῆ μέντοι πάντες. ἵσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσι οὖχ ἡν οἴονται οὔθ ἂν φαίειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φύσις ἔχει τε θείον ὁμοία εἰς τὸν ὀνόματος κληρονομιάν αἱ σωματικά ἡδονα διὰ τὸ πλευστάκιον τε παραβιβάλλειν εἰς αἰτίας καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν' διὰ τὸ μόναν οὖν γνωρίσθαι εἶναι ταύτας μόνοις οἴονται εἶναι.

5. 14.  οὗ δὲ ταύτην μόνην,

sc. ἂγνοισιν.

5. 17.  ἐτέ δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χαρίς τῶν ρυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

i. e. 'any imitation, whether accompanied by rhythm or song or not, creates sympathetic feeling.'

5. 18.  παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις.

'Near to or not far removed from their true natures.'

5. 20.  συμβάθηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ἔπαρχειν ὁμοιωμα τοῖς ἡθείοις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἁπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἥρμα σχῆμα γὰρ ἐστὶν τοιοῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρῶν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινώνοιν.

'As to the senses [other than the sense of hearing], objects of sight alone furnish representations of ethical character; (for figures are 1) objects of sight, or 2*) are of an ethical character); but to a certain extent only, and this intellectual element (though feeble) is common to all.'

The obscurity of the passage has led to the insertion of οὗ before πάντες: but the construction is then abrupt and the meaning
thus obtained, 'all do not participate in the sense of figure,' would be a strange statement.

ειτε δ'ουκ ἐστι παύτα ὅμωγματα τῶν ἡθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεία μᾶλλον. 5. 20.

'Yet such figures and colours (which have been previously called representations) are not really representations but more truly signs and indications.'

οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεὶ μὴ τὰ 5. 21.

Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγράτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματιστῶν ἐστὶν ἡθικά.

Cp. Poetics 2. 1448 a. 5, Πολυγράτου μὲν γὰρ κρείττον, Παύσων δὲ κείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίως εἶκαζεν.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτῶς. 5. 21.

'But though hardly discernible in painting we have the very expression of the feeling in music.'

καὶ τοῖς ὑκθοῖς εἶναι. 5. 25.

Bekker in his 2nd edition has inserted πρὸς τὴν ψύχην before εἶναι. Cp. a reading which is confirmed by one MS. of the old translator, 'cognatio ad animam.' Aretino's translation suggests ἤμιν, but the same sense can be got out of the Greek as it stands, ἤμιν (or πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν) being supplied from τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην or οἱ νέοι in the previous sentence.

For the doctrine that the soul is a harmony, cp. Plat. Phaedo 86, 92-95; Timaeus 35, 36.

ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λευχέν, 6. 6.

sc. τὸ ποιεῖν βασιλείας.

πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστερον. 6. 6.

Though there is no variation in the MSS., or in the old translator, there seems to be a corruption in this passage. Susemihl transposes χρήσεις and μαθήσεις. Goettling omits both. If retained in their present order, they must be translated as in the text, and may be supposed to mean that practice precedes theory. In the Republic practical life precedes philosophical leisure, and at the end of the Ethics (κ. 9. § 20) Aristotle says that the sophist
having no experience of politics cannot teach them (cp. Plat. Tim. 19 D).

But a fatal objection to this way of interpreting the passage is the word μάθησις, which elsewhere in this chapter, and even in the next sentence, means ‘early education,’ not ‘mature philosophical speculation.’

6. 7. Compare Plat. Rep. ii. 411. In the Laws vii. 810 he limits the time allowed for the study of music to three years.

6. 10. τὸ λόγον.
‘Speech,’ as in bk. i. 2. § 10.

6. 11. The singular outburst of intellectual life at Athens, which we may well believe to have arisen after the Persian War, belongs to a period of Greek history known to us only from the very short summary of Athenian history contained in a few pages of Thucydides. It was the age of Pindar and Simonides and Phrynicus and Aeschylus, of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Protagoras and Gorgias.

6. 12. Ἐκφαντίδης.
A very ancient comic poet who flourished in the generation before Aristophanes.

6. 15. ἐπεί δὲ τῶν τε ὑφίσχων κ.τ.λ.
This, like many other sentences beginning with ἐπεί, is an anacoluthon, of which the real apodosis is to be found in the words διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἄλλα δητι-κωτέραν.

7. 1. ἡ τρίτον δεῖ τινὰ ἐπερον.
Three alternatives are given: 1) Shall we use all the harmonies and rhythms in education? 2) Shall we make the same distinctions about them in education which are made in other uses of them? Or 3) Shall we make some other distinction?

τρίτον δεῖ has been suspected. τρίτον is certainly not symmetrical because it introduces not a third case but a subdivision of the second case. Yet other divisions in Aristotle are unsymmetrical (cp. supra c. 3. § 1 and vii. 11. §§ 1–4).
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7. 2.
νομικῶς.
‘After the manner of a law,’ i. e. ἐν τύπῳ explained by the words which follow.

tὰ μὲν ἡδικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δὲ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ πιθέντες.
These distinctions are but feebly represented by modern styles; the first is in some degree analogous to sacred music, the second to military music, and the third to the music of the dance.

πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος,
sc. τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ τῶν μελῶν.

7. 3.
τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, τῶν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῖς περὶ
ποιητικῆς ἔρουμεν σαφέστερον.
This promise is very imperfectly fulfilled in the short allusion to κάθαρσις in Poet. c. 6.

dιὸ ταῖς μὲν τουλίταις ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τουλίταις μέλεσι θετέω τοσί τὴν τὴν
θεατρικῆς μουσικῆς μεταχειριζόμενος ἀγωνιστέας.
‘Therefore it is for such harmonies and for such melodies that we must establish the competitions of musical performers,’ i. e. we must leave such strains of art to regular performers.

7. 7.
παρακριβευμένα.
παρακρίσεις are explained to mean ‘deviations from the received scale in music.’

7. 9.
ὁ δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρονιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει
μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμᾶσα τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν αὐλῶν.
This criticism of Plato appears to be just.

καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἔγκειρήσας ἐν τῇ δωριστὶ παιῶν διδόμεθα τοῖς τοῖς
μέθοδοι.
The emendation Μῦσουs (adopted by Bekker in his 2nd edition) is unnecessary. The words may also mean ‘to compose a dithyramb called the “Fables.”’ Whether fables could be written in a dithyrambic form or not, the difficulty which Philoxenus experienced was of another kind: what he found hopeless was the
attempt to compose dithyrambic poetry adapted to the severe Dorian music.

7. 15. δῆλον ὅτι τούτους δρονε τρεῖς
is abruptly expressed and possibly something may be omitted. The general meaning is 'that if there be a harmony suited to the young it must be tested by the three principles of education; the mean, the possible, the becoming.'

7. 15. Without assuming that Aristotle wrote a complete treatise on the subject of education, in which he includes gymnastic, music, drawing, and literature (cp. c. 3. § 1), it is hard to imagine that, if the work had received from his hands its present form, he would have broken off in this abrupt manner.
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